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Abstract 
This dissertation studies the contribution of sovereign wealth funds to the management of fiscal revenues 
derived from the extraction of natural resources. The literature on the “resource curse” has increasingly 
identified the institutional and political-economic foundations of the observed cross-country variation in 
the management of resource revenues. This literature has found the quality of general (or “meta”) 
institutions – such as the rule of law, democracy, government accountability and low levels of corruption – 
to be a critical differentiating factor in determining the success and failure of resource revenue 
management. The growing consensus around this argument – particularly the recent emphasis on “initial 
institutions” (the institutional quality at the time of resource discovery) – is noteworthy given the dismissal 
of the importance of institutions in the early resource-curse literature. From a policy perspective, however, 
a more productive line of enquiry pertains not to institutions at the general level, but to institutional 
responses to political-economy problems directly related to the management of resource revenues.   
Using the tools of institutional economics, the dissertation analyses the governance of sovereign wealth 
funds and the fiscal frameworks that accompany them. An evaluation of leading sovereign wealth funds 
and their fiscal rules is presented, as well as an empirical assessment of the impact of various fiscal rules in 
a number of illustrative country cases. The full embrace of the sovereign wealth fund model requires an 
often-elaborate institutional infrastructure to govern the policies and operations of independent 
operational investment authorities tasked with managing the assets. The dissertation therefore assesses 
the institutional arrangements between the owners and managers of the sovereign wealth fund, and a set 
rule-based investment policies through which to manage the principal-agent relationship established by 
the delegation of authority to an independent investment manager.  
It is contended that sovereign wealth funds can address a number of these specific political-economy and 
institutional problems, even in the context of relatively poor general institutions. A central argument 
advanced in the dissertation is that sovereign wealth funds alone have limited effectiveness, and that they 
should therefore form part of a broader fiscal framework that is rule based, constraining and 
countercyclical. The model of institutional reform developed here can be described as incremental or 
piecemeal. Considerable attention is paid to “second-best institutions”, particularly in the areas of fiscal 
rules and asset allocation, as intermediate steps towards more complex institutional arrangements.  
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Opsomming 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die bydrae van sowereine welvaartfondse tot die bestuur van fiskale 
inkomste uit die ontgunning van natuurlike hulpbronne. Die literatuur aangaande die “hulpbronvloek” 
indentifiseer toenemend die institusionele en politiek-ekonomiese grondslag van die variasie tussen lande 
in terme van die bestuur van hulpbron-inkomste. Hierdie literatuur dui toenemend op die kwaliteit van 
algemene (of “meta”) institusies – die oppergesag van die reg, demokrasie, publieke verantwoording, en lae 
vlakke van korrupsie – as ‘n kritiese onderskeidende faktor in die sukses en mislukking rondom die bestuur 
van hulpbron inkomstes. Die groeiende konsensus rondom hierdie argument - veral die onlangse klem op 
die gehalte van institusies ten tyde van hulpbron-ontdekking) – is opmerklik gegewe die ontslag van die 
belangrikheid van institusies in die vroeë literatuur. Vanuit 'n beleidsoogpunt is 'n meer produktiewe lyn 
van ondersoek egter een wat betrekking het op spesifieke institusionele reaksies tot politiek-ekonomiese 
probleme wat direk verband hou met die bestuur van hulpbron inkomste. 
Hierdie proefskrif gebruik die lens van institusionele ekonomie om die bestuur van soewereinewelvaart 
fondse en hul fiskale raamwerke te ontlleed. ‘n Bespreking van vooraanstande soewereine welvaartfondse 
en hul fiskale reëls word aangebied, sowel as 'n empiriese evaluering van die impak van verskillende fiskale 
reëls in 'n aantal lande. Die volledige “soewereine welvaartfonds-model” vereis ‘n dikwels-omvattende 
institusionele raamwerk rondom die beleid en bestuur van onafhanklike owerhede wat belas word met die 
belegging van die fonds se bates. Die proefskrif beoordeel vervolgens die institusionele reëlings tussen 
eienaars en bestuurders van soewereine welvaartfondse, en die rol 'n reël-gebaseerde beleggingsbeleid in 
die bestuur van hierdie verhouding.   
Dit word in hierdie proefskrif aangevoer dat soewereine welvaartfondse 'n aantal van hierdie spesifieke 
politiek-ekonomie en institusionele probleme kan aanspreek, selfs in die konteks van relatief swak 
algemene institusies. ‘n Sentrale argument wat aangevoer word is dat soewereine welvaartfondse alleen 'n 
beperkte effektiwiteit het, en dat hulle dus gesien word as deel van ‘n breër fiskaleraamwerk wat 
reëlgebaseerde, beperkende en anti-siklies is. Die model van institusionele hervorming wat hier ontwikkel 
word kan beskryf word as ‘n inkrementele of geleidelike proses. Aansienlike aandag word geskenk aan die 
konsep van “tweede-beste instellings”, veral op die gebied van fiskale reëls en beleggingsstrategie, as 
intermediêre stappe in die rigting van meer komplekse institusionele strukture. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation offers an institutional analysis of the sovereign wealth fund model for managing resource 
revenues. The increasing appeal of sovereign wealth funds is reflected not only in the growth in assets 
under their collective management, a number for which credible estimates vary between $6.5 trillion and 
$8.3 trillion (as of the end of 2015), but also in the proliferation of new funds. While the origins of the oldest 
sovereign wealth funds can be traced back to the mid-19th century and many of the largest and most 
famous of these funds emerged in the Middle East during the oil boom of the late-1970s, an acceleration in 
the establishment of new funds occurred around the dawn of the 21st century.  
Despite their increasing popularity and prominence, the literature has struggled to arrive at a satisfactory 
definition of sovereign wealth funds. This reflects, in part, the diversity of the sovereign wealth fund 
landscape, which features institutions with a variety of funding sources (notably resource revenue 
windfalls and excess foreign exchange reserves) and operational models; as well as a myriad of objectives, 
including macroeconomic stabilisation, saving, income and wealth diversification, and the funding of 
developmental projects. In this dissertation, the focus in firmly on sovereign wealth funds that are funded 
through natural resource revenues.  
A central argument advanced in this dissertation is that the full – and most fruitful – embrace of the 
sovereign wealth fund model in resource-rich countries requires more than the mere establishment of a 
portfolio of financial assets funded from resource revenues. Rather, the sovereign wealth fund model is 
best understood as a component of a credible, counter-cyclical rule-based fiscal framework for resource 
revenues. The sovereign wealth fund model contributes significantly to improved economic performance 
if it is embedded in a system of rules that govern the flow of resource revenues into the fund and the flow 
of assets and income out of the sovereign wealth funds (variously designed). Finally, the principal-agent 
relationships involved in the delegated authority around the management of sovereign investment 
institutions, requires another set of rules and institutions that are the subject of the final part of the 
dissertation.  
The analysis of the sovereign wealth fund model through an institutional lens proceeds from a particular 
reading of the literature on the relationship between natural resources and economic performance – also 
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known as the resource-curse literature. A careful reading of this literature underlines the historic and 
cross-sectional variation in economic performance of resource economies. Simply put, evidence for the 
resource-curse hypothesis is suggestive rather than conclusive. Indeed, the initially uncritical empirical 
support for the resource curse has been reassessed in light of various measurement problems identified in 
the literature (as discussed in Chapter 1) 
The result has been a much more conditional acceptance of the resource-curse hypothesis, in particular 
one that emphasises the central importance of institutions in determining whether resource wealth 
promotes or undermines economic growth in the long run. At the same time, it is argued in this 
dissertation (in line with recent scholarship on the resource curse) that the understanding of “institutions” 
in this context remains rather general. A fruitful line of enquiry is suggested in which the focus is on the 
cluster of institutional and policy reforms located around the management of the fiscal revenues generated 
from the extraction of natural resources. This dissertation presents the sovereign wealth fund model and 
its most critical components, as described above, as exactly this type of targetted institutional reform. 
A dominant question in the debates around sovereign wealth funds – which is also reflected in the 
literature on the role of institutions in the resource-curse dynamic (and, indeed in the literature on 
institutions and economic prosperity more generally) – pertains to the sequencing of institutional reforms. 
One argument suggests that targetted institutional reforms are either unlikely to occur or succeed in the 
context of weak general institutions. An alternative view is more sympathetic to the potential contribution 
of piecemeal or incremental institutional reform. Naturally, a generally supportive institutional context 
increases the odds that sound and durable institutions for the management of resource revenues will 
emerge; however, many resource-rich countries are not characterised by a general institutional 
environment conducive to economic prosperity. Yet sovereign wealth funds and fiscal rules for natural 
resource revenues appear to have contributed to ameliorating a number of the common afflictions 
associated with the resource curse.  
Also of relevance to this discussion is evidence that the emergence of resource revenue windfalls tend to be 
associated with a subsequent deterioration in institutional quality. This raises the possibility that 
targetted reforms around the management of resource revenues, particularly in new resource producers 
without an inherited institutional structure that has been shaped by a long history of resource production, 
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can contribute to avoiding a dynamic that might otherwise result in a further deterioration of institutions. 
Finally, it is far from the case that economies with otherwise sound institutions are in some way inoculated 
from the emergence of weak institutions for the management of resource revenues. This dissertation 
identifies aspects of the institutional arrangements for sovereign wealth funds and resource revenues in the 
likes of Norway, Alberta, Chile, Alaska and Wyoming that require reform – or at least have room for 
improvement. It is argued that the generally supportive view of the prospect for piecemeal institutional 
reform advanced in this dissertation is in keeping with a number of influential traditions in institutional 
economics, notably the strand of New Institutional Economics pioneered by Douglass North. A dynamic 
or evolutionary understanding of institutions, and a more sympathetic view of gradual institutional 
reform, also strengthens the case for what Rodrik (2008) referred to as “second-best institutions”. 
Particularly in the areas of fiscal rules and long-term asset allocation considerable attention is paid to sub-
optimal rules that have the advantage of simplicity and can serve as an intermediate steps towards more 
complex institutional arrangements. 
In adopting a comprehensive view of the sovereign wealth fund model, which includes its fiscal rules and 
institutional arrangements that govern its agency relationships, it becomes ever more important to 
appreciate the diversity in both the form and function of sovereign wealth funds (even within the sub-
category of resource-based funds), which includes: fiscal stabilisation funds, future-generations saving 
funds, investment-income (or permanent) funds, and increasingly popular and multi-faceted sovereign 
development funds. As with most institutions, sovereign wealth funds are neither normatively or positively 
“one-size-fits-all solutions”. There is significant scope for tailoring sovereign wealth funds’ functions and 
their consequent saving and spending policies to meet local requirements, based on the economic (and 
political) realities. Criticisms of sovereign wealth funds tend to underestimate the degree of nuance and 
variation in the sovereign wealth fund model; as well as the extent to which resource-based sovereign 
wealth funds are designed to directly and indirectly address common afflictions associated with the 
resource curse.  
Having argued that the successful adoption of the sovereign wealth fund model situates the fund within a 
rule-based fiscal framework, the dissertation devotes an entire section to normative and positive 
assessments of fiscal rules. This section distinguishes between saving rules that govern the flow of 
resource revenues into sovereign wealth funds, and spending rules that determine the transfer of these 
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funds’ assets and investment income to the budget (or other earmarked purposes). In practice, sovereign 
wealth funds’ saving and spending policies tend to be only loosely integrated with their host governments’ 
overall fiscal framework. A more typical arrangement is to combine either ad hoc or mechanistic savings 
rules with simple spending rules for investment-income funds and poorly designed (and typically ad hoc) 
transfers from stabilisation funds.  
The dissertation presents a positive and normative assessment of fiscal rules for sovereign wealth funds, 
based on both qualitative and quantitative analysis. In the vein of second-best institutions, a number of 
simple, mechanistic savings rules are described and analysed. These rules are clearly sub-optimal, as the 
discussion of their shortcomings reveals. However, they are an improvement on the alternative of simply 
consuming resource revenues as they arise, and therefore being subjected to the considerable volatility 
inherent to commodity price and production cycles. The use of simple, easy-to-communicate and –enforce 
saving rules are presented as a possible interim institutional response to the management of resource 
windfalls that may fruitfully precede a transition to a more complex and integrated fiscal framework for 
resource revenue and sovereign wealth fund assets. An example of such a complex, integrated fiscal rule is 
also discussed in the dissertation, and quantitatively evaluated through an application to five illustrative 
country cases (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Ghana, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia).   
The institutional arrangements or governance of the fiscal rule are often overlooked in the literature and 
policy debates on sovereign wealth funds. Even the best-designed rule-based fiscal framework for resource 
revenues and sovereign wealth funds can be undermined by weak institutional arrangements. A key 
objective of the governance of the fiscal rule is to move critical decisions in the management of finite and 
volatile resource revenues out of the realm of in-period politics to the level of constitutional politics. The 
discussion of sovereign wealth funds’ fiscal rules reveals a wide range of institutional mechanisms through 
which this is achieved, ranging from constitutional mandates to legislative statues to presidential decrees 
to elements of custom (or informal institutions). Three models that have achieved some measure of 
success and durability provide valuable insights into the specification and governance of fiscal rules for 
managing resource revenues and sovereign wealth fund assets and income. Norway emerges as an 
example where the fiscal rule is governed through consensus and custom, Chile as one that champions the 
contributions of technocratic expertise, and the American state endowment model as one in which the 
fiscal rule is hardwired into in constitution (albeit in an incomplete manner).  
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The final section of the dissertation focuses on the institutional aspects of the sovereign wealth fund 
model that pertain to the investment function, particularly various layers of delegated investment authority 
typically involved in this part of model. The section considers why and how to achieve a degree of 
operational independence from government for an investment management authority, how to clarify the 
roles and responsibilities of the various principals and agents involved in the delegated-authority model of 
investment, and how the governance and performance of the investment authority may be strengthened by 
transparency, accountability and an embrace of rule-based investment policies. 
Having restated and elaborated on the case for operational independence in the management of long-term 
sovereign investment portfolios, the institutional question considered in this section deals with a familiar 
tension in public policy: balancing the desire for assigning operational independence to a technocratic 
institution (in this case, the investment authority of the sovereign wealth fund) with a degree of 
government control and oversight of such delegated authority. While the case for operational 
independence rests on compelling foundations in the case of sovereign wealth funds – including improved 
investment performance, addressing fears of a regulatory backlash from recipient countries, a desire to 
escape from public-sector pay scales to attract and cultivate internal human capital, and the political ring 
fencing of assets – the analysis indicates that independence is typically (and appropriately) a matter of 
degree. Independence is never absolute, and the exercise of discretionary powers by delegated sovereign 
investment authorities should be constrained by clearly articulated rules and demands for transparency 
and accountability.  
The dissertation advances a qualified argument in favour of the role the sovereign wealth fund model can 
play in the management of resource revenues. This conclusion is premised on the understanding that 
sovereign wealth funds are embedded in a rule-based fiscal framework and institutional framework. The 
potential contribution of sovereign wealth funds, particularly when narrowly defined as a portfolio of 
assets funded from a resource revenue windfall, should not be overstated. However, when accompanied 
by supporting fiscal rules and a sound institutional structure for the management of agency relationships 
that arise from delegated authority, the sovereign wealth fund model is a promising targetted institutional 
intervention to the widely understood problems of resource economies. 
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SECTION I 
AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON RESOURCE ECONOMIES 
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Chapter 1  
The most disadvantageous lottery in the world:  
Historic controversies around natural resources and economic prosperity 
The anticipated and observed consequences of natural resource wealth on economic prosperity have 
preoccupied economists for centuries. At first glance, that there is any controversy around the question is 
counterintuitive: natural resources are an essential factor of production that generate massive economic 
rents for their owners and extractors, while the scarcity of essential minerals, metals and fossil fuels would 
seemingly confer great economic advantage on the societies in which they are located. Yet, the existence of 
a natural resource curse – however qualified and substantiated – has become increasingly supported by 
the weight of empirical evidence. The laments of political leaders capture the melancholy surrounding the 
economic history of resource rich countries: Ahmed Zaki Yamaani, the former oil minister of Saudi 
Arabia, once said of the Kingdom’s vast wealth of hydrocarbons, “all in all, I wish we had discovered 
water”; while Kenneth Kaunda, the long-serving first president of Zambia, suggested his country’s 
economic failures were due to “the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our mouths.”1 
Speculation about the contribution of natural wealth to the quest for economic prosperity have been part 
of economics since the emergence of the discipline. The Physiocrats, for example, espoused the centrality 
of agrarian production in societal and material progress. By contrast, Mercantilists of the same era 
emphasised the accumulation of wealth derived from nature in the form of precious metals, notably silver, 
accumulated through a positive balance from trade or the abundance of natural deposits of silver and 
other precious metals. Adam Smith disagreed. In his analysis, the wealth of a nation derived from 
productivity-enhancing specialisation with cooperation through markets. He argued that an undue 
obsession with resources may undermine the development of what he called a “commercial society.” 
Intellectual notions about the relationship between natural resources in economic progress do not emerge 
in a vacuum, but are bound by the emerging economic realities of the periods in which they are 
formulated. The narrative in this chapter described the intellectual consensus around natural resources 
shifts in line with four modern economic epochs: the Early Modern Era, the Industrial Revolution, the 
1 The Yamaani quote is from Ross (1999) and the Kuanda quoted in from an article in Africa Record, January – 
February (1978): 34. 
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post-War period and the aftermath of the oil shocks in the late-1970s (the latter culminating in the 
emergence of the resource-curse hypothesis).  
In the industrial revolutions in north-western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries technological advances 
changed the role of natural resources in economic production, as coal, steel and timber became a lifeblood 
of economic transformation – a shift that shaped intellectual traditions on the subject of these resources’ 
role in economic progress. The post-War period, marked by ever-increasing global trade in commodities 
and a proliferation of new producers of minerals, fuels and metals from the developing world, again 
shifting thinking on the subject.  In this period, the high-modernist development economists of the 1950s 
and early 1960s held a generally favourable view of resources, albeit as a stepping-stone towards rapid 
industrialisation and modernisation, particularly in the context of newfound, post-colonial independence.  
Finally, whereas earlier arguments tended to place natural resources within broader theories of economic 
transformation, the oil-price shocks of the 1970s shifted the focus more specifically to the possibly direct 
and dominant role resources may play in economic progress – or, more accurately, the failure to achieve 
such progress. The disappointing economic performance of commodity-rich economies (relative both to 
expectations and that of comparatively resource-poor economies, notably in East Asia) since the late-1970s 
provides the historical context for the emergence of what may now be called the resource-curse literature, 
with its proliferation of economic, institutional and political theories, and frequently contradictory 
empirical evidence. 
1 .1 .  Such strange delusions: natural resources in the Early Modern and Industrial Ages 
In intellectual traditions predating the ages of the Industrial Revolution, conceptions of natural resource 
wealth were synonymous with the relative ease of agricultural production. Generally, these traditions 
regarded favourable agricultural conditions and agrarian productivity were regarded as obviously 
conducive to economic and social wellbeing. The Physiocrats, the first économistes, who greatly 
influenced Adam Smith, famously extolled the virtues of agrarian productivity as the cornerstone progress 
– on occasion to the point of treating them as synonymous. An exception to this tendency is found in the
more moralistic view of wealth too easily gained from bountiful natural endowments. Jean Bodin, the 
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prominent 16th century French political philosopher and jurist, embodied this view, warning that “Men of 
a fat and fertile soil are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren country 
makes men temperate by necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant, and industrious” (Bodin, 1576). 
In the Enlightenment, natural wealth however assumed a broader meaning beyond agriculture. The 
bullionists who held sway over economic thinking at the height of the Mercantilism saw in national 
stockpiles of silver and other rare metals the reflection of national wealth. The moral philosophers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, notably David Hume and Adam Smith, held a more qualified view of natural 
wealth, in which the argument against the bullionist obsession with rare metals as a measure of wealth 
was one of the central lines of their attack on that particular strand of Mercantilist logic. While 
acknowledging the motivational significance (and frequent futility) of the quest for silver and gold to the 
Iberian colonial expansion during the Age of Discovery, and the extent to which the promise of bountiful 
raw materials underwrote successive European nations’ expansion into the New World, Smith was 
ultimately deeply critical of the irrationality that accompanied the pursuit of such wealth. “The same 
passion which has suggested to so many people the absurd idea of the philosopher’s stone,” Smith 
(1776[1981]: 563) argued, “has suggested to others the equally absurd one of immense rich mines of gold 
and silver.” Referring to Sir Walter Raleigh’s fixation with the mythical city of El Dorado,2 Smith argued 
that so strong was the lure of mineral riches, that “even wise men are not always exempt from such strange 
delusions.” 
Adam Smith’s scepticism over the imperialist quest for mineral riches extended to the profitability of 
mining. No economic enterprise was “more perfectly ruinous than the search after new silver and gold 
mines” – indeed, for Smith, mining constituted “the most disadvantageous lottery in the world [in which] 
the common price of a ticket is the whole fortune of a very rich man” (Smith (1776[1981]: 562). Smith’s most 
prescient insight on the subject of natural resources may be the more abstract notion that obsessive efforts 
to accumulate commodities at the expense of others can be a distraction from what are ultimately more 
productive economic endeavors – an early version of the rent-seeking argument that has been applied with 
increasing frequency and success to the case of resource-rich countries (as discussed in Chapter 3). Smith 
also understood that even when economic actors had an a priori understanding that “the wealth of a 
2 The myth of El Dorado, where mineral wealth was so bountiful that the Muiscan king covered the entire city (and 
himself) in gold, is a symbol for elusive social utopianism in Candide, a satirical novella by Voltaire. 
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country consists, not in its gold and silver only, but in its lands, houses, and consumable goods of all 
different kinds”; once confronted with resource abundance, “the lands, houses, and consumable goods, 
seem to slip out of their memory; and the strain of their argument frequently supposes that all wealth 
consists in gold and silver, and that to multiply those metals is the great object of national industry and 
commerce” (Smith (1776[1981]: 429). Late-20th century scholars would observe a similarly slippery grasp of 
prudence in the fact of large discoveries and realisations of resource wealth in their theories of 
“procyclicality” and “dynamic inconsistency” in the political economy of the resource curse. 
By the age of the industrial revolutions in Britain, Western Europe and America, the concept of natural 
wealth had again shifted, drawing increasingly on the direct industrial uses of commodities, especially 
fossil fuels and cotton (and later steel, copper and rubber). Contemporary observers and subsequent 
scholarship identified access to proximate natural resources as an unambiguous boon, and possibility a 
prerequisite, for economic development and industrialisation in this era. The relative ease with which 
Western European nations accessed supplies of coal, steel, timber and peat – from domestic deposits, as 
well as peripheral areas (such as the Baltics) and colonies – has been advanced by some scholars as a (or 
perhaps the) critical factor in determining to why the industrial revolution occurred there, rather than in 
other comparatively advanced societies of the time period. This influential argument for the centrality of 
abundant coal supplies as an explanation for why the industrial revolution occurred in Britain dates back 
to the work of William Stanley Jevons (1865).3  
At the same time, agricultural abundance, rather than access to industrial resources, remained a popular 
explanation for economic backwardness. The “bountiful tropics” thesis – the argument that societies 
stagnated when agricultural conditions were too easy, negating the need for investments in productivity-
enhancing technologies – became one of the most pervasive narratives in European accounts of the 
economic status of other regions. So prevalent was the bountiful tropics thesis by the mid-19th century, 
that Marx invokes it without much qualification or context in Das Kapital (1867) as the sole explanation 
for the failure of capitalist development in the tropics: “Where nature is too lavish, she keeps him in hand, 
like a child in leading-strings. She does not impose upon him any necessity to develop himself” (Marx, 
1867[1967]: 513).  
3 For authoritative accounts of this argument, as well as extensions to the industrialisation and economic ascendance 
of the United States, see Habakkuk (1962), Wright (1990), and Wright and Czelusta (2004 and 2007). 
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While abundant natural resources, or at least access to them from proximate locations, almost certainly 
constituted a necessary condition for early industrial take-off, there has for centuries been an 
accompanying scepticism over the effects of resource wealth on economic and social progress. There is a 
thread connecting Bodin’s warnings over “men of fat and fertile lands”, Adam Smith’s disdain for 
Mercantilist obsessions with the accumulation of precious metals, the bountiful tropics thesis, and indeed 
the late 20th century literature on the resource curse discussed below. It is the notion that that wealth too 
easily gained from the earth can just as readily reduce the incentives for toil, innovation and prudence, that 
provide the key to enduring prosperity. 
1 .2.  Escaping backwardness: natural resources in post-war development economics 
The increase in the global trade in commodities in the late-19th century made the proximity-to-resources 
argument less relevant in debates over the role of resources in economic development. In the United 
States, trade in agricultural goods increasingly migrated towards formal exchanges, such as the Chicago 
Board of Trade and the New York Mercantile Exchange, in order to facilitate more efficient price 
discovery, risk management (including through the trading of options and futures) and information 
sharing. Gradually, this mode of trade and market exchange became the norm across agricultural and 
non-agricultural commodities. On the demand side, rapid economic growth and international trade 
supported the expansion of global commodities trading and production.  
The interwar and post-war periods in particular heralded periods of high demand and trade in natural 
resources, driven by energy- and resource-intensive growth patterns, the rise of the use of the automobile 
and post-war reconstruction efforts. Persistent breakthroughs in transportation (notably, the use of “super 
tankers”, capable of transporting more than 3 million barrels of oil), technology and infrastructure (both 
physical and financial) promoted seemingly inexorable growth in international commodities trading, and 
completely globalised the supply and demand dynamics of most natural resources (World Trade 
Organisation, 2010). 
Of particular importance to the evolution of the literature on resources and economic development is the 
emergence during this period of a large number of developing countries as global suppliers of primary 
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products and traded commodities, particularly since the 1950s. Natural resources featured prominently in 
the grand theories of economic development that emerged after the Second World War. The “modern 
development economics” of this period, saw the rapid modernisation of poor countries as a distinct 
challenge and intellectual project, providing a fertile breeding ground for new scholarship on the role of 
natural resources in economic development.  
All the seminal contributors of this period – by the likes of Walt Rostow, Albert Hirschman, Hans Singer, 
Raul Prebisch, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurkse and Arthur Lewis – addressed the role of the 
natural resource sector in relation to broader economic development and modernisation. While offering 
contrasting views of the means and pace through which modernisation was to be achieved, these theories 
had in common the view that the key to economic development lay in moving away from the backward 
economic undertaking of extracting primary goods towards modern industry, characterised by higher 
skills, productivity and real wages.  Most of these modern development theories – still under the 
impression of the role of coal, steel and other industrial resources in the industrialisation of Europe and, 
subsequently, the United States – regarded abundant resources is a positive catalyst or starting point for 
economic development.  
Walt Rostow’s influential stages-of-growth theory (1960), with its central focus on investment and capital 
accumulation, viewed primary goods extraction as the most basic – or, in his words, “backward” – modes 
of economic production. However, resource abundance would be critical to mobilising the requisite 
savings, investment and capital formation to advance through – and possibly leapfrog – predetermined 
stages of economic development. Both the positive and normative dimensions of Arthur Lewis’ similarly 
influential two-sector model of economic development were based on the importance of releasing surplus 
labour from the agrarian modes of production towards an urban, capitalist one (Lewis, 1954 and 1955). In 
Lewis’ view, this process could only be accelerated by an abundance of natural resources – indeed, his 
starting point was to show how poor countries could still industrialise even when they were relatively 
resource poor.  Following Rostow, Lewis understood an abundance of natural resources to be a means 
through which to affect this transition with greater ease.  
A more dirigiste view of how natural resources should advance the goal of rapid economic development 
and modernisation was contained in Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) “big push” model, further developed by 
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Nurske (1961). The big push called for state-directed investments funded by resource windfalls into other 
sectors of the economy that remained underdeveloped in order to achieve “balanced growth”. Rosenstein-
Rodan and Nurske argued that in the absence of massive, state-led investment, developing countries 
would get stuck in a low-equilibrium trap based on specialisation in resource production. As with Rostow 
and Lewis, models in the big push tradition did not, therefore, regard an abundance of resources as in any 
way detrimental to process of modernisation, for it merely strengthened the means through which to 
achieve balanced growth and modernisation and potentially sped up this process.  
Hirschman (1958), particularly through his emphasis on the “forward and backward linkages” between 
economic activities, held a somewhat more nuanced view of the role of the resources sector in economic 
development. In his view, certain primary sub-sectors, such as agriculture, had relatively few linkages and 
were therefore not conducive to sustained development; while others, such as steel, were characterised by 
a myriad of such linkages, which could help spur development and growth. Importantly, Hirschman, who 
cautioned against heavy-handed state planning and generally favoured gradual economic reform and 
change, opposed Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurske’s “big push” approach. Hirschman was more comfortable 
with what he regarded as inevitable periods of “unbalanced growth” and the piecemeal realisation of 
forward and backward linkages that may stem of the extraction of natural resources.  
The majority of first-wave of development economists of the 1950s, therefore, held a largely positive view 
of natural resources in relation to economic development, albeit as a potential catalyst for modernisation 
and industrialisation. For this reason, a broad consensus emerged in the 1950s that the comparatively 
resource-rich developing countries of Africa and Latin America faced better growth prospects and would 
achieve faster rates of economic convergence with the advanced economies that their counterparts in Asia 
(Easterly, 2001).  
A notable exception to this view was found in the work of Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch, two influential 
economic advisors to third-world countries and leading advocates of export-led industrialisation and, 
more specifically, import substitution as a means to achieve it and avoid the entrenchment of the 
dependent relationship developing countries had with their developed counterparts. Working 
independently of each other, Prebisch (1949 [1950]) and Singer (1950) observed that developing countries 
primarily exported natural resources (or “primary goods’). On the basis of this observation, what later 
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came to be known as the Singer-Prebisch thesis held that the terms of trade for primary-goods exporters 
would decline relative to those exporting manufactured goods.  
The argument was based more on an interpretation of historic price movements than on a detailed 
theoretical explanation: the most detailed theoretical argument for the Singer-Prebisch thesis was that the 
demand for manufactured goods was subject to higher income elasticity than that for primary products. 
Therefore, the authors argued, as global incomes rose, the demand for manufactured goods was expected 
to increase more rapidly than that for primary products, resulting in a long-run price differential that 
favoured the former.  
The Singer-Prebisch thesis is built around a testable hypothesis: the anticipated historical decline of 
commodity prices relative to other goods and services. While the empirical evidence on the long-term 
trend in global commodity prices is highly dependent on the specification of the sample period, there is 
little evidence of the secular decline Singer and Prebisch predicted (for discussions of the empirical 
evidence on historic commodity cycles, see Erten and Ocampo, 2013).4 As Frankel observes: 
“Studies written after the commodity price increases of the 1970s found an upward trend, but 
those written after the 1980s found a downward trend, even when both kinds of studies went back 
to the early 20th century. No doubt when studies using data through 2011 are completed some will 
again find a positive long run trend.” (Frankel, 2012: 24). 
4 While the once popular notion of general economic “super cycles” (often referred to as Kondratiev cycles after their 
pioneer, the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratiev) has been largely discredited, such arguments might remain 
relevant to commodity prices, where the demand-side for industrial commodities in particular is supported by slow-
moving, structural dynamics in the global economy, such as the post-war reconstruction of Europe and the 
industrialisation of China since the late 1970s – and where the supply response to positive price incentives take many 
years to reach the market (Erten and Ocampo, 2013).  
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Despite the fact that historical evidence has, therefore, not been kind to Singer-Prebisch thesis, it remains 
a noteworthy chapter in the historiography:5 in was the first in a long succession of arguments in the 
second half of the 21st century that supported the idea that resource wealth may be damaging to long-run 
economic prosperity. The Singer-Prebisch argument regarded natural resources not so much as a 
valuable geological gift, but rather as a developmental challenge that had to be overcome and actively 
counteracted through government policies.  
Figure 1 .1 :  Developing country  growth and resource exports:  1970 –  2008 
Sources: Penn World Tables and World Development Indicators 
5 The enduring interest in an idea that has so clearly been discredited is in part due to its influence on economic 
policies. The Singer-Prebisch hypothesis was embraced by the United Nations, particularly its Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, an organisation in which Singer and Prebisch held prominent advisory and 
leadership positions, respectively. Given the historic context in which the thesis gained prominence – on the cusp of 
the decolonialisation of large parts of Africa and Asia – its popularity with newly empowered independence leaders is 
unsurprising. The thesis appealed to nationalist notions of economic sovereignty, reduced dependence on (and 
exploitation by) a global economic “core” dominated by former colonial powers, and visions of rapid social and 
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As discussed below, this line of reasoning remains popular in much of the resource-curse literature. 
Sustaining interest in the possible developmental challenges due to resource wealth is the sharp 
divergence in economic fortunes of developing regions since the 1960s. Contrary to the predictions of the 
development economists of the 1950s, who viewed natural resources as a stepping stone to capital 
accumulation and industrialisation, it was a succession of comparatively resource-poor Asian countries, 
rather than the more resource-rich countries of the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, that emerged 
as the growth champions of the second half of the 20th century (see Figure 1.1).  
Given that this divergence occurred over a long sample period, which included significant up- and 
downswings in both the global commodity cycle and in the prices of individual commodities, it is clear 
that a secular decline in the relative price of commodities, as per the Singer-Prebisch thesis, cannot be to 
blame. Thus, “studies based on the post-war experience have argued that the curse of natural resources is 
a demonstrable empirical fact, even after controlling for trends in commodity prices” (Sachs and Warner, 
2001: 828; emphasis in original). The remainder of this chapter discusses the evolution of this large 
literature on the resource curse in the aftermath of the oil-price shocks of the late 1970s.  
1 .3.  The emergence of  Dutch disease 
The difficulties encountered by the majority of oil-exporting countries in capturing the benefits of the 
1970s oil-price shocks – and particularly adjusting to its aftermath, once prices collapsed in the 1980s – 
provided the impetus for a flood of new scholarship on the economic problems associated with resource 
abundance. The most enduringly influential work from this period theorised what subsequently became 
known as the “Dutch disease”. Corden and Neary (1982) are often credited with writing the seminal paper 
on the subject, but in fact their contribution was largely one of consolidating an already rapidly expanding 
theoretical literature, with critical earlier contributions by Van Wijnbergen (1981, 1984a and 1984b), 
Buiter and Purvis (1981), and Bruno and Sachs (1982).6 The Dutch disease theory, which has seen a 
6 Van Wijnbergen developed many of the original insights in his doctoral thesis at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, awarded in 1980 (some of the confusion over the credit for the Dutch disease theory relates to delays 
between the awarding of his PhD and the subsequent publication of articles from it in leading academic journals). 
The idea was, however, already being discussed in non-academic circles: the term “Dutch disease” was coined in an 
article in The Economist (1977) describing the dynamics that led to the decline of the manufacturing sector in the 
Netherlands after the discovery of an offshore natural gas field in 1959. 
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number of important refinements and adaptations, remains largely (and in most versions of the argument, 
solely) based on purely “economic” dynamics – that is, a theory that explains the underperformance of 
resource-rich countries in terms of fundamental market disequilibrium or market failure, without 
assigning a critical the role to politics and institutions. There are a number of subtle variations and 
elaborations within models in the Dutch disease tradition, but the common diagnosis of the disease 
involves the following symptoms: 
(i) The discovery of a resource endowment results in a large windfall of public and/or private 
revenues and a surge in total investment and spending in the domestic economy; 
(ii) A resultant shift in the allocation of capital and labour away from the traded-goods sector 
(where prices are set on the international market) occurs due to rising prices and more 
attractive returns in the non-tradable commodities, goods and services; 
(iii) Nominal and real frictions between the traded and non-traded sectors prevent them from 
clearing simultaneously, resulting in a real appreciation of the currency as prices rise in the 
non-tradable sector (relative to the internationally cleared tradable sector); 
(iv) Ultimately, these dynamics are self-reinforcing (i.e., that are characterised by positive 
feedback loops). If they continue long enough, a country either destroys its existing tradable 
manufacturing sector or fails to develop one in the first place. 
Even economists who agree with the Dutch disease story as described above have questioned whether 
this sequence of events necessarily constitutes a disease. Why, for example, can a country not specialise in 
the production and export of natural resources, while allowing its resource earnings to strengthen the 
exchange rate and allow for cheap manufacturing imports from abroad, while developing thriving 
domestic service and non-traded goods sector? Is this not the exploitation of resource-rich countries’ 
comparative advantage? The Dutch disease literature suggests a number of problems with this scenario.  
First, the short-term price volatility due to exogenous shocks (such as weather, conflict and other supply 
disruptions), medium-term cyclicality, and long-term uncertainty of commodity prices and production 
volumes (due to geological factors and changing technologies) all render a reliance on commodity exports 
to pay for imports destabilising across all time horizons. The specialise-and-trade strategy requires 
stability and a steady stream of earnings from the export of resources in order to finance its imports. In 
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practice, however, commodity prices and export earnings can be extremely volatile, causing significant 
balance-of-payments shocks and painful adjustments.7  
Second, a number of Dutch disease models attribute positive externalities and specific developmental 
benefits to the manufacturing or tradable sector. These models typically include the assumption that 
primary sectors have less scope for productivity growth, and less potential for the exploitation of 
increasing returns to scale than the manufacturing (traded) sectors (Van Wijnbergen, 1984a and 1984b, 
Krugman, 1987 and Matsuyama, 1992). Another common element is that the manufacturing sector is more 
labour intensive (particularly at the early stages of development) than the primary sectors, implying the 
desirability of manufacturing from promoting full employment. “The Dutch disease can be a real disease – 
and a source of chronic slow growth,” Sachs and Warner (1997) note, “if there is something special about 
the sources of growth in manufacturing.”8 An abundance of natural resources can, therefore, be a curse if 
the manufacturing sector is modelled under non-neoclassical assumptions.  
1 .4.  The resource-curse hypothesis:  weak- and strong-form and early evidence 
Dutch disease models are essentially stories about what happens to an economy’s competiveness and 
internal resource allocation under conditions of a commodities boom. That is, of course, one half of the 
story – typically, the more obviously disconcerting second half follows when the boom turns to bust. 
While the theoretical work on the dynamics of the Dutch disease continued to expand over the course of 
the 1980s in response to the dramatic rise in oil prices at end of the preceding decade, the subsequent 
collapse – during which oil markets remained vastly oversupplied for more than a decade and prices 
slumped to below $10 per barrel in the mid-1980s – provided further impetus for scholarship of the long-
run relationship between resources and economic development.  
7 The volatility and uncertainty of natural resource prices and indeed a number of key macroeconomic aggregates in 
resource-dependent countries are popular explanations for the resource curse in their own right, without integrating 
volatility and uncertainty into a broader Dutch disease model (Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). 
8 Sachs and Warner (2001) acknowledge that the assumption of higher positive externalities in the manufacturing 
sector is based mostly on broad observations, rather than on “micro-level evidence” and “Therefore it remains 
somewhat speculative.” Another non-neoclassical assumption is the implicit or explicit belief that resource producers 
face credit constraints that prevent them from borrowing during unanticipated drops in resource revenues.  
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By the early-1990s, the adverse consequences of the poor management of resource booms and busts for 
economic performance were sufficiently apparent that the resource-curse hypothesis was formulated and 
increasingly accepted as received wisdom.9 In its simplest articulation, the resource curse simply posits 
formally that a large endowment of natural resources can be detrimental to economic prosperity, 
particularly in the long run. The strong-form version suggests that an abundance of natural resources 
results in lower growth than what would have been observed in the absence of such resources, either for a 
specific country or on average across countries. The weak form holds that although growth might still be 
positive in resource-abundant economies, it is sub-optimal (for example, lower than that predicted by a 
standard economic growth model).  
The term “resource curse” is most frequently attributed to Richard Auty (1993), although an explicit link 
between resources and the idea of a “curse” was made five years earlier in a World Bank volume, Oil 
Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? (Gelb, 1988). The latter study analysed the extent to which a number of oil-
producing developing countries had squandered an unprecedented positive terms-of-trade shock and the 
fiscal windfall that accompanied it. Gelb calculated that the countries in his study had consumed around 
two-thirds of these windfalls, with around half of revenues being invested in domestic public investment 
projects. Despite this massive increase in investment, “From 1974 to 1981 average growth rates were well 
below what would have been predicted by a simple neoclassical model, given the size of the investment 
boom…Growth rates were even further below what would have been predicted by theories of capital- or 
foreign-exchange-constrained growth.” This led Gelb to conclude: “oil exporters ended the period worse 
off than they would have been with a far lower, more predictable rate of increase in oil prices or, indeed, 
with constant real oil prices” (Gelb, 1988: 136).  
Gelb’s contribution is seminal in the resource-curse literature, not least because it underlines the 
importance of the weak form of the resource-curse hypothesis, as articulated above. From a long-term 
perspective, the question should not simply be whether resource-rich countries register positive growth 
rates in the aftermath of positive terms-of-trade or revenue shocks; or, whether they grow faster than 
9 The resource curse literature has been surveyed extensively elsewhere. Torvik (2009) and Frankel (2012) provide 
extensive accounts of leading theories, empirical evidence and policy proposals around the resource curse. Van der 
Ploeg’s (2011) survey is more narrowly confined to formal economic models explaining the resource curse, while Ross 
(1999) and Collier (2010a) assess arguments that focus on institutional and political economy explanations. 
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comparable countries with fewer resources. Given the massive increases in public investment and 
consumption that resource-rich countries generally experience following such booms, it is hardly 
surprising to observe higher growth rates than before the boom.  
The deeper question, implied in the weak form of resource curse hypothesis, is whether resource-rich 
countries enjoy the kind of economic benefits that may reasonably be expected from the spending and 
public investment financed by resource windfalls; and whether resource-based growth dynamics can be 
sustained. Testing the weak form of the resource-curse thesis requires a comparison between observed 
economic outcomes (which may appear positive) and a notional or modelled, but ultimately unobservable, 
counterfactual. This presents measurement and epistemological challenges. However, as Frankel (2012: 
19) concludes: “That resource wealth does not in itself confer good economic performance is a striking
enough phenomenon, without exaggerating the negative effects.” 
After this period of largely theoretical advances in the literature on the resource curse, empirical support 
followed alongside a major development in the broader evolution of the macroeconomics of economic 
growth: namely, the use of “growth regressions”. This research, with seminal contributions from Barro 
(1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), attempted to identify the determinants of GDP growth in 
large cross-country samples, by regressing long-run growth on a set of determinants proposed in leading 
growth theories (such as savings rates, population growth, educational attainment, openness to trade and 
so forth). Sachs and Warner’s (1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001) contribution was to show that resource wealth – 
measured as the share of resource in total exports (which, as discussed below, would later prove to be 
problematic) – was correlated with lower economic growth, controlling for structural, other geographic 
and institutional attributes.10 As such, they were the first authors to “confirm the adverse effects of resource 
abundance on growth on the basis of a worldwide, comparative study of growth.” Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
provided additional support for this finding by identifying natural resource abundance as one of the ten 
most robust variables from (literally) millions of alternative growth-regression specifications. These 
findings had a profound effect on strengthening the intellectual support for the resource-curse thesis, and 
therefore remains one of the important papers in the literature.  
10 Sachs and Warner are famous for advancing an understanding of a broad range geographic factors as critical to 
growth, including countries’ latitudinal position (typically measure as distance of the capitol from the tropics, which 
they argue provides a good proxy for susceptibility to debilitating tropical diseases) and direct access to coastline. 
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The impact of these results was compounded by the authors’ claim that natural resource abundance not 
only failed to have a positive effect on growth, but in fact that its effect was negative – that is, the 
statistically significant coefficient on the resources-abundance regressor was negative, rather than just not 
statistically significant. Unlike Gelb (1988), Sachs and Warner’s arguments amount to the strong form of 
the resource curse thesis: resource abundance is a curse, rather than something akin to the squandered 
opportunity identified by Gelb. This distinction between the strong- and weak-form versions of the 
resource curse hypothesis (and the fact that their finding was supporting the former), was explicitly 
addressed by Sachs and Warner in a subsequent paper: “[If] all that was happening was that the resource 
rents were consumed rather than invested, or that the investment that was done yielded low returns, then 
the path of GDP in natural resource abundant economies would be lower than it would have been in the 
same economies with optimal policies,” Sachs and Warner (1997: 10) noted. “But such economies would 
not necessarily grow slower than other resource-poor economies. In other words, to explain the negative 
association we find…there must be something else going on beyond wasteful policies” (emphasis in the 
original). While their contribution was an empirical one, Sachs and Warner (1999) briefly discussed 
possible theoretical explanations for their famous finding by tentatively invoking the Dutch disease theory 
(to which Sachs had already contributed), although they “remain[ed] open to other explanations”. 
The Sachs and Warner work has not escaped controversy around issues of measurement and 
methodology. The first line of criticism was that the findings might be subject to omitted variable bias. 
However, having provided regression evidence supporting the resource curse after controlling for popular 
variables favoured by four other empirical growth studies (including measures of initial income, 
macroeconomic policy, institutional quality, geography and education levels) in the original paper, an 
updated version, Sachs and Warner (1997), showed that their original finding survived the inclusion of 
nine additional regressors under multiple specifications. A second concern was whether the findings 
would be robust to alternative ways of measuring resource abundance, but the finding also survived under 
three alternative measures of resource abundance: the share of mineral production in GDP, the fraction of 
primary exports in total exports, and the amount of land area per person. Finally, critics questioned 
whether the results were biased by what Sachs and Warner called “an accident from the special experience 
of the Persian Gulf states” – a charge they also dismissed, “since most of these states drop out of regression 
samples for lack of data on other control variables” (Sachs and Warner, 2001: 828). 
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Sachs and Warner would have another important effect on the evolution of the resource curse literature, 
stemming from their forceful rejection of institutional explanations. In various specifications and 
extensions of their regressions over years of scholarship, institutional variables were repeatedly found not 
to be statistically significant, leading Sachs and Warner (2001: 835-836) to conclude that institutional or 
political “explanations do not pass even a cursory look at the data”. Moreover, they argued, even if 
econometric support could be found for the effect of natural resources on the formation of certain 
institutional and political characteristic, attempts to use this as an explanation for the resource curse 
would be highly questionable in light of broader insights from the cross-country growth regression: 
“although there is evidence that resource abundance is associated with more authoritarianism, there is 
unfortunately only weak evidence for an association between non-authoritarian political systems and 
growth” (Sachs and Warner, 2001). 
The force with which Sachs and Warner rejected political and institutional causes of the resource curse 
would ultimately spawn a large literature attempting to prove otherwise. For at least a decade after the 
publication of Sachs and Warner’s papers, a near obsession emerged in the resource-curse literature 
around whether institutions or the Dutch disease was a more important explanation for the resource 
curse.11 As discussed in Chapter 3, this “Dutch disease versus institutions” dichotomy has only recently 
softened due to the emergence of theoretical models and empirical evidence underlining important 
interactions between the two (as well as the more recent literature’s move away from trying to explain the 
average, cross-country relationship between resources and growth).  
1 .5.  The problem of endogeneity:  revisiting the empirical  evidence 
The resource curse remains a wildly popular idea in development economics and one that continues to 
attract considerable of scholarly interest. However, recent scholarship has taken issue with the standard 
measurement of key relationships used to study the existence of curse, particularly around the 
11 As discussed in Chapter 3, Sachs and Warner’s finding also challenged work that lay outside the confines of 
economics. Political scientists had long theorised the emergence of “rentier” and “clientelist” states as particular form 
of state formation and political organisation (particularly in the Middle East), and many of them suggested negative 
long-run economic implications of such arrangements.  
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interpretation and potential endogeneity of commonly used measures of resource abundance. A greater 
appreciation of the epistemological limits around the resource-curse dynamics has emerged alongside an 
understanding that country- and context-specific manifestations of the resource curse are more interesting 
and important than an examination of the average, cross-country relationship between resources and 
growth. However, for some scholars, the measurement issues loom so large that it undermines the very 
notion of the curse (Bulte, Damania. and Deacon, 2005, Brunnschweiler, 2008, and Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte, 2008). 
In the early literature identifying the resource curse, the most commonly used measure of “resource 
abundance” was the share of natural resources to either GDP or total exports. However, subsequent 
scholarship has underlined that, while these measures are good indicators of resource dependence – an 
important, but separate, issue – they are not exogenous indicators of resource abundance or resource 
wealth (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008) paper, and Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). Countries may 
have a low share of natural resources to total exports, not so much because they do not have an abundance 
of resources, but because they export many other products that are the direct consequence of economic 
growth and development.  
To illustrate this point, consider the following thought experiment: assume that Country A started off 
with a larger resource endowment than Country B in 1970. Country A then succeeded in developing a 
thriving manufacturing sector over the ensuing four decades, while Country B failed to do so. If we 
compare the share of resources to total exports of both countries in 2010, the share of resources in Country 
A’s total exports is likely to have dropped between 1970 and 2010 (as its share of manufacturing exports 
increased). Meanwhile, the share of resources in Country B’s exports is likely to have remained high, given 
its inability to build a thriving manufacturing sector. It is therefore likely that Country A’s share of 
resources to total exports will be lower than that of Country B in 2010.  
It would be a logical fallacy to conclude from this that Country B’s higher share of resources to total 
exports, as measured in 2010, that led to lower growth. As Frankel (2010: 15) points out, “Industrialisation 
may determine commodity exports rather than the other way around. The reverse causality could explain 
the negative correlation: those countries that fail at manufacturing have a comparative advantage at 
commodity exports, by default.” The point is that a country can be resource abundant, while still having a 
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low share of resource exports because the rest of its economy has developed (notable current examples are 
Canada, Australia, Norway and the United States). Because the share of resources to exports (or GDP) 
is endogenous to economic growth, it provides a biased indication of the relationship between resource 
wealth and economic growth.  
In an attempt to find an exogenous measure of resource wealth, scholars have used data on proven natural 
resource reserves (either in terms of total value, or per square kilometer or per capita). These measures, 
often referred to in the literature as measures of “resource intensity”, should in theory provide a more 
accurate indication of resource wealth. Using various “resource intensity” measures to capture resource 
abundance, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) conclude the resource curse “may be a red herring”, as their 
estimations show that “resource abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality,” thus calling 
the entire resource curse hypothesis into question.  
However, these measures of resource intensity are also potentially endogenous to growth (and to other 
factors, notably the quality of institutions), as they reflect past resource discoveries that required costly 
investments in exploration and prospecting. Norman (2009) argues that investment in exploration is 
endogenous to the rule of law, as private firms investing in costly exploration for resources want to know 
that they will be able to profit from any possible discoveries, rather than face the risk of appropriation once 
discoveries are made. In The Plundered Planet, Paul Collier (2010) similarly links “investments in search” 
to the quality of institutions and the rule of law.12 In their critique of the Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) 
paper, Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) argue that the endogeneity of resource intensity measures 
undermine the former’s findings and that evidence of the resource curse remains compelling, albeit 
through the generally neglected channel of excessive macroeconomic volatility in resource-rich countries 
(discussed in Chapter 2).13 
12 Collier and Goderis (2007) further note that any indicator that is expressed as a ratio of GDP is by definition 
endogenous to GDP growth: “Government policies and institutions are very likely to affect the ratio of commodity 
exports over GDP through the denominator (GDP).” The same could be said of measures that are expressed as a 
ratio of total exports, which could be affected by the countries trade policies and openness to trade. 
13 Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke’s (2009) objections to the Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) paper goes further, as 
they accuse them of “an unfortunate data mishap, omitted variables bias, weakness of the instruments, violation of 
exclusion restrictions and misspecification error.” 
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Ultimately, these endogeneity problems, as well as broader measurement issues, have continued to 
present difficulties to empirical investigations of the effects of resource wealth on a variety of economic, 
political and social outcomes – particularly when such investigations are conducted at the average or 
cross-country level. Efforts to overcome endogeneity problems have more recently turned to innovative 
econometric techniques (discussed in the remainder of this chapter) that aim to resolve the problem in a 
statistical manner, rather than engaging in continued efforts to unearth exogenous measures. In a more 
general sense, the empirical literature has evolved in terms of the econometric treatment of the data since 
the influential work of Sachs and Warner14 - and, as discussed below, revived more institutions-centric 
explanations for the resource curse.  
1 .6.  The revival  of  institutional arguments 
The first wave of empirical work, most emphatically represented by the Sachs and Warner studies, on the 
average cross-country empirical relationship between resource wealth and economic growth, therefore, 
strongly rejected the importance of institutional factors. In addition, the most powerful theoretical 
framework in the early resource-curse literature, namely the Dutch disease, built on purely economic 
dynamics.  
However, the gradual unearthing of the above-mentioned endogeneity problems in the earlier resource-
curse literature, coupled with the introduction of econometric techniques that attempted to capture 
possible interactions between institutions, politics and resource wealth, has resulted in a revival of interest 
in and support for arguments centered on institutional and political-economy explanations. Indeed, such 
has been the ascendance of institutional explanations for the resource curse that Frankel’s review of the 
literature included the assertion that, “Of the various possible channels through which natural resources 
could be a curse to long-run development, the quality of institutions and governance is perhaps the most 
widely hypothesised” (Frankel, 2010). 
14 The criticisms of Sachs and Warner’s worked briefly outlined in this chapter pertain to potential measurement 
flaws, while still assuming that the general econometric set-up of the growth-regression framework is sound. Of 
course, there have been important fundamental criticisms of the growth-regression approach as utilised in the 1990s. 
For more fundamental critiques of the growth-regression approach, see Mankiw, (1995) and Easterley (2005). 
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The most powerful empirical evidence in the revival of institutional explanations for the resource curse 
was presented by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006). The authors’ aims were boldly stated as 
investigating “the hypothesis that a poor quality of institutions is the cause of the resource curse and that 
good enough institutions can eliminate the resource curse entirely.” They find strong statistical support 
for this hypothesis arguing, “the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure (in 
managing natural resources) lays in the quality of institutions” (Mehlum et. al., 2006: 1117). In order to 
underline their direct challenge to Sachs and Warner’s forceful rejection of the institutional explanations, 
Mehlum et. al. (2006) use not only the same econometric set-up (with one noteworthy extension, 
discussed below) and the same dataset as the original studies by Sachs and Warner (1995 and 1997). 
Mehlum et. al.’s (2006) only major innovation was the inclusion of an interaction term between measures 
of institutional quality and resource abundance.15 Whereas the Sachs and Warner studies had attempted 
to identify the effects of institutional quality and resource dependence (or in their original interpretation, 
resource abundance16) on growth separately, the inclusion of an interaction terms helps test the hypothesis 
that resource wealth is conducive to economic growth in the context of strong institutions, and bad for 
growth in context of poor institutions. Mehlum et. al. (2006) found that the interaction term had a 
positive coefficient that was both economically and statistically significant, and concluded “resource 
abundance is harmful to growth when the institutional quality is poor, but conducive to growth when 
institutions are strong.” In their view, countries that are simultaneously characterised by weak institutions 
and resource abundance are, therefore, “doubly cursed”.  
Mehlum et. al. (2006) served a number of purposes in the evolution of the broader literature on natural 
resources and economic development. In the first instance, it revived in the resource-curse literature 
exactly the kind of institutions-centric perspective that had recently gained in ascendency in explaining a 
variety of complex long-term economic patterns, and more specific questions in development 
15 Their measures of institutional quality is an unweighted average of five commonly used indexes: a rule of law index, 
a bureaucratic quality index, a corruption in government index, a risk of expropriation index, and a government 
repudiation of contracts index.  
16 Recall that the endogeneity of the measure of resource abundance used by Sachs and Warner means that the 
findings of both studies should be reinterpreted as a statement about the consequences of resource dependence than 
resource abundance. 
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macroeconomics.17 Second, evidence that resource abundance has a sharply differentiated impact on 
economic performance depending on the quality of institutions also initiated a new emphasis on 
disaggregating the analysis between the “winners” and “losers” in the management of natural resources. 
Whereas the previous vintage of studies based on evidence from cross-country growth regression 
attempted to identify the average relationship between resource abundance and growth, insights into the 
potential institutional origins of the resource curse (and success stories), have led scholars down a more 
rewarding path of differentiation rather than categorical assertions around the impact of resources on 
economic growth.  
Finally, the Mehlum et. al. (2006) study underlined the importance of the quality of institutions at the time 
when resources are discovered (also known as “initial institutions”). Proponents of this argument suggest 
that better-quality initial institutions explain why countries such as Norway, Australia and Canada were 
able to harness their resource wealth with apparent success: large-scale discoveries and production were 
made in the second half of the 20st century, when these countries had already developed highly supportive 
institutions. Similar arguments have been presented in less obvious historical contexts, such as the mid-
19th century California gold rush (Clay and Wright, 2005) and post-independence Botswana (Robinson, 
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003). These arguments resonate with broader themes within institutional 
economics, most obviously with the North’s emphasis on path dependence and the deep historical 
foundations of differentiated economic performance; and with the qualitative analysis of economic 
historians (Wright and Czelusta, 2004 and 2007) and political scientists (notably, Terry Lynn Karl, 1997) 
who were all early proponents of the view that a resource discoveries negatively impact the performance of 
economies with underdeveloped institutions – or “extractive” and “grabber-friendly” institutions as per 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Mehlum et. al. (2006). A common theme in this literature is that the 
combination of poor (extractive or grabber-friendly) initial institutions and resource abundance make it 
more likely that resource revenues will be directed towards the benefit of a small elite. 
As noted earlier, Brunnschweiler (2008) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) have argued that the 
empirical literature on the resource curse (which they dismiss as a “red herring”) suffers from a set of 
17 The list of significant contributions in this extraordinarily fertile area of research since the start of the 21st century is 
a long one. However, the continued expansions of New Institutional Economics (North himself had numerous 
scholarly contributions on issues of development) into the major questions of development gained considerable 
impetus with such publications as Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), Glaeser, et. al. (2004) and Rodrik et. al. 
(2004). 
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insurmountable endogeneity problems that make the identification of casual relationships impossible. 
Rejecting both Dutch disease and institutions-centric arguments, they find that resource abundance, 
constitutions, and institutions determine resource dependence; second, resource dependence does not 
affect growth; and third, that resource abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality. A 
number of studies, such as Collier and Goderis (2007), Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) and Arezki 
and van der Ploeg (2010), have in turn countered these finding, using instrumental variables not only for 
institutions, but also for measures of resource abundance and resource dependence. These studies sustain 
support for the resource curse hypothesis, and particularly emphasise the importance of initial institutions 
in determining whether or not economies benefit from resources. Collier and Goderis (2007) add that 
there are important horizon effects, calling for a distinction between short- and long-run relationships 
between resource abundance and growth, while Arezki and van der Ploeg (2010) argue that in addition to 
sound institutions, openness to trade, can be a significant mitigating factor in the resource curse dynamic. 
Conclusion 
The relationship between natural resources and economic prosperity has confounded economists for 
centuries. The list of the largest producers of natural resources today includes some of the poorest and 
richest countries in the world. The role of resources in established theories of historic economic prosperity 
ranges from highly conducive (and even essential) to economic take-off to deeply undermining. Despite 
the contestation around the precise relationship between resources and economic prosperity, economists’ 
understanding has evolved in a number of illuminating ways. Compared to the uncritical acceptance of 
the resource curse that accompanied the findings of Sachs and Warner, the hypothesis is today 
maintained with considerable qualifications. The weak average relationship between resources and 
economic performance has promoted a more fruitful emphasis on country- and context-specific factors 
that promote success or failure in harnessing resource wealth. The role and quality of institutions and 
political-economy factors feature prominently in this discussion. 
On the whole, the resource curse hypothesis remains broadly supported, albeit in a modified, conditional 
restatement in which the quality of institutions at the time of resource discovery is particularly important. 
The earlier wholesale dismissal of the institutional link in the early resource-curse literature, therefore, 
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appears misguided. In particular, the conditional resource curse, with its emphasis on initial institutions, 
has very important policy implications for developing countries with recent resource discoveries, many of 
which have weak and underdeveloped institutions: weak institutions and resource windfalls are a deadly 
combination, reinforcing weak institutions and greatly increasing the probability of poor long-run 
economic performance.  
As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, institutional arguments in the resource curse literature are no 
longer presented in direct opposition to more fundamentally economic ones (such as the Dutch disease). 
Rather, there is increasing support for interactions between resource windfalls, the quality of general 
institutions, specific institutions relating to the management of resources and the quality of economic 
policies. Chapter 2 proceeds with a general discussion of the theory of institutions in economics, while 
Chapter 3 focuses more narrowly on institutional and political-economy challenges around the 
management of resource windfalls. These chapters form the theoretical backbone for the central 
argument advanced in this dissertation: that sovereign wealth funds, if embedded in an accompanying 
rule-based system for fiscal policy, provide a promising – if incremental – institutional solution to widely 
observed failures in the management of resource windfalls.  
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Chapter 2 
Getting to Denmark: 
Theoretical perspectives on the design and evolution of institutions 
In Political Order and Political Decay, Francis Fukuyama (2014) argues that the challenge that still 
confronts most societies is that of “getting to Denmark” – that is, “an imagined society that is prosperous, 
democratic, secure, and well governed, and experiences low levels of corruption”. However, the 
experience of repeated failures to promote these cornerstones of political order around the world had 
underlined to the author (some two-and-a-half decades earlier) of the much-maligned “End of History” 
(Fukuyama, 1989), just how difficult and complex a task institution building is. “We don’t understand how 
Denmark itself came to be Denmark and therefore don’t comprehend the complexity and difficulty of 
political development,” Fukuyama (2014: 25) argues.  
These epistemological challenges around how the political and economic institutions that promote 
prosperity are formed are pertinent to the more focused discussion around the role of such institutions in 
managing natural resources. With respect to the latter, the literature has developed in two distinct 
directions. First, is that countries with strong meta institutions (such as the democratic governance, the 
rule of law, low levels of corruption and the separation of powers), unsurprisingly, tend to harness the 
benefits of resource wealth more effectively than those that lack such institutions. The second, and 
arguably more fruitful, direction has been to focus on a set of specific economic, institutional and political 
pathologies commonly suffered by a number of resource-dependent countries. What therefore remains 
largely unresolved and open for debate is the contribution that targetted institutional reforms can make in 
addressing specific problems, under conditions of relatively weak meta institutions.  
This chapter presents a largely theoretical discussion of the central importance that institutional analysis 
has come to assume in economics. In light of the questions raised above, the chapter also describes how 
leading institutional economists have tended to think about the process of institutional change, 
suggesting that it is not in the tradition of New Institutional Economics to suggest that the process of 
“getting to Denmark” is likely to a rapid and straightforward one. Quite to the contrary, the New 
Institutional Economics tradition has long emphasised the deep historic (and even cultural) foundations 
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of social, political and economic institutions, and understood that the process of institutional change is 
highly path dependent. This intellectual tradition has also frequently pointed out that transitions to 
apparently “better” institutions are often curtailed by adverse political incentives, the incompatibility of 
particular institutions with accompanying elements of the “institutional matrix” and the frequently high 
cost of institutional change. Finally, these insights have also led the understanding of institutions in 
economics to a greater emphasis on the functions that good institutions perform, rather than the 
particular forms they are expected to take (although the chapter will also identify a set of principles for 
institutional design).  
2.1 .  The rise and enduring influence of  New Institutional Economics 
It is a testament to the enduring influence and contribution of New Institutional Economics to the study 
of economics that the assertion that “institutions matter” is rather banal. Indeed, assertions of their central 
importance and explanatory power have become so strong that Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi’s (2004) 
assertion that “institutions rule” seems more apt. The increasing emphasis on institutions in mainstream 
economics has also been accompanied by the ascendency of institutionalists perspectives in the social 
sciences.18 Institutional economics is a highly inter-disciplinary field, drawing not only on several 
influential branches of economics, but also on other social sciences and even disciplines outside the social 
sciences.19  
While, therefore, fairly resounding, the triumph of institutional arguments is recent – as Vernon Smith 
(2008) notes, for much of the 20th century, the neoclassical economics centered on developing “an 
institutions-free core”. Undoubtedly, the embrace by New Institutional Economics’ intellectual forefather 
of the standard tools of neoclassical economics initiated the steady acceptance of institutions into this 
core. Starting from the analytical framework of neoclassical economics, Coase (1937 and 1960) and Arrow 
18 The renewed interest in institutions across social-scientific disciplines is reflected in the emergence of New 
Institutionalism in both political science and sociology (see Koelble, 1995). 
19 Within economics these include, most notably but not exclusively, the work of the “early institutionalists”, public 
choice theory and constitutional economics, contract theory, the economics of information problems, game theory, 
the theory of the firm and the economics industrial organisation. Outside of economics, the list includes history, 
political science, law, anthropology, political philosophy and sociology. 
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(1969) demonstrated the implications of relaxing the neoclassical assumption that transaction costs were 
non-existent (or at least a trivial obstacle to market-based exchange). These insights promoted the 
recognition that transaction costs are a central and pervasive fact of economic life, which in the first 
instance helped explain the existence of observed forms of constraints that lay “outside the market” in 
Coasian language. Moreover, they showed that transaction costs, particularly those imposed by 
information problems between prospective market participants, and the pervasive uncertainty underlying 
cooperative economic exchange in a market system, necessitated the construction of an elaborate 
institutional infrastructure. Consequently, early scholarship focused as such aspects as the organisational 
structure of the modern firm, legal practices around contracting, different forms of insurance, mandatory 
disclosure requirements – all essentially institutional solutions to the need to economise on transaction 
cost in order to enable market-based modes of exchange.  
In using the tools of neoclassical economics to demonstrate the framework’s shortcomings, Coase, Arrow 
and subsequent authors more directly associated with New Institutional Economics20 (notably Oliver 
Williamson and Douglass North) were adopting a very different methodological approach than that of 
earlier institutional traditions in economics. For example, the institutional economics school of the 1920s 
and 1930s, which included Thorsten Veblen, John Commons and Wesley Mitchell, “adopted [a] posture of 
methodological hostility to mainstream economics”, arguing instead that institutions were the result of 
habits, power relations and cultural factor whose origins and functioning lay outside of economic logic 
(Williamson, 1990). In contrast, one of the binding and defining tenets of New Institutional Economics is 
that “the determinants of institutions are susceptible to analysis by the tools of economic theory” 
(Matthews, 1986).21 
While this methodological approach placed the institutional tradition that emerged in the aftermath of 
Coase and Arrow firmly within the economic orthodoxy as an increasingly important extension to 
neoclassical economics, New Institutional Economics took off as a discipline in its own right when Oliver 
Williamson and Douglass North advanced the study of the origins, functioning and impact of different 
institutional arrangements in two distinct directions. The starting point in both traditions in the 
20 The first use of the term “New Institutional Economics” is attributed to Williamson (1975). 
21 This focus is a critical element differentiation between New Institutional Economics and the treatment of 
institutions in other social sciences and law. 
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recognition that institutions assume many different forms, and that this institutional variation held 
important implications for economic outcomes and the incentives economic actors faced.  
New Institutional Economics is primarily concerned with examining the form and function of institutions 
as sets of social constraints. In North’s oft-cited analogy, institutions are the “rules of the game”, a set of 
“humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990). The rules of the game are 
requisites for impersonal, market-based exchange, which demands an (often elaborate) amount of 
certainty and information about the behaviour of other players in the game and external factors that may 
affect the way the game is played. Once the rules are established, the New Institutional Economics 
tradition assumes the players in the game react rationally to the constraints and incentives created by the 
institutional structure. Consequently, the outcomes vary greatly depending on the incentives created by 
different rules. For Williamson, the overarching question was why certain forms of economic exchange 
took place through markets, while others were deemed to be more efficiently conducted through 
institutions (or contracts). Williamson’s “economics of governance” studied the nature and implications of 
different ways of arranging economic activity – such as, public versus private ordering, vertical versus 
hierarchical structures, and the operation and organisational consequences of different legal systems.  
With North’s extension of institutional analysis to deep historical questions of why certain economies have 
developed rules of the game that promote decentralised cooperation and economic growth, while the 
majority failed, New Institutional Economics moved away from Williamson’s more microeconomic lens, 
to one that placed it in the canon of macroeconomic growth theory and development economics. In 
North’s own words, his contribution was to extend the analysis to why and how alternative sets of 
institutions devised by humans “shape the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation, or 
decline.” (North, 1991: 98). For North, mainstream economics’ assumption that formal constraints and 
their enforcement (largely, but not exclusively, by political institutions) were “a given” was a significant 
shortcoming, as “economic history is overwhelmingly a story of economies that failed to produce a set of 
economic rules of the game (with enforcement) that induce sustained economic growth” (North, 1991: 98). 
Whereas the Williamson strand of New Institutional Economics is, therefore, more concerned with 
“comparative statics”, North was interested in developing a dynamic understanding of the relationship 
between institutions, history and economic performance that has been described as “evolutionary” 
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(Hodgson, 1998; and Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1996). Through this more historically founded method of 
analysis, North was also widening the scope and toolkit of New Institutional Economics. The focus was 
still firmly on “sets of constraints” on the otherwise arbitrary and uncertain behaviour by economic agents, 
but North was pushing towards a deeper understanding of the historical origins and evolution of 
institutions, as well as the ways in which constraints were enforced. Consequently, North used an 
increasingly broad and abstract vocabulary to define the field and method of enquiry of New Institutional 
Economics: institutions are “a set of constraints on behaviour in the form of rules and regulations; a set of 
procedures to detect deviations from the rules and regulations; and, finally, a set of moral, ethical 
behavioural norms which define the contours that constrain the way in which the rules and regulations are 
specified and enforcement is carried out” (North, 1984). 
2.2. Criticisms of New Institutional Economics: too close a shave with Occam’s razor? 
Since establishing itself as part of mainstream economics, New Institutional Economics has been 
subjected to a number of critiques. Some of these criticisms remain unresolved (and, as discussed below, 
most probably unresolvable), while others have served to expand and enhance the field and method of 
enquiry in institutional economics.  
2 .2 .1 .  Institutional  “embeddedness”  and the problem of  inf inite  regress 
The methodological consistency with neoclassical economics that lead to New Institutional Economics’ 
gradual assimilation into mainstream economics has also been source of criticism of the approach, 
particularly from other social sciences, notably sociology. As Hodgson (1998) notes, the starting point of 
New Institutional Economics is to assume an “institutions-free state of nature”. Market interaction 
without institutions is assumed to be the natural state of human affairs: as Williamson (1975) himself 
argues, “in the beginning there were markets.” A case in point is the Coase theorem, the seminal 
contribution to placing transaction costs at the center of mainstream economic theory. The theorem 
asserts that if property rights are appropriately defined and transactions costs are negligible, the initial 
allocation of property rights does not affect the efficiency of the final outcome or distribution of property 
rights produced by free exchange. While the point of the Coase theorem is to underline that transaction 
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costs are, in fact, non-negligible and that the initial allocation of property right does, therefore, matter to 
the final outcome, the important observation for sociological critiques is that Coase’s arguments started 
from the assumption that free exchange is the natural order. It is with this conception of the fundamental 
purpose of institutions – that they enable the natural economic order of market-based exchange – that 
sociological critics of New Institutional Economics have taken issue (Hodgson, 1998).  
This criticism is in keeping with long-standing objections to the neoclassical methodology, particularly 
the foundational assumptions variously described as rational choice theory, individualistic rationality, 
social atomism and methodological individualism. A large body of sociological scholarship views human 
behaviour, including economic behaviour, as intrinsically and inexorably connected to (or, more strongly, 
the product of) the social or “structural” context in which it takes place. This is the broad orientation of all 
sociological enquiry, which ever since Karl Polanyi’s (1944) The Great Transformation has been cast as 
the problem of economic “embeddedness” or the “Substantivists versus Formalist” debate.22 Substantivists 
argue that market-based exchange is not akin to the natural order, but rather a culturally embedded 
response to the institutions of a market economy. Such critiques of New Institutional Economics are 
essentially arguing for a return to the tradition of “old” institutional economics. As Hodgson (1998: 180) 
notes, for early institutional economists, “rationality itself is regarded as reliant upon institutional 
props…[and] behavioural habit and institutional structure [are] mutually entwined and mutually 
reinforcing”.  
Taken to its logical conclusion, this criticism extends to both positive and normative implications of New 
Institutional Economics. If human economic actions are dominated by factors than (broadly or 
approximately) rational utility maximisation – such as custom, superstition and culture – who is to say that 
institutions can or should emerge to create, enable and expand the scope of the market? Would the 
pervasive influence of social and cultural factors not prevent the eventual emergence – and even the 
desirability of – the type of institutions studied and proposed by New Institutional Economics? As 
Hodgson (1988: 182) argues, “the market itself is an institution. The market involves social norms, 
customs, instituted exchange relations, and – sometimes consciously organised – information networks 
that themselves have to be explained.” 
22 Within sociology, there are also critiques of “oversocialised and culturally deterministic” views of human and 
economic behaviour (Granoveter, 1985). 
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This establishes a well-known epistemological challenge that Hodgson (1998) describes as “infinite 
regress”. If socially- or culturally-determined institutions and individual decision making are forever bound 
to each other, there is no way of discerning which one preceded or “caused” the other. We will never know, 
and in fact can never know, which comes first: the establishment of institutions that make market 
exchange possible (although with rationally optimising responses to these institutions) or the institutions 
themselves that shape individuals’ decision-making processes and abilities. There is no unequivocal 
solution to the problem of infinite regress, and no resolution to the Substantivists versus Formalist debate 
is possible.  
Concerns over infinite regress and imbeddedness have done little to curb the influence of New 
Institutional Economics, as several philosophical defenses have been mounted and the field’s 
understanding of institutions evolved. First, as with its application to other areas of economics, the 
method of rational choice in New Institutional Economics is best understood as a heuristic device: a 
deliberate simplifying rendering of the real world, made in order to arrive at a parsimonious and tractable 
theory. Ultimately, all social-scientific theories are by definition such simplified versions of a more complex 
truth – in much the same way that maps are functional, small-scale renderings of a larger reality. Maps are 
amended when they are revealed to be unfit for purpose and successful navigation requires that more 
details be added. In this vein, New Institutional Economics’ point of departure in the assumption that 
institutions emerge from the rationality of economic agents in pursuit of ways to engage in decentralised 
exchange and cooperation, is little more than a simplifying methodological step.  
Rational choice theory has always assumed that human behaviour is approximately characterised by 
rationality; and that repeated mistakes (departures from rationality) is not a sensible way to model 
economic behaviour. The classic argument for this approach in economics was presented by Milton 
Friedman’s (1953) famous analogy of billiard player. Friedman suggested that the best way to model the 
play of an accomplished billiard player is to assume the player is rationally solving the geometric challenge 
of hitting the balls at the optimal angles in order to get all the balls in the pockets. Of course, the billiard 
player does not literally solve a set of complex equations while playing, and indeed observed outcomes 
clearly suggest that billiard player’s actions are not optimal in an absolute sense. However, given that the 
billiard player’s strategy closely mimics such an optimisation exercise, and there is no repetition of 
obviously suboptimal behaviour, it is “not at all unreasonable that excellent predictions would be yielded 
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by the hypothesis that the billiard player made his shots as if he knew the complicated mathematical 
formulas that would give the optimum directions of travel…[and] could make lightning calculations from 
the formulas, and could then make the balls travel in the direction indicated by the formulas” (Friedman, 
1953; emphasis in the original). Of course, simplifying assumptions should be abandoned whenever it 
becomes apparent that it is fundamentally misrepresenting reality (much as one would add information to 
a map when it’s omission renders the map insufficiently detailed to complete a certain journey).23  
This argument is a restatement of the principle of Occam’s razor: simpler or more parsimonious theories 
are always preferred, until simplicity has to be traded for greater explanatory power.24 Recasting the 
sociological critique of New Institutional Economics on the basis of infinite regress and embeddedness in 
this light, the question becomes whether the discipline suffers irrevocably from excessive simplification in 
pursuit of parsimony. Clearly the enduring power and influence of New Institutional Economics suggest 
that the answer is a resounding “no” to the irrevocability question; although sociological critiques have, 
arguably, played a significant part in the expansion of the scope and vocabulary of the field. A number of 
New Institutional Economics’ most authoritative figure over time developed a deeper appreciation of the 
sometimes socially- and culturally-determined nature of institutions. Most obvious perhaps is North’s 
(1986) inclusion in a definition of institutions, “the moral, ethical behavioural norms” that affect the nature 
of human devised constraints. Later still, North described his own view of institutions as “endogenous” to 
the forces of history, politics and culture, even permitting the influence of “inherited cultural conditioning” 
(in contrast to Williamson’s view of institutions as “exogenous” to these factors); while emphasising the 
23 Popper (1992, chapter 7) adds another argument in favour of simpler theories, which is that simplification aids 
testability or “falsification”. A simple theory applies to more cases than a more complex one, and is thus more easily 
falsifiable.  
24 For some critics, the simplifying assumptions of New Institutional Economics are not the result of a good-faith 
attempt at methodological parsimony based on a particular scientific method, but rather an altogether more 
nefarious ideological project. Chang and Evans (2005) argue that the “false parsimony” of New Institutional 
Economics “provide(s) powerful ideological support…(for) decision-makers themselves or their most politically 
powerful constituents”. Constructing an elaborate conspiracy, they further argue that the interests and ideologies of 
these decision-makers and their most politically powerful constituents are advanced through the Bretton Woods 
institutions, with the help of New Institutional Economics’ “thin theory of institutions”. Chang and Evans (2005) are 
not optimistic that a corrective, multi-dimension understanding of institutions will emerge as a matter of orthodoxy, 
as the “contemporary economic canon enjoys all the necessary conditions for sustaining false parsimony and under 
current conditions it is unlikely to be unseated by a complex and ‘mushy’ institutionalist alternative. Even if an 
institutionalist alternative could unequivocally demonstrate its scientific superiority…practical and ideological 
costs…would militate against jettisoning the established canon.” (Chang and Evans, 2005: 31). Needless to say, this 
argument fails the falsifiability test (see the previous footnote). 
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importance of “informal constraints”, such as “norms, conventions, or personal standards of honesty”, as 
part of the institutional structure (North, 1994: 4). North’s emphasis on the compatibility of specific 
institutions with the rest of the institutional matrix and path dependence are further evidence of his 
appreciation of social, ethical and cultural influences on institutions. North put all residual concerns 
around his possible lack of appreciation of embeddedness to rest when he argued in Understanding the 
Process of Economic Change, published in 2005, that “much of rational choice is not so much individual 
cogitation as the embeddedness of the thought process in the larger social and institutional context” 
(North, 2005: 25). Williamson (1996: 230) too would later permit (in direct response to critiques by 
sociologists) that “transaction cost economics and embeddedness reasoning are evident complementary in 
many respects.” 
The incorporation of a greater appreciation of cultural and social factors into the study of institutions in 
the field of economics is by no means universal, but it is certainly a theme in the evolution of New 
Institutional Economics. The important consequence of this observation for the discussion in this chapter 
is the increasing awareness of these factors in both normative and positive applications of New 
Institutional Economics. The heightened awareness of cultural and social factors, while still a matter of 
lesser emphasis for New Institutional Economics compared to the field of sociology, is one of the reasons 
why the normative literature in particular has shifted more towards a consideration of the functions of 
institutions, rather than their exact forms. The potential role of political agency, discussed below, is 
another such factor.  
2 .2 .2 .  Polit ical  agency 
While sociologists took issue with a perceived disregard for cultural and social determinants of 
institutions, a number of prominent political scientists (otherwise sympathetic to the power of 
institutional arguments) have critiqued New Institutional Economics for lacking an underlying “theory of 
politics” (Bates, 2014; and Weingast, 1995 and 1997). Bates explains this shortcoming as follows: 
“It is politicians who create institutions; they that delegate to them political power. In addition, by 
manipulating their powers, politicians shape the manner in which institutions behave. Put simply: 
without a theory of politics, we lack a theory of institutions…Institutions are empowered when 
politicians wish them so…When the political game is such that ‘winning’ requires that politicians 
marshal the power of institutions to extract and to redistribute wealth, then institutions will be 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
50 
predatory. But when political forces align such that politicians are rewarded for the creation of 
wealth, then institutions will promote and safeguard productive activity.  To explain the role and 
impact of institutions…we must turn to the study of politics.” (Bates, 2014: 60).  
To illustrate the central importance of political power and incentives in the design and functioning of 
institutions, Bates compares the agricultural marketing boards (monopsonistic buyers of agricultural 
products, notably coffee, established by governments) in Uganda and Kenya in the 1970s. These 
institutions in the respective countries closely resembled each other, but operated in very different ways in 
practice, according to Bates: in Kenya they were supportive of farmers by providing stable and favourable 
prices; while in Uganda, the seemingly same institution was highly extractive and predatory at the 
expense of farmers. According to a Batesian view, the explanation for this difference lies in politics, rather 
than in the actual design of the institutions, including the enforcement apparatus that accompanies the 
institution. In Uganda, politicians from the arid and agriculture-poor north of the country held power, 
and the coffee marketing boards became an instrument to extract resources from the south, which they 
then spent on transfers and public investment programs in the north. In contrast, in Kenya, political 
power lay in the hands of politicians from the coffee-growing regions in central Kenya. In exchange for the 
votes that kept them in office, Kenyan politicians used the institution of the marketing board to enhance 
the wealth of their constituents (Bates, 2014).  
Institutions should not be seen principally in terms of their stated or implied objectives, argues Bates, but 
rather as instruments of “political action” and patronage. That institutions of this kind lie “outside the 
market” is precisely the point: “people turn to political action to secure special advantages – rewards they 
are unable to secure by competing in the marketplace.” (Bates, 1981: 4). New Institutional Economics, at 
least with its initial emphasis on individualistic rationality, paid insufficient attention to the ways in which 
political power and incentives interacted with institutions in a general sense; and more specifically, the 
extent to which institutions are often political constructs in the first place, rather than an attempt to 
enable to natural order of market-based exchange. 
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This line of criticism has imparted a lasting impact on New Institutional Economics, even if Bates 
somewhat overstates his case.25 New Institutional Economics has become increasingly mindful of the 
need to introduce a “theory of politics”, as demanded by Bates into the framework. This development is 
not inconsistent with the Occamite principle established earlier, but rather an illustration thereof: the 
inclusion of political agency certainly made new institutional arguments more complex, but the additional 
layer of analysis was justified by the increase in explanatory power of the theory. Without engaging in an 
extensive review of the substantial amount of work that has been done to incorporate and model political 
agency over economic institutions, it is import to highlight at least three leading strands in institutional 
economics that specifically develops a “theory of politics”: first, North’s influential inter-disciplinary 
research (notably his frequent collaboration with political scientist, Barry Weingast); second, the 
literature on Public Choice and Constitutional Economics pioneered by James Buchanan; and, more 
recently, the work of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson.26 
Consider, first, North’s suggestion that “the whole development of the New Institutional Economics 
must be not only a theory of property rights and their evolution, but a theory of the political process, a 
theory of the state, and of the way in which the institutional structure of the state and its individuals 
specify and enforce property rights” (North, 1986: 233).27 Later, North (1994) would argue that this task 
had in fact been achieved and that one of the ways in which New Institutional Economics had extended 
neoclassical theory was by “modelling the political process as a critical factor in the performance of 
economies”.  
Understanding and modelling the political process was also central to the work of James Buchanan, who 
argued (following what he called the Wicksellian tradition) that his fellow economists “should cease 
25 There is a clear limit to how widely the Batesian critique applies, as it is not true that all institutions are created – 
or even enforced – by politicians. The use of a lingua franca, for example, is an institution that is rarely created by 
politicians and over which they have little control. However, it is certainly true that many institutions are created and 
enforced by politicians, so Bates’ arguments should be seen in light of these types of institutions.  
26 The influence of these scholars is not overstated here: Buchanan and North both received Nobel Prizes in 
Economics, while Acemoglu was the fifth most-cited economist as of April 2015, according to the RePEc rankings. 
27 This focus on politics in North’s later work is a matter of emphasis rather than a dramatic change in his 
scholarship. Already in Structure and Change in Economic History, published in 1981, North discussed the 
difference between what he called the “contract theory” versus “predatory theory” of the state (North, 1981: 20–27).  
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proffering policy advice as if they were employed by a benevolent despot, and they should look to the 
structure within which political decisions are made” (Buchanan, 1987: 243). Buchanan (1975) described the 
required adjustment to mainstream economics as one of incorporating the “lens of contract” alongside the 
“lens of choice”. It was not only the exercise of choice within constraints that mattered (as per the standard 
analysis of neoclassical economics), but also how those constraints were established – or the choice 
between constraints. Clearly, from the Public Choice tradition in institutional economics, one gets a deep 
appreciation that the choice of a particular set of constraints (or institutions) may, or indeed may not be, 
conducive to decentralised cooperation and economic progress. There are a number of theoretical reasons 
why governments may be able to provide effective and efficient institutional solutions to market failures 
(resulting, for example, from asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse selection), including their 
coordinating abilities, their comparative advantage in violence and coercion, and the cost efficiency 
through which they achieve credibility around contract enforcement. However, counter to these 
advantages, Public Choice theory has examined the concept of “government failures,” that emerge due to 
political agents’ self-interested response to incentives that are not aligned with collective interests. Public 
Choice has curtailed the sometimes-unqualified enthusiasm for centralised (public) solutions to 
decentralised (private) problems (Buchanan, 1984).  
The early interest shown by North and Buchanan in issues of political agency in institutional economics 
has been reinforced by the more recent contributions of leading economists. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(along with their frequent co-author, Simon Johnson) continued a number of themes from North’s New 
Institutional Economics, not least the deep, historical foundations of institutions. One of the central 
arguments to emerge from this body of work is the primacy of politics in determining economic 
institutions and the way they operate – which is exactly the point Bates argued.28 The causality chain in 
the Acemoglu and Johnson’s thesis is as follows: history determines the type of political institutions a 
country has, which affects the type of economic institutions that are created as well as their use, which in 
28 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) is a grand synthesis of more than a decade’s worth of acclaimed scholarship and is 
intended for a general, popular readership. The arguments contained in it are based on a large body of more 
technical work, most prominently a series of articles published in the top-ranked journals in economics and political 
science: Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006 and 2008) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001 and 2002).  
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turn affects the incentives for different types of economic behaviour.29 There is no ambiguity around the 
importance they place on political agency:  
“It is the political process that determines what economic institutions people live under, and it is 
the political institutions that determine how this process work…while economic institutions are 
critical for determining whether a country is poor or prosperous, it is politics and political 
institutions that determine what economic institutions a country has” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012: 42-43).  
This is the broad statement in favour of the explanatory primacy of politics, but Acemoglu and Robinson 
have also developed detailed theories around why political institutions, to use their words, are either 
“inclusive” or “extractive”. Most of this work focuses on the political incentives for resisting transitions 
towards (better) inclusive institutions, for example: “political elites may block technological and 
institutional development, because…Innovations often erode political elites’ incumbency advantage, 
increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 129). Ironically, so 
strong is their emphasis on the pervasive influence of politics of institutions, including economic 
institutions, that the Acemoglu and Robinson thesis risks being politically deterministic (a tendency that 
has important implications for the third line of criticism of institutional economics, as discussed below).  
2 .2 .3 .  Determinism and the sequencing of  institutional  change 
A critical theme that has emerged as much from within economics as from outside it, is that the 
interpretation of the policy implications institutional economics literature, particular those built on 
findings of the empirical literature, is too prescriptive around particular institutional forms. The central 
questions raised in this regard are whether the establishment of sound institutions has to be preceded (or 
at least accompanied) by political reforms; and, more specifically, whether good institutions require 
certain forms of political organisation (notably, democracy and political contestation). In a famous paper 
on the subject, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane and Shleifer (2004) outline two views on the 
sequencing of policy, political and institutional reforms:  
29 That the story starts with history is a demonstration of the importance of path dependence, which is a dominant 
theme in New Institutional Economics, since North. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson have identified different 
forms of colonialism (itself the result of, amongst other factor, geography and climate) as the origins of political 
institutions. 
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“The first approach emphasises the need to start with democracy and other checks on government 
as the mechanisms for securing property rights. With such political institutions in place, 
investment in human and physical capital, and therefore economic growth, are expected to follow. 
The second approach emphasises the need for human and physical capital accumulation to start 
the process. It holds that even pro-market dictators can secure property rights as a matter of 
policy choice, not of political constraints. From the vantage point of poor countries, it sees 
democracy and other institutional improvements as the consequences of increased education and 
wealth, not as their causes” (Glaeser et. al., 2004: 271-272). 
This distinction arguably permeates every major debate in development macroeconomics, including that 
surrounding the resource curse. Glaeser et. al. (2004) point out that there are significant similarities and 
agreements between both schools of thought: clearly, both views are consistent with the broad notion that 
“institutions matter”, and both recognise the important function of institutions in securing property rights 
in order to incentise investment. However, they differ with respect to how these goals are to be achieved: 
the former emphasises the role of institutions in incentivising investment by imposing political constraints 
on government, whereas the latter places greater faith in the ability of (unconstrained) leaders to 
implement pro-investment policies. There is considerable support for both arguments, which as Glaeser 
et. al. (2004) point out have historic and “extensive intellectual pedigrees.”30  
The controversy pertains not so much to the relationship between these processes in the long run – a 
horizon over which the assumption of both sides tends to be that inclusive institutions are not only just, 
but also a more durable and flexible way to ensure economic cooperation, incentise investment and reduce 
transaction costs. Democracy and open (or “inclusive”) political systems are widely viewed as desirable 
exactly because they promote open-ended institutional arrangements and provide informational feedback 
loops in the design (and incremental change) of the institutional framework. As argued by Rodrik (2000), 
a strong advocate for flexible and context-specific institutional forms, “participatory and decentralised 
political systems are the most effective ones we have for processing and aggregating local knowledge. We 
can think of democracy as a meta-institution for building good institutions”. The debate is rather centered 
on different views as to the sequencing of policy, political and institutional reforms from low-equilibrium 
conditions – that is, the debate is really about competing theories of change. 
30 Glaeser et. al. (2004) argue that institutional-primacy arguments were emphasised by Montesquieu, Adam Smith 
and the Public Choice and New Institutional Economics literature; while the view that is more supportive of the 
possibility of enlightened and benevolent authoritarianism to kick-start growth, leading to subsequent political and 
institutional development, is traced by to the work of political scientists Seymore Martin Lipset (1960) and Adam 
Przeworski (1985), with empirical support from Barro (1999).  
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In their book, Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) occupy one end of the spectrum with 
their strongly prescriptive view that economic prosperity requires inclusive economic institutions, which 
cannot emerge in the absence of inclusive political institutions. However, even with this framework in 
mind, they are careful to avoid (political) institutional determinism. Given the wealth of historic examples 
(many of which are cited in their book) of countries that enjoyed periods of economic growth and “take-
off” under conditions that can hardly be characterised as consistent with inclusive political institutions and 
open contestation for power, 31 Acemoglu and Robinson permit that “extractive economic and political 
institutions are [not] inconsistent with economic growth…Extractive institutions that have achieved at 
least a minimal degree of political centralisation are often able to generate some amount of growth” 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 431). However, “growth under extractive institutions will not be 
sustained” – that is, inclusive political and economic institutions is a “requisite” for economic prosperity in 
the long run. 
At this point, it is instructive to return briefly to the relationship between natural resources, institutional 
quality and economic performance. Recall from Chapter 1 the emphasis on long-run relationships: the 
question cannot simply be around whether countries with significant natural resources experience higher 
economic growth rates in response to a commodities boom or, whether they grow faster than comparator 
countries with fewer resources in such periods. The deeper question, implied in the weak form of resource 
curse hypothesis, is whether resource-rich countries enjoy the kind of economic benefits that may 
reasonably be expected from the spending and public investment financed by resource windfalls; and 
whether resource-based growth dynamics can be sustained. Here, cast against the backdrop of long-term 
dynamics, questions of institutional quality enter the equation: institutional change is slow moving, and 
the effect of institutions on economic performance is hard to detect over short time horizons. The 
question then becomes whether there are defining attributes of resource-dependent economies that 
prevent or encumber the gradual and progressive realisation of the type of institutions commonly 
associated with sustained, long-run economic progress. If one permits, further, that examples of a gradual 
escape from a low-institutional quality equilibrium is possible, also in resource-dependent economies, this 
31 The example of Chinese growth since the 1970s is the elephant in the room. Acemoglu and Johnson argue that 
China cannot sustain its recent growth trajectory absent political reforms. Other obvious examples of growth take-
offs under non-inclusive political institutions include South Africa, Chile, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.  
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opens up a more optimistic line of enquiry around the search for piecemeal reforms around the 
management of resource wealth and revenues that promote broader institutional development.  
Finally, criticisms of an overly prescriptive and deterministic understanding of institutions in economics 
frequently result from the statistical treatment and measurement of institutions in the empirical literature. 
This empirical literature emerged well after the theoretical ascendency of New Institutional Economics, 
as the desire to test the field’s perceived hypotheses in large cross-country samples resulted in the 
development of statistical measures of institutional quality (or “governance indicators”), as used for 
example by Knack and Keefer (1995), and later expanded on by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2004). These measures are problematic for a number of reasons. However, at the most basic 
level, a fundamental objection can be raised about whether the deep, historical and largely abstract 
notions at the heart of New Institutional Economics can be satisfactorily captured by a handful of 
quantitative indicators that, moreover, permit little quantitative variation, both across countries and over 
time (Aron, 2013).  
It seems incongruous that an intellectual tradition arguing for the deep appreciation of historical path 
dependence, the compatibility of the institutional matrix, and the need to understand particular 
institutions within the context of cultural norms and various forms of political enforcement is accused of 
determinism and overly prescriptive ideas around the sequencing of institutional change and reform. A 
theme of this chapter is New Institutional Economics’ sensitivity to the importance of context, history and 
politics; and, moreover, that the evolution of the field has moved it even further in this direction, in part 
due to the criticisms outlined above. If the theory of New Institutional Economics argued these points in 
a somewhat abstract sense, the more recent literature has also been influenced by real-world events. In 
particular, the failure of various waves of institutional reforms in developing and post-Soviet economies 
since the 1980s underlined the difficulties of “getting to Denmark”, as per Fukuyama.32 
32 Oft-cited examples include the difficulties with “shock therapy” around the introduction of market-based economic 
institutions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European satellites in the early 1990s, the unhappy aftermath of 
which increasingly favours arguments for incremental, context-specific institutional reforms. Rodrik (2000) adds 
older examples, such as the Asian financial crisis (financial liberalisation in the absence of tried and tested regulatory 
institutions) and Latin American market-based reforms in the 1980s (which he argues paid insufficient attention to 
social insurance and safety nets). Scholars have also suggested that the apparent failure of the IMF’s Structural 
Adjustment Programmes in Africa during the 1980s underline the folly of rapid, context-obtuse institutional reform 
(Stein, 1994; and Bates, 2014). 
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2.3.  Form and function: perspectives on institutional design 
A corollary of the multi-dimensional understanding of institutions described above is the absence of shelf-
ready prescriptions or blueprints for the design of institutions. Rodrik (2000) argues “a strategy of 
institution building must not over-emphasise best-practice ‘blueprints’ at the expense of local 
experimentation…desirable institutional arrangements vary…not only across countries, but also within 
countries over time.” This context- and historically-grounded conception of institutions does not render 
institutional economics silent on the commonalities of good institutions, but has rather led to an emphasis 
on the functions performed by such institutions, rather than an obsession with their precise form. The 
conflation of form and function is a common criticism of popular measures of institutional quality. Chang 
(2006) critiques the World Bank’s widely used governance/institutional-quality indexes for bundling 
together institutional forms (democracy, independence of the judiciary, the absence of state ownership) 
and functions (the enforcement of property rights and contracts, the maintenance of price stability, the 
restraint on executive political power and corruption). This section briefly outlines common functions 
performed by economic institutions, while the final section will discuss broader principles for institutional 
design that are compatible with Rodrik’s call for local experimentation and variation.33 
2 .3 .1 .  Establishing and enforcing property  r ights 
The establishment and enforcement of property rights are essential market-creating or -enabling 
institutions: decentralised economic exchange requires, at the very minimum, security of property. North 
and Thomas (1973) identified the establishment of secure and stable property rights as the pivotal factor in 
the rise of the West and the foundation of modern economic prosperity – the practical importance (and 
moral case for) private property have long been a cornerstone of liberal economic thought. Smith 
(1776[1981]) regarded the right to property not as a natural right, but rather an acquired one that 
legitimated the state: “Till there be property there can be no government, the very end of which is to 
secure wealth.” For Smith, the protection of property rights mattered as much to preventing “pillage and 
plunder” by the rich of the poor, as the other way around. “Laws and government,” he argued, allowed the 
33 For more in-depth discussions of these functions, see Rodrik, 2000; Glaeser et. al., 2004; and Kasper, Streit and 
Boettke, 2012). 
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rich to “preserve to themselves the inequality of the goods which would otherwise be soon destroyed by 
the attacks of the poor, who if not hindered by the government would soon reduce the others to an 
equality with themselves by open violence” (Smith, 1762-63[1982]: 208). In a comment on China from The 
Wealth of Nations, repeated here at length for its striking similarity to the arguments of North or 
Acemoglu and Robinson, Smith argued that the arbitrary confiscation of property circumscribed the 
extent of transactions in the Chinese economy and, consequently, contributed to its stagnation:  
“China seems to have been long stationary, and had probably long ago acquired that full 
complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its laws and institutions. But this 
complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, 
climate, and situation might admit of…though the rich or the owners of large capitals enjoy a 
good deal of security, the poor or the owners of small capitals enjoy scarce any, but are liable, 
under the pretence of justice, to be pillaged and plundered at any time by the inferior mandarines, 
the quantity of stock employed in all the different branches of business transacted within it, can 
never be equal to what the nature and extent of that business might admit (Smith, 1776[1981]: 112). 
Recent scholarship has questioned whether New Institutional Economics’ traditional emphasis on the 
desirability of private property rights is required, particularly if the focus is more on the function of 
institutions rather than their form. Again, questions of sequencing, compatibility and piecemeal 
institutional change looms large: Rodrik (2000), for example, argues private property rights clearly 
establish strong incentives for investment, risk taking and entrepreneurship in the context of the rule of 
law and other supportive institutions. However, absent these (and other) supportive institutions, there 
may be “second-best institutions”, other than private property rights, for securing “control rights over 
assets” (Rodrik, 2000). Both Rodrik (2004) and North (2005) draw attention to the success achieved by 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in China (firms in which ownership is typically held by local 
governments) in incentivising investments by private entrepreneurs. “In a system where courts cannot be 
relied upon to protect property rights, letting the government hold residual rights in the enterprise 
may have been a second-best mechanism for avoiding expropriation,” Rodrik (2004: 13) argues, 
“Private entrepreneurs felt secure not because the government was prevented from expropriating 
them, but because, sharing in the profits, it had no interest to expropriate them.”  
For both authors, the contrast between the positive function played by Chinese TVEs in providing 
positive incentives for investment and the meaningless function of de jure private property rights in the 
context of the de facto absence of the rule of law in post-communist Russia underlines the primacy of 
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institutional functions over form. The depiction of Chinese TVEs as a “second-best mechanism” suggests 
that a system of private property, buttressed by the rule of law, is ultimately preferred in the long run. The 
importance of supportive institutions and overall coherence of particular institutions with other elements 
of the institutional matrix have long been important themes in New Institutional Economics. Rodrik’s 
notion of second-best institutions is not only an important articulation of the primacy of institutional 
functions over forms, but also of the need to consider compatibility with the existing institutional matrix 
and the sequencing of institutional reforms (themes discussed in greater detail below). 
The scarcity (and in the case of many natural resources, finite supply) of economic resources often triggers 
distributional struggles and conflict for their control, particularly when property rights are not well 
defined and enforced. Institutions can contribute to managing and preventing such conflicts by 
preventing the reality or perception that the distributional struggle is systematically tilted in favour of 
“winners” at the expense of “losers”. Even when property rights are well defined and societies are 
characterised by the rule of law, complementary institutions with the specific function of assisting in the 
management and prevention of conflict are frequently required (fiscal federalism and decentralisation are 
prime examples). Institutions that perform the function of conflict management are particularly important 
in countries characterised by acute ethnic fragmentation and sharp inequalities in income and wealth. As 
Rodrik (2000) notes, conflict or even the threat of conflict can “hamper social cooperation and prevent the 
undertaking of mutually beneficial projects.” For economists, institutions that perform the function of 
conflict management are also important for the efficient and productive allocation of the factors of 
production. Social conflict is damaging to economic prosperity, “both because it diverts resources form 
economically productive activities and because it discourages such activities by the uncertainty it 
generates” (Rodrik, 2000). 
2 .3 .2 .  Constraining the arbitrary  exercise  of  polit ical  power 
A well-understood tension underlying various theories of the state is that any entity powerful enough to 
create a system of property rights (and indeed other institutions) is simultaneously powerful enough to 
violate them – elsewhere referred to as the “paradox of power” or the “paradox of government” (Weingast, 
1995). The state typically enjoys a monopoly (or at least a significant comparative advantage) in the 
exercise and threat of violence and coercive power. On the one hand, this is why the state can credibly 
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commit to enforcing property rights; while, on the other, requiring institutional constraints on the use of 
political power that can result in the confiscation of property. Historically, robust institutions to constrain 
state and political power include constitutions and the rule of law, the separation of powers between 
various arms of government, political contestation, federalism, mechanisms that enforce transparency and 
accountability around government actions, and the transfer of powers otherwise vested in the state to 
independent authorities (for example, the conduct of monetary policy, financial supervision and the 
management of public pensions). These institutional functions clearly resonate with Western democratic 
traditions that emerged most prominently from the Enlightenment (but date back at least as far as 
Aristotle).34  
Here too, however, alternative institutional arrangements can conceivably perform similar functions in 
constraining the arbitrary use of political power – after all, Fukuyama’s “end of history” has not arrived35 - 
and the Chinese example stands out as the case that needs to be explained. Fukuyama (2012) argues that 
while China never developed the rule of law – that is, “an independent legal institution that would limit 
the discretion of the government” – the Chinese model, which he argues has essentially been maintained 
for 2,000 years, “substituted for formal checks on power a bureaucracy bound by rules and customs, which 
made its behaviour reasonably predictable.” However, the absence of checks on power has created (and 
will arguably continue to create) a fundamental risk, with occasionally devastating consequences, which 
Fukuyama calls the bad Emperor problem: “while unchecked power in the hands of a benevolent and wise 
ruler has many advantages, how do you guarantee a continuing supply of good Emperors?”  
The experience under the last truly “bad emperor”, Chairman Mao, was sufficiently atrocious to institute 
reductions in centralised power under the imperial system in favour of the nine members of the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party (who serve fixed terms). However, the rules 
governing the Standing Committee are not public knowledge, are not embedded in a constitution or 
34 In Chapter XVI of Politics, Aristotle asserts, in opposition to Plato’s notion of the philosopher king who is above 
the law: “It is more proper that law should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle, if it is 
advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to be only 
guardians, and the servants of the laws.” (Aristotle, 1853). 
35 In The Origins of Political Order Fukuyama tones down the “end of history” narrative, but still maintains the 
modern political order requires three institutional characteristics: a strong and capable state, the state’s 
subordination to a rule of law, and government accountability to all citizens. The tension described here is apparent 
from Fukuyama’s first two characteristics.  
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enforced by a judicial system, but rather “simply internal rules of the (Communist) Party, which actually 
have to be inferred from the Party’s behaviour”. Hence, the bad Emperor problem remains: while system 
lacking formal constraints on the arbitrary exercise of political power can deliver positive results under 
very specific conditions, their inability to get rid of bad leaders – and, importantly curb their discretionary 
powers while in office – remains a significant shortcoming over the long run.  
Once again, the point here is not that the full-fledged adoption of the rule of law and Western standards of 
transparency, accountability and political contestation are absolute prerequisites for economic progress, 
particularly from low-equilibrium points of departure. A number of historical episodes of economic 
growth and modernisation under the tutelage of relatively unconstrained autocrats have resulted in an 
unscientific romanticism around the merits of benevolent dictatorships (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011).  
Yet, three counter arguments may be presented. First, as Easterly (2011) in particular has shown, the 
argument that autocracy and unconstrained executive power is somehow positive for growth is 
statistically weak, subject to various cognitive biases, and ultimately unfalsifiable. Second, the argument in 
favour of the rule of law and Western standards of transparency, accountability and democracy as 
desirable mechanisms for constraining political power generally rests of their durability and long-run 
resilience, rather than short-run impact. Third, the claim is rarely made the rule of law, accountability, 
transparency and the rule insurers against bad outcomes – rather, the argument is that these meta 
institutions provide built-in means of responding to the world outcomes than autocracies generally lack. 
Ultimately, an emphasis on institutional functions underlines the importance of establishing mechanisms 
for political constraint. Rules, however contextually determined and nuanced, are an example of such 
mechanisms, and there are examples where rules have been successfully implemented in non-democratic 
environments.  
2 .3 .3 .  Incentive  al ignment 
An emphasis on the incentive structures established by institutions is a central theme in New Institutional 
Economics: “Institutions provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes 
the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation, or decline” North (1991: 97). In the context 
of decentralised economic organisation, which relies on a myriad of principal-agent relationships, as 
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economic exchange moves from self-reliant modes of existence towards one characterised by 
specialisation, trade and cooperation, the study of agency relationships is a specific application of the tools 
of analysis of transaction costs, asymmetric information and incentive alignment. Given imperfect 
information between cooperating agents, “it takes resources to define and enforce exchange 
agreements…in the context of individual wealth-maximising behaviour and asymmetric information about 
the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged (or the performance of agents), transaction costs are a 
critical determinant of economic performance” (North, 1991: 98).  
A number of factors can bring about agency problems and raise the cost of maintaining cooperative 
principal-agent relationships. The agent may have objectives that differ significantly from that of the 
principal, which become problematic if the pursuit of the agent’s objectives undermines that of the 
principal. The contribution of institutional economics to the study of agency relationships has emphasised 
the importance of clearly defined contracts and other institutional “commitment technologies” that change 
the incentives confronting agents, so that it becomes in the agent’s best interest to act in a way that is 
consistent with the achievement of the principal’s objectives. In game-theoretic terms, successful 
institutions provide positive incentives for cooperation (and negative incentives for defection), thereby 
lowering the cost of decentralised exchange.  
The principal-agent framework is also a helpful and frequently used lens through which to analyse the role 
and functioning of government and its various institutions. Buchanan’s “lens of contract” outlined earlier is 
particularly relevant here, as all contractual arrangements, whether between employer and employee or 
the state and the citizen, contain important elements of agency (Ross, 1973). Contracts around the 
conduct of government function as a means to align incentives when they are imbedded in a system of rule 
of law, when the terms (for example, the achievement of policy goals) are clearly defined, and the 
supporting institutional infrastructure demands or at least promotes transparency.  
2 .3 .4.  Promoting (macroeconomic)  stabil ity  
The idea that markets do not always stabilise automatically – or, more to the point, that welfare gains can 
be achieved by efforts to speed up what might otherwise be a protracted return to equilibrium – is now 
widely accepted by almost all major intellectual and methodological traditions in the study of the business 
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cycle (Romer and Romer, 2002). Policies and institutions aim to promote stability across at least three 
major dimensions: real economic activity, nominal variables, and the banking and financial system. While 
much of attention the literature falls on the positive role of counter-cyclical policy, notably monetary and 
fiscal policy (and the institutional underpinnings of such policies, as per Rodrik, 2004), it is clear that 
macroeconomic instability is also the result of institutional weaknesses – particularly at the extremes, for 
example, during sovereign debt defaults and episodes of hyperinflation. An exclusive focus on the 
technical aspects of monetary and fiscal policy in their role in stabilising the economy constrains the 
discussion to a purely technocratic and analytical exercise. However, observed policy actions and 
frameworks can also be the proximate cause of instability, while institutions are the ultimate cause or 
“deep determinants” (Satyanath and Subramanian, 2004). Recent empirical studies have found strong 
support for institutions as the ultimate cause of both real (Rodrik, 1999; and Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2003) and nominal instability (Satyanath and Subramanian, 2004).  
A prominent theme in the literature on the economics of the business cycle is that monetary and fiscal 
policies (and indeed stabilising institutions) do not only frequently fail to provide counter-cyclical forces, 
but also that they are in fact procyclical: that is, they exacerbate the natural fluctuations in the real 
economy. This is particularly true in developing countries, suggesting that technocratic miscalculations 
and misapplications of policy tools are only part of the story, and that institutional weaknesses also 
warrant close scrutiny. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is a particularly significant problem in resource-rich 
developing countries (Alesina, Campante and Tabellini, 2008; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009; and 
Arezki, Hamilton and Kazimov, 2011). 
The study of inflationary biases that emanate from political influences on monetary policy provided the 
catalyst for the most important institutional innovations in central banking, notably the move towards 
central bank policy independence and the adoption of inflation-targeting policy frameworks. A large part 
of the procyclicality of fiscal policy is still attributed to the political business cycle in the literature 
following the theoretical formalisation of Nordhaus (1975). The adoption of rule-based fiscal institutions 
has been more staunchly resisted in the area of fiscal policy than in monetary policy, but offer a promising, 
if partial, solution to the observed tendency towards procyclicality – not least in highly volatile resource-
dependent economies (Ossowski, Villafuerte, Medas and Thomas, 2008 and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012).  
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2.4.  Principles for the design of sound institutions 
This chapter has outlined the growing scepticism about categorical claims regarding the desirability of 
specific institutional configurations. The argument against a narrow view of appropriate institutional 
forms rests on three inter-related pillars. First, we do not know enough about origins of and incentives for 
institutional change to make strong and realistic prescriptions. Second, that an emphasis on specific 
institutional forms can naively ignore political agency, and that the political use of institutions (that appear 
similar in form) is more important than their form. Third, that the support for specific institutional forms 
can be similarly ignorant of history and context, which bring to the fore questions about the compatibility 
of particular institutional forms with other elements of the institutional matrix and the most effective 
sequencing and pace of institutional reform. The consequent tendency to advance institutional functions 
over specific forms does not, however, render the literature completely silent on normative principles for 
institutional design, which are summarised briefly here. 
2 .4.1 .  Cost  ef f ic iency 
The overarching function of institutions is to reduce the costs that accompany decentralised market-based 
exchange due to information problems, uncertainty and various transaction costs. Logically, the 
institutions established to reduce those costs should not be more expensive to society. The cost-efficiency 
constraint applies across a number of dimensions: the cost of creating institutions (including adjustment 
costs), changing them in a dynamic setting, and the costs associated with the enforcement of institutions. 
New Institutional Economics has focused on the prevalence of significant adjustment costs and path 
dependence to explain why apparently poor institutions persist.36 This insight underlines the keen 
appreciation of the deep historical origins of institutions in New Institutional Economics: path 
dependence describes how the historical reinforcement of a given set of institutional arrangements raises 
the cost of changing them. The cost of switching to an ostensibly better set of institutions, even if society 
36 A classic example of path dependence and adjustment costs is David’s (1985) analysis of persistence of the 
QWERTY keyboard, despite knowledge of obviously better alternatives. David argues that a switch to more 
ergonomically efficient keyboards would involve costs that are too high – for example, in terms of retraining typists 
and changing the production process for keyboards – to justify an adjustment. David (1985) coined the phrase “path 
dependence” to describe the pervasive influence of the past on the present and future structure of the institutional 
matrix. 
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is able to positively identify them, may be prohibitively expensive. The cost of adjustment is also a 
frequently invoked argument for gradualism: a piecemeal process of institutional change may in such 
costs, or at least spreads the burden of carrying them over successive generations, while allowing other 
elements of the institutional matrix to adjust at a commensurate pace.  
Another theme pertaining to the costs associated with institutions is that the credibility of enforcement is 
inversely related to cost: again, commitment technologies are important to ensure that economic agents 
do not second-guess institutions and their enforcement. One of the institutional arguments for contingent 
rules over the exercise of discretion is that such rules are a means towards achieving credibility and 
reducing the cost of enforcement.  
2 .4.2.  Receptiveness  
This chapter has repeatedly underlined the importance of context in the design and functioning of 
institutions. As noted above, it is a positive insight from New Institutional Economics that institutions 
change gradually due to the powerful effects of path dependence; but also a normative argument that 
piecemeal, gradualist reform is desirable, given not only path dependence and adjustment costs, but also 
the intricacy and inter-woven nature of institutional matrix. However, it also follows from these positive 
and normative arguments that institutions do and should change, when both endogenous and exogenous 
events affect the functions they are required to perform. As discussed earlier, this dynamic understanding 
of institutions is due in particular to Douglass North. 
Institutions can become obsolete if they do not adapt to changing contexts and changes to other elements 
within the institutional matrix. The New Institutional Economics literature suggests that institutions that 
are receptive to such changes have built-in mechanisms for receiving feedback and evaluation. The 
receptiveness of institutions touches on a range of structural political and economic features of a country – 
for example, the extent of judicial and legislative oversight (the separation of powers), the culture and 
public expectations with respect to the transparency of government institutions, and openness to global 
trade and competition. However, even within open societies, some institutions are better than others at 
promoting feedback and evaluation – that is, receptiveness is also a matter of design.  
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2.4.3 .  Stabil ity  and durabil ity  
One of the fundamental tensions in institutional economics is that while institutions should be receptive to 
dynamic change in the manner described above, they should also not constantly change – after all, the 
purpose of institutions is generally to bring a degree of predictability into otherwise higher uncertain 
economic exchange. As Hodgson (2006) observes, “the durability of institutions stems from the fact that 
they can usefully create stable expectations of the behaviour of others…Being relatively stable, institutions 
have equilibrium-like qualities, even if their equilibria can be disturbed.” Following the analogy of 
institutions as the “rules of the game”, the quality of the game will suffer if players were uncertain about the 
rules. Ever-changing institutions can be a source of instability, uncertainty and unpredictability in 
economic life, rather than a solution to it.  
Political economic considerations provide additional reasons why durability is commonly associated with 
good institutions: they are often designed to outlive the time horizon or term of policymakers or 
politicians. Political timeframes are notoriously short, adding tremendous uncertainty and 
unpredictability to economic life in the absence of more durable, institutionalised rules of the game. Even 
in more benign policy contexts, rule-based policy frameworks can provide stability and continuity by 
avoiding cults of personality.37 For Buchanan and other economists in the tradition of “constitutional 
economics” (which was described early as part of institutional economics, if not New Institutional 
Economics), there was a critically important distinction to be made between political-economy at the 
constitutional level (the area of focus for Buchanan and others in the field of constitutional economics) and 
in-period economic and political decisions (Buchanan, 1987). The former was concerned with the analysis 
of the rules and (political) limits that outlive, and indeed frame, in-period decisions. Sovereign wealth 
funds (and the rules-based fiscal framework that govern them) are understood and analysed in this 
dissertation as an attempt to move, through a set of institutional reforms, a variety of choices around the 
37 Contrast the arrival of Janet Yellen as chairman of Federal Reserve with that of Ben Bernanke before her. 
Bernanke succeeded Alan Greenspan, whose reputation for economic insight assumed cult-like levels, who 
eschewed rule-based policy frameworks. Consequently, Bernanke had to overcome the cult of personality that 
accompanied Greenspan’s chairmanship; and his arrival at the Fed resulted in widespread uncertainty over the 
policies of the “Bernanke Fed”. During his term, Bernanke introduced a much more rule-based policy framework, 
based on inflation targets and systematic expectations management that was less reliant on the personalities 
implementing them. Consequently, the arrival of Yellen as chairman was largely a non-event compared to Bernanke’s 
succession of Greenspan.  
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management of resource revenues that have historically been situated at the level of in-period politics to 
that of politics at the constitutional level. 
2 .4.4.  Coherence 
New Institutional Economics underscores the critical importance of situating specific institutions within 
the broader context of what North called the “institutional matrix” or the “institutional framework”. 
Institutions and the organisations responsible for enforcing them cannot be analysed and assessed in 
isolation, as they invariably form part of an “institutional matrix [that] consists of an interdependent web of 
institutions and consequent political and economic organisations” (North, 1991: 109, emphasis added). 
Hall and Soskice (2001: 17) emphasise that the effectiveness of the institutional matrix depends on 
“institutional complementarity” – the extent to which “the presence (or efficiency) of one [institution] 
increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other.” Similarly, Rodrik (2002) argued that “different 
elements of a society’s institutional configuration tend to be mutually reinforcing” and that the design and 
functioning of any particular institution has “repercussions for other parts of the institutional landscape.”  
From an institutional-design perspective, this point underlines the importance of considering whether a 
specific institutional change is productively paired with other elements within the (pre-existing) 
institutional matrix. This has both positive and negative implications. Positively, certain institutional 
forms that would appear inefficient or ineffective in isolation, can deliver surprising results given the 
nature of the institutional matrix in which it is situated. Negatively, certain institutional forms that have 
worked well in a number of contexts, can fail in an unsuitable and unsupportive institutional matrix. 
Rodrik’s (2004) previously mentioned example of the (apparently) contrasting effectiveness of Chinese 
communal property rights and private property rights in post-Soviet Russia can be explained by 
considering the institutional matrix. An apparently poor institution “worked” in the Chinese context, 
while an apparently good institution failed in Russia given the weakness of supporting institutions in the 
matrix. The complexity of the institutional matrix is another reason for advocating gradualism with 
respect to process of institutional change.  
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2.4.5 .  Incentive  compatibi l i ty  
Decentralised forms of economic organisation invariably necessitate delegated interactions and principal-
agent relationships. Well-designed institutions and contracts establish incentives for agents to act in way 
that serves the interests of the principal, a feature that economists refer to as incentive alignment or 
incentive compatibility. Politics looms large over attempts to establish institutions that align incentives in 
public principal-agent relationships. Consider Bates’ (1981 and 2014) previously cited belief that most 
institutions are in the final analysis a political construct; and consequently, a political instrument. In 
contexts where existing institutions are tool for political patronage and security of office, it can be 
exceedingly difficult to align political incentives in favour of institutional reform.  
Recognition of the difficulty of aligning political incentives has been another source of support for 
gradualism in the process of institutional reform, notably from Rodrik (2008) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2013a). Rodrik, in particular, is sympathetic to the idea of sub-optimal (or in his words, 
“heterodox” and “second-best”) institutions, if these can be demonstrated to provide better incentive 
compatibility. Ultimately, good institutions take incentive alignment seriously and attempt to incorporate 
internal mechanisms to achieve this. At the very least, good institutions should not create a set of 
incentives that are clearly at odds with each other and the function the institutions is tasked with 
performing.   
Conclusion 
Chapter 1 presented a number of observations about the increasing support for institutions-centric 
explanations for the observed variation in economic prosperity of resource-rich economies. In this respect, 
the resource-curse literature reflects the broad ascendance of institutional analysis in economics in general 
and development economics specifically. Chapter 3 deals in greater detail with a number of the leading 
insights from this literature regarding the institutional and political-economy channels through which 
resources affect economic performance. The role of this chapter was to situate the contribution and 
influence of institutional economics, particularly New Institutional Economics, in the context of the 
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broader discipline of economics; and offer a theoretical framework for analysing the form and functions of 
institutions.  
This framework will be employed in this dissertation to conduct both positive and normative assessment 
of sovereign wealth funds and their accompanying fiscal rules as an institutional response to the resource 
curse. However, one overarching theme from this chapter bears emphasis: namely, the slow-moving 
nature of institutions and the extent to which arguments for the primacy of institutions in economics tend 
to pertain to long-run relationships. This is particularly important for any argument linking institutions to 
the resource curse, because – as argued in the preceding chapter – the latter is also best understood as a 
set of arguments around long-term economic relationships.  
An important practical implication of this long-term, institutional perspective is that it calls into question 
the wisdom of many policy prescriptions for the resource-dependent developing countries. Subsequent 
chapters, notably Chapter 4, will return to the tension between gradualism and rapid transformation in 
policy debates around resource-dependent economies, particularly as it applies to potential contribution of 
sovereign wealth funds. Clearly, the institutional economics, as presented in the chapter, tends to favour 
gradualism. In contrast, a powerful intellectual tradition that started with Rosenstein-Rodan’s big-push 
model in the 1950s, suggests that governments in resource-dependent poor countries should use 
commodity windfalls to promote rapid economic transformation. Leading development economists such 
as Paul Collier (see, for example, Collier, 2010 and 2012) and Jeffrey Sachs (see Sachs and Warner, 1999 
and Sachs, 2005) are the intellectual heirs of Rostenstein and Rodan in arguing that, along with foreign 
aid, resource revenue windfalls are a means through which to achieve rapid economic transformation, 
diversification and development. This tradition typically argues for the strong hand of the state in the 
escape from a number of perceived “development traps”, with resource revenues (and/or aid) providing 
otherwise lacking capital through which to achieve it.38  
38 The use of the trap analogy in development economics is widespread. In The Bottom Billion, Collier (2007) 
identifies four poverty traps, of which the “natural-resource trap” is one (alongside conflict, bad governance and 
landlocked traps). Economists and other social scientists often refer without much reflection or substantiation to the 
importance of escaping poverty traps through bold (typically state-led) action, although it is not always clear if this 
guarantees the subsequent avoidance of the “middle-income trap”, about which there is much concern in the 
development literature (Agénor and Canuto, 2012). 
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The institutional argument in favour of sovereign wealth funds presented in this dissertation takes a 
different view of resource-based economic development. This view suggests that big-push models in the 
spirit of Rosenstein-Rodan, Sachs and Collier, particularly as they assign such an aggressively activist role 
for the state in investing resource revenues underplay, if not entirely ignore, the institutional and political-
economy constraints on efficient and sustainable public investment financed by resource revenues. 
Moreover, as the following chapter suggests, there is a wealth of research to suggest that resource 
windfalls impede rather than promote positive institutional change.  
The contribution of sovereign wealth funds proposed in this dissertation regards these institutional and 
political economy constraints as fundamental to resource-dependent economies. Consequently, the 
institutional perspective on sovereign wealth funds calls for them to be embedded in a set of rules and 
supports a more long-term, gradualist view of how resource revenues should be used in the process of 
economic development. The establishment of a rule-based sovereign wealth fund model for managing 
resource revenues is nothing more (and nothing less) than part of process of piecemeal reform and 
institutional change that acknowledges, first, that existing institutions are difficult and costly to change; 
second, that specific institutions are part of broader institutional matrix with which they need to be 
compatible; and, finally, that history suggests that resource-abundance has had a negative impact on 
institutional development.  
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Chapter 3 
To behave to l ike Swedes:  
Institutional and political problems of resource-dependent economies 
Scandinavian countries frequently appear as distant, limiting cases in discussions of social and economic 
progress. As noted in the previous chapter, Francis Fukuyama views the quest for institutional stability as 
an effort to “get to Denmark”, while countries with natural resources are often desperate to imitate the 
“Norwegian model”. For Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, the Last Shah of Iran, the utopian ideal was Sweden. 
Buoyed by swelling oil revenues, the Shah initiated a series of sweeping social and economic 
modernisation programs, with evocative names such as the White Revolution and the Great Civilisation. 
Soon, the Shah promised, Iranian living standards would match those of Western Europe.  
While the Shah’s plans certainly lacked nothing in terms of ambition and scale, the contents was a mass of 
contradictions (including, for example, parallel efforts at privatisation and nationalisation; creeping 
authoritarianism together with the enfranchisement of women, the establishment of a social safety net and 
a secular public education system) and lacked even the pretense of constitutional authority or political and 
social consultation. The Shah swept these concerns aside arguing, “when Iranians learn to behave like 
Swedes, I will behave like the King of Sweden.”39 
The Shah’s paternalism is depressingly characteristic of many modernising monarchs and benevolent 
dictators; while his grand schemes for spending oil revenues reflect pathologies suffered by a great 
number of resource-rich countries: autocratic government, wasteful “investment” of resource windfalls, 
and misguided efforts to rapidly transform resource-dominated economies into diversified, modern ones. 
Above all, the Shah’s remarks about the differences between Iran and Sweden bring to light a much-
debated issue in development economics: the timing, sequencing and interactions of political, institutional 
and policy reforms, particularly in the context of challenging initial conditions. Recall that, as outlined at 
the end of Chapter 2, scholars have identified the quality of institutions at the time of resource discovery 
(initial institutions) as a robust predictor of countries’ ability to successfully manage commodity wealth. 
39 This quote appeared in an article by Claire Sterling (1961) and was cited in Political Order in Changing Societies 
by Samuel Huntington (1968). 
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Coupled with evidence that natural resources tend to erode the quality of institutions, especially when 
they are already weak, the prospects for positive institutional reform appear even bleaker for economies 
that discover resources in the context of poor institutional quality (and even worse still for countries with 
poor institutions, coupled with a long history of resource extraction).  
A simple reading from the empirical literature of the past decade on the relationship between institutions 
and natural resources suggests that, unless countries “behave like Swedes” – and, moreover, miraculously 
start to do so the moment they discover resources – they are most likely doomed to failure. In light of the 
discussion in the previous chapter, economists from New Institutional Economics tradition would not 
predict much success in the overnight embrace of the rule of law, security of contracts, and accountable 
and transparent public institutions by countries with poor initial institutional conditions. The intricacy of 
the institutional matrix and the path-dependent nature of institutions has led to the positive observation 
that institutions change incrementally over the course of history, and supported the normative conclusion 
that piecemeal reforms of existing institutions is more likely to succeed than abrupt ones.  
Therefore, the policy implications of underlining the importance of institutions writ large – that is, the 
macro or meta institutions of a society (the rule of law, security of contracts, the accountability, 
transparency and efficiency of public institutions, the extent of democracy and the degree of corruption) – 
in the resource-curse phenomenon is rather limited. The more rewarding – and intellectually challenging – 
question is whether targetted institutional reforms can be proposed that, first, address specific political 
and economic problems associated with resource wealth; and, second, have a reasonable chance of being 
implemented and sustained in the context of relatively poor general institutions (particularly when 
coupled with resource windfalls, which may exacerbate or sustain weak meta institutions). Acemoglu and 
Robinson phrased the challenge as follows:  
“the reform of [macro] institutions will be very hard because…it is typically not a coincidence that 
societies have unaccountable political systems, lack the rule of law and have low capacity states all 
at the same time…A good place to start in reforming institutions is perhaps not the macro 
institutions of the whole society, but the nexus of institutions that surrounds natural 
resources…[which constitute] much more fruitful lines of policy reform than blaming the resource 
curse on just weak “rule of law” or lack of “checks and balances” – even though both statements are 
likely true” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013b). 
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The need for greater specificity in understanding the role of institutions in resource-rich countries has 
been highlighted by a number of scholars. Arguing that the literature on the “political economy of the 
resource curse...is still in its infancy,” Torvik (2009), for example, notes: “We still have a quite limited 
knowledge along which dimensions the resource-abundant winners and losers differ, and about what the 
mechanisms behind these differences are.” It is contended in this dissertation that rule-based sovereign 
wealth funds are exactly the kind of targetted institutional reform that can address a number of the 
common specific political and economic problems of resource-dependent countries.  
A more speculative contention is that this type of institutional change, which can be incremental, is a 
potentially hopeful direction even in the context of relatively weak institutions. A related claim is that the 
adoption of a rule-based sovereign wealth fund model can arrest the further deterioration of institutional 
quality that has been found to accompany resource discoveries in the context of poor general institutions. 
This chapter discusses the literature on the specific institutional and political-economic problems of 
resource-based economies, in order to understand which issues targetted reforms and institutional 
interventions need to address. 
The literature on the institutions and political economy of resource-rich economies is vast and addresses 
every conceivable link in the resource “value chain”: from the point of exploration to decisions around the 
spending and investment of revenues. Collier (2007) popularised the concept of a resource value chain in 
his book, The Bottom Billion: the chain begin with exploration (and incentives and policies that promote 
or discourage exploration), followed by the taxation of resource extraction and sales, the public disclosure 
of the taxation regime, the management of volatile revenues, and the investment of these revenues.40 In 
this section, the emphasis is on the institutional and political economy problems that result in particular 
from the last two links in this chain.  
40 This framework has since become a reference for other a multitude of organisations working on natural resource 
governance, including the Natural Resource Governance Institute (formerly Revenue Watch Institute), the World 
Bank and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
74 
3.1.  Rent seeking 
Since their emergence in the 1970s, theories of rent-seeking behaviour have become hugely influential in 
development economics, following the contributions of Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974). Rent seeking 
describes efforts to manipulate the political and regulatory environment in order to capture “economic 
rents” – that is, income paid to factors of production in access of their opportunity cost. The analysis of the 
effects of rent-seeking behaviour on economic activity has emphasised that it allocates economic resources 
away from productive activities (value creation) towards an unproductive scramble for rents surrounding 
existing economic value (rent seeking). Central to the concept and implications of rent seeking are waste 
and inefficiency – economic agents devote economic resources to efforts to grab a share of the existing 
wealth, rather than trying to create new wealth. The government and the state play an important role in 
this process as frequent creators of rents through pervasive regulation, awarding of monopoly rights and 
public work contracts.  
It is a well-documented fact that the resource sector potentially generates enormous rents and is therefore 
prone to pervasive rent-seeking behaviour (Gelb, 1988, Collier, 2012 and Frankel, 2012). The government 
typically plays a major part in the creation and distribution of these resource rents, as it typically has the 
power to award contracts for exploration and concessions for extraction, and impose taxes resource 
production and profits. An important implication of the rent-seeking perspective on resource economics is 
that, while traditional rent seeking models can explain why these countries have underperformed their 
own potential (that is, the weak form of the resource curse thesis, as discussed in Chapter 1), it cannot 
explain why they underperform resource-poor countries (as per the strong-form version of hypothesis). 
Traditional rent-seeking models explain sub-optimality (waste and inefficiency), but not outright negative 
economic performance.  
Influential research by Tornell and Lane (1999) and Torvik (2002) incorporated negative feedback 
mechanisms in their models in order to account for such negative performance. Tornell and Lane (1999) is 
the most celebrated application of the rent-seeking argument to issues of resource economies. They 
introduced the idea of a “feeding frenzy” around the capturing of rents emanating from the resource 
economy, which they call the “voracity effect”. A resource boom results in more income being available for 
redistribution between a set of competitive and powerful domestic interest groups. In their game-
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theoretic set-up, as each group demands higher transfers, a tax increase is required because capital is 
reallocated from the formal sector to the less productive informal sector, where it is safe from taxation. 
The higher tax rate required to offset higher transfers, reduces the return on capital, which in their model 
can outweigh the direct effect of increased productivity and therefore lower growth. In Torvik (2002), a 
resource boom results in a shift of entrepreneurial talent away from high-productivity modern firms 
toward unproductive rent seeking – thereby introducing elements of the Dutch disease tradition, albeit 
with a political-economy or institutional underpinning.  
Hodler (2006) provides another significant contribution by linking a number of strands within the 
institutional literature: institutional quality is a key determinant of success in combating the curse, and is 
influenced by the degree of ethnic fractionalisation, via the process of rent seeking. Rent seeking – and, 
more specifically, the related idea that governments can use the rents and revenues resources generate to 
effectively pay off interest groups – has also featured prominently in a number of theories linking resources 
to the (lack of) government accountability and the (short) length of political time horizons in the context of 
resource wealth. 
3.2.  Fiscal  f inancing, accountability and forms of government 
Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006) produced one of the most comprehensive theses on the interactions 
between abundant resource revenues, political accountability and the origins of institutions. Their 
argument and empirical evidence suggests that governments that do not have to introduce socially 
tolerable and consistent systems of taxation, but can rather finance themselves through resource revenues, 
have reduced incentives to be accountable and responsive to their citizens. Consequently, they do not 
have a vested interest in the development of a thriving market-based, non-resource economy that is 
otherwise required to establish a taxable economic base and secure the fiscal sustainability of the state. By 
contrast, governments and ruling elites in non-resource countries have an incentive to promote the 
development of such a market-based economy, as it generates a multitude of corporate and individual 
taxpayers, providing a steady and stable source of fiscal revenue (in exchange for accountable governance 
and the provision of public goods).  
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In the Robinson et. al. (2006) model, the existence of resources and their related rents increases the utility 
of holding political power for longer. As a result, political horizons across a range of policy issues are sub-
optimally short (from a social welfare perspective), as most political resources are directed to the single 
purpose of retaining power. One manifestation of this is a bloated public sector, which establishes a 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo and is “paid off” through rents emanating from the resource 
sector. Unsurprisingly, a number of prominent studies have found strong evidence that resource 
abundance is associated with higher levels of corruption; even less surprising is the conclusion that 
resource abundance is more likely to be associated with high levels of corruption in countries with poor 
institutions (Mauro, 1995; Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2009).  
Sarr and Swanson (2013) and Sarr, Bulte, Meissner and Swanson (2011) extend the analysis of the links 
between dictatorship and resources, by introducing the role of lending. In their model, a dictator 
confronts a choice between “staying” and “looting”. Whereas staying requires public investment so as to 
enhance the productive capacity of the economy, the latter entrenches “the sort of corruption that renders 
resource-rich countries subject to the (resource) curse” (Sarr and Swanson, 2013). The model focuses 
specifically on the enabling role of external financing in establishing incentives for looting and finds that 
“excessive resource-based lending by external financial institutions can induce political instability and 
looting”, as access to external liquidity directly increases the opportunity cost to staying and investing in 
the economy (Sarr and Swanson, 2013). 
Robinson et. al. (2006) and Auty’s (2007) theories of “rent cycling” are powerful tools for explaining not 
only the existence of narrow patronage systems associated with a political elite, but resonate with models 
of the forms of governments that emerge (in the language of political science, state formation) in the long 
run in resource-rich countries. Economic historians (Wright and Czelusta, 2004 and 2007; and Engerman 
and Sokoloff, 2000) have suggested that non-extractive societies developed institutions and foundations 
around the state built on individualism, decentralisation, accountable democracy, egalitarianism and 
capitalism. Extractive societies, on the other hand, failed to develop along these lines, because centralised 
states and political elites had access to easy financing through a control of rents. This work also ties in 
with a significant theme in an older political science literature of resource-abundant and –dependent 
states, which has theorised the emergence of durable “rentier states” that assume a clientelist relationship 
with their citizens (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Ross, 2001; and Wantchekon, 2002). So-called 
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“petrostates” are a specific, and acute, manifestation of such forms of government (Mahdavy, 1970; and 
Karl, 1997). In this sense, the resource-curse literature has started the important task of describing the 
political-economy foundations of observed institutional outcomes (or certain types of state formation) – 
rather than jump straight to the deep, slow-moving institutional structures.  
3 .3.  White elephants:  the misallocation of public investment  
The rent-seeking and broader political-economy literature on the resource curse helps explain the 
prevalence of poor public investments financed by resource-related public revenue windfalls. Torvik 
(2009) suggests that one of the biggest intellectual puzzles surrounding resource-rich economies is why 
the massive domestic investments have not resulted in greater growth pay-offs. Gelb (1988) calculated that 
around half of the windfall gains from the oil shocks in the 1970s were invested in domestic projects. As 
both these studies observe, any of the leading growth models in economics would have predicted strong 
growth on the back of such significant public investments.  
There are a number of plausible arguments for why the anticipated growth failed to materialise, many of 
which draw on the previously discussed rent-seeking literature, as well as other insights from the broader 
Public Choice literature.41 In his study of the Nigerian government’s response to positive terms-of-trade 
shocks between 1972 and 1988, Gavin (1993) finds a “tendency for governments to invest in projects with 
high prestige or political payoff, but with little economic rationale.” Similarly, Robinson and Torvik argue 
that resource-rich countries are more prone to investing in “white elephants” – that is, public investment 
projects with negative social surplus: “The higher the rents from holding office, the more economically 
inefficient investment projects can be and still be politically efficient” (Robinson and Torvik, 2005). 
41 Of course, there are more technically economic reasons for this, particularly those relating to the volatility of 
resource revenues, which results in damaging “stop-start” public investment cycles, procyclicality and sharply 
diminishing marginal returns to public investments during boom periods. These issues are discussed below, with a 
particular emphasis on the possible interactions between these economic outcomes and political-economy factors.  
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3.4.  Resources and conflict 
An extreme manifestation of the political pathologies of the resource curse is found in countries with civil 
wars and a proclivity for violent conflict. Various studies – most notably by Paul Collier and Anne 
Hoeffler – have found that a strong link between civil wars and natural resources, and provided some 
theoretical explanations for this link. Collier and Hoeffler (1998 and 2004) examine a range of issues 
related to the relationship between resource abundance and political unrest, conflict and war (which are 
all unambiguously bad for growth). Their theoretical work suggests that resource-rich countries face a 
higher risk of conflict for two reasons. First, resources provide easy financing for weapons and soldiers. 
Secondly, because resources often have a “winner-takes-all” quality with large pay-offs for the winner and 
limited needs for future cooperation to extract rents, resources tend to trigger violent struggles for 
control. Based on their analysis of the data, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) conclude that “the extent of 
primary commodity exports is the largest single influence on the risk of conflict.”42 
3 .5.  Excessive volati l ity and procyclical  policy 
One of the leading explanations for the resource curse revolves around the extraordinary volatility of most 
commodity prices and the extent to which sharp and unpredictable fluctuations in value of their primary 
export products affect other macroeconomic aggregates in resource-dependent countries. So compelling 
and voluminous is this sub-set of the literature, that it can be considered, as Frankel (2012) does, to be an 
explanation for the resource curse in its own right. However, an insightful debate has developed in this 
literature around whether the underlying reasons for excessive volatility and procyclicality are due to 
market failures (specifically, some credit-market imperfection or constraint) or, as is now more commonly 
42 Conflict scholars have contested the strength of this conclusion, while economists have questioned Collier and 
Hoeffler’s findings on econometric grounds. Humphreys (2005) offered a general critique, suggesting that the 
Collier and Hoeffler argument is too simplistic. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue that the measures of 
resource dependence used are endogenous to conflict, and that instrumenting for resource dependence removes its 
statistical significance in explaining conflict. Laurie (2005) argues that the quality of data used in Collier and 
Hoeffler’s studies is questionable.  
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proposed, government failure (due to political-economy factors).43 Therefore, arguments around the 
observed excessive volatility and procyclicality of resource-rich countries are treated here as part of the 
political-economy literature. 
It is a stylised fact that commodity prices are more volatile than that of manufactured goods (Frankel, 
2010: Jacks, O’Rourke and Williamson,, 2011; and Hamilton, 2009). It has also been documented that many 
resource-dependent countries experience more generalised macroeconomic volatility; and moreover, have 
a strong tendency towards procyclicality (this point is widely made, but are central to the argument in 
Hausmann and Rigobon, 2003; and Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). Finally, it has been shown 
repeatedly that such volatility “is detrimental to long-run economic growth and development, controlling 
for initial income per capita, population growth, human capital, investment, openness and natural 
resource dependence (Ramey and Ramey, 1995). Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) have argued that 
the direct and indirect channels through which the volatility of natural resources negatively affect growth 
have been generally neglected in the literature – particularly the indirect channel through which resource 
exports “make already volatile countries more volatile and thus indirectly worsen growth 
prospects…Ignoring the volatility channel may lead one to erroneously conclude that there is no effect of 
resources on growth.” 
The extreme level of volatility in commodity prices is powerfully illustrated by an anecdote about research 
conducted by James Hamilton on the statistical properties of time series of the oil price. Hamilton (2009) 
applied various possible statistical models to these time series, using different sample periods, and 
concluded that the oil price was best approximated by a random walk. This meant that starting from a 
price of $115 per barrel44 in 2008 (the time of his writing), the best-guess estimate of where the real oil price 
would be four years hence, was exactly the same price ($115) – the price series was a random walk, so there 
was equal probably the real oil price would be higher or lower than the starting price. However, 
Hamilton noted, given the volatility and unpredictability of a random walk, it was also plausible that the 
price would be as high as $391 or as low as $34 per barrel. The range of this prediction, particularly his 
lower-bound number, seemed outlandish at the time, given the sharp and nearly unrelenting run-up in 
43 Recall also that part of the Dutch disease argument includes volatility and procyclicality. In these models, the real 
exchange rate, public and private consumption and investment, and wages in the non-traded sector all increase 
procyclically. 
44 Hamilton (2009) used the price for West-Texas Intermediate (WTI) Crude oil. 
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prices between late-2001 and 2008, which saw prices rise from around $30 per barrel to over $145 shortly 
before Hamilton wrote his paper. Conventional wisdom at the time suggested oil prices were going 
nowhere but up over the coming years (the commodities analysts of various Wall Street firms started 
talking about “$200+ oil”). Ultimately, the real oil price registered at almost exactly the same levels in mid-
2012 – the end of Hamilton’s “forecast” horizon – having dropped from $145 per barrel in June 2008 to $31 
by the end of the same year.  
Clearly, the challenges of macroeconomic policymaking in countries that rely almost exclusively on oil 
exports for foreign exchange earnings and oil taxes and royalties for fiscal revenues are staggering, given 
this level of exogenously determined volatility. Arezki, Gylfason and Sy (2012) calculate that for Nigeria 
(often the poster child for oil/resource dependence, but by no means unique in this regard), starting from a 
base value of $100 per barrel, the difference between a price of $50 and one of $150 is equivalent to a 
difference of 50% of GDP. It may be asking too much of macroeconomic policy to effectively stabilise the 
economy in the face of such volatility. Given the extreme volatility and uncertainty around resource prices 
and revenues, even the best-intentioned policymakers in resource-rich and, perhaps particularly resource-
dependent, countries face a massive and often overwhelming information problem: it can be nearly 
impossible to identify whether a commodity-driven shock (whether positive or negative) is permanent or 
temporary, let alone how long shocks of the latter variety will last and how severe they will be.  
However, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that not only is macroeconomic policy in resource-rich 
developing countries unable to provide counter-cyclical stabilisation, but in fact, there is a tendency for 
policy to make things worse. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) examination of procyclicality across a 
range of indicators, including fiscal policy, monetary conditions and capital flows found that 
“macroeconomic policies in developing countries seem to mostly reinforce the business cycle, turning 
sunny days into scorching infernos and rainy days into torrential downpours.” Frankel (2012) also 
emphasises the compounding effect of policy on volatility in resource-rich countries, arguing that 
government interventions “tend to exacerbate booms and busts instead of moderating them”.  
Nese (2011) examines the cyclicality of five fiscal measures in 28 oil-producing countries developing 
countries during 1990-2009. The results suggest that the five measures - government expenditure, 
consumption, investment, non-oil revenue, and non-oil primary balance – are all strongly procyclical in the 
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full sample. The procyclicality of fiscal spending is driven in large part by two major items in the budget: 
public investment projects and the civil service wage bill. Talvi and Vegh (2005) examine the evidence for 
a large number of developing and developed countries, and find the resource-dependent developing 
countries, in particular, exhibit a “very low propensity to save out of what turned out to be a temporary 
shock...due mainly to the public sector’s spending spree.” Medas and Zakharova (2009) find evidence that 
oil windfalls are often spent on higher public sector wages and tend to increase the number of people 
employed by the government, as well as indications that this increase is difficult to reverse when resource 
prices collapse.  
A number of studies draw attention to the fact procyclicality tends to manifest across an even broader 
array of macroeconomic variables in resource-rich countries (Hausmann and Rigobon, 2003; and Van der 
Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). This literature finds that the exchange rate, capital flows, household 
spending, monetary conditions, bank lending and credit extension and investment are all typically 
procyclical in resource-rich countries, and often more so than in comparator countries. Frankel (2012) 
finds that, not only do developing countries on the whole tend to have more pronounced economic cycles 
than advanced countries, but also that this is especially true of developing countries that are dependent on 
exports of oil, minerals, and other primary commodities.  
Why are resource-rich and –dependent countries prone to macroeconomic volatility, and why do 
macroeconomic policies that should be counter-cyclical end up being procyclical? As noted earlier, the 
literature is divided into two broad camps, which essentially reflects neo-Keynesian and Public Choice 
foundations. The first category of explanations emphasise the existence of market failures, particularly 
credit-market imperfection or –constraint that encumbers the countercyclicality of (most fiscal) policy, by 
making it easier for government and other economic agents in resource-rich countries to lend during 
resource booms than to borrow during slumps (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; and Kaminski, Reinhart and 
Vegh, 2004). Other authors have emphasised structural shortcomings or “missing markets” as factors that 
contribute the volatility and procyclicality of resource economies. Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) and van 
der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) argue that a lack of financial development makes risk management costly 
or impossible in volatile resource-rich countries (which as a corollary also leads to higher risk aversion 
amongst economic agents, reducing growth). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 
The second set of explanations emphasises government failures due to political-economy factors. The 
argument is that governments in resource-dependent should be able to anticipate their excessive exposure 
to exogenous volatility, that market imperfections will make it costly or impossible to borrow in hard 
times, and that the lack of financial-sector development makes risk-management prohibitively expensive 
for many economic agents. A rational response would, therefore, be to “self-insure”, building up buffers 
during boom periods. Alesina et. al. (2008) argue that in order to answer why such forms of self-insurance 
are rare in developing countries, “one needs to consider the political arena” and that “procyclical and 
myopic fiscal policy stems from a political agency problem.” The impact of political-economy constraints 
(that are binding in the context of weak institutions) on volatility is implied in Tornell and Lane’s (1999) 
famous voracity model: the absence of strong and credible legal-political institutions allows a multitude of 
powerful interest groups to compete for rents through the fiscal process, so that a positive terms-of-trade 
shock generates a disproportionate increase in fiscal redistribution – with available resources rising during 
boom periods, it follows that government spending will be prone to procyclicality.  
Talvi and Vegh (2005) find empirical evidence to support the veracity effect to the extent that large 
fluctuations in fiscal revenues lead to procyclical fiscal policies. Alesina et. al. (2008) develop a more 
elaborate model in which voters are able to observe the state of the economy (that is, identify a resource 
boom), but not how much of government revenues are appropriated as rents by the state apparatus. Due 
to corruption and a lack of government credibility, voters do not trust the government to save rents or 
invest them in productive assets, and therefore demand tax cuts and higher transfers. They describe this as 
“starving the Leviathan”, which is a “second-best solution to an agency problem in an environment of 
corruption and imperfect information” (Alesina et. al., 2008). In the empirical section of their paper, they 
find support the hypothesis that fiscal policy is more procyclical in countries where corruption is more 
widespread, particularly (and, in some specifications, only) in corrupt democracies, where corruption is 
combined with “reelection constraints”. Frankel also emphasises the compounding effect of policy on 
volatility in resource-rich countries: 
“That developing countries tend to experience larger cyclical fluctuations than industrialised 
countries is only partly attributable to commodities. It is also in part due to the role of factors that 
‘should’ moderate the cycle, but in practice seldom operate that way: procyclical capital flows, 
procyclical monetary and fiscal policy, and the related Dutch Disease. If anything, they tend to 
exacerbate booms and busts instead of moderating them. The hope that improved policies or 
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institutions might reduce this procyclicality makes this one of the most potentially fruitful avenues 
of research in emerging market macroeconomics” (Frankel, 2012: 2). 
Negative incentives in the political economy of resource-rich countries are central to all models that 
develop an implied or explicit link between institutional quality and cyclicality (of fiscal policy or more 
generally): political pressures to spend resource revenues are high during boom period, while the 
variability of the tax base generates procyclical fiscal expenditure. The low propensity to save in boom 
periods further results in contractionary fiscal policy in bad times, since there are less fiscal buffers 
available for smoothing the business cycle, thereby accentuating fiscal procyclicality.  
Conclusion 
A more granular perspective on the institutional and political economy problems in the management of 
resource revenues identified in the literature is useful for a number of purposes. First, it enables a more 
fruitful discussion of piecemeal change of the cluster of institutions located specifically around the 
management of resource revenues, rather than macro or meta institutions. Whereas the latter expects 
countries to “behave like Swedes”, to paraphrase the Last Shah of Iran, the focus of the former is a more 
hopeful line of enquiry in pursuit of institutional interventions that help reduce the negative impact of 
resource revenue windfalls on general institutional quality. For economies with poor initial institutions, 
this at least opens the possibility of achievable, piecemeal reforms; while for countries starting from a 
point of relative institutional strength (at the meta level), targetted institutions directed at resource 
revenue management can guard against a deterioration in institutional quality due to the resource 
windfall.  
Second, the more granular perspective on the specific institutions of resource revenue management is part 
of a generally insightful recent effort in the resource-curse literature to a move away from understanding 
the average relationship between resources and economic performance towards a more country-specific 
approach. This has brought into sharper focus why certain countries appear capable of harnessing their 
resource in a positive way, while others fall victim to the resource curse. The quality of macro institutions 
is obviously an important factor, but even within the group of economies with sound meta institutions, 
there are relative successes (Alaska and Norway) and failures (Alberta in the 1980 and early 1990s); 
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likewise, there are selected instances in which resource windfalls have been managed with a surprising 
degree of prudence in the context of weak general institutions (Timor Leste and Abu Dhabi).  
Third, the arguments outlined in this chapter underline the extent to which the sharp dichotomy between 
purely economic and Dutch-disease type explanations and more institutional and political-economy based 
ones has softened. The recent vintage of leading models theorises a series of deep interactions between 
political structures, institutions and macroeconomic policies in resource-rich countries. Consequently, the 
leading models in this tradition – built on theories of rent seeking, links between forms of revenue 
generation and state formation, inefficient capital allocation, resources and conflict, and excessive 
volatility and procyclical policies – all integrate institutional and political features and incentives with the 
“institutions-free core” of the first vintage of resource-curse models. 
This dissertation proposes that sovereign wealth funds can best be understood as a targetted institutional 
innovation that seeks to address a number of the most pervasive causes of the resource curse, particularly 
those that are founded in the political economy of managing resource revenues. Judged from the 
perspective of New Institutional Economics, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is a priori support 
for an emphasis on specific institutional arrangements (rather than a focus on meta institutions) As argued 
in Chapter 2, institutional economics has long emphasised the gradual, progressive and contextual nature 
of institutional change.  
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SECTION II
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AS A TARGETTED INSTITUTIONAL 
INTERVENTION IN RESOURCE REVENUE MANAGEMENT 
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Chapter 4 
Guardians of  the future against the claims of the present:  
Sovereign wealth funds as an institutional response to the resource curse 
In his survey on the resource curse, Frankel (2012) asserts that “there is no reason why resource-rich 
countries need fall prey to the curse” and identifies no less than ten common policy and institutional 
responses that “merit consideration” (an additional six interventions where deemed to have been failures) 
in addressing problems associated with various links in the resource value chain.45 Of particular relevance 
to this dissertation are three relatively recent items on Frankel’s list that deal directly with the fiscal and 
institutional challenges of managing large, volatile and temporary resource revenue windfalls. First, the 
avoidance of excessive spending in boom times through clearly defined counter-cyclical rules to govern the 
allocation of resource revenues; second, the establishment of commodity funds that are transparently and 
professionally run, with rules to govern the payout rate and with insulation of the managers from political 
pressure; and third, the mandating of an external agent to provide transparency and freeze accounts in the 
event of a coup.  
Combined, these three interventions reflect the growing acceptance that rule-based sovereign wealth 
funds46 can play a crucial in the prudent management of resource revenues. Progress has not been equal 
across all three areas: there is a far greater number of sovereign wealth funds than there are independent 
authorities managing them, while even fewer of them are managed within what could credibly be 
described as a rule-based counter-cyclical fiscal framework. Nevertheless, the combination of these three 
policy and institutional interventions today constitute “best practice” with respect to the management of 
resource revenues.  In a growing number of cases resource-based sovereign wealth funds have emerged as 
the national (and sometimes sub-national) equivalent of endowed institutions, such as universities and 
charitable foundations, whose trustees James Tobin (1974) described as “the guardians of the future 
against the claims of the present”, with the task to “preserve equity among generations.” 
45 As discussed previously, the idea of a resource value chain has been promoted by Collier (2007). 
46 Frankel mentions “commodity funds”, which is a subset of sovereign wealth funds, as discussed below. Commodity 
funds (or natural resource funds) account for the majority of sovereign wealth funds, both in number and assets 
under management; and for the bulk of the growth in new funds since 2000, as per Figure 4.1. 
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The increasing appeal of sovereign wealth funds is reflected not only in the growth in assets under their 
collective management, a number for which credible estimates vary between $6.5 trillion and $8.3 trillion47, 
but also in the proliferation in new funds, as shown in Figure 4.1. This increase in new sovereign wealth 
funds appears unlikely to end soon, with a geographically, politically and economically disparate group of 
countries – including Israel, Lebanon, Colombia, Peru, Mongolia, Guyana, Niger, Uganda, Namibia, 
Zambia and Tanzania – considering the establishment of funds to manage anticipated future resource 
revenue windfalls.48  
Figure 4.1 :  Number of  new sovereign wealth funds by decade 
Sources: estimates based on SWF Institute data, Das et. al. (2009) and fund documentation. 
This chapter discusses the historic emergence and leading functions of sovereign wealth funds. What is 
striking about this discussion is the extent to which these functions emerge as a response the economic 
and institutional causes of the resource curse, discussed in the preceding chapters. The chapter also 
47 The exact measurement of sovereign wealth fund assets is complicated by delays in reporting, the assessment of 
mark-to-market gains and losses, a lack of transparency and disclosure amongst a number of the world’s largest funds 
– and, not least, by uncertainty and inconsistencies regarded definitions and whether or not certain investors should
be categorised as sovereign wealth funds. 
48 A number of sub-national jurisdictions, such as Saskatchewan and the North West Territories in Canada, and 
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attempts to clarify a number of often misleading discussions around the definition and categorisation of 
sovereign wealth funds. It concludes with an assessment of criticisms that have been levelled against the 
sovereign wealth fund model; and identifies a broad framework of analysis for the critical policy and 
institutional choices that surround this model. 
4.1.  Defining and categorising sovereign wealth funds 
While academic and regulatory interest in sovereign wealth is a relatively recent phenomenon, the funds 
themselves are not. The roots of one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds, the Kuwait Investment 
Authority, for example, trace back to 1953 when its predecessor institutions were established under the 
British Protectorate to stabilise and invest its oil revenues. While the Kuwait Investment Authority is 
widely regarded as the first sovereign wealth fund (Kimmit, 2008, Balin, 2009, and Jory, Perry and 
Hemphill, 2010), the true origins of the model date back to the permanent funds established in various 
American states, notably Texas and New Mexico, in the late-19th century to invest the proceeds 
generated on public land, notably from oil and gas production, to finance public spending needs, such as 
education, deferred maintenance on public investment projects and the general budget.    
The proliferation of interest in sovereign wealth funds has had the unfortunate consequence of 
imprecision in the use of the term itself.49 Sovereign wealth funds are a highly diverse set of institutions 
that defy simple categorisation; and consequently, definitions of sovereign wealth funds tend to be highly 
contextual. Broad definitions are typically suitable to general debates around issues of state investment; 
while narrower definitions are required when more specific issues are analysed. For example, the literature 
that focuses on the regulatory and geopolitical implications of sovereign investors – much of which is 
concerned with the rise of “state capitalism” (Summers, 2007; Wolf, 2007; and Kimmit, 2008) – has tended 
to adopt rather broad definitions, permitting the inclusion of a multitude of state-owned investment 
vehicles, such as public pension funds, state-owned enterprises and development banks. On the other 
hand, discussions that focus on narrower questions – such as how sovereign wealth funds should shape 
their investment models to meet savings and inter-generational objectives and liabilities – have adopted 
49 The first use of the term “sovereign wealth fund” was in Rozanov (2005). 
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more granular definitions that draw subtle distinctions between the various sovereign wealth fund models 
in operation.   
The question of appropriate definitions is not an exclusively academic one, given the regulatory and 
political concerns that have been raised about the rise of state capitalism and state-owned investors. 
Sovereign wealth funds have been identified in this regard as potential instruments through which to 
advance a series of contentious national objectives, thus raising a range of risks around national security, 
industrial espionage and investments in “strategic” assets and sectors (Summers, 2007; Cox, 2007 and 
Truman, 2010). Summers (2007) argued that the state ownership of sovereign wealth funds “shake the 
capitalist logic” due to the possible “pursuit of objectives other than maximising risk-adjusted returns”, 
while Kimmit likened in their impact to that of “public footprints in private markets”. While the state-
owned nature of these funds has been perceived as a threat in its own right, the obscurity of many 
sovereign investors with respect to size of their asset under management, their portfolio composition, and 
their objectives and investment practices has compounded the concerns of recipient countries (Truman, 
2010). 
The threat of a regulatory backlash from investment-recipient countries (which essentially disappeared in 
the wake of the global financial crisis that started in 2008) resulted in the formation of an International 
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. This body subsequently established a set of Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices, commonly referred to as the “Santiago Principles” after the Chilean 
capital where they were adopted, which an implied commitment to focus on serving macroeconomic 
purposed, pursuing purely commercial investment objectives, and advancing accountability, transparency 
and disclosure (International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2008).50 However, a less 
appreciated consequence of the establishment of this group was its contribution to the definition and 
categorisation of sovereign wealth funds. In the first instance, it required a degree of self-association with 
the concept of a “sovereign wealth fund” in order to participate in the group. Second, a number of funds 
50 This structure was subsequently remodelled as the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds when it 
assumed an autonomous governance structure and facilitated regular meetings between these funds. 
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that did not join the group took additional steps to assure national governments that are not (or do not 
regard themselves to be) sovereign wealth funds.51  
Finally, the Santiago Principles also contained an actual definition of the term “sovereign wealth fund”. 
However, as per the discussion above, the adopted definition is unsatisfactorily broad for any qualified 
discussion around sovereign wealth funds, which are defined as “special-purpose investment funds or 
arrangements that are owned by the general government” (International Working Group on Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, 2008). Clearly, this definition draws no distinction between sovereign wealth funds and a 
myriad other types of investment institutions under government ownership – for example, social security 
fund, development banks and even state-owned enterprises. Even the added qualification that sovereign 
wealth funds are “created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes [and] manage or 
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies that include 
investing in foreign financial assets” fails to fully distinguish sovereign wealth funds from other public 
investment institutions, such as public pension reserves and central banks’ foreign exchange reserves.  
51 The Canada Pension Plan, for example, has gone to great lengths to distance itself from sovereign wealth funds. In 
December 2007 it issued a statement noting “Neither the Canada Pension Plan nor the CPP Investment Board, 
which manages the assets of the CPP, meet the definition of a Sovereign Fund,” adding: “At stake for the CPP 
Investment Board would be its ability to compete for global investments if it is incorrectly categorised as a sovereign 
fund” (Canadian Pension Plan, 2007). Despite these efforts, the CPP is still commonly included in discussions 
around sovereign wealth funds. 
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Table 4.1 :  A typology of  sovereign investors  
Sovereign 
investor type 
Sources of  
capital  
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In order to sharpen the definition, Table 4.1 situates sovereign wealth funds within a broader sovereign-
investor landscape consisting of the following type of institutions: 
• Classic  sovereign wealth funds:  stabilisation and savings funds, established through the
transfer of natural resource revenues, excess foreign exchange reserves or privatisation windfalls.
Note that there are further sub-categories of funds within this grouping, as explained in greater
detail below.
• Central  banks managing foreign exchange reserves: monetary authorities hold foreign
exchange reserves in highly liquid fixed-income securities and cash. While the distinction between
sovereign wealth funds and central bank reserves appears obvious, it has been blurred in recent
years by the accumulation in a number of countries of massive reserve holdings that far exceed those
needed for conventional policy purposes. Consequently, a number of central banks – such as the
Swiss National Bank, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Dutch central bank – have
embarked on the diversification of their reserves into equities and other riskier assets, without the
additional institutional change of giving these assets to a separate sovereign wealth fund.
Therefore, some “investment tranches” managed by central banks have become de facto sovereign
wealth funds (Das, Lu, Mulder and Sy, 2009).
• Pension-reserve funds: concerns over future public liabilities in countries facing long-run fiscal
pressures due to deteriorating demographics have resulted in the establishment of pension-reserve
funds. The logic behind these funds is that their absence of current liabilities (they are pure reserve
funds, without actual liabilities) enables them to assume greater investment risk in exchange for
higher average returns. Consequently, they hold more diversified, risk-exposed portfolios than the
underlying pension funds that they help pre-fund (Blundell-Wignal, Hu and Yermo, 2008). Again,
the distinction between pension-reserve funds and sovereign wealth funds appears fairly clear, but is
in practice complicated by the desire of certain pension-reserve funds (such as the Canadian
Pension Plan) to actively disassociate themselves from sovereign wealth funds, while others
(notably the Australian Government Future Fund and the New Zealand Superannuation Fund)
are self-described sovereign wealth funds.52
• Development banks,  funds and agencies: there is a large and varied group of sovereign
investors whose primary function is to invest in projects and sectors with high expected social and
economic returns, particularly in context of private-sector financing gaps. While institutions in the
classic sovereign wealth fund model – whether of the saving- or stabilisation-fund variety – have
invested exclusively (as in the case of Norway, Abu Dhabi, Botswana and Chile) or largely (as in
the case of Kuwait and Alberta) in foreign assets, there is a growing tendency to include a domestic- 
and/or developmental-investment mandate within the ambit of a national sovereign wealth fund.
The emergence of so-called “sovereign development funds” again blurs the definitional lines around
sovereign wealth funds, as discussed in greater detail below.
52 The Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, the Norway Pension Fund – Global, may be included in this list; however, 
the link to the funding of future public pension liabilities has not been formally or legally defined (despite the fund’s 
name). The Norwegian fund is, therefore, better categorised as a classic sovereign wealth fund, of the investment-
income variety (as it makes an annual transfer, based on its real return, to the budget).  
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As is evident from the categorisation presented in Table 4.1., once differentiated from other types of 
sovereign investors, sovereign wealth funds themselves can be categorised according to a number of 
interrelated criteria, including: (i) investment mandates and styles, based on the length of investment 
horizons, target returns, degree of portfolio liquidity and portfolio of diversification, and defined or 
implied risk tolerance; (ii) funding sources, for example, oil revenues, fiscal surpluses, privatisation 
proceeds or foreign-exchange reserves; and (iii) functions, including macroeconomic stabilisation, 
intergenerational transfers and savings, income generation and revenue diversification, and domestic 
investment and diversification.  
There is an intriguing parallel between the issues raised by difficult task of defining and categorising 
sovereign wealth funds and the distinction in the literature on institutional economics between the form 
and function of institutions. As discussed in Chapter 2, the latter literature has increasingly emphasised 
the importance of institutional functions over forms. In keeping with this tradition, the following section 
discusses the most important functions performed by sovereign wealth funds. A full list of funds that meet 
the criteria to be considered sovereign wealth funds, based on the functions discussed below, is provided 
in the Appendix to this chapter.  
4.2.  The functions of  sovereign wealth funds 
The heterogeneity of sovereign wealth funds is reflected in the wide range of economic and political 
contexts in which they operate: sovereign wealth funds exist in some of the world’s richest (Norway, 
Canada and the United States) and poorest (East Timor, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe and Papua 
New Guinea) countries. Not surprisingly, sovereign wealth funds perform a wide-ranging set of 
functions, often in combination. It is useful to differentiate between primary and ancillary functions – the 
former are typically articulated in the formal mandates and objectives of the fund, while the latter are often 
of a more implicit nature.  
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4.2.1 .  Primary functions 
The three most important functions of sovereign wealth funds relate to their role in: (i) to stabilise 
macroeconomic outcomes, (ii) to serve as an investment vehicle for accumulated public savings; and (iii) to 
generate and diversify of fiscal income and national wealth (particularly in the case of resource-dependent 
countries). These three primary functions map into the three type of classic sovereign wealth funds: 
stabilisation funds, savings funds and investment-income funds. While the stabilisation function is most 
commonly associated with sovereign wealth funds in countries with volatile resource revenues, the saving, 
income generation functions cut across both resource- and reserves-based funds (but have a particularly 
meaning in the context of depleting natural resource wealth). 
4.2.1.a. Macroeconomic and fiscal stabilisation 
The stabilisation function is particularly important in resource-rich countries, and even more so in those 
that are also highly dependent on volatile resources for economic prosperity and government revenue. 
Resource-dependent economies face economic uncertainties on a number of fronts – commodity prices 
are highly volatile, while production levels and the value of resource reserves are near impossible to predict 
over the medium- to long term. Stabilisation funds are a critical part of the policy apparatus for 
combatting general macroeconomic spillovers from these underlying sources of volatility, as well as more 
specific purposes such as stabilising fiscal revenue, foreign-exchange earnings and public investment.  
The stabilisation function is in most cases performed by dedicated stabilisation funds, which hold safe and 
liquid assets that can be used for intervention purposes when unanticipated shocks hit resource-
dependent economies. Examples of such short-term stabilisation funds include the Economic and Social 
Stabilisation Fund in Chile, the Oil Stabilisation Fund in Colombia, the Oil Revenues Stabilisation Fund 
of Mexico, the Algerian Revenue Regulation Fund, and the Stabilisation Fund managed by the Nigerian 
Sovereign Investment Authority. 
Long-term investment-income funds (or, as they are called in the United States, “permanent funds”), 
which have more diversified portfolios that include more illiquid and risky assets, can also contribute to 
the stabilisation of fiscal revenues if their annual investment income is significant compared to other 
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public revenue sources. Examples where this is the case include Norway, Kuwait, Botswana and 
Wyoming – where investment income is a significant and stabilising source of fiscal revenue (without 
being linked to an explicit stabilisation fund). Through either a liquid stabilisation or an investment-
income fund, sovereign wealth funds reduce the volatility of fiscal revenues by generating a stable 
alternative revenue stream that can also be countercyclical if the investment income is (at least partially) 
uncorrelated or even negatively correlated with the underlying resource revenue.  
Note that the function of macroeconomic stabilisation also played an important role in the accumulation 
of excess foreign exchange reserve holdings that led to the establishment of reserves-based sovereign 
investment in a number of Asian countries in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Reserve 
accumulation has been described as a form of self-insurance against debt, banking and balance-of-
payments crises, and the widespread economic instability that followed the crisis (Aizenman and Lee, 
2006). While accumulated foreign-exchange reserves held for these purposes have typically remained 
under the control of national central banks, a portion of “excess” reserves have been transferred to 
dedicated sovereign wealth funds with a more long-term saving function (see below).  
4.2.2.b. Long-term investment of public savings 
Sovereign wealth funds are increasingly popular vehicles through which to achieve the kind of aims 
evoked by James Tobin’s (1974) quote in the introduction to this chapter: acting as “the guardians of the 
future against the claims of the present”. Savings funds facilitate a degree of intergenerational equity in the 
allocation of the benefits from national assets, preserving the claims of future generations to these assets 
from those of the present. This assumes special significance in the context of resource economies, as the 
finite and uncertain nature of resource wealth creates unique challenges in which the sovereign wealth 
fund transforms finite assets from depleting natural resources into permanent wealth in the form of a 
portfolio of financial assets.53 
53 Economists have theorised these issues for centuries, from Jevons’ (1865) The Coal Question, which raised the 
prospect of British imperial decline due to dwindling coal supply to Hotelling’s (1931) for the efficient rate of resource 
extraction, to Solow (1974) and Hartwick’s (1977) examination of issues of inter-generational justice and efficiency in 
the extraction of finite resources and the investment of their proceeds.  
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Sovereign wealth funds in both resource- and reserve-rich countries perform the function of investing 
accumulated public savings through diversified portfolios with long-term investment horizons and higher 
expected average returns. The motivations underlying the public savings that feed sovereign wealth funds 
in resource- and reserves-rich countries are, however, rather different. By transforming a depleting natural 
resource into a potentially permanent one in the form of an endowment of financial assets, a country can 
ensure that the level of public spending observed during the period of resource extraction can be sustained 
– or even increased – in its aftermath. Several commodity-based sovereign wealth funds, including those in
Norway, Kuwait, Chile, Botswana, Alberta and Alaska, have the stated objective of preserving resource 
wealth for future generations. Finally, concerns over the ability to prudently and productively spend and 
invest potentially massive resource windfalls (even when stabilised in the manner described above) has 
been part of the motivation behind the establishment of long-term savings funds in countries such as Abu 
Dhabi, Kuwait, Qatar, Botswana and East Timor, as well as developed and industrialised economies, 
such as Norway (see discussion below of the Dutch disease).  
The savings function has also gained increasing prominence in economies that accumulated excess 
foreign exchange reserves. These assets were initially held almost exclusively in low-yielding, liquid assets, 
until after roughly a decade of rapid reserve accumulation resulted in increased awareness of the 
opportunity costs of holding of low-yielding assets.54 This opportunity cost of holding hundreds of billions 
of dollars in low-yield assets, coupled with the need to provision for anticipated future liabilities associated 
with demographic shifts, prompted the transfer of a share of accumulated reserve assets into more 
diversified portfolios with longer investment horizons and greater risk tolerance, in pursuit of higher 
returns (most notably in a number of East Asian countries, where dedicated sovereign wealth funds, such 
as the China Investment Corporation and the Korea Investment Corporation, were establish to manage a 
share of the reserves).  
A striking similarity in the operational and institutional arrangements for the management of sovereign 
assets of both a reserves- and resources-based nature has therefore emerged. These similarities pertain to 
the objectives behind the establishment of different pools of sovereign wealth, the investment strategies 
54 Academics have attributed the accumulation of reserves to two primary motivations: “mercantilism” and “self-
insurance”. The former relates to the desire to maintain a favourable exchange rate in order to stimulate export 
growth and suppress the demand for imports; while the latter arises from the need to hold foreign assets in order to 
handle and prevent balance-of-payment, foreign-debt and currencies crises (Aizenman and Lee, 2005).
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adopted in pursuit of those objectives, and the separate institutional arrangements required for the 
effective management of these distinct pools. The stabilisation funds of resource-rich countries are 
comparable to the conventional foreign exchange reserve portfolios managed by central banks, while the 
savings and investment-income funds of resource-rich countries are the counterparts of the long-term 
investment funds established with excess reserves in a number of countries. The former are essentially 
buffer funds – insuring against external shocks (reserves-based funds) and revenue volatility (resource-
based funds), respectively – and therefore hold highly liquid, low-yielding assets. The latter are established 
to generate higher long-run average real returns and consequently hold more diversified portfolios with 
significant risk exposure.  






Primary motivation Precautionary savings against 
shocks (debt, trade, financial crises) 
Stabilisation of volatile revenues and 
commodity-price shocks 
Management authority  Central bank Ministry of Finance 
Typical  portfol io  structure Highly liquid, short-dated 
sovereign bonds and cash 
Highly liquid, short-dated sovereign bonds 
and cash 
Investment horizon Short (0-12 months) Short (0-12 months) 
LONG-TERM PORTFOLIO 
Primary motivation Higher return on excess reserve 
assets 
Establishing an alternative source of wealth 
and fiscal income 
Management authority  Dedicated investment authority (or 
dedicated unit in central bank if 
investment model is not too 
complex) 
Dedicated investment authority (or 
dedicated unit in central bank if investment 
model is not too complex) 
Portfol io  structure Diversified portfolio, with 
significant exposure to risk assets 
Diversified portfolio, with significant 
exposure to risk assets 
Investment horizon Medium to long-term (1-10+ years) Medium to long-term (1-10+ years) 
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To the extent that the management of these longer term and more risk-orientated portfolios – whether 
financed by resource revenues or excess foreign exchange reserves – required different governance 
arrangements, operational structures and investment expertise, a number of countries created new, stand-
alone institutions in the form of sovereign wealth funds. This often involved transferring assets away from 
their traditional locations in the treasury (in the case of resource revenues) and central banks (in the case of 
foreign exchange reserves). The Korea Investment Corporation and the China Investment Corporation, 
created in 2005 and 2007 respectively, are notable examples of the latter; while the National Oil Fund of 
Kazakhstan, the Pension Reserve Fund of Chile and the Kuwait Investment Authority are examples of 
the former. Table 4.2 summarises the similarities in the economics, operations and institutional 
arrangements of managing resource- and reserves-based sovereign wealth. 
4.2.2.c. Income generation and wealth transformation 
Resource-based sovereign wealth funds are often part of a process of transforming one source of wealth – 
natural resources – into another with more attractive properties – financial assets. Portfolio theory 
suggests that wealth, assets and should be diversified to increase risk-adjusted returns (alternatively, to 
reduce the expected risk of the portfolio for a given level of return). If applied at the national level, this 
provides a rationale for the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund, which is an institutional mechanism 
through which (at least part of) natural wealth is transformed into financial wealth.  
In the context of resource dependence, this transformative function of sovereign wealth funds assumes 
even greater urgency. Investment-income type sovereign wealth funds provide a supplementary – and, 
potentially, uncorrelated – source of public income to finance both capital and recurrent fiscal 
expenditures. The desire to transform the income source from commodities to financial assets arises for a 
number of reasons: the afore-mentioned volatility of resource-based revenues; a concern that resource 
revenues may be declining and therefore need to be replaced by a (potentially permanent) financial 
endowment; and, a belief that financial assets may have a higher risk-adjusted return than natural assets.  
In a speech titled “From oil to equities,” Knut Kjaer, the former head of the Norwegian sovereign wealth 
fund, made the case that the continued transformation of oil wealth into financial wealth was the prudent 
thing to do for the sake of future generations, based on both return and risk considerations. It is clear that 
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the inter-related concerns over inter-generational equity, risk and return all a part in the establishment of 
the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, and the articulation of its role is transforming the country’s sources 
of wealth and income: 
 
 “the transition from oil in the ground to a broad portfolio of international equities contributes 
both to increasing the expected return on government wealth and reducing the associated 
risk…(the fund is) an instrument for diversifying government wealth and transforming income 
from temporary petroleum resources into a permanent flow of investment income…(it is for the) 
benefit of future generations that Norway succeeds in continuing the 
transformation/diversification of wealth into foreign financial assets (Kjaer, 2006).” 
 




Source:  Kjaer (2006); adapted using data from Bloomberg. The chart shows the cumulative total (nominal) 
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(stocks) have outperformed oil. Oil has demonstrated a similar cumulative total return to that of US 
Treasury bonds, however at a much higher volatility, evident in Figure 4.2. However, Kjaer argued 
further that if one considers the Value-at-Risk of Norway’s total oil wealth (yet-to-be-extracted oil under 
the ground) relative to that of its financial assets (in the sovereign wealth fund), the risk-based argument 
for wealth transformation is similarly compelling. Arguing that if risk is measured as the standard 
deviation of the returns for the years 1900 to 2005, “the risk associated with the remaining portion of 
petroleum wealth is more than seven times higher than for the (sovereign wealth) fund,” the risk 
associated with oil-price volatility has, historically, been “more than twice as high as that associated with a 
well-diversified portfolio of international equities” (Kjaer, 2006).  
4.2.2 .  Ancil lary  functions 
A number of implicit functions of sovereign wealth funds emerge as extensions or underlying motivations 
for the primary functions discussed above – for example, the primary function of a sovereign wealth fund 
may be to save a share of resource revenues, but the reasons for savings may be related to a secondary 
function (such as avoiding the unsustainability or misallocation of investment financed from temporary 
resource boom). Other ancillary functions are entirely independent from - and possibly in conflict with – 
the primary functions outlined above, notably the increasingly popular role sovereign wealth funds are 
expected to play in the domestic economy. It is particularly striking in light of the discussion of the 
resource-curse literature in Section 1 that many of the functions associated with resource-based sovereign 
wealth funds directly or indirectly address the most important causes of resource-related economic 
afflictions.  
4.2.2.a. Domestic economic development: infrastructure and economic diversification 
Particularly amongst the sovereign wealth funds in developing countries, there is a growing tendency to 
give these funds a mandate for investing at least part of their capital in domestic assets that are expected to 
generate broader social and economic benefits. These investments run the gamut of public goods, but 
there has been a specific emphasis on physical infrastructure. The motivations for investments in domestic 
infrastructure include an apparent shortage in well-functioning physical infrastructure, evidence of a 
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financing gap in the supply of infrastructure-related capital, a belief that infrastructure investments can 
generate high financial returns in the context of capital-scarcity over a sufficiently long investment horizon, 
which a sovereign wealth fund has (at least in theory), and the argument that functional infrastructure is a 
prerequisite for economic growth and development, and therefore has a variety of social and economic 
returns outside of financial-return considerations.55  
Another dimension of the developmental function some sovereign wealth funds are tasked with is that of 
direct investment in certain industries and sectors that policymakers believe will promote economic 
diversification.56 Amongst resource-rich countries, some sovereign wealth funds with domestic investment 
mandates invest in downstream industries related to the primary resource, such as refining and petro-
chemical engineering, in order to capture a greater national share of the resources value chain – notably, 
Mubadala in Abu Dhabi and Samruk-Kazyna in Kazakhstan. Sovereign wealth funds in both resource- 
and reserves-rich countries have also been given mandates to invest in completely unrelated sectors, such 
as tourism, biotech, entertainment and particularly financial services – notably Mumtalakat Holdings in 
Bahrain, Temasek Holdings in Singapore, and Khazanah Nasional in Malaysia.   
Examples of sovereign development funds that combine domestic infrastructure development, the 
financing of other public goods, and diversification functions, include Bahrain’s Mumtalakat Holdings, 
Vietnam’s State Capital Investment Corporation, Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala, Saudi Arabia’s Public 
Investment Fund and France’s Fonds Stratégique d’Investissement. Singapore’s Temasek Holdings 
could also be seen as a sovereign development fund, although it has graduated towards a more long-term 
wealth management approach that increasingly favours commercial objectives over developmental ones. 
Sovereign wealth funds with developmental functions differ in terms of their ranking of commercial and 
developmental objectives underlying such investments. Some are expected (at least de jure) to apply strict 
commercial criteria to domestic investments, based on their expected risk-return characteristics; while 
others explicitly take non-commercial objectives into account, and are willing to forgo financial returns in 
order to pursue these additional objectives.  
55 These observations are very much in keeping with so-called “post-2015 development agenda” and the emphasis on 
“financing for development” by the likes of the World Bank and the United Nations.  
56 As noted below, many sovereign wealth funds in resource-rich countries contribute in an indirect way to 
diversification by preventing or combatting Dutch disease and an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which 
undermines the competitiveness of their tradable goods sector. 
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So pronounced has been the increased interest in domestic and developmental investment models, that 
sovereign development fund should arguably now take a position alongside sovereign saving, investment-
income and stabilisation funds as the most important types of sovereign wealth funds. Similarly, domestic 
development may be elevated to a primary function of sovereign wealth funds. However, as argued in the 
remainder of this chapter, the governance and operational implications that accompany a domestic 
development function are sufficiently different from that of classic sovereign wealth fund models, that it is 
useful to treat them as somewhat separate entities.  
4.2.2.b. Preventing the Dutch disease and maintaining export competitiveness  
Sovereign wealth funds in both resource- and reserves-rich countries have been intrinsically linked with 
efforts to maintain export competiveness through the exchange rate channel. As discussed in previous 
chapters, Dutch disease remains one of the most popular explanations for the resource curse. By investing 
(part of) the proceeds from the extraction of natural resources in foreign assets, sovereign wealth funds 
help avoid an appreciation of the real exchange rate during boom periods in the commodity-price or –
production cycle. Dutch disease effects are particularly acute in countries with limited absorptive capacity, 
due to an inflexible and unskilled labour market, infrastructure bottlenecks and a lack of trade openness. A 
number of countries – including Norway, Botswana and Chile – have made reference to the role of their 
sovereign wealth funds in avoiding the Dutch disease; and have, consequently, prohibited domestic 
investments by their sovereign wealth funds. While the function of the sovereign wealth fund in this 
respect is purely “economic”, the management of political-economy dynamics, adverse political incentives 
and public-sector capacity constraints also play a critical role in the case for establishing a sovereign 
wealth fund.  
4.2.2.c. Preventing waste, corruption and poor public investments 
Political-economy factors are pivotal to the case for establishing a sovereign wealth fund. Evidence 
suggest that the quality of public investment deteriorates during periods of (often unexpected) sharp 
increases in public revenue, spending and investment, particularly in resource-rich countries (Gelb, 1988). 
By establishing a clear, rules-based framework for the management of resource revenues, sovereign wealth 
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funds can reduce the rent seeking associated with the revenue windfalls (Tornell and Lane, 1999; Torvik, 
2002; and Robinson et. al., 2006). Beyond these political dimensions, there is strong evidence that public 
investment is subject to significant declining marginal returns in the short run, particularly in the context 
of both economic and institutional capacity constraints (Pritchett, 2000; Berg, Portillo, Yang and Zanna, 
2013; and Presbitero, 2016). Finally, long-term public investments may be incomplete or their recurrent 
costs unfinanced if the revenue and export boom is reversed due to a decline in commodity prices or 
production.  
These issues are particularly pertinent to countries with poor institutions at the start of the revenue boom, 
as these are general also countries that have not yet built the requisite political and public investment 
processes to ensure that the windfalls are spent and invested in a sustainable, inclusive and growth-
enhancing manner. While sovereign wealth funds are no panacea to deep-rooted political and institutional 
problems, they can lengthen the horizon over which revenue windfalls are spent and invested in the 
domestic economy, thereby potentially improving the political incentives and avoiding the sharply 
declining returns on public investment in the short run. That is, sovereign wealth funds are an 
institutional “commitment technology” that allows the revenues from a resource boom to be spent and 
invested more gradually, as absorptive capacity constraints are lifted over time. 
4.3.  Debates around the suitability sovereign wealth funds for poor countries 
The classic sovereign wealth fund model – which combines resource-based funding, with stabilisation, 
savings and income-generations functions – has been criticised by a number of scholars who argued that 
this model is inappropriate for countries characterised by capital scarcity and large infrastructure 
investment needs (Van der Ploeg, 2008, Collier, Van der Ploeg and Vernables, 2010 and Venables, 2010). 
Collier, for example, has argued that “the conventional model of a sovereign wealth fund” is inappropriate 
for poor countries, as “in a capital-scarce country it is unwarranted to accumulate long-term foreign 
investments” and that “the core objective should evidently be to finance domestic infrastructure” (Collier, 
2012). Similarly, Collier et. al. (2010) have argued that “an international sovereign wealth fund is not 
appropriate for a capital-scarce country [as it] is too conservative in that it precludes any near-term 
increases in consumption.”  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
104 
This criticism is informed by the view that the sovereign wealth fund model is based on the permanent 
income hypothesis, a powerful theory developed by Milton Friedman (1957), which forms the basis of 
modern consumption theory. Collier argues instead for an immediate surge in spending and investment in 
the aftermath of resource-revenue boom – beyond the level consistent with permanent-income type 
smoothing – even if that means a lower level of spending in the long run.57 Collier and his co-authors’ 
argue that citizens of a country with a large resource discovery will be wealthier in the future, and that 
therefore it makes sense to spend the resource windfall upfront, so as to move the country towards its 
higher level of income and consumption: 
“...the value to the society of consumption in the near term is considerably higher than 
consumption in the distant future when the economy has become fully developed...It is therefore 
appropriate for a developing country to use some of its resource revenues to raise consumption up 
towards the level of the distant future, rather than to use them to raise the level of consumption in 
that distant future (Collier et. al., 2010: 2). 
Collier (2010 and 2012) and Santiso (2008) provide enthusiastic support for sovereign development funds 
over investment income funds for capital-scare countries with abundant resources, while Collier in 
particular promotes the idea of using such funds to investment in domestic infrastructure: not only will 
investment raise the country’s growth potential, but the returns on these investments are high, given the 
capital scarcity (low capital-labour ratio) in these countries. 
This criticism is a significant challenge to the rising academic and policy support for – and increasing real-
world embrace of – the “conventional” sovereign wealth fund model, not least because of Collier’s standing 
in the fields of African economic development and resource economics. However, this challenge to the 
sovereign wealth fund model appears to wish away many of the pervasive themes in the resource-curse 
literature, as discussed in first part of this dissertation, notably the institutional and political constraints to 
efficient large-scale public investment financed by resource-revenue windfalls (which may also be 
temporary and subject to sharp reversals); the Dutch disease and inherent procyclicality of resource-rich 
economies.  
57 Ironically, Collier is one of the leading forces behind the Natural Resource Charter, a list of “best practices” for the 
management of natural resources. Precept 8 (Principle 3) of the charter states: “Effective utilisation of resource 
revenues requires that domestic expenditure and investment be built up gradually and be smoothed to take account 
of revenue volatility.” 
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A second objection is that Collier et. al. (2010) attack a straw-man version of the sovereign wealth fund 
model. The adoption of a sovereign wealth fund d0es not preclude an increases in consumption or force 
governments into save all resource revenue (as Collier and his co-authors suggest), without any access to 
investment income in return. Finally, Collier’s argument relies on two would-be inevitabilities that have 
rarely been observed in the history of resource-rich poor countries: that future generation will be much 
richer than current ones; and that the return on domestic investments is by definition higher than that on 
international assets.  
4.3 .1 .  Imprecise  c laims about savings rates  in  the sovereign wealth fund model  
Collier et. al. (2010) contend that the conventional sovereign wealth fund model proposes “that all revenue 
should go into the sovereign wealth fund” and that this savings rule is “too conservative in that it precludes 
any near-term increases in consumption” (emphasis added). In practice, this is never the case. In most 
cases, domestic investment can still rise to a level consistent with that seen in high-growth developing 
countries in recent years, regardless of whether the country has a long-term investment income fund or 
not.  
Botswana is a case in point: despite having a large sovereign wealth fund (investment income from which 
is the second largest contributor to government revenue, after diamonds), only 10% of its estimated asset 
accumulation between 1983 and 2015 was in the form of financial assets, versus around 43% in physical 
infrastructure and 46% in human capital (African Development Bank, 2016).  Similar analysis can be 
conducted for a range of countries with sovereign wealth funds, ranging from Norway to Timor Leste, all 
of whom either experienced significant growth in public investment or maintained already-high levels.  
The point of the conventional sovereign wealth fund model is that resource-rich countries tend to 
experience periodic revenue booms – which are of an unpredictable magnitude or duration – that generate 
rents in excess of what can be efficiently invested, given a range of economic, administrative and 
institutional constraints that are can only be progressively lifted (Berg et. al., 2013; and Presbitero, 2016).  
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By suggesting that the presence of a sovereign wealth fund moves all resource-revenue related public 
spending and investment into the future, Collier et. al. (2010) are attacking a straw man. In practice, 
governments with sovereign wealth funds typically transfer only a portion of their resource revenue 
windfalls to the fund. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 9, governments typically specify a savings rule in the 
form of certain percentage of revenues (for example, 30% of oil-related royalties) or hurdle-price for oil (for 
example, $75 per barrel), suggesting that a significant share of resource revenue remains available for 
public spending and investment.  
4.3 .2 .  Domestic  returns are  often much lower than predicted 
The expectation that the return on domestic investment is higher than that on foreign investments is an 
important part of the argument for channeling resource revenues to domestic public investment. This is a 
common theoretical result in growth models with declining marginal returns to capital and a cornerstone 
of the “convergence” argument derived from them; as well as the idea that capital should flow to countries 
with low capital stocks or low capital-labour ratios (in search of higher marginal returns). However, it has 
been demonstrated with depressing regularity that neither convergence in economic growth nor the flow 
of capital from developed to developing countries are in any way inevitable: Pritchett’s (1997) famous 
investigation of the evidence on convergence concluded that the reality was one of “divergence, big time”; 
while the Lucas Paradox, in which capital flows “upstream” from emerging to advanced economies 
remains relevant (Lucas, 1990).  
Clearly, there are a host of complex factors, beyond the capital-labour ratio, that affects the rate of return 
on infrastructure investments in poor countries, including institutional factors. There is near universal 
recognition that the quality of institutions has a very significant bearing on the effectiveness of 
infrastructure investment on growth, as summarised by Esfahani and Ramirez: 
“Institutional capabilities that lend credibility and effectiveness to government policy play 
particularly important roles in the development process through infrastructure growth. The effects 
indicate that countries can gain a great deal by improving investment and performance in 
infrastructure sectors. But, the exercise also implies that achieving better outcomes requires 
institutional and organisational reforms that are more fundamental than simply designing 
infrastructure projects and spending money on them (Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003: 471). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
Given the insights from the resource-curse literature on the interactions between resources and the 
development of institutions, the assumption of high rates of return on infrastructure in resource-rich poor 
countries appears tenuous – particularly when the combined with an unambiguous appeal for a rapid 
scale-up in such forms of investment.  
4.3 .3 .  The impact of  institutional ,  polit ical -economy and public-choice factors  
Part of the appeal of sovereign wealth funds lies in the fact that, if property structured and governed, they 
reduce the “voracity effect” and a race-for-rents that accompanies a windfall revenue boom. Sovereign 
wealth funds are potentially powerful institutional commitment devices, establishing a framework of rules 
and guidelines for the difficult task of managing volatile and finite resource revenues. As noted in Section 
1, the political and institutional challenges around resource-revenue management is “probably the most 
active research field on theories of the resource curse currently, and will probably continue to be so for a 
while, simply because there are so many political-economy characteristics of resource-rich countries that 
still cry out for an explanation” (Torvik, 2009).  
The public choice literature suggests that government officials face a variety of adverse incentives in 
arriving at these decisions. Even absent negative incentives, centralised policymakers face significant 
information problems in successfully identifying which infrastructure projects can be efficiently completed 
within the uncertain timeframe established by a resource-revenue boom. This is consistent with Mehlum 
et. al.’s (2006) conclusion that good institutions are crucial to the successful investment of resource 
revenues; as well as the empirical and theoretical work by Gelb (1988), Robinson and Torvik’s (2005) and 
Robinson et. al.’s (2006). While institutional economics, therefore, emphasises informational and 
incentive constraints on the ability to manage large-scale public investments, the argument against 
sovereign wealth funds – and for rapid ramping up of public spending financed by resource-revenue 
windfalls – surprisingly oblivious to the risk of Dutch disease, which arises as a result of institutions-free 
economic dynamics.  
4.3 .4.  The Dutch disease 
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The preceding point made the case for gradualism in domestic investment in light of anticipated 
institutional limits and adverse political incentives, but the purely economic argument based on Dutch 
disease can be added to the case for a gradual scaling up of investment financed by a resource boom. In 
some sense, the fact that Collier is the leading authority associated with the criticism of sovereign wealth 
funds is highly surprising, given his personal scholarship on Dutch disease (and indeed all the above-
mentioned problems with the spending and investment of resource revenues) – Collier and Goderis 
(2007), for example, found “that a substantial part of [the resource curse] is explained by high public and 
private consumption, low or inefficient total investment, and an overvalued exchange rate.” This amounts 
to very strong support from Collier for the Dutch disease hypothesis – and, moreover, for the role of 
inefficient spending and investment in causing it.  
4 .3 .5 .  Lack of  rules  and f iscal  anchors  
Collier’s criticism of conventional sovereign wealth funds has also been directed at the International 
Monetary Fund, given its support for the model. Responding directly to Collier’s promotion of the 
sovereign development fund model has a more appropriate alternative for resource-rich poor countries, 
the Fund’s Fiscal Affairs Department has suggested that “development funds tend to fragment the budget 
process and policy decision-making, weaken the control of fiscal aggregates, as well as reduce the 
credibility and even the quality of the regular budget. Rather than looking for quick fixes, public financial 
management weaknesses need to be tackled holistically” (Baunsgaard, Poplawski-Ribeiro, Villafuerte and 
Richmond, 2012). Referencing Collier’s (2011) contribution, the authors argue further that “the recent 
literature has emphasised the merits of using resource wealth to invest in physical assets with high yields 
in terms of non-resource productivity and growth (and non-resource fiscal revenue),” before adding: “Such 
a formulation, while theoretically sensible, is problematic from a practical perspective since it does not 
provide a meaningful anchor for fiscal policy” (Baunsgaard et. al. 2012). The use of a sovereign wealth fund 
as a commitment device for spending and investing resource revenues – alongside other rule-based 
elements of the institutional matrix, notably a rule-based fiscal framework – establishes a more credible 
anchor for fiscal policy.  
4.3 .6.   The non-inevitabil ity  of  growth and r is ing incomes 
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Collier acknowledges that his recommendation of raising current consumption and investment of 
resource revenues will likely lower average spending of these revenues over time. This is acceptable, he 
argues, because the citizens of resource-rich poor countries will be richer in future, so that there will be no 
welfare losses. There is, of course, nothing in the economic history of resource economies, which in fact 
includes large-scale investments in domestic infrastructure of kind Collier proposes, to suggest that this is 
in any way inevitable or even likely. The appeal to the supposed inevitability of rising incomes and future 
wealth is a way to dismiss concerns over intergenerational equity and sustainability once resources are 
depleted. If future wealth and prosperity is no longer regarded as a deterministic inevitability, 
intergenerational equity is yet another argument in favour of the conventional sovereign wealth fund 
model. 
4.4.  Critical  elements of  the institutional framework of sovereign wealth funds 
This chapter has described the emergence of sovereign wealth funds, situated them with a broader 
landscape of public investment institutions, and categorised them based on a number of criteria, including 
funding source, investment styles and most importantly, a range of common functions. The most 
important functions performed by sovereign wealth funds appear as a direct response to the common 
afflictions suffered by resource economies, as per the resource curse literature discussed in Section 1. The 
remainder of this dissertation is concerned with the establishment of policy and institutional framework 
that enables sovereign wealth funds to perform these functions. The following elements constitute the 
critical building blocks of such a framework: 
4.4.1 .  Savings rules  
All resource-based sovereign wealth funds need a mechanism through which to receive a portion of 
resource revenues in order to perform their stated functions. These mechanisms can be informal and 
discretionary, but in the interests of public accountability, predictability and credible commitments are 
often rule based. Most savings mechanisms in operation today amongst resource-based sovereign wealth 
funds are based on very simple rules, such as a fixed percentage of resource revenues, a deviation from the 
past moving average of resource revenues, or as windfall revenues that arise when a commodity price 
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exceeds a certain “hurdle price” (for example, $75 per barrel for oil). If the country has a number of different 
sovereign wealth funds with stabilisation, savings or development functions (or a sovereign wealth fund 
with different sub-funds or divisions), further rules may be required to allocate funds between the different 
funds. Section 3 of this dissertation will analyse a number of common savings rules, and make the case for 
a more dynamic rule that integrates savings, spending and stabilisation objectives in a single coherent and 
contingent rule-based framework. 
4.4.2.  Spending rules  
Decisions around how to use the sovereign wealth fund’s resources pertain to both its capital (or 
principal) and its investment income. Following the well-known “permanent fund” approach, several 
sovereign wealth funds, such as those in Norway and several American states, spend only the real returns 
generated on the fund’s capital, while the latter is preserved in real terms into perpetuity or to meet or 
insure against a major future spending needs. An alternative is to reinvest the fund’s investment income in 
order to achieve a more aggressive build-up of assets managed by the sovereign wealth fund (perhaps 
before switching to a permanent fund approach, once the fund has reached a target level of assets under 
management). Both the sovereign wealth fund’s capital and its investment income can be linked, implicitly 
or explicitly, to specific public spending needs on, for example, infrastructure, education, health and 
pensions.  
4.4.3 .  Rule-based investment policies  
The specification of a sovereign wealth fund’s investment policy should reflect its stated functions, the 
government’s needs and preferences, and the capacity, expertise and unique attributes of the institution. 
The functions and implied (or explicit) liabilities of the sovereign wealth fund determine a number of 
characteristics:  the fund’s ability to gain exposure to different asset classes or risk factors, its investment 
horizon, target return and risk limits. Further, the investment strategy also encompasses operational and 
implementation decisions around the active versus passive, and internal versus external fund management. 
For either public disclosure purposes, or for the clarity of the internal decision-making process, sovereign 
wealth funds’ investment policies and strategies should ideally be consolidated in an Investment Policy 
Statement and be governed be a set of rules.  
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4.4.4.  The institutional  framework 
The management of sovereign wealth funds often require coordination between various parts of 
government and the public sectors, including government ministries (for finance, natural resources and 
economic planning), the central bank, independent investment authorities, the parliament and public 
auditors. Three key elements of any sovereign wealth fund’s institutional framework are:  
• The governance of  savings and spending rules  and decisions:  as discussed earlier, the
flow of funds in and out of sovereign wealth funds can be discretionary or rule based. The
institutional dimension to these policies relate to who decides on these transfers under a
discretionary arrangement; and, under a rule-based system, who has the authority to set and
potentially change the rules.
• Posit ion in  the public  sector and operational  independence:  who is responsible for the
day-to-day operations and policy implementation of the sovereign wealth fund? Common
arrangements are for the operational aspects of the fund to sit in the central bank, the ministry of
finance or in a dedicated investment authority (often depending on the operational complexity of
the investment process). Generally, these decisions are made based on the nature of the fund’s
investment strategy, and the concerns and sensitivity around the possibility of political interference.
To the extent that sovereign wealth funds of the saving and investment-income variety have long-
term investment horizons and are expected to maximise investment returns, an institutional model
characterised by operational independence is both popular and desirable.
• Internal  governance:  the sovereign wealth fund’s internal governance structures – the rules and
procedures that determine the powers and responsibilities of different groups in the organisation –
are also critically important. The success of the organisation in performing the functions expected
of it depends on clarity around the powers and responsibilities of the board versus the executive, the
role and composition of the investment committee, and clear reporting lines with the organisation.
Of particular importance are an articulation of responsibilities and rules for the various elements of
the investment process.
Conclusion 
This chapter has emphasised is significant variation within the broad sovereign investor landscape and 
within the narrow grouping of sovereign wealth funds. It provided a typology of the different kinds of 
sovereign investors and sovereign wealth funds, with a specific emphasis on the variety of functions they 
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perform and how these are determined. The chapter also considered how the articulation of sovereign 
wealth funds’ functions influences their policy and governance frameworks. It is clear that there is 
significant scope for tailoring sovereign wealth funds’ functions, policies around savings, spending and 
investments, and intra-governmental and internal governance arrangements to meet local requirements, 
based on the economic (and political) realities of the countries in question.  
Criticisms of sovereign wealth funds tend to underestimate or mischaracterise this degree of flexibility; as 
well as the extent to which resource-based sovereign wealth funds are designed to directly and indirectly 
address common afflictions associated with the resource curse. The remainder of this dissertation 
addresses the critical elements of the policy and institutional framework for resource-based sovereign 
wealth funds, as identified at the end of this chapter. Before doing so, however, the following chapter 
considers the striking similarities the model of the independent central bank and the sovereign wealth 
fund model proposed here – and identifies the lessons and implications that can be drawn from the policy 
and institutional breakthroughs in modern monetary policy for sovereign wealth funds. 
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Appendix to  Chapter  4:  Sovereign wealth funds 
Government Fund Authority   Inception Source of  Funding 
Texas Texas Permanent School Fund 1854 Oil and Public Land 
Texas Permanent University Fund 1876 Public Lands 
New Mexico Land Grant Permanent Fund 1898 Minerals and Public Land 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 1953 Oil 
Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund 1956 Phosphates 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund 1971 Oil 
New Mexico Severance Tax Permanent Fund 1973 Oil and Minerals 
Wyoming Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund 1974 Minerals 
Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 1976 Oil 
Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund 1976 Oil 
Alberta Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 1976 Oil 
Montana Montana Permanent Coal Trust Fund 1978 Minerals 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 1980 Oil 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 1983 Oil 
Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment Co. 1984 Oil 
Alabama Alabama Trust Fund 1985 Oil and Gas 
Louisiana Louisiana Education Quality Trust Fund 1986 Oil 
Malaysia National Trust Fund 1988 Oil 
Norway Government Pension Fund - Global 1990 Oil 
Botswana Pula Fund 1996 Diamonds  
Gabon Sovereign Fund of the Gabonese Republic 1998 Oil 
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilisation Fund 1998 Oil 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 1999 Oil 
Iran National Development Fund 1999 Oil 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 2000 Oil 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 2000 Oil 
Mexico Oil Revenues Stabilisation Fund 2000 Oil 
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilisation Fund 2000 Oil 
Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company 2002 Oil 
Equatorial Guinea Fund for Future Generations 2002 Oil 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 2003 Oil 
Russia National Welfare Fund 2004 Oil 
Sao Tome and Principe National Oil Account 2004 Oil 
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Ras Al Khaimah RAK Investment Authority 2005 Oil 
Venezuela National Development Fund 2005 Oil 
Timor Leste Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 2005 Oil and Gas 
Chile Pension Reserve Fund 2006 Minerals 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 2006 Oil 
Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai 2006 Oil 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 2006 Oil 
Mauritania National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves 2006 Oil 
Malaysia Terengganu State Sovereign Fund 2006 Oil and Gas 
Chile Social and Economic Stabilisation Fund 2007 Minerals 
Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea Sovereign Wealth Fund 2011 Oil and Gas 
Mongolia Fiscal Stability Fund 2011 Oil and Minerals 
Ghana Ghana Heritage Fund 2011 Oil 
Ghana Ghana Stabilisation Fund 2011 Oil 
Nigeria Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority 2011 Oil 
North Dakota North Dakota Legacy Fund 2011 Oil 
Australia Western Australian Future Fund 2012 Minerals 
Angola Angola Sovereign Fund 2012 Oil 
Kazakhstan National Investment Corporation 2012 Oil 
Non-resource based funds 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 1975 Fiscal Surplus 
Singapore Government Investment Corporation 1981 Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional 1993 Various Public Revenues 
Australia Future Fund 2004 Fiscal Surplus 
South Korea Korea Investment Corporation 2005 Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation 2006 Various Public Revenues 
China China Investment Corporation 2007 Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil 2008 Various Public Revenues 
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Chapter 5 
To be boring: 
Institutional lessons from the “Modern Monetary Consensus” for sovereign wealth funds 
Mervyn King, the esteemed British central banker and monetary economist, once famously said the Bank 
of England’s ambition is “to be boring” (King, 2012). While the extraordinary steps taken by central banks 
in the aftermath of the international financial crisis have been anything but boring, King’s statement 
concisely captures the central tenets of a broad consensus around the appropriate institutional 
arrangements and policy frameworks of monetary policy. This consensus renders monetary policy so 
predictable, rule-based and transparent that news of the latest meeting should be greeted by a collective 
shrug of the shoulders and a relegation to the back pages of daily newspapers. “Macroeconomic policy 
has, for most of our lifetime, been rather too exciting for comfort,” King noted, adding that “our belief is 
that boring is best”. 
This chapter argues that the benefits of predictability, even boredom, are not unique to monetary policy, 
but that the logic that resulted in the modern monetary consensus can inform the design of other 
economic institutions and policy frameworks, notably those tasked with macroeconomic stabilisation – 
and, in this specific case, sovereign wealth funds. As argued in this section, a number of the world’s best-
governed sovereign wealth funds, for example those in Norway, Chile, Botswana and the United States, 
reflect this basic insight. However, an arguably still stronger and seductive tendency remains in which 
sovereign wealth funds are viewed, on both positive and normative grounds, in exactly the opposite way: 
as mystical “power brokers” of the 21st century global capital markets.58  
The fledgling academic literature on sovereign wealth funds has already underlined the critical 
importance of institutional arrangements (or “governance”) – notably spending and savings rules and 
mechanisms for transparency and accountability – to the effectiveness of sovereign wealth funds (Bacon 
58 “Power brokers” is the phrase use to describe sovereign wealth funds in a well-publicised report by McKinsey & 
Company (Farrell, 2007). An in-depth feature in Euromoney, described how the secrecy of many of the world’s 
largest sovereign wealth funds has single-handedly established an aura of mystique around them: “The strategies and 
dimensions of Gulf sovereign wealth funds are an arcane subject made more mysterious by the lack – apart from Abu 
Dhabi’s fund – of published annual reports” (Wright, 2012).  
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and Tordo, 2006; Humphreys and Sandbu, 2007;  Monk, 2009; Das et. al., 2009; Ang, 2010 and Frankel, 
2010). One of the leading scholars of sovereign wealth funds underlined why these aspects rank above 
more glamorous issues around investment: 
“One can underperform a reasonable benchmark by 2-5% per annum and the SWF will still 
operate as a mechanism for transferring wealth into the future. Naturally, this underperformance 
hurts, but spending all the money now is the far greater loss with detrimental economic 
consequences. In the worst case, poorly functioning governance structures…affect the legitimacy 
of a sovereign wealth fund.” (Ang, 2010).  
It is important to underline that the discussion of sovereign wealth funds’ governance and institutional 
arrangements in this section (and in Ang’s understanding in the quote above) pertains not only narrowly 
to what may be called the “internal governance” of the fund – for example, the distribution of powers and 
responsibilities between its Board of Directors and its executive, and the fund’s investment rules and 
policies. An obvious addition layer of analysis is that of “external governance” – for example, its 
independence from and accountability to government, the legal status of the fund (and its management 
authority), and its public disclosure and reporting policies. The institutional arrangements for the internal 
and external governance of sovereign wealth funds are discussed in detail in Chapter 10 (while Chapter 11 
discusses a range of institutional aspects that fall within internal governance). 
A critical additional layer for commodity based sovereign wealth funds is the operation and governance of 
the transfers (or the fiscal rule, as per Section 3): the flow of funds into and out of the sovereign wealth 
fund, and whether these are discretionary, ad hoc or rule based. Fiscal rules are discussed in Chapters 6 
through 9. These analyses could be extended further to consider the coherence of the fiscal rule and the 
external and internal governance structures with broader institutional characteristics and policies (for 
example, the strength of the rule of law, and limits on borrowing that may offset and undermine the 
accumulation of assets in the sovereign wealth fund). As argued in this chapter, the modern monetary 
consensus similarly rests on a multi-dimensional understanding of institutional arrangements.  
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5.1.  The basic problem: principal-agent relationships 
Sovereign wealth funds are typically part of an elaborate system of delegated authority, the likes of which 
are widely studied in the economics of principal-agent relationships. A principal-agent relationship arises 
when one party (the principal) delegates authority or responsibility for achieving certain outcomes to a 
second party (the agent). Such agency relationships are pervasive in modern societies characterised by 
specialisation and cooperation; however, they can introduce significant costs, particularly when the 
principal lacks the means to ensure that the agent behaves in a manner consistent with the advancement 
of the principal’s objectives. As one of the leading authorities on agency economics observed: “Examples of 
agency are universal. Essentially all contractual arrangements, as between employer and employee or the 
state and the governed, for example, contain important elements of agency” (Ross, 1973). 
A number of factors can bring agency problems to bear and raise the cost associated with the principal-
agent relationship and cooperative economic arrangements. The agent may have objectives that differ 
significantly from that of the principal. This is particularly problematic if the pursuit of the agent’s 
objectives undermines that of the principal. The economics literature, particularly the New Institutional 
tradition, has emphasised the importance of clearly defined contracts and other mechanisms that change 
the incentives of agents, so that it becomes in the agent’s best interest to act in a manner consistent with 
the principal’s objectives. In monetary policy, the adoption of an explicit, rule-based inflation-targeting 
regime, possibly complemented by clearly defined contracts for central bankers, is an example of a set of 
institutional arrangements that incentivise the agent (the central bank) to act in the interest of the 
principal (society). Inflation targeting focuses the central bank’s attention on the maintenance of low and 
stable inflation, over other policy objectives, and constructs a detailed institutional infrastructure 
promoting transparency and open communication regarding both the goals and the strategy pursued by 
the central bank (the agent) on behalf of the principal (society). In this sense, inflation targeting clarifies 
and reinforces the, often implicit, contractual relationship underlying modern monetary policy (Svensson, 
1997). 
Agency problems also arise when principals are unable to clearly specify what their goals are or how the 
progress towards the achievement of its goal(s) may be measured or observed. Clearly, this compromises 
the process through which the principal may wish to ensure or incentivise that the agent acts in his best 
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interest. It also complicates the monitoring of the agent’s performance and track record, which is 
important in the context of accountability, particularly in a democracy. The literature has emphasised the 
importance of making the principal’s objectives as clear and precise as possible. In public policy context, 
this has resulted in the case for and widespread adoption of explicit policy target, which policymakers are 
tasked with achieving. Clearly defined numeric inflation targets are an example of this trend in the context 
of monetary policy (Walsh, 1995). 
A final concern in the principal-agent tradition is that the behaviour of the agent can be difficult, expensive 
and sometimes impossible to monitor. Again, this complicates the monitoring process between the 
principal and agent. The literature has therefore emphasised the importance of transparency on the part of 
the agent in general, and in more applied settings on clear and practical mechanisms for promoting 
transparency (and, again, accountability in a democratic setting). In modern monetary economics, this is 
reflected in strong emphasis on transparency on the part of monetary authority (Dincer and Eichengreen, 
2014). 
In conclusion, the principal-agent framework is a powerful theoretical lens through which to analyse the 
incentive structures and institutional arrangements underlying devolved authority and decentralised 
decision making. The tools and solutions of principal-agent analysis have extensive applications in matters 
of public policy, with notable success in modern central banking.59 Moreover, principal-agent concerns 
also permeate the field of finance and investment, given the myriad of agency relationships that arise from 
the extraordinarily high degree of specialisation, cooperation and decentralisation in modern finance. The 
tools and solutions of principal-agent analysis are therefore particularly useful in the study of sovereign 
wealth funds. These funds are at the intersection of a number of fields in which principal-agent analysis is 
widely applied: general situations of devolved authority, decentralised public and macroeconomic 
policymaking, and highly specialised modern finance and investment. This chapter will frequently return 
to the question of how particular institutional arrangements can contribute to the resolution of agency 
problems related to sovereign wealth funds, and the extent to which the modern monetary consensus 
addresses these issues. 
59 Principal-agent analysis is, unsurprisingly, a mainstay of the fields of Public Choice, New Institutional Economics 
and Monetary Economics. 
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5.2.  Lessons from modern monetary institutions for sovereign wealth funds 
Since the misadventures of the 1970s, a remarkable intellectual and practical consensus has been achieved 
around the appropriate institutional foundations and policy frameworks of modern monetary policy. This 
consensus reflects a synthesis in the historical disagreements between Monetarist and Keynesian schools 
of thought (Romer, 1993; Taylor, 1997 and de Long, 2000). Above all, modern monetary policy recognises 
the appeal of institutional independence in the implementation of monetary policy. From this, it follows 
that such operational indepedendence has to be accompanied by explicit institutional mechanisms for 
addressing ensuing agency problems. Consequently, the most important innovations in monetary policy 
since the 1970s - a period that has been accompanied by a remarkable intellectual and practical 
convergence towards a concensus around the scope and conduct of monetary policy, as well positive 
macroeconomic outcomes60  – are institutional in nature. These include the specification of clear goals and 
targets for monetary, the establishment of mechanisms to ensure operational independence for the 
monetary authority, the embrace of rule-based policy frameworks to enhance consistency and 
transparency, and greater emphasis on transparency in the conduct of monetary policy.  
A detailed literature has emerged on each element of the consensus and surveys of this body of work 
feature subtle variations in emphasis. However, hardly any monetary economist or central banker today 
would quibble with the following six elements of the modern monetary consensus: 
(i) The primacy of price stability as the long-run objective of monetary policy, coupled with 
an understanding of the contribution monetary policy can make to reducing output 
fluctuations; 
(ii) The desirability of central bank independence in monetary policy, understood as 
“instrument” or “operational” independence, while retaining goal dependence; 
(iii) The expression of the central bank’s objectives in terms of explicit policy targets (or 
nominal anchors); 
60 Some observers are concerned that the hard-won battles that led to instrument independence and rule-based 
policymaking have already been forgotten (Taylor, 2010). Alternatively, one could argue that the fact that neither 
deflation nor rapidly rising inflation has occurred – and that inflation and inflation expectations have remained 
anchored around most central banks’ implicit or explicit targets, despite the biggest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression and unprecedented monetary and fiscal easing, is a further indication of remarkable advances in 
monetary policy. 
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(iv) The use of contingent rules, which incorporate forward-looking information on the 
expected state of the economy, to achieve policy objectives and targets; 
(v) The importance of institutionalising the credibility of the central bank; 
(vi) The need for accountability in the monetary policy framework of instrument independent 
central banks, with a resulting focus on transparency. 
This list is very close to that compiled by Mishkin (2000), but makes the two uncontroversial additions of 
contingent rules and credibility.61 The omission of these two elements by Mishkin is simply a matter of 
organisation. The author does stress the importance of credibility, but under the discussion of nominal 
anchors (as have other synthesising contributions, such as Blinder, 2000; Friedman, 2002 and 
Goodfriend, 2007). Similarly, the case for rules – with a critically important understanding of the 
desirability of their contingent nature – is no longer controversial, as evidenced by the detailed discussion 
of rule-based monetary policy in other synthesising articles on modern central banking (Bernanke, 1994; 
Cecchetti, 1998 and Woodford, 2002). While there is still some debate in monetary economics around the 
relative weight applied to “rules versus discretion”, this traditional distinction has been considerably 
softened by an emphasis on contingent (or “state-dependent” or “feedback”) rules. Mishkin himself has 
acknowledged the consensus around the desirability of contingent rules, linking it to the idea that central 
banks operate under principles of “constrained discretion” (Mishkin and White, 2014). The remainder of 
this chapter will assess the applicability of these six elements of the modern monetary consensus to the 
design of policy rules and institutional arrangements for central banks.  
5 .2 .1 .  Policy  objectives  and institutional  mandates 
A binding theme in the modern monetary consensus is the emergence of a broad agreement around the 
appropriate goals of monetary policy. Greater clarity around both the power and limits of monetary policy 
informed other institutional aspects of the consensus. The consensus reflects the understanding that 
monetary policy cannot affect (and therefore cannot target) real variables in the long run; and that the 
most significant contribution of monetary policy is the achievement of price stability (understood as low 
and stable inflation). The modern consensus also recognises that monetary policy can contribute to 
61 Mishkin adds that a “central bank should also have the goal of financial stability,” which is a valid and 
uncontroversial addition in the context of the role of central banks in generally, but falls outside the core focus on 
monetary policy (although the role of monetary policy in financial stability has reemerged as a more point of debate in 
the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis).  
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reducing fluctuations in real variables (output and unemployment) in the short run and therefore can be 
used in part to stabilise short-run output fluctuations, albeit in a rule-based counter-cyclical manner (for 
reasons discussed below). This understanding was achieved long after Milton Friedman (1968) famously 
warned that “the danger of assigning to monetary policy a larger role than it can achieve [is] preventing it 
from making the contribution it is capable of making.” But Friedman’s insight would prove remarkably 
prescient in understanding, first, that monetary policy is a powerful tool; and second, that misdirecting 
that power compromises its effectiveness.  
Advocates of sovereign wealth funds and of a particular set of institutional arrangements for these funds 
cannot (yet) rely on a comparable broad-based consensus. However, as is the case in monetary policy, 
debates around the objectives of institutions tasked with managing resource revenues, can rely on decades’ 
worth of empirical evidence and practical experience. As discussed in Chapter 4, the emergence of 
sovereign wealth funds can be understood as a response to long-observed problems in resource-rich 
countries. As discussed in Section 1, the findings of the resource-curse literature are varied, but a stylised 
list of problems in resource-dependent economies can inform the scope of sovereign wealth funds: 
• Volati l i ty  and pro-cycl ical ity : the exceptionally volatility of commodity prices is well
documented (Jacks et. al., 2011; and Hamilton, 2009). Consequently, countries dependent on
resources for fiscal revenue and export earnings, are exposed to greater volatility in their fiscal
policy, balance of payments and business cycles; and have a documented tendency towards pro-
cyclical fiscal policy.
• Dutch disease: resource booms can result in a (temporary) loss of export competitiveness due
to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and an demonstrably inefficient allocation of capital
and other factors of production.
• Weak institutions and polit ical  economy challenges: that there is a negative correlation
between resource abundance and institutional quality is not controversial (Mehlum et. al. 2006
and Robinson et. al. 2006). As discussed in Chapter 3, the association of resource windfalls with
rent-seeking behaviour, public investment in “white elephants”, and unaccountable government
and fiscal practices is well documented.
• Intergenerational  equity  and the sustainabil ity  of  public  spending:  sovereign wealth
funds are a mechanism through which to achieve a degree of intergenerational equity in the
allocation of revenues derived from exhaustible or finite natural resources. The concern here is
both moral (is it fair that the proceeds from finite resources are allocated to a particular generation
alone?) and practical (can the level of public spending enable by a resource boom by maintained
both across the commodity cycle or more long-term once resources are depleted).
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
122 
An understanding of how these proplems map into a clear institutional mandate for sovereign wealth 
funds is not (yet) as widely accepted today as the price-stability objective is for modern central banks with 
regard to monetary policy. However, the experience of monetary policy suggests a number of valuable 
philosophical insights. The first is the appreciation from Friedman (1968) that the undeniable 
contribution of public policies are undermined by exaggerated expectations. It is in the best interest of 
both the principal and the agent that there is a realistic view of both the power and limitations of certain 
policies and policy instruments. This understanding takes into account the technical constraints and 
epistemological limitations of policymakers: Friedman (1968) warned that the promise of attempted “fine 
tuning” of the business cycle by monetary policymakers had an “evocative” ring to it, which unfortunately 
bore “little resemblance to what is possible in practice”. Similarly, there is no shortage of grandiose 
proposals for the tasks sovereign wealth funds should set themselves, many of which bear little 
consideration of feasibility.62  
If the objective of a sovereign wealth fund is to transform volatile and finite revenues from natural 
resources into a permanent and stable stream of income, saddling the institution with a variety of other 
mandates – popular additions include financing infrastructure and other public goods and services (such 
as healthcare and education) – risks undermining the achievement of this narrow, but immensely valuable, 
task. With a defined focus on the objectives of stabilisation and income-generation, a sovereign wealth 
fund contributes to social welfare in a number of important ways: it reduces the volatility of government 
revenues (and fiscal policy more generally), removes a number of the adverse incentives associated with 
revenue windfalls that result in poor governance and politics, and it lengthens the horizon over which the 
benefits of natural resources are enjoyed. 
In practice, there is a tendency to assign a wide range of policy goals to sovereign wealth funds, alongside 
those of stabilisation and income generation. As discussed in Chapter 4, many sovereign wealth funds 
have been tasked with allocating a share of their portfolio to domestic investments with anticipated 
“social” or “economic” returns rather than purely financial ones. Great care needs to be taken in ranking the 
relative importance of different mandates, making sure different objectives are very clear differentiated and 
articulated, and ensuring that the achievement of ancillary objectives do not compromise the primary 
objectives of an institution.  
62 These problems here include, but are not limited to, greatly exaggerated expectations of the sophistication of 
sovereign wealth fund’s investment models and strategies. 
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5.2.2 .  Operational  independence 
Greater clarity over the appropriate objectives and contribution of monetary policy set in motion 
institutional innovations that aimed to remove obstacles to their achievement. The most fundamental of 
these is the near universal acceptance of the benefits of operational independence in monetary policy. The 
case for operational independence rests on insights about the political difficulties of avoiding various 
inflationary biases when the monetary authorities are simultaneously tasked with achieving other policy 
objectives, particularly when they face incentives to stimulate output and employment in the short run. 
These biases arise under assumptions of perfectly benign intentions on the part of policymakers. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) identified a dynamic inconsistency that arises from the divergent long- and 
short-run effects of monetary policy on the real economy, which means policymakers are confronted with 
an exploitable short-run Philips curve and long-term monetary neutrality. Rational public expectations 
recognise that the monetary authorities have an incentive to exploit the short-run trade-off between 
inflation and output once low and stable inflation has been achieved. In a dynamic setting, however, this 
raises long-run inflation expectations and observed inflation above the socially optimal level (and raises the 
cost of achieving price stability). More immediately intuitive examples of inflationary biases are based on 
assumptions of outright malevolence on the part of government, such as inconsistent behaviour across the 
political business cycle (Nordhaus, 1975) and the generation of an inflation tax due to the pursuit of 
seignorage revenue (Alesina and Summers, 1993).  
The case for the operational independence of monetary authorities is based on the belief that 
independence enables a more credible commitment to prudent behaviour that resists these biases. The 
operationally independent central bank is conceived of as a technocratic institution, capable of resisting 
the public and political pressures that results in higher than optimal inflation: with a primary objective 
narrowly defined as the achievement and maintenance of price stability, independent authorities are not as 
likely to be tempted to unduly exploit short-term trade-off and help ensure that public expectations of 
inflation remain anchored.  
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Similarly, the operational independence of the authority managing the  sovereign wealth funds builds on 
belief that the investment of resource revenues may be subject to similar biases unless it is insulated from 
the political process. Empirical evidence has demonstrated that political intervention in the investment 
processes of public funds compromises investment performance (Carmichael and Palacios, 2003; Mitchell 
and Hsin, 1997; Useem and Mitchell, 2000). More specifically, empirical investigations of sovereign 
wealth fund investment behaviour have identified that politically motivated domestic investments and 
direct political representation in their management structures lower returns (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 
2009; Dyck and Morse, 2011; and Bernstein, Lerner and Shoar, 2013). Concerns over the effects of 
political influence on sovereign wealth funds’ investment decisions have been raised in a more theoretical 
sense by other scholars (Ang, 2010 and Das et. al. 2009). Bernstein et. al. (2013) contains a number of 
important findings and observations. The authors suggest that “the more closely sovereign wealth funds 
are exposed to political influences, the more they might show major distortions from long-run return 
maximisation”, while “political involvement can either lead to misguided policy attempts to prop up 
inefficient firms or industries or [lead sovereign wealth funds to] engage in investment activities in 
industries, sectors or geographies that are ‘hot’”.  
Political biases manifest in a number of ways in the investment process of sovereign wealth funds (and 
other public investment institutions). First, from a theoretical perspective it is easy to understand how 
lower returns are generated by the misalignment between the short horizons of politicians and the longer 
horizons that sovereign wealth funds should assume in order to generate higher average returns. Models 
of distortions and misaligned incentives caused by the sub-optimally short horizons of politicians have 
many applications, building on the work of Nordhaus (1975). The adverse effect of short political horizons 
on long-term investment in resource-rich economies has been studied extensively (Gelb et. al., 2002). 
Institutional arrangements that incentivise and ensure long-term horizons are, therefore, valuable.  
In the specific area of portfolio management, a large body of research has demonstrated that while various 
rule-based investment policies and strategies, such as dynamic portfolio rebalancing, raise expected long-
run returns, most investors have shorter de jure or de facto time horizons than those required for these 
approaches to pay off, thus limiting investors’ ability to exploit these opportunities (De Long et. al., 1990; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). For sovereign wealth funds, political and public pressures can drive undue 
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short termism, absent appropriate institutions that incentivise assessing investment objectives and 
performance over a longer horizon.  
Political interference can result in “trend chasing”. Trend-chasing investors have been variously described 
as “naïve” (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), “popular” (Shiller, 1984) and “noise” (Black, 1986) 
investors, with the common characteristic being that they “tend to get overly excited about stocks that 
have done very well in the past and overinvest in them, so that these ‘glamour’ stocks become overpriced” 
(Lakonishok et. al., 1994). Political interference in the investment process makes trend chasing more likely 
for two reasons. On the one hand, politicians may apply undue pressure to pursue investments in prestige 
assets for political expedience and stature. On the other hand, sensitivity around political risk and 
exposure may result in an overly cautious or bureaucratic investment process, whereby even when trends 
are detected in a timely manner, organisational inertia results in “buying high and selling low”.  
Finally, particularly in the context of a potential lack of clarity around the goals of sovereign wealth funds, 
political influence may advance the pursuit of non-financial objectives, either implicitly or explicitly. In 
addition to generating political and regulatory concerns on the part of recipient countries of sovereign 
wealth fund, such pursuits are also likely to undermine long-term investment performance, particularly if 
politicians to favour “pet projects” that deliver high political returns, rather than financial returns (or social 
utility, more generally). This risk is more pronounced if the sovereign wealth fund is to invest in the 
domestic economy, where the potential for investments with high political returns is significant. 
The discussion of the incentive and governance problems around domestically and developmentally 
orientated sovereign wealth funds speaks directly to the frequent suggestions that these funds to assume a 
more explicitly developmental function. Collier (2012) and Santiso (2008), for example, have proposed 
that developing countries should eschew more conventional sovereign wealth fund models in favour of 
“sovereign development funds” that provide public goods. While the merits of this proposal can be 
debated from a number of angles, it is uncontroversial to state that political pressure and direction could 
have a negative impact on the incentives under which a sovereign development funds operates – just as it 
does for other institutions and instruments of public investment, such as development banks, state-owned 
enterprises and conventional fiscal spending and investment channels.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
126 
It has been suggested that sovereign wealth funds could act as catalytic “anchor investors” in the 
development of nascent domestic debt or other capital markets, as environmental saviours that provide 
funding for long-term investment in clean technologies and infrastructure (Stiglitz, 2012 and Guérin, 
2013), and even as a potential “buyers of last resort” during the Eurozone debt crisis (Verma, 2012). There 
have also been concerns that sovereign wealth funds could be used as instruments of foreign policy or 
international relations (Summers, 2007 and Kimmit, 2008). All of these potential non-commercial 
ancillary objectives of sovereign , whether advocated or feared, raise the spectre of political influence, and 
risk transferring the political-economy and incentive-based problems associated with the management and 
investment of resource revenues out of the budget process by simply transferring it to the management of 
the sovereign wealth fund.  
Of course, there is no guarantee that the operational independence of sovereign wealth fund will guard 
against the above-mentioned biases – just as there are no guarantees that an independent central bank will 
always succeed in avoiding dynamic inconsistencies. Moreover, the government is by no means the only 
threat to prudent policy behaviour. Faust (1996) has argued that the appointment of technocratic boards 
to conduct monetary is, at least in part, a solution to concerns that “rule by majority” would result in 
distributional struggles between debtors and creditors (and different income classes), which that could 
undermine monetary prudence. A sovereign wealth fund is similarly subjected to the popular pressures 
from social agents with heterogeneous preferences around the trade-offs between saving and spending, 
and long-term returns and short-term stability. However, as observed by Alesina and Summers (1993), 
central bank independence contributes to reducing political pressure (both from the government and the 
public) that biases policy towards inflation. The granting operational independence to a sovereign wealth 
fund, if complemented by additional “commitment technologies” and appropriate transparency and 
accountability arrangements, can significantly contribute to the mitigation of similar biases.  
5 .2 .3 .  Institutionalis ing credibil ity  
The central importance of credibility on the part of policymakers is a cornerstone of modern monetary 
consensus. The theoretical work of the 1970s and the subsequent experience have greatly contributed to 
the realisation that an ex ante commitment to price stability alone lacks credibility, because the monetary 
authorities have an incentive to renege on their commitment and exploit the short run trade-off between 
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inflation and output, ex post. The emphasis on the credibility of central banks arises in large part due to 
the endogeneity of inflation expectations and price- and wage-setting behaviour to the monetary policy 
process. This introduces a game-theoretic relationship between the central bank and wage- and price-
setters. In order to avoid self-fulfilling inflationary spirals and reduce the cost of maintaining price 
stability, price- and wage-setters need to believe the monetary authorities will do what they say they will 
do, rather than renege on previous promises. Absent credibility, the public constantly second-guesses the 
future behaviour of policymakers, raising the cost of price stability by requiring higher interest rates in 
equilibrium. 
The potential role of sovereign wealth funds and fiscal rules in managing public expectations and the 
behaviour of economic agents in the context of commodity-driven volatility have not been discussed much 
in the literature. However, there are a number of channels through which agents would respond positively 
to the actions and credibility of a sovereign wealth fund. The resource curse literature has identified a 
causal relationship running from the prevalence of corruption, rent seeking and volatility in resource-rich 
countries to the observed low levels of investment, particularly of a long-term nature in these economies 
(Mehlum et. al., 2006). A sovereign wealth fund may contribute to removing the incentives and scope for 
corruption and rent seeking, while their role in reducing volatility in uncontroversial. The fiscal rule 
introduced and discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 of this dissertation, as well as other rule-based policies that 
use sovereign wealth funds as a means to reduce the volatility of government spending, can contribute 
significantly to the management of medium- to long-term expectations by private agents in resource-
dependent economies. However, to change expectations and behaviour in a meaningful way, the 
sovereign wealth fund and the accompanying fiscal framework will need to achieve high levels of 
credibility. In the absence of such credibility, agents anticipate that the government will renege of its ex 
ante commitments to fiscal stability by saving an insufficient portion of revenues in “boom” periods, 
drawing down on assets unsustainably during “bust” periods and deviating from a pre-committed 
spending path.  
An additional reason to emphasise the importance of credibility is more generic: sovereign wealth funds 
will, by design, be subject to considerable volatility, resulting both from their inherently volatile source of 
funding (under most fiscal models involving sovereign wealth funds, the volatility of commodity-based 
revenue and spending patterns are simply transferred from the budget to the funds – volatility does not 
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magically disappear) and their investment behaviour. With respect to the latter, note that an appropriately 
mandated and incentivised sovereign wealth fund (particularly a saving or investment-income type fund) 
will adopt a long-term and often countercyclical investment model – which allows it to harvest volatility 
premiums that other, more short-term investors are simply unable to.  
Thus, these funds should go through periods (sometimes lasting a number of years) of lower and even 
negative returns. In all cases, political and popular support will be essential to the sovereign wealth fund’s 
effectiveness or even its survival. Credibility and the ability to demonstrate that periodically lower 
investment returns are the result of exogenous market swings (to which the fund wants to be exposed in 
anticipation of higher long-run returns), rather than discretionary policy mistakes by the fund’s managers 
are critical in the fund’s defense from inevitable attacks. Chapter 11 outlines how sovereign wealth funds 
can employ a number of established rule-based investment policies to, first, avoid behavioural tendencies 
towards dynamic inconsistencies; and, second, protect themselves from attacks during periods of volatility 
and low returns.  
An important lesson from monetary policy for sovereign wealth funds is the emphasis on institutionalising 
– that is, de-personalising – credibility. In monetary policy there is a long-standing debate around the
degree which credibility is, can and should be centered around individuals or in a more elaborate 
institutional and rule-based policy framework. Alan Blinder (1997) famously argued that central bankers 
did not require rules and other “precommitment strategies” to achieve low inflation. Rather, all that was 
needed was the will to do the right thing, following which central bankers could “just do it”. According to 
Du Plessis (2003) this view “disregards a fundamental insight of the institutional literature, i.e. that the 
benign decisions of any particular policymaker, or succession of policymakers offer no confidence that the 
next policymaker would continue in similar vein”. Vesting credibility in an institution – or, more 
specifically, the rules and principles that it is understood to follow – helps avoids the “cult of personality”. 
It is not hard to see how such a cult can emerge at a sovereign wealth fund, particularly if the fund 
investment policies permit a relative high degree of managerial discretion over investments. The 
investment world is famous for developing cults of personalities around would-be “investment gurus”: a 
thriving cottage industry exists attempting to replicate the investment philosophies and portfolios of 
celebrated investors.  
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A model of how institutionalised credibility can assist in avoiding the cult of personality is found in the 
leadership succession at the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund. Knut Kjaer, who became reluctant 
spokesperson for the global sovereign wealth fund community during their emergence into the limelight 
in 2007, managed the fund since its inception. When Kjaer resigned in 2008 (at a time of great turmoil in 
the global financial markets), outside observers wondered how the transition to a new chief executive 
might impact on the fund’s investment strategy. Ultimately, however, the transition was a complete non-
event: the new chief executive, Yngve Slyngstad, simply stuck to the same rules and principles that guided 
the fund’s investment approach under Kjaer’s tenure. The fund has increased its exposure to equities and 
made its first ever allocations to real estate, but this diversification process – and importantly, the rules and 
principles that underpinned that process – was already underway before Slyngstad took over. It is 
unavoidable that the heads of a fund approaching $1 trillion in assets will attract attention – but the extent 
of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund’s credibility, vested in the institution’s rules and track record, 
rather than in the individual(s) that manage it, makes reporting on the fund rather boring.  
Credibility has a very specific and important meaning in modern monetary policy, informed in large part 
by the endogeneity of price- and wage-setting behaviour and expectations. Credibility is critically 
important to sovereign wealth funds as well. In the first instance, a credible sovereign wealth fund 
removes a number of well-documented obstacles in resource-rich economies to long-term investment by 
positively affecting expectations around corruption, rent seeking and volatility. Credibility is also 
important from a political-economy perspective. An established track record of “doing what one said one 
would” provides essential insurance against political pressure during inevitable tough times. In this 
context, credibility might be better described as a tool towards “legitimacy” – a concept emphasised by 
noted scholars of sovereign wealth funds (Monk, 2009 and Ang, 2010). The central banking literature has 
long since turned the attention from a general emphasis on credibility to specific commitment 
mechanisms, notably explicit policy targets, operational rules, and accountability and transparency, which 
reduce the cost of establishing and maintaining credibility. The chapter now turns to the role of these 
three commitment mechanisms in advancing institutional credibility.  
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5.2.4.  The use of  explicit  targets 
As is the case with credibility, the strong theoretical and practical support for the use of explicit targets in 
monetary policy is in large part based on the desirability and efficiency of anchoring endogenous inflation 
expectations. Indeed, the use of explicit targets in monetary policy is widely understood both as a means 
to achieving credibility and as a benchmark for assessing whether that credibility has been achieved. As 
Sterne (1999), noted the adoption of explicit inflation targets are critical in “helping to define an 
institutional relationship between the central bank, the government and the population”. Explicit policy 
targets are similarly critical to the political economy and institutional relationships surrounding sovereign 
wealth funds.  
Perhaps the most important manifestation of this role is that it clarifies the fact that the government 
typically sets the policy target, while the delegated institution (the monetary authority or the sovereign 
wealth fund management authority) is granted freedom and power to achieve it. Explicit rules promote 
communication and accountability, thereby reinforcing the credibility – or legitimacy – of the delegated 
institution. Based on a survey of the reasons for central banks’ adoption of explicit targets, Sterne (1999) 
concludes that “policymakers use explicit targets because they find that it is better to have narrow 
objectives and explain misses, rather than having imprecise objectives that make success or failure difficult 
to measure.”  
This function of explicit targets has attractive applications for a public investment institution, such as a 
sovereign wealth fund. The use of various forms of targets is commonplace in the investment industry and 
there is no shortage of ways in which the investment objectives of a sovereign wealth fund can be clarified 
through the adoption of explicit investment targets. In the first place, the fund may adopt – or receive from 
government – an explicit (long-run) target return, expressed in either nominal or real terms. The sovereign 
wealth fund’s investment policies, decisions and performance can be further clarified by the adoption and 
disclosure of an investment benchmark (in the form of a well-known index, combination of indexes or 
reference portfolio), which the fund is expected to track with some acceptable degree of flexibility (in the 
form of a maximum tracking error). A narrow objective for a sovereign wealth fund could further be given 
content through the specification of explicit investment targets, as per the following stylised statement: 
“The fund seeks to achieve an annualised real rate of return of 5%, net of fees. This target is to be achieved 
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over the long term, due to the volatility implicit in short-term periods. In pursuing this target, the fund is 
expected to track two index benchmarks: the MSCI All Country World Index (60%) for equities and the 
Barclays Global Aggregate Bond Index (40%) for fixed-income securities.”63 This articulaton in fact 
mirrors the stated investment objectives and targets of the sovereign wealth funds of Norway, Chile and 
Botswana (to name only a few prominent examples). 
A natural progression from targets is to the discussion of a rule-based framework for policy 
implementation – that is, the game plan devised for hitting those targets. Monetary economics has moved 
away from stark “rules versus discretion” debates, to a modern understanding of middle group 
characterised by contingent or state-dependent rules (and “flexible” inflation targeting). This shift has 
important implications for the discussion of fiscal rules for resource revenues and the investment rules of 
sovereign wealth funds, as discussed below.  
5 .2 .5 .  The use of  contingent rules 
Economists’ understanding of the respective merits of rules and discretion in the conduct of monetary 
policy has evolved in the post-war era. Three distinct intellectual developments underline the piecemeal 
advances in understanding how rules – and in particular what kind of rules – contribute to the credibility 
of commitments to avoid various inflationary biases, public understanding of the monetary policy process, 
and the accountability of independent central banks. A major development was the work of Milton 
Friedman in the 1960s around limits and dangers of activist counter-cyclical policy (and his advocation of a 
constant money-growth rule).  
Friedman was followed by important contributions in the late 1970s by Sargent and Wallace (1975), 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Lucas and Sargent (1978) that identifiied incentive-based dynamic 
inconsistency problems in policymaking. Finally, the work of John Taylor, Michael Woodford and Lars 
Svensson has led to an important softening of the distinction between “stark” or “mechanistic” rules and 
discretion. These contributions have underlined the fact that rules – including ones that are fairly simply 
specified – can take information on the current and expected future state of the economy into account. In 
63 Note that this formulation includes some assumptions around the fund’s desired asset allocation and the selection 
of particular indexes through which to best express the fund’s expected returns.  
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this jargon of monetary economics, such rules are variously known as “activist”, “feedback”, “contingent” or 
“state-dependent” rules.  
Combined with an explicit policy target, the modern understanding of rules as outlined above constitute 
what Woodford (2002) calls “principles of systematic conduct for institutions that are aware of the 
consequences of their actions and take responsibility for them”. Emphasising the fact that contingent rules 
and explicit targets by no means place policymakers in a straitjacket, Du Plessis (2003) notes that “the 
adoption of explicit targets has not implied a move to stark rules for monetary policy, but rather a move to 
a systematic framework for monetary policy that allows flexible implementation and transparent 
communication of policy decisions.” While the expectations-management aspect of contingent rules are of 
great significance to monetary policy given the endogeneity of price- and wage-setting behaviour, there are 
more generic virtues to contingent rules that are relevant to the design of institutional arrangements of 
sovereign wealth funds. These implications apply to both the fiscal rules that govern the flow of revenues 
and income to and from the sovereign wealth fund and the investment rules that guide the fund’s 
investment policies.  
With respect to fiscal rules, Chapter 6 describes a number of simple savings rules for transferring a share 
of resource revenues to the sovereign wealth fund, which range from highly mechanistic (for example, 
fixed-percentage rules, which apply irrespective of the state of the economy, resource revenues or 
commodity prices) to less so (for example, reference-price based rules). Similarly, spending rules (flows of 
assets and income from the sovereign wealth fund to the budget) can be mechanistic (a fixed percentage 
draw) or contingent (based, for example, on the level of funding needed to maintain a stable government 
spending path). As noted in Chapter 6, the advantage of mechanistic fiscal rules is their simplicity, clarity 
and ease of communication, while advantage of more dynamically specified contingent rules is that they 
can be more stabilising and counter cyclical. A trade-off therefore exists between the benefits simplicity 
(but functional sub-optimality) of mechanistic fiscal rules for sovereign wealth funds and the management 
of resource revenues, and the complexity (but superior functionality) of more dynamic, state-contingent 
rules.  
A parallel consideration of the merits of mechanistic versus contingent rules in the area of sovereign 
wealth funds pertains to their investment policies. As a starting point, it is clear that rule-based investing 
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in a general sense is widespread amongst well-governed institutional investors, including some sovereign 
wealth funds. The investment equivalent of a Friedman-like k-percent rule is a very strict adherence to the 
benchmark, with low or zero tracking error, a standard measure of the extent the investor is allowed to 
deviate from the benchmark. With innovations in the investment industry in recent years, this kind of 
mechanistic rule has the benefit, in addition of being constraining (which has obvious attractive properties 
in certain contexts), is low costs. An index-tracking approach amounts to simply following the market, 
implying zero or minimal “active management” that seeks to outperform the market. The increasingly 
widespread embrace of passive, indexed investment strategies – which has long had considerable 
academic and empirical support – reflect the believe of many investors, both of a retail and institutional 
variety, that fees for active management (which are typically accrued whether “alpha” or market-
outperformance is achieved or not) or investments of “in-house” human capital in pursuit of 
outperformance are simply not worth the cost.  
The following chapter will outline how sovereign wealth funds might implement a number of established 
rule-based investment policies that strengthens their institutional foundations. However, two important 
implications from the discussion around mechanistic versus more activist or contingent investment rules 
should be highlighted. First, the argument for mechanistic strategies is much more compelling in the area 
of investment than it is for monetary policy. The burden of proof lies with those in favour of a more activist 
investment approach in pursuit of market-beating returns: a move towards more active strategies raises 
costs – monitoring costs, trading costs, management fees, technological infrastructure acquisition and 
maintenance, and investments in human capital – and introduces additional uncertainty into the 
investment process. Practically, these cost considerations are important for emerging sovereign wealth 
funds in countries with relatively small talent pools, experience, infrastructure and expertise in investing. A 
new sovereign wealth fund needs to clear a high hurdle in the form of additional returns in order to justify 
active strategies, even if they are to be rule based. Over time, a sovereign wealth fund may accumulate 
sufficient human capital, technological infrastructure and institutional credibility to pursue more skill-
intensive active strategies or manage the complex oversight and manager-selection processes that 
accompany allocating investment mandates to external managers.  
Part of these costs pertain to the need for more extensive governance and institutional arrangements when 
contingent rules, and particularly strategies that require a degree of managerial discretion, are pursued by 
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sovereign wealth funds. Even if, as is desirable for all large institutional investors (let alone ones that 
manage public assets), the allocation to active strategies is governed by a robust rule-based framework64, 
the operation and interpretation of the rule needs to be explained and evaluated. Accountability 
mechanisms also have to become more elaborate, as the fund’s managers have to account (to the Board, 
political overseers and the general public) for its pursuit of particular strategies and why deviations from 
benchmarks – which will inevitably be negative on occasion, sometimes for lengthy periods of time – 
occurred. Finally, active strategies raise the complexity of agency relationships between government, the 
fund’s management and external fund managers.  
Ultimately, an overarching lesson from monetary policy is that all rule-based systems that govern 
processes involving at least some degree of discretion – whether it is the flow of funds to and from the 
sovereign wealth fund, or its investment policies – perform an important institutional function in both the 
ex ante internal decision making process and the ex post evaluation of the performance of an operationally 
independent public institution. Du Plessis (2003) notes in relation to the role of rules in the evaluation of 
the monetary policy that “The ‘normal’ behaviour of the central bank as well as its ‘discretionary’ decisions 
are, accordingly, rendered intelligible, and hence potentially transparent; and if potentially transparent, 
then potentially accountable.” The case for constrained discretion, encapsulated in contingent rules, rest 
on the belief that gains can be made from incorporating information about the state of the world (or the 
commodity cycle or the financial markets), rather than relying purely on a stark, information-less rule. 
Often policymakers will be granted the power to interpret this information and act according. This is as 
true for monetary policy as it is for active investing – hence, there will always be flexibility or discretion – in 
the interpretation and implementation of contingent rules. The existence of the rule establishes a 
benchmark through which both the policymaker and the public can understand the meaning and 
implications of the exercise of discretion. 
64 In designing contingent rules that govern active investment strategies, sovereign wealth funds should bear an 
important lesson from monetary policy in mind: monetary economists have recognised that specific targeting rules 
are typically “sub-optimal” in each specific context, but in practice the futile search for “optimal rules” has been 
replaced by a search for ones that are most robust to various specifications of the economic structure (see especially 
Svensson, 2002 and 2003). The global financial markets are prone to periodic “regime shifts” and temporary 
deviations from long-standing structural features and asset correlations – the importance is to identify rules that 
govern the active allocation process that are robust to various plausible financial conditions and relationships, rather 
than one that is “optimal” in the strict sense for a particular structure. 
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5.2.6.  Transparency and accountabil ity  
In a democratic and open society, the agency relationship established by the devolution of authority in the 
management of resource revenues requires institutional arrangements that promote and enforce 
accountability and transparency on the part of the agent. This is an entirely uncontroversial foundational 
assumption, which then shifts the discussion towards what kinds of institutional arrangements for 
transparency and accountability are appropriate and most important. In less democratic environments – 
which clearly characterise the landscape of some sovereign wealth fund, notably in the Middle East – the 
attention may be less on transparency and broad public accountability, but accountability to political elites 
(the king, the royal family or a ministry) is nevertheless important.  
Note that a number of the other lessons from the modern monetary consensus discussed above support 
both accountability and transparency. This include the importance of clarifying institutional mandates 
that clarify what policy and the institutions responsible for it can and cannot achieve;  the expression of 
these mandates into explicit, measurable policy targets; and the adoption of (contingent) rules to guide 
the implementation and ex post and ex ante evaluation of policy. The need for (and apparent lack of) 
transparency and accountability funds has been a major area of focus in both the literature and policy 
discussions on sovereign wealth funds.  
As noted in Chapter 4, this focus emerged from the regulatory concerns expressed by recipient countries 
of sovereign wealth fund investments, notably the United States, France, Germany and Australia. Most of 
these concerns emanated from the obscurity that surrounded leading sovereign wealth funds from the 
Middle East and Asia, which made it impossible to gauge even the most basic facts about these 
institutions, such as their assets under management; investment objectives benchmarks and target 
returns; source of funds and use of assets and income (fiscal rules); asset and currency allocations; internal 
management structures and relationships to their respective government; legal status; and their approach 
to the exercise of shareholder rights.  
These concerns led to a number of frameworks for sovereign wealth fund transparency and accountability, 
as well as positive assessments of the extent to which sovereign wealth funds were in compliance. The 
most influential of these was a “scoreboard”, developed by Truman (2008), which listed and ranked the 
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public information around four aspects of sovereign wealth funds: (i) structure, (ii) governance, (iii) 
transparency and accountability, and (iv) behaviour. The sovereign wealth fund community itself also 
responded to the rising political and regulatory pressure by convening the International Working Group 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds (later renamed as the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds). 
Amongst the goals of this body is establishment of – and subsequent periodic evaluation of compliance 
with – a set of 24 “voluntary best practices”, formally known as the Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices, but more commonly referred to as the Santiago Principles after the city where they were 
adopted.  
Of interest to the discussion in this chapter is the scope and content of these two sets of transparency and 
accountability measures. There are striking similarities overlap between the accountability and 
transparency aspects of the Truman scoreboard and the Santiago Principles, as shown in Table 5.1. (note 
the exact language is paragraphed for the sake of brevity), but also some differences in emphasis. 
Truman’s primary concern is that the potential impact of sovereign wealth funds on global financial 
markets cannot be anticipated due to their lack transparency, hence his heavy and granular focus on 
investment practices. The scoreboard lists 25 questions across the four categories, for which the results of 
simple “yes/no” answers are collated to create a score out of 25. 
The Santiago Principles are, in turn, primarily concerned with addressing concerns over state-ownership 
of sovereign wealth funds and their potential use for non-commercial objectives, hence their emphasis on 
governance and accountability arrangements, as well as high-level data disclosure (rather than specifics 
about investment holding and performance). Truman’s criteria are more granular and specific, while the 
Santiago Principles are broader and leave more scope for local interpretation. Where Truman, for 
example, specifies annual and quarterly reporting cycles, the Principles uses language such as “in a timely 
fashion”; where Truman asks for a “clearly specified” rule around the use of assets and income, the 
Principles suggest the disclosure the “general approach to withdrawals from the sovereign wealth fund 
and spending on behalf of the government”.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
137
Table 5 .1 .  The Truman and Santiago Principle  transparency and accountabil ity  criteria  
Truman scoreboard Santiago Principles  
GOVERNANCE AND OBJECTIVES 
Roles and responsibil it ies  Is the role of the government, governing 
body and management clearly stated? 
The governance framework should establish a clear and effective division of 
roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and operational 
independence. 
Accountabil ity  framework The accountability framework should be clearly defined in the relevant 
legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement. 
Legal  framework and status  Is there a clear legal framework? Key features of the SWF’s legal basis and structure, as well as the legal 
relationship between the SWF and other state bodies, should be publicly 
disclosed. 
Functions and objectives Is the SWF’s objective clearly stated? The policy purpose and objectives of the SWF should be clearly defined and 
publicly disclosed. 
Non-commercial  objectives  Non-economic and non-financial investment considerations should be clearly 
set out in the investment policy and publicly disclosed. 
FISCAL RULES 
Saving rule/mechanism Is the source of the SWF’s funding clearly 
specified? 
The source of SWF funding should be publicly disclosed. 
Spending rule/mechanism Is the nature of the subsequent use of the 
principal and earnings of the fund clearly 
specified? 
The general approach to withdrawals from the SWF and spending on behalf 
of the government should be publicly disclosed. 
Continued on fol lowing page 
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INVESTMENTS 
Investment objectives  and 
policy  
Are the fund's investment objectives clearly 
stated? 
A description of the investment policy of the SWF should be publicly 
disclosed. 
Returns/performance Do reports include information on 
the returns it earns? 
Type,  geography,  currency and 
specif icity  of  investments  
Do reports include information on the (i) 
types, (ii) geography, (iii) specificity, and 
(iv) currency allocation of investments?   
External  mandates  Are the holders of investment mandates 
identified? 
Risk management The general approach to the SWF’s risk management framework should be 
publicly disclosed. 
REPORTING AND AUDITS 
Annual  and quarterly  report  Does the SWF provide annual and/or 
quarterly report on its activities and 
results? 
An annual report and financial statements on operations and performance 
should be prepared in accordance with recognised international or national 
accounting standards.  
Audit  reports  Is the SWF subjected to a regular audits; 
are these audits published and 
independent? 
The SWF’s operations and financial statements should be audited annually in 
accordance with recognised international or national auditing standards in a 
consistent manner. 
High-level  f inancial  disclosure Do regular reports on the investments by 
the SWF include the size of the fund? 
Relevant financial information should be publicly disclosed to demonstrate its 
economic and financial orientation to contribute to international financial 
stability and enhance trust in recipient countries. 
General  data disclosure The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a 
timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where 
appropriate in macroeconomic data sets. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
139 
Demands and expectations for sovereign wealth fund transparency arise from three sources. First, in line 
with the philosophy behind the accountability test and scores for central banks proposed by de Haan, 
Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998), is an argument about addressing the “democratic deficit” that 
potentially arises from institutional independence: “a delegation of powers to unelected officials can only 
be acceptable in a democratic society if…(independent policy institutions) are one way or another 
accountable to democratically elected institutions” (de Haan et. al., 1998). Second, and more specific to 
sovereign wealth funds, are demands for transparency in particular, imposed by the international 
regulatory community or unilaterally by recipient country governments and financial supervisors. Finally, 
sovereign wealth funds, particularly when embedded a clearly communicated rule-based fiscal framework, 
can enhance transparency, accountability and predictability in the management of resource revenues – the 
absence of which is widely theorised as associated with the resource curse, as discussed Chapter 3.  
Table  5 .2:  The f irst  Truman Scoreboard –  selected resource-based SWFs 
Structure Governance Transparency & 
Accountabil ity  
Behaviour Total  
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global 7.50 4.00 10.50 1.00 23.00 
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 8.00 2.00 11.75 0.00 21.75 
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 7.50 3.00 9.00 0.00 19.50 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 5.00 2.00 9.50 0.00 16.50 
Chile Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund 7.00 2.00 6.50 0.00 15.50 
Botswana Pula Fund 5.50 2.00 7.00 0.00 14.50 
Kazakhstan National Oil Fund 6.00 2.00 6.50 0.00 14.50 
São Tomé & Príncipe National Oil Account 8.00 2.00 2.25 0.00 12.25 
Trinidad & Tobago Heritage & Stabilisation Fund 6.50 2.00 3.75 0.00 12.25 
Kuwait Investment Authority 6.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 12.00 
Russia Stabilisation Fund 4.00 2.00 3.50 0.00 9.50 
Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund 5.00 2.00 0.50 0.00 7.50 
Mexico Oil Income Stabilisation Fund 5.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 7.00 
Venezuela National Development Fund 1.50 0.50 4.00 0.00 6.00 
Iran Oil Stabilisation Fund 4.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 5.50 
Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilisation Fund 3.00 0.50 2.00 0.00 5.50 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 3.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 3.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 4.50 
Brunei Investment Agency 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 2.50 
Qatar Investment Authority 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
Total  Possible  Points  8.00 4.00 12.00 1 .00 25.00 
Average Number of  Points 4.80 1 .42 4.02 0.03 10.27 
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If this improvement is to be achieved, however, it follows that the objectives and operations of the 
sovereign wealth fund and its fiscal rule are are openly communicated. Based on the assessments of 
sovereign wealth funds in the original Truman scoreboard, reported in Table 5.2, a number of funds fall 
far short to contributing to greater transparency and accountability (in fact, their secrecy may compound 
and reinforce the lack thereof), although subsequent Truman scoreboards have recorded improvements 
by a number of funds (Bagnall and Truman, 2013).  
Similarly, Behrendt (2010) noted significant variation in the degree of compliance with the Santiago 
Principles amongst sovereign wealth funds and demonstrated a correlation between the degree of 
compliance, not only with the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and Transparency 
International’s Transparency Index, but also the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, which 
measures countries’ electoral processes, pluralism, civil liberties, government functioning, political 
participation and political culture (Figure 5.1.). As with updates on the Truman scoreboard (Bagnall and 
Truman, 2013), more recent assessments by Behrendt do, however, note a gradual improvement across 
sovereign wealth funds in terms of compliance with the Santiago Principles (Behrendt, 2014).  
Figure 5 .1 :  Compliance with the Santiago Principles  and democracy 
Source: Behrendt (2010) 
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How should the lack of transparency and accountability – and the marginal gains in these areas in recent 
years – be interpreted? As noted earlier, the first source of demand for sovereign wealth fund transparency 
and accountability (as with monetary policy) rises from concerns around the democratic deficit of 
independent authorities. Unsurprisingly, concerns about a democratic deficit are not a powerful driver of 
demand for transparency and accountability in countries that are not democratic. Second, it is noteworthy 
that the majority of resource-based sovereign wealth funds that have shown significant improvements in 
transparency and accountability in recent years, as measured by Bagnall and Truman (2013), are from 
broadly democratic countries, such as Canada (Alberta), the United States (Alaska), Chile, Trinidad & 
Tobago, and Mexico.  
Botswana is an exception as a country that is broadly democratic, but whose sovereign wealth fund has 
maintained a low transparency and accountability score; while the funds of Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and 
Azerbaijan have significantly improved their measured transparency and accountability scores, without 
becoming more democratic (the same observation applies to the large non-resource based sovereign 
wealth funds from China and Singapore). The pattern of improvement amongst the less-democratic 
group, therefore, appears to be more in response to the second source of demand for transparency and 
accountability – international regulatory pressure (this conclusion is intuitive, as a regulatory backlash 
against these funds would be a major commercial threat to these large funds, which invest hundreds of 
billions of dollars in global capital markets).  
One final observation regarding sovereign wealth fund transparency and accountability pertains to the 
type of openness that might be regarded as most important and impactful. Another way to cast this 
question is: are there demands for transparency that can be damaging and are, therefore, legitimately 
resisted by sovereign wealth funds? Note that similar questions have been raised by leading central 
bankers and monetary economist in their field (Cukierman, 2007; Cruijsen, Eijffinger and Hoogduin, 2008; 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2008; and Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014). When the most important 
contributions of sovereign wealth funds are believed to be in advancing stability and predictability in the 
management of volatile natural resource revenues, in providing a degree of separation in their 
management from the political progress, and in transforming a depleting asset (natural resources) into a 
sustainable and permanent one (a financial endowment), the most important elements of the previously 
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discussed frameworks (see Table 5.1.) are those pertaining to “governance and objectives” and “fiscal rules”, 
rather than, for example, high-frequency investment reports, such as quarterly reports. As Truman (2008) 
himself noted in regards to his demand for quarterly investment reports, “views differ on the desirability of 
quarterly financial reporting. Some argue that it promotes too much focus on short-term returns.” 
Here, the importance of incentive compatibility and coherence with the institutional matrix, identified in 
Chapter 2 as important characteristics of sound institutional design, enter the discussion. Simply put, the 
majority of sovereign wealth funds – particularly relatively new ones – still rest on flimsy institutional and 
political foundations, and are subject to frequent political attacks. Clearly, poor short-term investment 
returns, which are to be expected from long-term investors, can be a source of ammunition for 
opportunistic opponents of a sovereign wealth fund. These concerns are less pressing in contexts where 
other elements of the institutional matrix are already supportive of the role of sovereign wealth fund (such 
as as the rule of law, rule-based fiscal policy and traditional of respecting the independence of accountable 
economic institutions), as they are, for example, in Norway and Chile.  
A consideration of the appropriate horizon for transparency and accountability is also warranted. 
Sovereign wealth funds with long-term investment horizons associated with saving and investment 
mandates should have multi-year, if not multi-decade, investment horizons. As discussed in greater detail 
in the following chapter, the full and appropriate exploitation of this horizon suggests, and even requires, 
significant exposure to short-term volatility. A consistent theme in the finance literature relating to long-
term investment is that this insight is difficult to understand and communicate, and that long-term 
thinking and a tolerance of short-term volatility is very difficult to incentivise. The question, therefore, is 
whether an emphasis on high-frequency financial reporting (monthly and quarterly) can be damaging to a 
nascent sovereign wealth fund, opening it up undue political pressures, absent complimentary elements in 
the gradually realised institutional matrix; and preventing the establishment of incentives that promote 
long-termism in investment. In the area of investments, it is likely to be much more important that the 
sovereign wealth fund is accountable and transparent with respect to such elements as its long-term 
investment objectives, target returns, investment beliefs, rules and strategies. More generally, it is self-
evident that from a broad-based institutional perspective, demands for greater accountability and 
transparency around sovereign wealth funds’ fiscal rules, ownership and reporting structures (internal and 
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external governance), and ultimate policy functions and objectives are of a higher-order concerns that 
whether or not the fund publishes a monthly or quarterly investment report.  
Conclusion 
This chapter assessed the extent to which the central tenets of the modern monetary consensus may be 
applied to the institutional arrangements for sovereign wealth funds. In doing so, the discussion 
frequently returned to the set of common principles for the form and function of sound institutions 
identified in Chapter 2. The central importance of forward-looking expectations management plays a 
particularly significant role in the institutional arrangements of the modern monetary policy. This 
dimension, while not entirely absent in the area of sovereign wealth fund management (as argued 
throughout this dissertation, sovereign wealth funds and fiscal rules can enhance the stability and 
predictability around the spending of resource revenues), plays a less central role. Nevertheless, the more 
generic institutional implications and insights from monetary policy are highly applicable to sovereign 
wealth funds.  
The first is the importance of clarifying institutional mandates and objectives, which are not only 
important for accountability, but also because it defines the appropriate scope of specific policies and 
institutions by emphasising their optimal contribution and clarifying which social objectives lie beyond 
their reach. It was noted that there is currently less agreement around the appropriate objectives and 
mandate of sovereign wealth funds than there is for monetary policy. It is therefore critical to the process 
of institutional design for sovereign wealth funds that great care is taken to define, both positively and 
negatively, exactly what the functions, mandates and objectives of sovereign wealth funds are – not least 
because this informs all other institutional arrangements.  
The management of sovereign wealth funds share with modern monetary policy institutions the 
characteristics of an agency relationship, established by the granting of operational authority to 
independent institutions in order to avoid well-known political biases and incentive problems that 
otherwise result in less stable, predictable and broadly economically conducive policymaking. Operational 
independence has gained a particular understanding through the theory and practice of modern monetary 
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policy – notably, it is typically accompanied by goal dependence, and an elaborate set of complementary 
institutional arrangements that promote accountability and transparency. The discussion of two major 
initiatives aimed at advancing the cause of sovereign wealth fund transparency – the Santiago Principles 
(along with independent assessments of funds’ compliance with the principles) and the Truman 
scoreboard – revealed a high degree of variation in terms of sovereign wealth fund transparency. The more 
general national political environment, unsurprisingly, explains a significant part of this variation 
(particularly the extent to which host governments are regarded as being democratic), although there is 
evidence that sovereign wealth fund transparency, in general, is improving (including amongst funds 
located in less democratic countries).  
The chapter also noted the important lesson from the modern monetary consensus for sovereign wealth 
funds that results from an emphasis on institutionalised credibility – and the adoption of explicit targets 
and contingent rules as means to reduce the costs associated with achieving such credibility (which in turn 
also promotes accountability). The institutional framework established in this chapter combined the 
theoretical insights from institutional economics identified in Chapter 2 with the consensus around the 
institutions of modern monetary policy. This framework can be used to evaluate fiscal rules and rule-based 
investment policies that sovereign can (and in certain instances do) use.  
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SECTION III 
RULE-BASED FISCAL POLICIES FOR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
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Chapter 6 
Rule-of-thumb savings:  
Simple mechanisms for transferring resource windfalls to sovereign wealth funds 
Following heated debate during the 1975 elections, the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund was 
signed into law in May the following year by the legislature of the oil-rich Canadian province. The 
fund’s architects set it four lofty goals: ensuring fairness to future generations, strengthening and 
diversifying the economy (particularly through in-province infrastructure investments), improving the 
quality of life of Albertans, and providing a rainy day fund. These vague and sprawling ambitions, 
coupled with legislation that left considerable discretion in hands of politicians in determining 
priorities, set in motion a tug-of-war over the conflicting aims of the fund, which remains unresolved.  
The early years of the Alberta Heritage Fund were dominated by an agenda that prioritised “societal 
objectives” over financial returns, under the provincial government’s economic mantra of “Alberta 
First”. Investments were targetted at three sectors: commercial loans at subsidised rates to encourage 
economic diversification; grants for health, education and environmental initiatives; and finally, 
income-generating investments, which were restricted to 15% of the fund’s total assets. The fund’s 
performance was decidedly mixed, with the commercial loan portfolio in particular requiring a 
government subsidy to cover losses (Warrack, 2008; and Murphy and Clemens, 2013). A second 
problem was chronic underfunding. Due to the emphasis on in-province developmental investments, 
the fund was not financially self-sustaining by means of investment income. In order to grow the fund – 
or merely protect the real value of its capital (“inflation proofing”) – regular funding contributions were 
required, which would have to be increased in the event of losses suffered on the fund’s portfolio. In 
reality, exactly the opposite occurred: an initial flow to the Heritage Fund of 30% of non-renewable 
resource revenue was halved in 1982 and ultimately completely suspended in 1987 (Warrack, 2008). 
Moreover, the Alberta treasury responded to the collapse in energy prices in mid-1980s by drawing 
down on the fund’s assets to fund public expenditure.  
In 1995, the government canvassed public opinion about how to reform the floundering fund through a 
survey entitled “Can we interest you in an $11 billion question?” Among several policy alternatives, the 
majority of respondents favoured restructuring the fund into a permanent endowment, which would 
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be invested to maximise returns and provide a steady source of income to the government, while 
protecting the fund’s capital in real terms. The unambiguous expression of preferences by citizens for 
long-term savings and income-generation through the fund resulted in a shift away from in-province 
investments, efforts to ensure greater funding contributions are made and sustainable spending out of 
the fund (based, using endowment-fund principles, on its real return).  
However, these changes remain largely discretionary, with the threat public resentment and the 
collective memory of the fund’s historic mismanagement serving as the primary checks on executive’s 
discretion in all key aspects. For example, there is no specific legal requirement for the government to 
contribute to the Alberta Heritage Fund; rather, the contributions are made on a discretionary basis 
each year, authorised by a Special Act” (Murphy and Clemens, 2013). While the plundering of the 
Heritage Fund has ceased in recent years, the fund’s size and contribution to the Albertan economy 
remains limited. According to an authoritative estimate, the fund has received and retained a mere 5-
6% of the province’s resource revenues (Murphy and Clemens, 2013). 
The history of the Alberta Heritage Fund, particularly when contrasted – as it frequently is – with the 
sovereign wealth funds of Norway and Alaska (see, for example, Warrack, 2008; Murphy and Clemens, 
2013; and Torvik, 2012) provides a number of cautionary tales. First, it underlines the risks involved with 
potentially conflicting investment objectives, particularly when they are vaguely specified. Second, it 
demonstrates a simple fact about the long-term contribution of sovereign wealth funds to their associated 
economies: that a fund (or its management institution) can be rendered ineffective by the absence of 
robust fiscal (spending and saving) rules. Finally, the Albertan experience demonstrates how a high 
degree of political discretion – particularly with respect to the aforementioned domestic or developmental 
investments and fiscal rules – can fundamentally undermine sound intensions surrounding the 
establishment of a sovereign wealth fund. 
These lessons bear repeating, as there is a discernable tendency amongst policymakers worldwide to 
trumpet the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund – in name and in institutional form – as a major 
achievement in itself. However, the argument advanced here is that an effective sovereign wealth fund is 
but a part of broader rule-based fiscal regime. The establishment of a sovereign wealth fund in name, the 
declaration of lofty objectives and mandates, and the creation an elaborate management structures can 
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become empty political gestures absent commitments to capitalise these funds in boom periods and 
refrain from drawing down on their assets in an ad hoc manner during bust periods.  
This chapter considers a number of rule-based mechanisms for transferring resource revenues to and from 
a sovereign wealth fund. Such fiscal rules can assume a wide range of institutional characteristics – they 
can, for example, be explicit or implied, transparent or obscure, and pro- or counter-cyclical. Moreover, 
they can provide some general form of funding for a sovereign wealth fund with a number of functions (as 
discussed in Chapter 4, these typically include stabilisation, savings, income generation and domestic 
investments); or earmark or allocate funds to specific sovereign wealth fund functions.  
This chapter outlines four simple rules for accumulating resource revenues in the form of financial assets. 
These rules, while having the attractive feature of being easy to understand and communicate, have 
notable shortcomings and offer only a very partial solution to the need for fiscal rules around sovereign 
wealth funds (focusing only on the savings dimension). Therefore, these simple rules are best understood 
as sub-optimal “rules of thumb” that guide the possible accumulation of sovereign wealth funds and little 
else. As discussed in this chapter, despite their obvious shortcomings, many sovereign wealth funds make 
use of rules of this kind, given their simplicity and the ease of communication they enable. 
6.1. Simple accumulation rules for resource-rich countries: a conceptual overview 
Accumulation mechanisms for resource-rich countries can be anchored to a number of macroeconomic 
variables: the consolidated or non-oil/non-resource fiscal balance, the underlying commodity price(s), or as 
a rule-based or ad hoc percentage of total resource revenues. Conditioning the accumulation rule on 
revenues has the advantage that it incorporates a number of critical factors related to the resource 
economy, as total resource revenue is a function of both exogenous factors, such as the resource price; and 
aspects over which policymakers have at least some control, such as production levels, and the taxes, 
duties and levies imposed on resource extraction (and the efficiency with which they are collected).65 An 
65 In some countries, notably Nigeria, total oil revenues are also a function of the extent of oil theft and sabotage. In 
Nigeria, these are not trivial factors – the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative estimated that Nigeria lost 
$10.9bn in revenue in 2009-11 due to oil theft, a figure that equates to 10% of reported government revenue from oil 
over the same period.  
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accumulation rule anchored on commodity prices bases the savings process on factors that are exogenous 
to government policies, as governments typically have some control over production and revenue capture, 
but no influence on market-determined resource prices (unless, as has historically been the case in Saudi 
Arabia, the producer is so large that it enjoys some pricing power). The decision to anchor the 
accumulation rule or mechanism on either revenue or price change is at the discretion of policymakers and 
reflects their preference for exposing the savings process to factors that are endogenous (production levels 
and tax rates) and exogenous (commodity-price movements) to government decisions. 
As noted above, the rules discussed in this section work best as a means towards accumulating financial 
assets in a sovereign wealth fund. With the exception of the rule based on the financing of the non-
resource deficit, none of these rules in any way integrate savings decisions with spending and stabilisation 
decisions. Moreover, these rules do not provide indications of how accumulated assets may be split 
between the stabilisation and savings functions of a sovereign wealth fund. Instead, these rules assume a 
high degree of a priori political will and consensus around the desirability of putting aside assets from 
current spending in order to provision for future spending needs and stabilisation needs.  
One way to, therefore, understand the role of these basic rule of thumb savings processes is that they may 
be an interim step towards a fully-fledged rule-based fiscal framework that links savings, stabilisation and 
spending policies and rules can be adopted (outlined in the following section). Once countries have 
accumulated such a critical level of funds (or if they have already done so previously), an integrated and 
contingent fiscal rule is clearly preferable. If the emphasis is, however temporarily, purely on the 
accumulation of financial assets, the following four rules are examples of simple accumulation processes 
through which this may be achieved.  
6 .1 . 1 .  Fixed-percentage transfers  
Simple, mechanistic rules transfer a fixed percentage of annual resource revenues to a sovereign wealth 
fund. If consistently adhered to, such transfers are entirely agnostic to the state of the commodity-price or 
–revenue cycle, production levels or the economy. A variation of this simple rule may be to introduce some
explicit or implied “escape clause” that suspends the rule in response to a negative shock (most obviously a 
drop in exogenously determined commodity prices). While these rules – particularly in the absence of 
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escape clauses – are potentially pro-cyclical, as they oblige the government to transfer revenues even in 
years of unanticipated revenue shortfalls, they have the advantage of being very easy to communicate and 
difficult to manipulate. Examples of sovereign wealth funds that receive their funding through fixed-
percentage saving rules include US state permanent funds, such as the Alaska Permanent Fund and the 
Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund, and the Kuwait Investment Authority. 
6.1 .2 .  Transfers  based on deviations from a moving average 
More dynamic accumulation rules may be conditioned on deviations in resource revenues (or resource 
prices) in a particular year from its moving average of preceding years. For example, if a country receives 
$60bn in oil revenues in a given year, having on average received $50bn in oil revenues in the preceding 
four years; a rule may specify that the above-average $10bn should be transferred to a sovereign wealth 
fund. While this rule has the advantage of hardwiring counter-cyclical properties – transferring more 
revenues to the fund when prices and revenues exceed the average level of recent years; and vice versa – 
transfers can also be volatile in periods of sharp fluctuations in commodity prices and resource production. 
This volatility does not impose significant adjustments to fiscal policy, but may complicate the operations 
and investment process of the sovereign wealth fund. The rule also imposes some technical challenges and 
introduces scope for manipulation. First, policymakers need to decide the period and weightings to use in 
applying the moving average – and can find ways to manipulate the time period and weightings in order to 
make more resources available for spending rather than transfer to the sovereign wealth fund. Second, the 
rule can be applied symmetrically, allowing for both in- and outflows from the fund, depending on 
whether revenues are above or below the moving average; or asymmetrically, with positive transfers to the 
fund when revenues exceed their moving average, but no outflows from the fund when revenues drop 
below the average. The Ghanaian sovereign wealth fund’s saving mechanism is based on deviations from a 
moving-average of past prices.  
6 .1 .3 .  Transfers  based on reference prices  
Another dynamic and potentially counter-cyclical set of accumulation rules are conditioned on deviations 
in the underlying commodity (oil) price from a specified reference price. Such reference prices may be 
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established by the legislature, executive or technocratic (and potentially independent) policymakers, most 
typically as part of the annual budget process. Under these types of rules, the government commits to 
transferring excess revenues that arise when the observed commodity price rises above the reference price, 
resulting in unanticipated windfalls. For example, if the government sets a reference price of $75 per barrel 
for oil in the 2014 budget and the average oil price for the year ends up being $90 per barrel, 20% of 
revenues are transferred to the sovereign wealth fund at the end of the year. This provides leeway to 
regularly adjust the accumulation rule by adjusting the reference price, and to pick a conservative, high-
accumulation rule (low reference price) or low-accumulation rule (high reference price).  
As with preceding rule based on a moving average, reference-price based rules can be applied 
symmetrically, permitting in- and outflows from the fund, based on positive and negative deviations from 
the reference price; or asymmetrically, only allowing inflows to the fund when the observed price exceeds 
the reference price. One important implication is that the strength of the government’s commitment to 
saving is dependent on whether it sets a high or low reference price. This underlines the critical 
importance of the process and institutions through which the reference price is determined. Additionally, 
price-based transfer rules define the windfall concept entirely in reference to the exogenously determined 
price of the commodity, and exclude factors that are at least in part endogenous to outcomes such as the 
level of production and revenue capture (although, in theory, the rule could also be conditioned not on a 
reference price, but a reference level of total or resource revenues). The funding of the Nigerian Sovereign 
Investment Authority’s sovereign wealth funds and the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan are based on a 
reference price for oil.  
6 .1 .4.  Financing of  sustainable  non-resource f iscal  deficits  
A number of countries have adopted rules that transfer all resource revenues to the sovereign wealth fund, 
which then in turn transfers an annual amount of funds equal to size of the non-resource fiscal deficit back 
to the budget. The advantage of this rule is that, if prudently applied (i.e., if the non-resource deficit is 
sustainable), it will ensure that government spending does not become dependent on resource revenues. 
In order to be sustainable, such rules need to ensure that the financing of the non-oil deficit through the 
resource revenues and/or the sovereign wealth fund is not too large.  
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The most famous example of this rule is adopted by the government of Norway, which limits the non-oil 
deficit to an amount equal to the expected average long-run real return of its sovereign wealth funds 
(which it believes is 4%) – that is, the government may run a non-oil deficit equal to 4% of the size of the 
Norwegian sovereign wealth, which is then financed by a transfer from the fund to the national treasury to 
balance the overall budget. Adhering to this rule ensures that oil revenues are sustainably consumed. This 
is a highly effective, if conservative, rule that achieves intergenerational equity in the consumption of the 
proceeds from a depleting natural asset.  
However, one shortcoming of this type of rule is that it cannot be introduced in countries that are already 
dependent on resources for fiscal revenues, as the non-resource deficit will be very large and, therefore, 
impossible to finance through the sovereign wealth fund’s annual investment income. In Nigeria and 
Alaska, for example, where oil revenues account for around 90% of total budget revenues, the concept of a 
non-resource deficit-funding rule is of no practical significance, as the non-oil deficit is impossibly large. 
Non-resource deficit rules, therefore, only work in the context of significant non-resource revenues. More 
positively, it can help prevent a country from becoming dependent on resource revenue in the first place, if 
it constrains itself to spending only a small amount of resource rents in the form of real returns generated 
by the sovereign wealth fund.   
The main features, advantages and disadvantages of these four types of rules – as well as countries and 
funds that make use of rules that follow some version of these rules – are summarised in Table 6.1. Section 
6.2 offers an empirical investigation of a counterfactual scenario in which two of the above-mentioned 
rules are applied to three contrasting oil-dependent countries, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Azerbaijan. By 
analysing how these rules would have worked in a backward-looking fashion, using data on actual oil 
revenues for the 2004-13 sample period, the exercise identifies the extent of financial assets that these 
countries could have accumulated during this period of generally rising resource prices and revenues. 
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Table 6.1 :  Key features  of  s imple accumulation rules  
Type of  
rule  
Operation Advantages Disadvantages Examples 
Fixed 
percentage 
A fixed percentage of 
annual resource revenue is 
transferred to the SWF – 
for example 10% or 20% of 
oil revenues. 
Easy to communicate and 
monitor (if data total 
resource revenues is 
available, accurate and 
public). 
Rule is mechanistic and does 
not respond to cyclical state 
of the economy or 
commodity prices/revenue – 
government still has to 
transfer a portion of revenues 










Revenues are transferred 
to (and potentially from) 
the SWF when revenues 
are above (or below) their 
multi-period moving 
averages. Policymakers 
need to decide if rule is 
symmetrically or 
asymmetrically.67 
A more dynamic, counter-
cyclical rule than the fixed-
percentage transfer rule. 
Does not require transfers 
to the SWF in periods of 
low revenues. 
Difficult to communicate 
and monitor, and therefore 
open to abuse. Can generate 
volatile transfers to (and 
from) the SWF, 
complicating the fund’s 







Revenue transfers are 
based on deviations from a 
pre-determined reference 
price for the underlying 
commodity. 
Can provide strong 
counter-cyclical force. Also 
allows government to 
better plan multi-year 
public spending programs, 
as unanticipated surpluses 
are saved rather than spent. 
Rule is constantly open for 
manipulation in the absence 
of a binding commitment or 
institutional arrangement to 
set prudent (low) reference 
price. Transfers to the SWF 












The government commits 
to running a non-resource 
fiscal deficit that can be 
sustainably funded by 
income from the sovereign 
wealth fund. 
If prudently applied, 
combats fiscal dependence 
on resources and ensures 
sustainable consumption of 
resource revenues 
(incentises the generation 
of non-resource revenues). 
Requires strong 
commitment from 
government to run 
sufficiently small non-
resource fiscal deficit. 
Cannot be implemented in 
countries that are already 
fiscally dependent on 
resources (but can help 







66 Unless a separate “escape clause” is established (in law or implicitly) to suspend transfers to the sovereign wealth 
fund in low revenue/price periods. 
67 Rules are symmetrical if outflows from the fund are permitted when revenues fall below average; and asymmetrical 
when only inflows are permitted.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
154 
6.2.  Country applications:  counterfactuals of  the 2004-13 oil  boom 
The analysis in this section includes two established oil-producers, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, who 
experienced an upward trend in revenues over the period (particularly due to a number of windfall years 
towards the end of the period); as well as Azerbaijan, whose revenues rose sharply, not only due to the 
upward trend in oil prices between 2000-13 (which also boosted the revenues of the established oil 
producers) but also due to a sharp increase in oil production over the period. The analysis shows that if 
countries followed relatively modest savings policies between 2004 and 2013, the accumulation of 
sovereign wealth fund assets would have been significant. This finding in revealing in its own right, but 
also have important implications for the analysis that follows in Chapters 7 and 8, where a more 
contingent rule-based fiscal framework is introduced that combines the transfer decision with the 
stabilisation and saving functions of resource-based sovereign wealth funds.68 As the rules discussed in 
this chapter are focused exclusively on the savings process, they are best understood as being relevant to a 
temporary period in which a country accumulates a critical level of initial assets, before implementing the 
more contingent fiscal rule discussed in Lise and 8.  
6 .2 .1 .  Historical  resource revenues 
Data on country-level resource revenues can be calculated based on IMF estimates of the ratio of resource 
revenues to GDP, which is available at the annual frequency from the Fund’s Article IV consultations. In 
order to get cross-country data on the annual dollar amount of resource revenues, this ratio is applied to 
estimates of each country’s nominal GDP in US dollar at market prices from the World Development 
Indicators. This yields a series of annual data on the total resource revenues, expressed in billions of US 
dollar for a number of countries for the 2000-13 sample period. In order to ensure accuracy, the data is 
crosschecked with national sources, where these are available. Table 6.2 shows the annual oil revenues 
generated by Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Azerbaijan over the sample period, as well as the average oil price 
for the years. 
68 As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, having a critical level of initial funds reduces the trade-offs involved with 
implementing savings and stabilisation policies. 
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Table 6.2:  Oil  revenues (nominal  US$bn) and average oi l  price  
 
Azerbaijan Nigeria  Saudi 
Arabia 
Oil  price 
(US$) 
2000 0.3 16.2 57.2 30.4 
2001 0.2 15.6 49.0 26.0 
2002 0.7 12.2 44.3 26.2 
2003 0.8 16.3 61.6 31.1 
2004 0.9 25.2 88.0 41.5 
2005 1.3 34.4 134.5 56.6 
2006 3.0 40.0 161.2 66.1 
2007 5.0 33.9 149.9 72.3 
2008 18.8 53.7 262.2 99.7 
2009 12.1 18.0 115.8 62.0 
2010 18.2 32.1 178.7 79.5 
2011 22.1 56.7 275.8 94.9 
2012 20.8 48.3 305.3 94.1 
2013 20.6 37.0 276.0 98.0 
Source: IMF Article IV consultations, national sources and author’s calculations. Oil prices are for the annual 
average for WTI crude oil, as provided by the US Energy Information Agency.  
6 .2 .2 .  Historic  f inancial  market  returns 
The returns on a diversified global portfolio are a reasonable, low-cost benchmark for sovereign wealth 
fund investments, and can be therefore be used to approximate a plausible set of investment returns on the 
accumulated assets. For illustrative purposes, and based on the best available information regarding the 
asset allocation of sovereign wealth funds and similar long-term institutional investors, it is important to 
approximate the fund’s return through a portfolio is broadly diversified in terms of geography and 
currency-, asset-class and risk-factor allocations (Avendaño and Santiso, 2011; Megginson and Fotak, 
2015). Such a portfolio can be constructed based on the following allocations: 25% in the S&P 500 Index 
(large market-capitalisation US stocks), 10% in the Russell 2000 Index (small market-capitalisation US 
stocks), 15% in the MSCI EAFE Index (21 developed markets excluding North America), 5% in the 
MSCI EME Index (emerging market equities), 25% in the Barclays Capital Aggregate Index (global 
bonds), 5% in the Barclays 1-3m Treasury (US dollar money markets), 5% in the CS/Tremont Equity 
Market Neutral Index (global hedge funds), 5% in the Dow Jones/UBS Commodity Index (global 
commodities) and 5% in the NAREIT Equity REIT Index (a leading proxy for US real estate). Annual 
returns on this portfolio are shown in Figure 6.1. In order to isolate the impact of investment returns, this 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
156 
performance will also be compared to a stylised scenario where the fund simply makes a fixed 5% annual 
nominal return.  
Figure 6.1 :  Annual  returns on globally  diversi f ied  portfol io,  2004-13  
Source: Bloomberg 
Using this data, it is possible to construct a number of counterfactual scenarios in which government 
implemented an accumulation rule from the set of simple rules discussed above. Given the procyclical 
nature of the fixed-transfer rule and the more data-intensive nature of rules based on the non-oil deficit, 
two simple rules are considered. The first is a moving-average rule under which transfers to the sovereign 
wealth fund (savings) are based on “upside” deviations in revenue from its four-year moving average. The 
second is a reference-price rule in which transfers to the sovereign wealth fund are based on upside 
deviations in the price of oil from a predetermined reference price, so that a percentage of revenues 
proportional to the percentage difference between the actual price and pre-specified one.  
Note that the application of both accumulation rules is asymmetric – the government transfers money to 
the sovereign wealth fund when revenues exceed the moving average or the oil price is above the reference 
price, but it does not transfer money from the fund back to the government when revenues or prices fall. 
The government does have other policy options for insuring against downside risk to revenues, such as 
hedging against a drop in oil prices in the option market. For example, the government can secure a floor 
price by buying options to sell oil at $60 per barrel. Mexico has adopted this approach to managing 
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6.2.3 .  Applying the moving-average rule  
Assume that the governments of the countries listed above committed to accumulating foreign assets 
from windfall oil revenues, starting in the year 2000. In order to determine what constitutes a windfall, the 
governments calculate the four-year moving average of revenues, and save all revenues arising in any given 
year in excess of that moving average, starting in the year 2003. Figure A.1. in the Appendix shows the 
difference between actual revenues and the four-year moving average of revenues for the three countries.   
Of course, the government would invest the money transferred to the fund, as (at least during this build-
up phase) the sole objective is to accumulate a critical level of financial assets with which to stabilise future 
revenue volatility and/or create a financial endowment for permanent spending. The fund has no short-
term liabilities in this initial accumulation phase, and can therefore invest in a relatively aggressive, risk-
tolerant manner, as implied by the choice of the globally diversified portfolio described earlier. For 
comparison and in order to assess whether the results are in some way biased by exceptional investor 
returns, the evolution of the funds assuming a fixed 5% annual nominal return is also shown. 
Table  6.3:  Key indicators  of  the moving-average rule,  2003-2013  
Azerbaijan Nigeria  Saudi Arabia  
Years yielding positive transfers 11 out of 11 8 out of 11 10 out of 11 
Total oil revenues ($bn) 123.6 395.6 2,006 
Total transfers ($bn) 30.7 72.3 413.0 
Implied savings rate 24.8% 18.3% 20.6% 
Fund assets by 2013 with fixed 5% return ($bn) 39.6 98.5 716.5 
Fund assets in 2013 with global portfolio return ($bn) 46.0 113.2 829.7 
Note: for Saudi Arabia, the fund starts with initial capital of $100bn at the start of 2003, as the country had already 
amassed substantial savings by that point from previous boom periods. 
Table 6.3 shows a number of key statistics around the counterfactual application of this rule in the three 
countries: the number of years between 2003 and 2013 in which the rule yields a transfer to the funds (i.e., 
revenue is above the moving average), total transfers, total oil revenues, and the implied savings rate 
generated by the rule; while Figure 6.2 shows the growth in the funds’ assets from 2003 to 2013 under the 
two return scenarios.  
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Figure 6.2: Accumulated assets under moving-average rule with retained investment income 
6.2.a. Azerbaijan  
6.2.b. Nigeria 
6.2.c. Saudi Arabia 
Note: all values are in nominal US$bn 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
159 
6.2.4.  Applying the reference-price  rule  
Accumulation rules can also be conditioned on the underlying commodity price, rather than total 
revenues. It is therefore useful to investigate the implications of a reference-price based rule described 
above. The key element in determining how conservative any such rule is – and therefore the size of 
transfers to the sovereign wealth fund – is the choice of a high or low reference price. The choice of a low 
reference price implies a conservative accumulation rule, and vice versa.  
To analyse the impact of different reference prices, consider a counterfactual starting from three plausible 
reference prices, established in 2000: $30, $40 and $50 per barrel, respectively (recall that the observed 
average price for WTI crude oil for 2000 was $30.4). In order to inflation-adjust the reference prices, 
assume that it increases by 2% per annum $30 reference price for 2000 yields a $38.8 reference price in 2013, 
the $40 reference price in 2000 equals $51.7 in 2013, and the $50 reference price in 2000 equals $64.8 in 
2013. This provides for three inflation-adjusted reference-price paths: (i) a high-savings path, derived from 
a starting $30 reference price in 2000; (ii) medium-savings path, starting from a $40 reference price in 
2000; and (iii) a low-savings path, starting from a $50 reference price for 2000. A saving rule can be 
specified mandating the transfer of a percentage of revenues to the sovereign wealth fund equivalent to the 
percentage of a deviation of the actual price from the reference price – that is, if actual oil prices are 10% 
above the reference price in any given year (for example, $44 relative to reference price for the year of $40), 
10% of total oil revenues would be transferred to the fund.  
The difference for each of the three countries between the actual revenues (based on the observed oil 
price) and the revenues consistent with these three price paths is shown in Figure 6.3. Note that while 
Figure 6.3 shows both positive and negative deviations in revenues, the asymmetric version of the rule 
would transfer assets to sovereign wealth fund only when the values are positive. It is striking that the 
medium-savings price path (using the $40 reference price for 2000) does not result in any savings until 
2005, given the relatively low oil prices during that period. Excess revenues, arising when prices are above 
the respective price paths, are dominated by four years – 2008 and 2011-2013 – across all three 
specifications of the reference price.  
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Figure 6.3:  Annual  transfers  to  the fund based on reference-price  rules  
6.3.a. Azerbaijan 
6.3.b. Nigeria 
6.3.c. Saudi Arabia 
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As was the case for the moving-average rule analysed earlier, the government would invest the assets 
transferred to the sovereign wealth fund, so that the accumulated assets would grow not only due to 
transfers, but also through the compounding of investment returns on those assets. Assume that the 
government adopts the medium-savings price path and saves all resource revenues that arise when the 
actual oil price exceeds the price signaled by the price path in any given year. Figure 6.4 shows the result 
to such a rule with investment returns added. 
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6.4.c. Saudi Arabia 
Note: all values are in nominal US$bn 
6.3.  General  policy implications 
This chapter has introduced a number of simple accumulation rules, and applied them in a backward 
looking manner to construct a number of counter factual scenarios for the period 2003 – 2013. Basic 
moving-average and reference-price rules were applied to data for Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Azerbaijan69 
to quantify how large the accumulation of assets in a hypothetical sovereign wealth fund would have been 
under the implementation of these rules. The exercise showed that all three countries – and the same 
argument applies to other countries producing oil and other commodities that experienced a favourable 
price environment, particularly towards the end of the sample period – could have amassed significant 
assets over the years in question. With simple combination of a simple savings rule to capture windfall 
revenues (without requiring countries to save in years when revenues are down sharply) and the 
investment of the accumulated assets in a balanced, globally diversified equity-bond portfolio, Saudi 
69 These three countries are chosen here, as they illustrate the effect of various savings rules in three distinct contexts 
and experiences over the sample period: a large oil producer that enjoyed stable production and price-driven 
increases in revenues (Saudi Arabia); a country that experienced not only price-driven volatility but also production-
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Arabia would have amassed a total of $830bn - $1 trillion by the end of 2013, while Nigeria and Azerbaijan 
would have accumulated $113bn - $165bn and $46bn-$60.5bn, respectively.  
These findings underline above all the importance and value of saving windfall revenues during boom 
years. Yet, it is important to recognise the limitations of the analysis conducted thus far. The rules 
analysed above completely isolate the accumulation decisions from the spending decisions and the 
possible functions of the sovereign wealth fund, as discussed in the Introduction. The idea behind these 
rules is that the government is committed to saving a portion of the windfall in a way that is economically 
(and politically) viable, in order to accumulate assets and establish principal capital for a sovereign wealth 
fund. Once the government has completed this initial accumulating period, attention can turn to a more 
integrated and contingent fiscal rule that matches the assets of the sovereign wealth fund to its function, 
particularly stabilisation and the generation of investment income through savings. Subsequent chapters 
will continue the analysis in this direction, but it is worth highlighting the most important policy 
implications from the analysis and application of simple accumulation rules: 
6.3 .1 .  The power of  savings in  boom years  
The analysis underlines how important and powerful it is to save a portion of revenues during boom 
periods (or even in single boom years) in which exceptionally high resource prices result in an 
unanticipated revenue windfall. For established resource producers who are dependent on resource 
revenues to finance the budget, implementing accumulation rules that are centered on such boom years 
should be relatively painless, as the government can maintain spending in low- or even average-revenue 
years; while only saving when resource revenues rise unexpectedly due to exogenous price movements.  
Of course, the resource revenue boom could arise also from an increase in production levels. For new 
resource producers, modest savings from rapidly rising revenues allows the government to graduate the 
scale-up in public spending and investment, while also creating a buffer fund with which to stabilise 
resource revenues and endow future generations. By saving only a quarter of revenues during the first 
decade of oil production and investing them prudently, Azerbaijan would have created a buffer equal to 
roughly twice annual resource revenues – which, as discussed in Chapter 8, places the country in a 
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reasonably strong position to stabilise future resource revenues and endow future generations with 
investment income once the underlying resource depletes.70  
6 .3 .2 .  Reference-price  rules  are  very  sensit ive  to  the chosen price  
Many countries, including Nigeria and Azerbaijan (and previously, Chile and Russia) have adopted a 
variant of the reference-price rule used above, either formally or informally, to guide the decision making 
process around saving windfall revenues. The analysis above underlines a simple and intuitive fact about 
these rules: the commitment to save revenues during a windfall period can only be realised if policymakers 
establish a prudent reference price. A $10 difference has a massive impact on the total amount of funds 
transferred to the sovereign wealth fund. Consider, the example of Nigeria, the use of three different 
reference-price paths, based on a real oil price of $30, $40 and $50 (with 2000 as the base year) resulted in 
total transfers (before investment returns) of $92bn, $144bn and $202bn respectively.  
The sensitivity of the magnitude of savings to the specification of a reference price-path raises important 
questions around the process or mechanisms through which the reference price (or indeed other “triggers” 
for savings) is set: is it at the discretion of the ministry of finance, by an independent panel of experts, in 
consultation with the IMF, or according to a formula or model?71 How frequently is the reference price 
(or reference-price path) updated in light of revised oil-price expectations? These are critically important 
issues to consider with respect to the governance and institutional arrangements of the sovereign wealth 
fund.  
70 The implied savings rate of 20-25% refers to the amount of revenue put aside in the fund. Note, however, that the 
government is able to invest those funds. In the absence of short-term spending of those assets, these assets earn 
compound returns, which in the analysis above equates to roughly 50% of the saved amount. Therefore, the effective 
savings rate (the transferred amount, minus the compound returns earned on those savings) drops to around 10%-
15%. 
71 The moving-average rule considered above, while conditioned on revenue rather than price, is an example of a 
formula-based mechanism for implementing the rule. The moving-average approach could easily be adapted to apply 
to price movements too.  
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6.3.3 .  Transfers  can be “ lumpy”  
The rules analysed above, particularly the reference-price rule, can generate highly concentrated or 
“lumpy” transfers to the sovereign wealth fund – for example, years in which oil prices are below the 
reference price (generating no new transfers to the fund) can be followed by a single year in which price far 
exceed the reference price (generating a big transfer to the fund). In the scenarios above, for example, the 
overwhelming share of the total net transfers occur in only two boom periods, namely 2008 and 2011-13. 
While this is not necessarily a problem from the perspective of government spending, it does potentially 
complicate the long-term investment planning and strategy of the sovereign wealth fund. If this is the case, 
the government and policymakers may need to consider an additional mechanism to stagger transfers to 
fund, enabling it to better plan the implementation of its investment strategy.  
6 .3 .4.  Symmetrical  versus asymmetrical  rules  
Unsurprisingly given the volatility of oil and other commodity prices over the sample period, there is a 
significant difference in total transfers under the versions of the accumulation rule that permits both in- 
and outflows (symmetrical) and ones that only allow for inflows (asymmetrical). Using the example of 
Nigeria again: under the medium-saving price path, a symmetric rule with in- and outflows from the fund 
would have yielded net transfers of $116bn, while an asymmetric rule with inflows only allowing only for 
inflows in boom years, would have resulted in $144bn in transfers. It is critical for policymakers to decide 
whether the fund’s transfer rule apply in a symmetrical or asymmetrical manner, not only because it has a 
serious impact on the total net assets transferred to the sovereign wealth fund, but also because the need 
to provision for potentially large (and unpredictable) outflows from the fund will significantly impact the 
fund’s investment strategy. With the possibility of outflows, the fund will have to hold a significant portion 
of its portfolio in liquid assets, which will lower its expected long-term average return.  
6 .3 .5 .  Exchange rate  implications 
It is insightful to consider some of exchange rate dynamics in the relationship between resource revenues 
(typically priced in US dollars), government spending (typically in local currency) and the assets and 
income of the sovereign wealth fund, which, as modelled here, invests largely in foreign assets. In the 
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modelling of various savings rules in this chapter (as well as the model introduced in the following two 
chapters), the simplifying step is taken to dominate the entire framework in US dollar, including resource 
revenues, the level of spending of oil revenues, and the assets and income of both components of the 
sovereign wealth fund.  
A possible extension of the empirical analysis of fiscal rules could explicitly model interactions between oil 
revenue, financial income and the real exchange rate. However, the decision to denominate the framework 
in US dollars can be justified based on a number of observations. First, if the government wishes or needs 
to spend income from oil and the sovereign wealth fund in local currency, but is concerned about a 
possible currency mismatch, the exchange rate exposure could be hedged through the use of currency 
futures and options. More fundamentally, the majority of oil- and other-commodity exporting countries 
are in fact primarily concerned with the ability to maintain their level of income and spending in foreign-
currency terms during period of oil revenue volatility. As typical exporters of commodities and importers 
of a wide range of tradable goods, a drop in commodity prices constitutes a terms-of-trade shock, the 
effects of which could be offset by sovereign wealth fund earnings in dollar. In addition to the trade 
channel, many commodity producing economies have fixed exchange rates and/or large dollar-
denominated debts – due to the “original sin” dynamic identified by Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) – 
which makes a steady stream of dollar-based income invaluable for managing exchange-rate and debt-
repayment pressures in the event of a drop in resource revenues.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed a number of simple rule-based mechanisms for transferring public assets 
arising from natural resource revenues into funds, portfolios and institutions that are able to invest these 
assets with a long-term investment horizon, with higher exposure to risk and illiquidity in order to 
generate higher returns. After discussing a number of different types of accumulation rules, the chapter 
demonstrated the extent to which these rules would have resulted in the accumulation of significant assets 
in three country cases, namely Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Azerbaijan, between 2000 and 2013.  
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The policy implications outlined above are universal to all resource-rich countries intending to embark on 
a transition period of accumulating assets with which to subsequently implement a more integrated and 
contingent fiscal rule that combines savings and spending decisions, and distinguishes between the 
stabilisation and income-generating functions of a sovereign wealth fund. It can be very useful for new 
resource producers - or established producers moving towards the establishment of sovereign wealth fund 
type model for fiscal policy – to implement simple accumulation rules that determine how much and when 
a portion of revenues are set aside to capitalise a new sovereign wealth fund. While static and mechanistic 
rules that set aside a fixed percentage of annual revenues are easiest to implement and communicate, more 
dynamic and cyclically adjusted rules are more desirable from an economic perspective – particularly in a 
dynamic setting across a boom-bust cycle in commodity revenues.  
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Chapter 7 
An integrated fiscal  rule:  
A contingent rule for spending, saving and stabilising resource revenues 
Enormous differences exist within the group of countries for which volatile and depleting resources 
constitute a significant share of public revenues. The group includes some of the richest economies in the 
world, such as Norway, Canada and Australia; and the poorest, such as Nigeria, Timor Leste and 
Bolivia. Countries that have adopted sovereign wealth funds are similarly diverse, although as discussed 
in Chapter 4, the argument is frequently made that these funds and fiscal rules aimed to spreading the 
allocation of resource revenues over successive generations are inappropriate in the context of many 
developing countries. A central contention of this dissertation is that this criticism is misplaced, not only 
because it appears strangely sanguine about common causes of the resource curse, but also because it fails 
to appreciate the flexibility of the sovereign wealth fund model.   
In order to be widely applicable, a framework based on fiscal rules and the use of sovereign wealth fund 
income and assets should be sufficient flexible to allow implementation in a variety of contexts, 
characterised by different preferences, needs and constraints. Amongst the structural factors that 
determine an appropriate and feasible response to use of resource revenues are: the level of economic 
development and national income, the degree of resource dependence, the current and anticipated long-
term public liabilities and spending needs, countries’ growth and debt-servicing potential, and the size of 
accumulated assets from previous resource revenue booms. In the context of fiscal rules and sovereign 
wealth funds, these structural features determine the balance between the spending, saving and 
stabilisation of resource revenues.  
The simple savings rules discussed in Chapter 6 exhibit some degree of flexibility. Clearly, countries can 
tailor the rules in such as a way as to permit greater of less spending of resource revenues in the near term, 
and make their own assessments of the appropriate balance between allocations to stabilisation, savings 
and domestic investment funds. However, these rules, while having the general advantage of simplicity, is 
sub-optimal to the extent that they do not provide for an analysis of spending, saving and stabilisation 
needs in a single, integrated framework. Second, while reference-price and moving-average based rules 
allow for some degree of state dependence or contingency, the adjustment mechanisms are fairly crude. 
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The fiscal rule outlined in this chapter and applied in Chapter 8, is based on the framework developed for 
Kazakhstan by Hausmann, Lora and Lora (2014) and improves on the shortcoming of these simple rules 
by incorporating a number of the desirable institutional properties identified in the theoretical discussion 
in Chapter 2. It is a contingent rule with built-in feedback mechanisms that respond to unanticipated 
fluctuations in the resource revenues, of both a cyclical and long-term nature. The tradeoffs involved with 
spending, stabilising or saving resource revenues are considered jointly – that is, these choices are 
integrated into a single framework, rather than treated as separate decisions. While therefore allowing for 
some degree of flexibility, the framework is still rule based, thereby constraining policymakers in a manner 
that prevents time-inconsistent policies. The most obvious example of this is that the rule prevents 
spending an undue, unsustainable and inefficient portion of a temporary resource windfall. More 
generally, Hausmann et. al.’s (2014) rule assists in enhancing the predictability of government actions with 
respect to the consumption of these volatile and finite sources of fiscal income, and distinguishes between 
technical decisions around the reduction of volatility versus discretionary choices around inter-temporal 
trade-offs in the time profile of resource revenue consumption. 
The theoretical set-up of the fiscal rule introduced in this chapter follows Hausmann et al. (2014), 
although the version of the rule in this chapter introduces a different rate of return for the Stabilisation 
Fund and the Investment Income Fund (Hausmann et al.’s original formulation assumes the same return 
for both funds). The modelling of the rule in this chapter and Chapter 8 does, however, depart from 
Hausmann et al.’s (2014) approach in a number of ways. Whereas the latter simply generated completely 
randomised paths for fund returns (around a stable mean) and oil revenues (around a specified trend), the 
approach in this dissertation is more involved. First, the simulation of modelled returns of the Investment 
Income Fund is in this dissertation fitted to historic distributions of a 60/40 bond-equity portfolio; while 
that of the Stabilisation Fund are modelled as an autoregressive process. Finally, the simulation of oil 
revenue paths in this dissertation includes both a predictable component and a randomised element. The 
methodology for modelling various elements of the fiscal rule are discussed in section 7.3. of this chapter.   
The integrated, contingent fiscal rule introduced in this chapter can be viewed as a logical extension from 
rule-of-thumb savings rules of the kind discussed in the previous chapter, while adding greater 
sophistication at the cost of complexity. The rule will most likely be successfully adopted following an 
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initial phase of accumulating financial assets in a new sovereign wealth fund (a process that could feasibly 
rely on the type of simple rules discussed in Chapter 6). This chapter starts with an intuitive overview of 
the fiscal rule, followed by a more formal discussion of its dynamics. The chapter then discusses 
methodology employed to model the potential operation of the rule in specific country cases, the results of 
which are presented in Chapter 8.  
7.1 .  An intuitive overview of the rule 
The first departure from the simple, and more widely used, rules discussed in Chapter 6 is that, rather 
than transferring a portion of resource revenues to a sovereign wealth fund after their allocation in the 
budget, the rule proposed here assumes that all revenues are transferred first to a sovereign wealth fund. 
The distribution of funds from the sovereign wealth fund to the budget is then governed by a spending 
rule that generates a stream of revenue, which is more stable and predictable than the underlying resource 
revenue itself. The most important function of the rule is that it decouples spending patterns from both 
the cyclical volatility of revenues and their long-term decline due to the depleting of the underlying 
resource wealth. 
The sovereign wealth fund in the rule consists of two sub-components: a Stabilisation Fund and an 
Investment Income Fund. The convention in the literature on sovereign wealth funds is to simply refer to 
the latter structure as a “savings fund”. However, a distinction between savings funds and investment-
income funds made here clarifies an important point: pure savings funds preserve and accumulate assets 
for future use exclusively; while, in addition to preserving assets over time (savings), an Investment 
Income Fund also provides a steady (and permanent) source of funds for current spending.72  
The spending rule proposed here includes transfers from both components of the sovereign wealth fund. 
Transfers from the Investment Income Fund are based on its expected long-run real return, for example 
5% per annum. This rule ensures that the fund is “inflation proofed” (that is, its capital is protected in real 
72 The Investment Income Fund in the framework described here could also be called a “permanent fund”, as per the 
convention in the public finances of American states with similar funds; or an “endowment fund”, as per the 
convention in the literature on universities and foundations with similar funds. The Savings Fund could be 
described as a “future-generations fund”. 
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terms over the long run); and that income/revenue streams from this fund are both stable and predictable. 
The second component of the sovereign wealth fund, the Stabilisation Fund, also makes an annual 
transfer to the budget, and based in part on the previous year’s transfers and in part on the value of assets 
in the Stabilisation Fund. Combined, the three revenue components (one from the Investment Income 
Fund and two from the Stabilisation Fund) anchors spending through boom and bust periods of the 
commodity cycle.  
The need for an Investment Income Fund arises in the context of declining resource revenue (based on 
declining production, rather than temporary price-driven decline) and/or raising spending needs. Under 
the stylised assumption that resource revenues are permanent and not subject to a long-term decline, the 
Stabilisation Fund and the spending rule alone are sufficient to stabilise transfers (and, hence, government 
spending) in perpetuity, even when underlying resource revenues are highly volatile.73 When resource 
revenues are assumed to be permanent, there is no need to transform declining natural wealth into 
permanent financial wealth, which means an Investment Income Fund is not needed – the only challenge 
is that of stabilising the volatility of that permanent wealth. Note, however, that even under the 
permanent resource scenario, a government may still wish to create a separate Investment Income Fund 
that is invested in more risky assets in order to generate a higher return and raise the average size of 
transfers over time (rather than just stabilising and maintaining the current level spending). This would 
naturally involve a trade-off between current and future spending, as transfers from current revenues, 
implying some foregone spending in the near term, would be required to grow the Investment Income 
Fund.  
In the more typical situation where resource revenues are expected to decline over time, the investment 
income supplements – and, potentially, completely replaces – the depleting natural resource as a source of 
permanent income to the government. Within this context, the share of annual resource revenues that are 
transferred to the Investment Income Fund becomes a discretionary policy variable, reflecting the 
preferences of policymakers for trading off current for future spending. If the objective is to stabilise the 
real level of spending during and after the depletion of the resource base, the fiscal rule and the percentage 
of revenues to be transferred to the fund can be set accordingly, using the best available information 
73 The assumption of permanent revenue means that revenues (in real terms) move within a steady range, which can 
be wide given the volatility of revenues, around a constant mean.   
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regarding the size and value of a country’s resource endowment. The impact of different percentage 
transfers to the Investment Income Fund are demonstrated in the country examples below. Note that, 
once resource revenues have completely ceased to exist, the Stabilisation Fund can be gradually depleted 
and the Investment Income Fund will stabilise at a permanent steady-state level in real terms. There are 
no new revenue inflows “feeding” the fund, and it is transferring only its real return to the budget (these 
dynamics are formalised below).  
A final set of observation regarding this rule-based framework is institutional. Separating the sovereign 
wealth fund into Stabilisation and Investment-Income Fund components enables a differentiation 
between the management, investment mandates and asset allocation of the two funds. The Stabilisation 
Fund needs to hold more liquid assets, as its transfers (or implicit liabilities) are more volatile and 
unpredictable than that of the Investment Income Fund, which only transfers its expected average long-
run real investment return. The latter can have a much more illiquid and risk-orientated asset allocation, 
which raises its expected return, generating more revenue for government spending and investment in the 
long run. An Investment Income Fund should also operate at arm’s length from the government and the 
standard budget and fiscal process, as its mandate is to focus on long-term portfolio decisions in order to 
meet its target expected long-run average return. 
7.2.  Formalising the key relationships of  the rule 
Having provided an intuitive overview of the main dynamics of the proposed rule-based fiscal framework 
above, the key relationships can be formalised using a few simple equations. If a resource-dependent 
government is committed to stabilising public spending, it should attempt to decouple spending from the 
underlying resource revenues, which are subject to massive annual swings and long-term unpredictability. 
To achieve stability and sustainability, this commitment should be symmetric: government needs to show 
restraint in spending resource revenues in boom periods, as this is what allows them to maintain a steady 
level of spending in bust periods.  
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7.2.1 .  The spending rule  with permanent revenues and one fund 
In order to achieve this, consider a rule in which spending is anchored to two underlying factors: some 
percentage of the previous year’s spending and fixed percentage of assets held in Stabilisation Fund 
(which, as discussed above, receives all resource revenues – not just unspent surpluses or excesses). Such a 
rule can be specified as follows: 
    (1) 
where T is an annual transfer from the fund to the government; S is the size of the Stabilisation Fund; and 
α and β are fixed parameters <1 that indicate the respective weight given to each of the components 
respectively in stabilising spending. 
Through this equation, government spending is stabilised through plausible combinations of α and β. It is 
possible to identify values for α and β that provide optimal solutions to the stabilisation objective in a 
calibration of the model, given certain assumptions regarding the distribution of future oil revenues and 
fund returns. The criteria used for identifying suitable parameter values are discussed below, but the 
decision is based on the criteria that the operationalised rule provides a satisfactory degree of stability in 
spending, while ensuring a high probability that the Stabilisation Fund is not depleted prior to the 
completion of the resource production lifecycle. The robustness of the parameters are tested using Monte 
Carlo simulations that incorporate scenarios in which there is a combination of low-revenue and low-
return outcomes (as discussed below). Over time, the level of the Stabilisation Fund will evolve according 
to the following accounting identity: 
     (2) 
where r is the interest generated on the Stabilisation Fund and X is the amount of resource revenue 
transferred to the fund. As per Equation (2), the Stabilisation Fund’s value is therefore determined by its 
return and the net transfers (total transfers to the fund minus funds transferred to the budget to stabilise 
spending).  
Tt =αTt−1 +βSt−1
St = 1+ rt( )St−1 + Xt −Tt
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This simple savings and spending rule, and the manner in which it decouples spending from volatile 
resource revenues, has a number of attractive features. It is not anchored on, and does not rely upon, 
assumptions about future resource prices, production volumes or total revenues in order to stabilise 
spending. If resource revenues go up during any particular year, the value of the Stabilisation Fund will 
increase and the government will receive a fraction, β, of that increase in the following year. Should 
revenues stay the same the year after that, the government receives another fraction, β(1+r); plus a fraction, 
α, of the increased transfers of the previous year. On the other hand, if revenues were to fall, the annual 
transfer to the Stabilisation Fund would also fall only by a fraction, β, in the following year, with further 
adjustments the subsequent years. The rule, therefore, assures that transfers to the government (i.e. 
spending) adjust upwards and downward gradually in response to often-dramatic annual changes in 
resource prices, production and revenue.  
This rule has attractive stabilising properties in the short run, but it is also instructive to consider its 
dynamics over the long run. Assume a steady-state scenario in which resource revenues and the rate of 
return on Stabilisation Fund are fixed. Under this stylised scenario, the value of the Stabilisation Fund 
relative to resource revenue reaches a steady state, expressed by the following equation (note, steady-state 




β − 1−α( )r
 (3) 
From Equation (3), the size of the fund as a share of resource revenues transferred to the Stabilisation 
Fund will be determined by three variables: the parameters of the spending rule, α and β, and the interest 
rate, r. The stabilising transfers to the budget are expressed as follows: 
(4) 
An important implication from the steady-state analysis is that transfers from the Stabilisation Fund are 
larger than transfers to it. As follows from Equation (4), t > x, given that in addition to annual resource 
74 The steady-state dynamics shown in Equations (3) and (4) are derived in the Appendix to this chapter. 
t = x β
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revenues, the government receives the returns generated on the fund. Therefore, under the assumption 
that resources revenues are permanent (that is, a “steady state” in which revenues are not subject to 
terminal declines over the long run), the rule is sufficient to achieve not only the stabilisation objective, but 
also a saving objective.75 
In the more likely scenario in which resource revenues are no longer assumed to be permanent but rather 
subject to declines over the long run, the Stabilisation Fund can no longer serve both the stabilisation and 
savings functions. The reason for this is that, once the steady-state assumption of a fixed level of resource 
revenues is relaxed, the long-run secular decline in such revenues leads to a depletion of the fund’s assets, if 
spending remains anchored (that is, if the level of transfers from the fund is not reduced). Under non-
steady state conditions, the transfers from the fund required to achieve stable spending, as per Equation 
(4), draws increasingly heavily on withdrawals from the fund: if resource revenues are faced with a long-
term downward trend, no possible combination of parameters α and β can achieve the stabilisation 
objective indefinitely.  
Consequently, before resources are depleted the addition of an Investment Income Fund, whose 
investment income over time replaces resource revenues as the source of permanent income, is required. 
At the limit, when resource revenues have ceased, the Stabilisation Fund is completely depleted and the 
Investment Income Fund now performs the stabilisation and savings functions. At this point, the 
government has completed the transformation of natural-resource wealth and income into financial assets 
as a source of government revenue and wealth.  
7 .2 .2 .  Depleting resource wealth:  introducing the Investment Income Fund 
As noted above, if resource revenues are permanent, a Stabilisation Fund is sufficient to achieve both the 
stabilisation and saving functions, as government would receive in perpetuity not just the current resource 
revenues, but also the investment returns on the fund. The continual (albeit volatile) inflow of annual 
resource revenues means that the level of the Stabilisation Fund oscillates within stable bounds, rather 
75 As the return generated on the Stabilisation Fund is lower than that of a dedicated long-term investment fund, 
certain countries create different portfolios, tranches and funds to pursue various type of investment strategies. That 
is, even with the (stylised) assumption of permanent revenues, a government may establish two separate funds: one 
to provide liquidity and one to generate higher returns.  
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than being drawn down to fund spending. In reality, however, oil and most other commodities associated 
with sovereign wealth funds are, by definition, non-renewable resources. Once production (and hence 
revenues) starts to decline, the Stabilisation Fund would be gradually consumed until it is eventually 
depleted. While the spending of resource revenues will be stabilised over the horizon of the production 
lifecycle, no part of the resource wealth is left for future generations.  
If the government wishes to endow future generations with a permanent source of income financed by the 
revenues generated on depleting natural assets, it is necessary to build up an endowment during the years 
of extraction of the resource.76 Assume that a fraction, θ, of total oil tax revenues is saved every year into 
the Investment Income Fund (the rest going to the Stabilisation Fund), so that: 
XEt =θXt   (5) 
where XE is the share of total revenue that is transferred to the Investment Income Fund and θ can be 
interpreted as a flow “savings rate” for oil revenues. Over time, the size of the Investment Income Fund 
will be determined by the following identity: 
 (6) 
where i is the return generated on the Investment Income Fund and TE is the transfer obtained from the 
fund based on the size of the fund in the preceding year, multiplied by the fund’s expected average long-
term real return, δ: 
 (7) 
76 As noted earlier in Chapter 4, Collier et. al. (2010) have argued that inter-generational equity does not require 
leaving a financial endowment from finite resources to future generations, under the assumption that future 
generations would be wealthier and/or that the resource endowment is better-spent financing infrastructure and 
other forms of public investment (for example, education) that will raise output and income in the future. In that 
case, the government may be willing to simply implement the stabilisation-only part of the framework and therefore 
run down the fund as resource revenues decline. In practice, however, the disappointing track record of 
infrastructure and other forms of public investment financed by resource revenues, as documented by Gelb (1988) 
and Robinson and Torvik (2005), have led an increasing number of countries to use sovereign wealth funds as a 
means to inter-generational wealth and income transfer.  
Et = 1+ it( )Et−1 + XEt −TEt
TEt = δEt
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Basing the size of the transfer from the Investment Income Fund on the expected average long-term real 
return, δ, is a prudent strategy (assuming that expected return is realistic): using the average annual 
(rather than the observed annual) return ensures a stable stream of income to the government; spending 
only real returns ensures that the fund’s capital is not eroded by inflation and can be maintain indefinitely 
(i.e. the fund’s capital is “inflation proofed” and it generates “permanent” income); and finally, focusing on 
the long-run return enables the fund to capture a number of premiums (for example, volatility, value and 
illiquidity premiums) that raise the expected return of the fund. It is important that the fund’s actual 
average return over time is not lower that the assumed or expected average return (used to determine the 
value of δ) – otherwise the fund would be depleted or reduced, leaving a smaller endowment for future 
generations. 
Under these conditions, the two funds have different dynamics. The Stabilisation Fund tends to a steady-
state equilibrium that is proportional to the revenues feeding it, before gradually depleting once those 
revenues end. The Investment Income Fund grows continuously during the production lifecycle to reach 
its permanent level once revenues end. An important implication is that combining a Stabilisation Fund 
and an Investment Income Fund is a way to stabilise and maintain the level of domestic expenditure 
beyond the resource production lifecycle – and potentially into perpetuity – if the government only spends 
the real income generated on the Investment Income Fund. With the introduction of the Investment 
Income Fund alongside the Stabilisation Fund, the rules of operation of the model can be set so that it 
simultaneously meets the stabilisation and saving objectives. The key relationships in the framework 
combining the Stabilisation Fund and the Investment Income Fund are captured in Table 7.1.  
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Table 7 .1 :  Summary table  of  equations and variables  of  the f iscal  rule  




XSt = (1−θ )Xt
XEt =θXt
X t = Oil revenue  
XSt = Revenue allocated to the 
Stabilisation Fund  
XE t = Revenue allocated to the 
Investment Income Fund  
θ = “saving rate” (fixed share of oil 
revenue transferred to the Investment 
Income Fund) 
Spending rule   
(transfers from the 
sovereign wealth fund) 
ttt TETST +=  
TSt =αTSt−1 +βSt−1  
TEt = δEt−1  
T t = Total transfers (from both funds)  
TSt = Transfer from Stabilisation Fund 
TEt = Transfer from Stabilisation Fund 
α = Fixed percentage of preceding 
year’s transfer from Stabilisation Fund 
β = Fixed percentage transfer from 
Stabilisation Fund 
δ = Fixed percentage transfer from the 
Investment Income (expected long-run 
real return) 
Fund dynamics 
(size and growth of 
the funds) 
SWFt = St +Et  
St = 1+ rt( )St−1 + XSt −TSt
Et = 1+ it( )Et−1 + XEt −TEt
SWF t = Total sovereign wealth fund 
assets  (two funds combined) 
St = Stabilisation Fund value 
Et = Investment Income Fund value 
rt = Stabilisation Fund return 
it = Investment Income Fund return 
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As in the case of the one-fund version of the framework, α and β should be chosen so as to stabilise 
transfers to the government from the Stabilisation Fund. In turn, δ should correspond to the expected 
long-term return of the Investment Income Fund; while the savings rate, θ, can be chosen to assure the 
accumulation of an endowment; thereby, achieving the saving objective without jeopardising the 
stabilisation objective. The higher the savings rate, θ, the more willing policymakers are to accept a lower 
current or near-term level of spending from resource revenues in favour of transfers to future generation 
(and a higher level of permanent spending); while a lower θ implies a greater preference for spending the 
resource revenue as they arise, leaving less of an endowment for future generations. In summary, the 
fundamental dynamics and features of this rule-based fiscal framework are as follows: 
• The rule decouples spending from resource revenues so that volatility in spending is reduced and
both positive and negative shocks to resource revenue are only passed through to spending in a
stabilised and delayed manner.  Volatility is effectively transferred to the fluctuating levels of the
Stabilisation Fund.
• This decoupling is achieved by basing annual spending on three sources: (i) a fixed percentage of
the previous year’s spending (α); (ii) a fixed percentage of the value of the Stabilisation Fund (β);
and (iii) a fixed transfer from the Savings Fund (δ), equal to its long-run average real return.
• The Stabilisation Fund’s size fluctuates in line with shocks to resource revenues. The fund’s value
increases when positive shocks to revenue occur, as the government is constrained by the fiscal
rule from spending the excess revenue windfall immediately. Likewise, the Stabilisation Fund
decreases when negative shocks materialise, as the rule permits withdrawals from the fund in
order to stabilise spending.
• The long-term growth of the Savings Fund is determined by the size of transfers from annual
resource revenues – a higher savings rate implies lower near-term spending in favour of higher
future (and permanent) spending. As the Savings Fund grows, it’s annual contribution to the
budget in the form of investment income (based on its expected long-run real return) supplements
resource revenues – and potentially replaces it entirely, upon depletion of the resource.
• Finally, if the level of spending from the Savings Fund does not exceed its long-run real return, its
capital value will be preserved in real terms, meaning it becomes a permanent endowment and a
source of permanent income across generations. Critically, in the context of finite resources, this
enables spending to be maintained at a level commensurate with the level of savings, even once oil
or other resource revenues diminish and ultimately cease.
The governments’ preferences and political constraints have to be incorporated into the framework and 
the way key parameters are calibrated to specific circumstances. The basic assumption is that the 
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government favours stability in spending; which, subject to certain feasibility constraints, determines the 
values for the stabilisation parameters, α and β, of the spending rule.77 Second, the government faces an 
inter-temporal tradeoff between current and future spending in determining the desired savings rate, θ. In 
analysing these tradeoffs, it is important to bear in mind that all things equal, policymakers may also have 
a degree of “impatience”, valuing near-term spending higher than the promise of future spending (that is, 
future spending is discounted). As shown in the following chapter, these policy preferences are 
incorporated into the calibration of the rule to specific country cases.  
7.3.  Modelling in the rule 
An attractive features of the rule-based framework described above is that is allows policymakers to tailor 
policies – and assess the trade-offs involved in stabilisation, spending and savings decisions – to context-
specific needs, preferences and constraints. To demonstrate this flexibility, the rule is applied to five 
prototypical resource-rich countries: Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Ghana and Saudi Arabia. These 
give countries have wide-ranging economic fundamentals, historic and expected future resource 
production profiles, and are at different stages of their economic development, thereby offering 
perspectives on how the framework could operate in contrasting settings.  
In order to apply the framework in a forward-looking manner, the modelling strategy needs to account for 
the inherent uncertainty and volatility around key variables. Resource revenues and the returns generated 
on the Investment Income Fund, in particular, are subject to considerable volatility – after all, the volatility 
and uncertainty around resource revenues is the primary reasons for adopting the fiscal rule in the first 
place. The key inputs into the fiscal rule that therefore need to be modelled are the returns of the 
Investment Income Fund, the returns of the Stabilisation Fund and oil revenues. The modelling of these 
inputs in this dissertation departs from Hausmann et al.’s (2014) approach in a number of ways. Whereas 
Hausmann et al. (2014) assumed the same rate of return for both funds and simply generated completely 
randomised paths for this return (around a stable mean), the modelling of these input in this dissertation is 
77 The argument for stable spending rests on a number of well-established theoretical pillars. This may derive from 
an ethical concern with intergeneration equity; or on the permanent-income and life-cycle approaches pioneered by 
Friedman (1957) and Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), respectively. Preferences for, and the general desirability of, 
stable public spending are also standard building blocks in literature on the macroeconomics of the business cycle 
(Blanchard and Fischer, 1989), and the microeconomics of household utility (Deaton, 1991). 
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differentiated: the simulation of modelled returns of the Investment Income Fund is fitted here to historic 
distributions of a 60/40 bond-equity portfolio; while that of the Stabilisation Fund are modelled as an 
autoregressive process. Finally, the simulation of oil revenue paths in this dissertation includes both a 
predictable trend component and a randomised element. The methodology for modelling various 
elements of the fiscal rule are discussed in sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2. and 7.3.3.  
7 .3 .1 .  Simulating Investment Income Fund returns  
As noted earlier, the Investment Income Fund is assumed to have a long investment horizon and the 
ability to be exposed to a number of risk factors that may increase the volatility of the fund’s returns in 
exchange for a higher expected long-run average return. In order to simulate this return profile, assume 
that the Investment Income Fund’s return approximates that of a classic 60/40 equity-bond portfolio, the 
workhorse benchmark for long-term institutional investors, such as pension funds, endowments and 
sovereign wealth funds (Cochrane, 1999, and Ang, 2014). In simulating future returns for the Investment 
Income Fund, a large number (in this case, 1000) of different return paths are simulated. This approach, 
referred to as Monte Carlo simulations, incorporates a wide range of potential future return paths into the 
analysis, based on a distribution that mimics the observed distribution of historic portfolio returns. 
Given the ample historical evidence that stock- and balanced-portfolio returns are not normally 
distributed – for example, the distribution of stock returns are known to have “fat tails” – a distribution for 
future returns that includes higher moments beyond the mean and variance of historic returns is fitted 
(Stein and Stein, 1991; and Ang and Timmermann, 2012). In order to take skewness, kurtosis and fat tails 
in the distribution of past returns into account, portfolio returns are modelled to follow a Generalised 
Lambda Distribution. The four-parameter Generalised Lambda Distribution is capable of mimicking 
various distributions and data samples, including those with fat tails, and is therefore used with increasing 
frequency and academic support for the simulation of portfolio returns (Asquith, 2006 and Pfaff, 2012).  
To fit a Generalised Lambda Distribution on historic balanced-portfolio returns, a 60/40 equity-bond 
portfolio is constructed, based on annual real returns of the S&P 500 and 10-year US Treasuries 
(calculated based on the constant-maturity approach), employing data collected by Shiller using on public 
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sources.78 The portfolio is rebalanced back to the 60/40 equity-bond weighting annually, and real returns 
are calculated by subtracting the year’s inflation, measured by the percentage change in the US Consumer 
Price Index. Based on this data, the characteristics of the distribution historic real returns are shown in 
Table 7.2, along with that of the simulated returns fitted through maximum likelihood estimation, 
assuming a Generalised Lambda Distribution.  
Table 7.2: Key features of the distribution of historic and simulated returns 
Moment Historic  returns Simulated returns 
Mean 0.0596 0.0596 
Variance 0.0144 0.0147 
Skewness -0.220 -0.226 
Kurtosis 0.0210 0.357 
Based on the distribution of historic annual returns from 1879 to 2014, the portfolio fitted through 
maximum likelihood estimation has an average (expected) annual real return of 5.96%, with considerable 
variation around that mean. As noted earlier, and shown in Figure 7.1, which shows both the distribution 
of actual annual returns and that of the fitted returns, the Generalised Lambda Distribution takes the 
higher moments of the non-normal distribution of past returns, particularly the existence of “fat tails” and 
skewness (hence the non-symmetric clustering of returns around the mean).  
78 The data has been maintained on Shiller’s Yale University website (www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm) since 
the publication of two celebrated books, Market Volatility (1989) and Irrational Exuberance (2000). The 
methodological approaches to the construction of these time series are not controversial, but are discussed in 
Chapter 26 of Shiller (1989) and on the author’s website.   
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Figure 7.1 :  Distr ibution of  s imulated and actual  60/40 portfol io  returns 
Note: the distribution of historic annual returns is for 1879 to 2014. 
For the stability of the rule, it is important to assess the degree of “persistence” in fund returns, which can 
be tested based on the degree of autocorrelation in past returns. The assumption that equity returns, 
certainly at the annual frequency, are independently identically distributed (i.i.d) enjoys considerable 
empirical support (Ang, 2012). As show in Figure 7.2, annual S&P 500 returns have not historically been 
auto-correlated; and the annually rebalanced, equity-dominated 60/40 portfolio has similar 
characteristics: there is no evidence of positive (or indeed negative) autocorrelation or “persistence” in 
historic balanced-portfolio (or pure equity) returns at the annual frequency. 
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Figure 7.2:  The lack of  persistence in  balanced-portfol io  returns 
Note: dotted line indicates the 95% confidence interval 
Figure 7.2 shows that there is no evidence of systemic autocorrelation or persistence in the Investment 
Income Fund’s returns. In a practical sense, the concern around possible autocorrelation in the returns of 
either of the Stabilisation or the Investment Income Fund is that a series of persistently low real returns 
could deplete the fund. It is therefore important to test, and potentially account, for a degree of 
autocorrelation in the Stabilisation Fund’s returns below.  
7 .3 .2 .  Simulating Stabil isation Fund returns 
Compared to the Investment Income Fund, the Stabilisation Fund’s portfolio can be assumed to be 
primarily concerned with the preservation of capital and liquidity. In order to model this return behaviour, 
the Stabilisation Fund’s returns are approximated by the 10-year US Treasury yield (assuming constant-
maturity yield). Unlike equity- and balanced-portfolio returns, it cannot be assumed that 10-year US 
Treasury yields are i.i.d and have no (positive) autocorrelation. The empirical evidence and academic 
theory suggested the real return on US Treasuries are related to the interest-rate cycles, which have at 
least some degree of positive autocorrelation. Figure 7.3 shows that there is statistically significant 
evidence of positive autocorrelation in 10-year US Treasury yields with a 1-year lag. That is, the real 
returns on the Stabilisation Fund are likely to have some persistence.  
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Figure 7.3:  Evidence of  l imited autocorrelation in  US Treasury yie lds 
Note: dotted line indicates the 95% confidence interval 
The evidence of statistically significant autocorrelation at a one-year lag shown in Figure 7.3, suggests that 
it is unrealistic to expect that the returns of the Stabilisation Fund follow a random pattern around a 
stable rate. Therefore, a simple autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model is fitted for 
purpose of the simulation. The intention of the exercise is to “stress test” the rule by incorporating high 
levels of persistence in the Stabilisation Fund’s returns, rather than having an accurate forecast of real US 
10-year Treasury yields. The equation for the fitted AR (1) model, again estimated using maximum 
likelihood methods, is as follows: 
     Yt = 1 - 0.294  * 0.0237 + 0.294 * Yt-1 + εt 
The modelled return of the Stabilisation Fund is, therefore, a weighted average of the long-term mean 
(0.0237) and the yield level the previous year, this accounts for both the mean reversion component and 
the persistence that real treasury yields might have, plus a random normally distributed error !!, which has 
mean zero and standard deviation 0.05. Importantly, in a large number of draws, the interest rate moves 
occasionally far away from its long-term value (and do not return that mean within the forecast horizon).  
It is, of course, possible to model the process in a way that allows for greater mean reversion, less 
persistence (driven by the random-walk component) and a “tighter” distribution of rate paths (which 
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would result from a smaller standard deviation of the error term). However, for the purpose of calibrating 
the model, the risk of potentially significant persistence around low returns in the simulated rate paths is 
captured. This ensures that the results are robust to the risk of depletion of the Stabilisation Fund under 
such a scenario. The simulated rate paths allows for “stress testing” the fiscal rule under assumptions of 
exceptionally high persistence in returns on Stabilisation Fund.   
7.3 .3 .  Simulating oi l  revenues 
The simplest way to project oil revenues is to assume that they fluctuate around an expected oil-revenue 
path over the relevant horizon, which can be represented as follows: 
(14) 
where is the projected value for period t and is a random term (normally distributed around zero). 
It is instructive to think of as the permanent component of oil revenues, which can be expressed as its 
lagged variable multiplied by 1 plus its projected rate growth, , and a random component, λt (also, 
normally distributed around zero): 
Xpt = Xpt−1(1+ gpt +λt )  (15) 
Therefore 
Xt = Xpt−1(1+ gpt +λt )+µt    (16) 
This process, therefore, assumes that oil revenues have two sources of random fluctuations: one that 
affects the projected rate of growth, and therefore has a permanent effect on the level of oil revenues in the 
future; and one that is entirely transitory and leaves no trace in the subsequent behaviour of oil revenues. 
The heuristic interpretation of this process is as follows: oil revenues may depart permanently from their 
originally projected path if, for example, the actual size of an oil well turns out to be different from the 
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exploration and development that affects long-term or future national production volumes. That is, the 
permanent-shock component captured in Equation (16) derives from changes in production levels. Oil 
revenues may also depart temporarily if, for example, an oil pipeline suffers some damage that limits the 
flow of oil for some time or, more importantly, a change in global energy prices affects the revenue 
generated on existing production volumes. That is, the transitory-shock component in Equation (16) 
derives from temporary production shocks and price movements. 
Table  7 .3:  Expected trend in  oi l  revenues for  selected countries  (US$bn) 
Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Nigeria  Ghana 
2015  17.2 14.7 16.4 0.6 
2016 11.7 16.2 8.4 0.7 
2017 16.0 17.8 11.8 0.8 
2018 17.6 19.9 14.8 1.3 
2019 19.5 21.5 16.8 1.8 
2020 21.8 20.0 20.7 2.6 
2021  22.7 18.8 24.6 3.1 
2022 24.5 17.9 29.5 3.8 
2023 25.7 16.9 35.4 4.0 
2024 27.4 16.0 42.5 3.8 
2025 27.0 15.0 51.0 3.7 
2026 26.5 14.0 61.2 3.3 
2027 25.4 13.1 55.7 2.8 
2028 25.0 12.2 54.8 2.6 
2029 24.4 11.4 53.5 2.3 
2030 23.5 10.7 51.5 2.1 
2031  22.6 10.0 49.5 1.8 
2032 21.6 9.3 47.4 1.6 
2033  20.7 8.7 45.3 1.4 
2034 19.7 8.1 43.2 1.2 
2035  18.7 7.6 41.0 1.0 
2036 17.7 7.1 38.9 0.9 
2037 16.8 6.6 36.8 0.7 
2038 15.8 6.2 34.7 0.5 
2039 14.9 5.8 32.5 0.3 
2040 13.9 5.4 30.4 0.2 
Sources: IMF Article IV consultations and Fitch country reports 
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In simulating oil revenues as an input into the modelling of the fiscal rule, the expected-path component is 
based on current “best-guess” estimates of oil revenues and oil reserves/production. In order to generate 
this baseline trend for future revenues, around which to construct Monte Carlo simulations that 
incorporate the above-mentioned two sources of random shocks, the country-level oil-revenue forecasts 
collected by the International Monetary Fund under their Article IV consultations are used. The data 
collected after 2015 provide oil revenue forecasts for up to 2020 – and incorporate the expectations of a very 
gradual recovery in revenues, following the collapse of oil prices starting in late 2014. In all cases, revenue 
estimates are crosschecked with those of Fitch country reports. Beyond the 2020 horizon, a country-by-
country trend path is projected based on the expected production volumes (using the best available 
estimates from geological surveys of proven oil reserves). The simulated revenue paths are shown in 
Figure 7.4, while the forecasted revenue trend for the countries used in the application of the model is 
shown in Table 7.3 and the long-term oil-revenue trend for each country is described, along with the other 
input assumptions, in Table 7.4. 
It is important to underline the manner in which oil-revenues (and thus, indirectly, oil prices and oil 
production levels) enter the fiscal rule. As noted earlier, the fiscal rule has the attractive feature that it 
“decouples” spending from resource revenues: volatility in spending is reduced, as both positive and 
negative shocks to resource revenue are passed through to spending in a smoothed and lagged manner, 
through changes in the level of the two components of the sovereign wealth fund. However, there is a 
need to distinguish between the role of oil revenues (prices and production) in the operation of the fiscal 
rule and the simulation of oil revenues as an input in the modelling of the rule.  
First, the operation of the fiscal rule has the attractive feature of not being conditioned on assumptions or 
forecasts for oil revenues, prices or production. Rather, the rule conditions the level of spending from oil 
revenue on the size of assets held in two separate sovereign wealth fund accounts and an autoregressive 
component based on the previous year’s spending. In this way, the volatility associated with oil revenues 
(due to the unpredictable nature of oil prices and long-run oil production trends) are “filtered” or 
“absorbed” through the two sovereign wealth funds. The rule has built-in “auto-corrective” or “auto-
stabilising” properties, as fiscal spending adjusts gradually (through changes in the value of the two 
sovereign wealth fund) to changes in oil revenues. The operation of the fiscal rule can, therefore, be 
described as independent of short-term fluctuation in oil revenues, prices and production.  
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Figure 7.4:  Simulated oi l  revenue paths including random components  
In the long run, however, oil revenues – to the extent that they are a major determinant of the evolution of 
size of the sovereign wealth fund – are clearly important to the spending path. While the operation of the 
rule does not, therefore, require the specification of oil-price or oil-production assumptions and forecasts, 
oil revenues are an important input in the simulation of the rule and its inputs. In the modelling of rule in 
this dissertation, total oil revenues are modelled (rather than oil prices and oil production separately). As 
discussed in this sub-section, the simulation of oil revenues as an input into the modelling of the fiscal rule 
makes the foundational assumptions that (i) part of the path of future oil revenues are randomly 
determined (most obviously due to oil prices, but also permanent shocks to production), and (ii) that 
current “best-guess” estimates of the trend in production can be used as a baseline for simulating oil 
revenues (around which randomised components are added to account for the high degree of volatility 
and unpredictability in oil prices and production).  
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7.3 .4.  Init ia l  fund sizes  and spending levels 
The final inputs into the model are the initial values of the Stabilisation Fund, the Investment Income 
Fund and the level of spending from oil revenues – that is the values of key variables of the spending rule in 
year t = 0. These starting values are important, given the essentially autoregressive nature of the spending 
rule: initial levels need to be realistic and appropriate, as by design the level of spending (transfers) persists 
for a long time through the rule. Similarly, the existing level of savings in year t = 0 is important, as it 
determines the level of sustainable draws from the Stabilisation and Investment Income Funds. 
Table  7 .4:  Country  inputs,  assumptions and starting values  





Oil  production 
outlook 
Gradual 
increase to peak 


















increases over next 
decade from 
current levels, 
followed by steady 
















recovery by to 
2020, followed 
by gradual 
decline of 7% 
p.a. 
Gradual recovery 
up to 2020, 
followed by 
production-driven 
trend, with peak 
of $60bn in 2026, 
followed by 
gradual decline to 
2040. 
Gradual recovery 
up to 2020, 
followed by 
production-driven 
trend, with peak of 
$60bn in 2026, 
followed by gradual 
decline to 2040. 
Oil revenues rise 
from $0.5bn to 




Init ial  transfer  
(2015)  
$8bn $13bn $10bn $10bn $0.2bn 
Stabil isation 
Fund (2015)  




$51.2bn $12bn $1bn $30bn $0.25bn 
Note: Saudi Arabia is not included in this table, as the application of the rule is backward looking. Saudi inputs are 
discussed separately in Chapter 8. 
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For countries experiencing the emergence of a new resource windfall, for example Ghana, these values are 
close to zero (incorporating only a small amount of current savings and oil revenue). However, for 
countries with established resource revenues and existing savings through their sovereign wealth funds 
(and other buffers), the initial values of the three elements of the spending rule van be based on public data 
from national budgets and IMF’s Article IV consultation reports. The initial values of the Stabilisation 
Fund and the Investment Income Fund are based on the size of assets under management of the national 
sovereign wealth fund (and related budgetary buffers) in the case of Nigeria, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. 
These input assumptions discussed in greater detail on a country-by-country basis below, and presented in 
Table 7.4. 
7 .3 .5 .  Calibrating the parameters  of  rule  
With the inputs described above, spending rule can be calibrated for each country. The values of α and β, 
which determine the size of and transfers out from the Stabilisation Fund; and the value for θ, which 
determines the size of transfers to (and, hence, the long-term growth of) the Investment Income Fund. In 
theory, the level of spending out of the Investment Income Fund can also be a policy variable, and have 
some time-varying properties. However, the purpose of the Investment Income Fund is to remain a 
source of permanent income, so the value of δ should equal to the fund’s expected long-run average real 
return. As discussed earlier, the historical long-run average real return of a 60/40 equity bond portfolio is 
5.96% - however, in order to ensure a prudent calibration of the framework, the spending rate is reduced to 
5% (that is δ = 0.05). Following the permanent-income approach to the use of the Investment Income 
Fund proceeds, the policymaker has little scope for adjusting or controlling this parameter, as long-run 
returns are determined market-based returns to exposure to risk factors.  
The identification of feasible parameters for α and β is a technical exercise. The objective is to a find a 
robust combination of parameters, based on country-specific characteristics for the expected trend in 
future oil revenues, the level of current and target-path for future spending, and the size of previously 
accumulated assets. Note that, for any given set of inputs, there are a number of feasible combinations of α 
and β that provide stability in transfers from the Stabilisation Fund – rather than a unique solution. As a 
general rule, a higher α requires a lower β, and vice versa (for example, α = 0.8 and β = 0.1 could yield 
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similarly stabilising results as α = 0.7 and β = 0.15). In order to select the desired set of parameters, a step-
wise approach to finding appropriate parameter values is adopted. 
Assume that policymakers prefer as high a value for α as possible (as α = 1 would completely stabilise 
spending). A high value for α also addresses the concern over loss aversion: by definition, a high α ensures 
that there cannot be a significant year-on-year reduction in spending. Therefore, the first criterion is to 
choose the highest value of α from within the set of feasible α and β combinations. However, α cannot be 
implausibly large, as this risks explosive dynamics in the evolution of the Stabilisation Fund, depleting the 
fund if revenues are consistently low (and generating excessive growth in the fund if revenues are 
consistently high). 
In order to find the highest feasible value for α, a two-step process is followed. First, using all the country-
specific inputs described above, 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of the whole framework are run to 
identify all the combinations of α, β and θ that meet the criteria of having a low risk of triggering a 
depletion of the Stabilisation Fund (recall that a depletion would occur when the parameters enable 
excessive spending relative to revenues). This set of feasible parameters are selected based on the criteria 
that the Stabilisation Fund’s assets remain positive in at least 95% of the simulations. This establishes a 
country-specific set of parameter combinations, referred to here as the “feasibility set”. Second, from this 
feasibility set, only the values of β and θ values associated with the highest possible α are considered. This 
is intuitive, as the highest feasible α naturally establishes a stabilising anchor with autoregressive 
properties. With the feasibility set, the choice of β affects the stabilisation of transfers, while the θ affects 
the inter-temporal trade-offs between near- and long-term spending. A lower θ implies higher near-term 
spending relative to long-term spending, while a higher θ implies lower near-term spending in favour of 
higher spending in future (including permanently).  
It can be assumed that policymakers dislike sharp drops in spending, even if it helps ensure a higher level 
of spending in aggregate or in the future (due loss aversion and a desire to reelected); and discount higher 
levels of future spending relative to near-term spending (impatience). These two conditions affect the 
choice of β and θ respectively. In calibrating the spending rule, the highest possible β that is available from 
the feasibility set is chosen (although a lower β would be a more prudent or safer option, ensuring that the 
framework “survives” – that is, the Stabilisation Fund avoids depletion – in a great number of simulated 
outcomes).  
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The choice of θ is treated as a discretionary policy choice, reflecting the time-preference of policymakers 
and the value placed on the welfare of future generations. The impact of different values of θ for the 
spending profiles over time is shown in Figure 7.5 (the same approach will be used in the application of 
the rule to different country cases in the following chapter). Figure 7.5 depicts a set of stylised spending 
levels for fixed values of α and β, combined with four different values of θ. Starting from left to right in the 
top panel, the impact of θ equal to 0.1 and 0.3 respectively is shown; while the bottom panel shows the 
outputs for θ equal to 0.5 and 0.7.  
The results of the simulated spending profile will be presented as a distribution, as per Figure 7.5.  As the 
results from the Monte Carlo simulation process are not normally distributed, the low-probability “tail 
outcomes” are not symmetrical to the higher-probability outcomes. The distribution of outcomes, 
particularly the “upside potential”, increases with higher θ – this is an illustration of the effects of 
compounded returns, as the Investment Income can grow very large under a scenario that combine a 
higher portion of revenues being transferred to it and higher than expected returns generated on the fund. 
Figure 7.5:  Hypothetical  spending profi les  based on dif ferent  savings rates  
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A number of observations are worth highlighting. First, the spending profile flattens and eventually 
steepens as θ increases. This is intuitive, as a higher θ implies that a greater share of revenues is transferred 
to the Investment Income Fund (policymakers are willing to forego current consumption for future 
consumption). Lower values of θ imply that a smaller percentage of revenues are transferred to the 
Investment Income Fund, allowing spending to rise more rapidly over the first 10-15 years of the forecast 
horizon, but at the expense of lower long-term – and, importantly – permanent, post-resource spending. 
The methodology described in this chapter for the calibration of the fiscal rule, along with the 
visualisation of the modelled outcomes in terms of probabilities, will be used in the following chapter. 
Chapter 8 will apply the rule to a number of illustrative country cases and discuss the implications of the 
results.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a simple fiscal rule for the spending, stabilisation and saving of resource 
revenues. The framework is based on a rule that anchors spending – or, more precisely transfers from the 
sovereign wealth fund to the government – on a function of the previous year’s spending and the balance of 
assets in the sovereign wealth fund(s). In contexts where resource revenues are a permanent source of 
income – with annual revenues fluctuating within a stable band around a stable mean – the sovereign 
wealth fund needs only to consist of an adequately capitalised Stabilisation Fund. However, in the more 
realistic situation where resource revenues are expected to decline after a period of peak production (now 
assuming volatile annual flows within and around a drifting moving average), the government needs to 
build-up an Investment Income Fund, which is a financial endowment that replaces resources as a source 
of permanent income to the government. This simple set of rules does not depend on any assumption 
about the expected trajectory of oil prices or its distribution function, as is often required in other 
stabilisation rules. Nor does it require choosing any specific oil production scenario to define the 
parameters. 
This fiscal rule underlines the clear trade-off between a rapid ramp-up in public spending financed by 
resource revenues (“front-loaded spending”) and the accumulation of a significant pool of financial assets in 
the Stabilisation Fund; and, if the government wants to leave a financial endowment from the depleting 
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natural asset as source of permanent income, in the Investment Income Fund. The trade-off between 
current spending and the creation of a Stabilisation Fund is not that acute (beyond the initial 
accumulation with which to establish the fund); but the establishment of an Investment Income Fund 
involves more substantial reduction in the level of current spending in order to establish the endowment 
and maintain permanent spending. The higher the savings rate, the sharper this trade-off.  
Of course, a number of resource-rich countries have already accumulated such assets during previous 
commodity booms – these countries essentially already have the financial building blocks in place to 
successfully implement the framework, given the establishment of appropriate institutional arrangements 
to ensure adherence to the rules. For countries that are yet to build-up the requisite initial “capital buffers” 
with which to establish the sovereign wealth fund, the challenge is more substantial, particularly if the 
government wishes to continue consuming a high percentage of its annual resource revenues. Ideally, 
these historically “low savings” countries will use future periods of unanticipated revenue booms to set 
aside a portion of windfall with which to implement the framework. 
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Appendix to Chapter  7:  Steady-state  conditions of  the Stabil isation Fund 
To better understand the long run interactions between of the level of the Stabilisation Fund, resource 
revenues and transfers from the fund, it is useful to derive steady state conditions. Assume no changes in 
annual revenues and the interest rate – that is, rather than allowing for fluctuations around the stable 
mean, in the steady state these variables are always equal to their mean. Recall the spending rule that 
governs transfers from the Stabilisation Fund is captured by the following equation (in a dynamic state): 
        
and that the level of the Stabilisation Fund will evolve according to the following accounting identity: 
In the steady state, the two equations above can be rewritten as, where steady state variables are denoted 
in lower case without subscripts to indicate time period: 
t =αt +βs (A.1) 
      (A.2) 




And Equation (A.2) can be rewritten as: 
x = t − r(s) (A.4) 
To derive the size of the Stabilisation Fund as a share of resource revenues in the steady state, substitute 
and rearrange using Equations (A.3) and (A.4):  
Tt =αTt−1 +βSt−1
St = 1+ rt( )St−1 + Xt −Tt
s = 1+ r( )s+ x − t







































β − 1−α( )r
Hence, in the steady state, the size of the Stabilisation Fund relative to revenue is determined only by the 




β − 1−α( )r
To determine the dynamics of the transfers to be received by the government in the steady state, use 
Equations (A.3) and (A.4): 
Rearranging, the steady-state level of transfers from the Stabilisation Fund are a function of the share of 
revenues transferred to the funds, the α and β parameters choices, and the interest rate, r:
x = t − r (1−α)
β
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Chapter 8 
From oil  to equities:  
Applying the rule to illustrative country cases 
In Chapter 4 reference was made to the manner in which the former head of the Norwegian sovereign 
wealth fund made the case for converting natural resource wealth into permanent financial wealth – or, as 
he described it, diversifying part of the nation’s wealth “from oil to equities”. The fiscal rule proposed in 
Chapter 7 does exactly the same thing, while recognising that the countries also need differentiate 
between the need to hold liquid assets for fiscal-stabilisation purposes and holding long-term assets to 
generate income and grow the financial portfolio. The flexibility of the rule also reflects an understanding 
that capital-scare resource-rich countries may have economically or politically founded reasons why a 
greater share of current resource wealth needs to be spent in the near term rather than transformed into 
permanent financial wealth. 
This chapter discusses the application of the fiscal rule proposed in Chapter 7 to five instructive country 
cases: Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Ghana and Saudi Arabia. The five countries differ in terms of 
their levels of initial savings, degree of resource dependence, the consumption of current resource 
revenues, their outlook for the future trend resource production, and in terms of their current public 
spending and investment needs. The application of the rule to these contrasting cases, therefore, allows us 
to assess how the framework operates in different circumstances. 
Kazakhstan is an example a country that has accumulated significant savings in recent years, relative to the 
current level of spending and oil revenues. This enables high starting (or “initial”) levels for both the 
Stabilisation and Investment-Income Fund components of the sovereign wealth fund in the model. The 
country’s expected resource revenues trend assumes an initial increase, due to gradual price recovery and 
production increases, followed by a gradual decline. Despite the prospect of a gradual decline in oil 
production, therefore, Kazakhstan’s level of savings implies strong initial conditions through which to 
pursue reforms to their existing sovereign wealth fund structures, adopt a more rule-based saving and 
spending process, and raise the level of government spending in a sustainable way.  
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Like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan has accumulated assets in its existing sovereign wealth fund structures – 
although its savings, relative to current spending, is less impressive. Azerbaijan also faces a less promising 
long-term outlook for oil production and revenues: revenues are expected to rise somewhat over the next 
five years due to a gradual recovery in oil prices, followed by a steady decline due to falling production. 
Azerbaijan’s initial conditions are, therefore, similar to that of Kazakhstan, except with a lower relative 
level of savings and a less positive revenue outlook.  
Nigeria has exceptionally high levels of resource dependence – and, consequently, limited room for saving 
from resource revenues, without reducing the level of spending (or enjoying large, unexpected revenue 
windfalls). Very low savings and an expected long-term decline in oil revenues compound Nigeria’s 
challenges, after an initial period of rising prices and production. These conditions limit Nigeria’s policy 
options around the use of oil revenues (and underline the importance of raising non-oil revenues to ensure 
the country’s long-term fiscal stability). 
As a typical emerging oil producer, Ghana is anticipating a sharp, but relatively short-lived, rise in 
resource production. Importantly, with oil revenues rising from current negligent levels, Ghana’s current 
lack of fiscal dependence on oil (coupled with significant public spending and investment needs) 
establishes a policy choice between spending oil revenues as they arise; versus moderating the increase in 
spending due to new oil revenues, while saving a portion of those revenues over the expected production 
period to leave a financial endowment to support spending by future generations.  
Finally, Saudi Arabia one of the world’s largest oil producers, with massive proven oil reserves, most of 
which has a low marginal extraction cost. Saudi Arabia has also accumulated significant savings during 
previous oil revenue booms. However, the absence of robust fiscal rules results in a rapid depletion of 
these assets in bust periods. Given Saudi Arabia’s very high dependence on oil revenues and rising long-
term spending needs, the need for holding financial assets and generating investment income are acute.  
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Table 8.1 :  Init ia l  conditions,  strengths and weaknesses  
Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Nigeria  Ghana Saudi Arabia  
Existing savings Very High High Very Low Low High 
Level  of  current oi l  
consumption,  relative  to 
revenue and savings 
Moderate High Very High N/A High 
Long-term outlook for  
oi l  production 
Positive Negative Positive Positive Positive 
Current public  spending 
and investment needs 
High High Very High Very High High 
Current f iscal  
dependence on oi l  
revenues 
Moderate Moderate Very High Very Low Very High 
The respective strengths and weaknesses of the five countries used as the examples in this chapter, as they 
pertain to the case-specific calibration of the fiscal rule, are summarised in Table 8.1. These initial 
conditions reflect those of many other resource-rich countries, so that the implications of the application of 
the fiscal rule discussed in this chapter has wider lessons for policymakers in resource-rich countries. 
These inputs affect the outcome of the calibration exercise for each country (using the methodology 
described in Section 7.3.5). Table 8.2 shows the stabilisation-parameter values identified for each country. 
Table  8.2:  Spending rule  parameters  for  each country 






Anchor on previous year’s 
stabilisation transfer 
0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 
Beta  
Additional transfer from the 
Stabilisation Fund 
0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.1 
Delta  
Transfer from the 
Investment Income Fund 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
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8.1.  Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan is in the most favourable position with respect to fiscal sustainability of the five countries 
under consideration here. Indeed, its level of savings (assumed here to be $64bn) relative to spending and 
oil revenues places is exceptionally high compared to a peer group of global oil-dependent economies. 
This position of strength is evident in the comparatively high parameters for the spending rule that can be 
permitted, following the selection criteria described in the previous chapter. The process identified 
parameters for Kazakhstan of α = 0.7 and a β = 0.1; with δ = 0.05, based on an assumed 5% real earning 
potential of the Investment Income Fund.   
Figure 8.1, shows the modelled transfers from the two components of the sovereign wealth fund for 
Kazakhstan, with the calibration of the rule such that α = 0.7, β = 0.1 and δ = 0.05; coupled with different 
values for θ. As discussion in Chapter 7, θ is a discretionary policy variable that reflects preferences for the 
tradeoff between current and future (including permanent) spending: lower savings (lower values for θ) 
permit a significant scale-up in public spending over the first 10-15 years of the forecast horizon, but then 
results in a drop in spending as oil revenues decline, until spending ultimately stabilises at a long-run level 
based on earnings from the Investment Income Fund alone.  
With a relatively low savings rate of 30%, Kazakhstan would be able to raise the level of spending based on 
oil revenue and financial income to around $23bn per year under the central tendency in the distribution of 
outcomes (recall that all outputs in the model are expressed in real terms). However, beyond the peak in 
spending (achieved after 12-23 years in the forecast), spending would decline along with oil revenue, given 
the limited degree of savings – that is, limited transformation of depleting natural assets into permanent 
wealth. Eventually, oil-derived spending will stabilise around $15bn per annum, based on income from the 
Investment Income Fund. Higher saving rates of 50% and 70% allows for a more stable spending profile 
over the forecast horizon. With a 50% savings rate, spending rises gradually to a peak under the central 
tendency of around $20bn before declining slightly and stabilising around $18bn in perpetuity. In that 
sense, the Investment Income Fund completely replaces oil as store of national wealth and source of fiscal 
income (note that the simulated values of the Stabilisation and Investment Income Funds, for all 
countries under various savings rates, are included in the Appendix to this chapter).  
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Figure 8.1 :  SWF transfers  for  Kazakhstan with dif ferent  savings rates  
8.1.a. Low savings (30% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
8.1.b. Medium savings (50% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
8.1.c. High savings (70% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
Note: all values are expressed in real terms 
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The lessons and policy implications of the modelling of the rule for Kazakhstan can be summarised as 
follows. The Kazakh example demonstrates above all the value of previously accumulated saving: the high 
level of accumulated assets enables high value for the key parameters in the spending rule, with the 
practical implication that spending is firmly anchored, and can rise over time through growth in the value 
and earnings from the Investment Income Fund. Under more conservative formulations of the fiscal rule, 
with higher saving rates, spending stabilises in perpetuity at a high level: roughly double that (in real term) 
of Kazakhstan’s current level of spending from oil and transfers from its sovereign wealth fund.  
Another implication for the results for Kazakhstan, and particularly how the spending rule shapes the 
trajectory of spending over time under different savings rates (that is, different values for θ), is that 
previously accumulated savings have effective “bought” Kazakh policy options for the future. Policymakers 
can have many valid reasons for choosing different saving rates. It may be that urgent infrastructure 
investments are required – for example, in the oil and gas sector, in order to raise future expected revenues 
beyond those used as a baseline in the modelling for Kazakhstan; or in the non-oil economy with the 
potential to create non-resource based economic activity and revenue. Under such circumstances, a 
relatively lower savings rate (for example, a θ of around 0.3), which will enable a significant, but still 
stabilised, increase in the level of spending over the coming decade, while still leaving an endowment for 
future generations in the form of an Investment Income Fund, so that the decline in spending once oil 
depletes is not too severe. Alternatively, policymakers may be concerned about identified future liabilities, 
requiring a much higher savings rate. As the simulation demonstrated, due to the high level of previously 
accumulated savings, Kazakh policymakers have a greater set of feasible policy options than many other 
economies enjoy.  
8.2.  Azerbaijan 
In anticipation of this gradual decline in oil revenues, the two-fund version of the fiscal rule is necessary, if 
policymakers wish to both stabilise spending, and to some degree increase or maintain the current level of 
spending even as oil revenues decline. In order to achieve the latter (in the context of declining oil 
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production), an Investment Income Fund that receives a share of existing and future savings out of future 
oil revenues, is required to transform depleting oil assets into a permanent financial wealth.   
As noted previously, the stabilisation parameters identified for Azerbaijan are for α = 0.6 and a β = 0.1. An 
alternative specification of α = 0.7 and a β = 0.075 would also have been possible, and created almost 
identical results. As in all examples discussed here, δ = 0.05, based on an assumed 5% real earning 
potential of the Investment Income Fund.  A parameter choice of α = 0.7 and a β = 0.1 would be possible, 
however, it risks very low levels of spending and a depletion of the Stabilisation Fund under an 
unsatisfactorily high percentage of outcomes in the model (that is, in more than 5% of the simulated 
outcomes).  
Figure 8.2 shows the modelled transfers from the two components of the sovereign wealth fund for 
Azerbaijan, with the calibration of the rule such that α = 0.6, β = 0.1 and δ = 0.05; coupled with different 
values for θ. For a low θ of 0.3, implying savings from oil revenues of 30% respectively, note that spending 
rises following a small, temporary drop over the first few years of the forecast, due to the sharp drop in oil 
revenues and a slightly higher-than-sustainable initial level of spending. With θ = 0.3, spending from oil 
revenues and investment income rises to around $18bn after ten years (based on the central tendency in the 
distribution of modelled transfer paths). However, the low level of savings and transfers to the Investment 
Income Fund under this scenario results in a gradual decline in spending as resource production declines. 
Eventually, the Stabilisation Fund will deplete, in line with oil revenues, and spending from saved oil 
wealth will stabilise below $10bn per year (in the central tendency), based on earnings from the 
Investment Income Fund alone.  
If policymakers wish to maintain a flatter and more stable level of spending across the forecast horizon, 
including when oil production has ended, higher savings (θ = 0.5 or 0.7) are necessary to generate stream 
of a permanent income. As shown in Figure 8.2, savings of 50% and 70% achieve this objective. A 50% 
savings rate still generates an increase in the level of spending over the first 10-15 years, followed by a small 
decline: under the central tendency, spending rises to around $12.5bn per year, before declining and 
eventually stabilising around $10bn per year. A high savings rate of 70% establishes the flattest spending 
profile, with spending stabilising at around $12bn per year in the central tendency in perpetuity.  
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Figure 8.2:  SWF transfers  for  Azerbaijan with dif ferent  savings rates  
8.2.a. Low savings (30% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
8.2.b. Medium savings (50% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
8.2.c. High savings (70% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
Note: all values are expressed in real terms 
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The lessons and policy implications from the Azerbaijan example can be summarised as follows. Given 
that the oil revenues are assumed to peak and then start to decline within a decade, the government needs 
to maintain a high savings rate of at least 50% (but more likely 70%) of oil revenues, if indeed it wants to 
maintain current levels of spending from oil revenues. Of course, the government could decide not to do 
so, but that would require raising alternative sources of fiscal revenue through which to finance and 
maintain future public spending. 
Second, in order to ensure the fiscal stability of the rule, a small (tolerable) degree of initial spending is 
required under all savings rates – that is, all the outputs in Figure 8.2 show a small drop in spending over 
the first three years of the forecast. This suggests that current levels of spending are slightly higher than 
sustainable, given the level of initial savings and the assumed revenue outlook (additional savings of 
around $10bn would have completely eliminated the initial drop in spending). This is consistent with 
suggestions by the International Monetary Fund (2014) that savings from oil revenues over the past 
decade are “insufficient”.79 
8.3.  Nigeria 
Nigeria has encountered many difficulties with respect to the management of its oil sector and, in 
particular, oil revenues. These problems manifest in a number of ways, but one that is particularly 
pertinent to the calibration of the fiscal rule for the country, is that unlike many oil- and other commodity-
producing countries, Nigeria has not accumulated significant financial assets and reserves during 
previous revenue booms, including the most recent one between 2003-14. This lack of initial funds means 
that the country faces a difficult set of choices around the current and future use of oil revenues, as 
expressed in through the fiscal rule.  
79 IMF. (2014a). Republic of Azerbaijan: 2014 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report, 11 June 2014. 
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One option would be to significantly reduce the level of oil-revenue consumption in order to build up such 
funds, which is only really feasible under a scenario of a significant recovery in oil prices and revenue.80 
Alternatively, Nigeria may need to give up on the idea of leaving any substantial financial endowment to 
future generations and redouble efforts to grow the non-oil economy and non-oil revenues (recall that oil 
has accounted for more than 90% of consolidated government revenue since 2005). Under the latter 
approach, Nigerian policymakers would still be advised to adopt the single-fund version of the rule, and 
focus on the objective of reducing the volatility of oil-based spending through the spending rule and a 
Stabilisation Fund. The impact of these two policy choices is discussed below. 
Even if somewhat charitable assumptions about Nigeria’s starting point for the calibration of the model 
are made, the challenges are severe. Assume that the initial level of spending from oil is $10bn per year 
(derived from the latest IMF Article IV consultation report); and that Nigeria has $5bn in saved assets 
split between $4bn in the Stabilisation Fund and $1bn in the Investment Income Fund, which is broadly 
in line with the assets of the stabilisation and savings components of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment 
Authority (leaving some room for the transfer of other surplus assets, such as those from the Excess Crude 
Account).  
It is immediately apparent that the rule all but fails in the Nigeria context. Given the combination of a 
higher ratio of spending relative to oil revenues (indeed, spending is almost double that the size of 
assumed oil revenue at the start period of the simulation) and a low level of savings, the best combination 
of parameters for Nigeria are a low α = 0.5 and β = 0.05. Moreover, these parameters need to be 
combined with incredibly low savings rates in order to avoid a high probability of depleting the 
Stabilisation Fund. Given an α = 0.5 and β = 0.05, a θ = 0.1 results in a depletion event in 5.5% of the 
simulated outcomes; while higher savings rates are not feasible (or at least introduce significant risk of 
depletion of the sovereign wealth fund), as they raise the probability of default (t0 6.6% for an θ = 0.2, 7.7% 
for θ = 0.3, and 11.2% for θ = 0.4). Figure 8.3 shows the results of the calibration of the rule for Nigeria 
with α = 0.5 and β = 0.05, a θ = 0.1. 
80 One way in which this may occur is through a sharp increase in oil production relative to current expectations, 
through significant new discoveries and investment in exploration. While there are a number of estimates that 
suggest Nigeria still has significant unproven oil reserves and scope for large production increases, this to too 
speculative an outcome to be the basis for prudent policy. 
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Figure 8.3:  SWF transfers  for  Nigeria  with a  10% savings rates  
Note: all values are expressed in real terms 
The outcome of the rule, calibrated in this manner, is nothing short of disastrous for Nigeria, resulting in 
a simply unbearable drop in oil-derived spending over the first decade of the forecast horizon. In the 
central tendency of the range of modelled outcomes, oil-based spending drops from $10bn per year to 
around a meager $2bn by 2020, before rising gradually.81 The model does suggest a sustainable level of 
real spending around $25bn – but this is only achieved at the end of the forecast horizon (that is, around 
2040). It is unlikely that policymakers would commit to the level of austerity proposed by the model in 
order to possibly achieve this outcome in the distant future.  
An interpretation of this result is that the drop in spending underlines the cost to Nigeria of not having 
saved a share of resource revenue in the past decade through a sovereign wealth fund that could be used in 
future to stabilise and diversify revenue sources. Consequently, the dramatic drop in oil revenues means 
that spending has to drop to unfeasible levels in order to avoid a depletion of existing funds and build up 
funds large enough to stabilise spending and have a permanent income stream in the long run. As 
81 One partially mitigating factor in this precipitous drop would be the exchange rate. The primary reasons why the 
funds are at such high risk of depletion in the Nigeria case are the country’s low initial savings and the expectation 
that oil revenues are set for a sharp decline over the period 2016 – 2020 (as per Table 7.2), based on IMF Article IV 
assumptions. However, the system is modelled in terms of US dollar – in reality, the Nigeria naira weakened 
dramatically after 2014 when oil prices collapsed, so the domestic-currency value of the drop in spending is less 
severe. Over the medium term, however, the assumption is that these exchange effects disappear.  
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previously discussed in reference to policymakers’ preferences, such a drop in spending is politically 
unfeasible (as well as potentially devastating to the real economy). Therefore, a different approach to the 
calibration of the model that reflects these realities should be considered. Policymakers could argue that 
the country has massive current infrastructure and human capital investment needs, coupled with 
significant growth potential in the non-oil economy, if these investments are made. Consequently, 
following the arguments of Collier et. al. (2010), it could be argued that Nigeria does not need to establish 
a permanent income stream from oil, as over time the economy will develop and diversify generating 
alternative revenue source (arguably even more so if it uses oil revenues today to invest in much needed 
infrastructure and human capital).  
Under this approach, the government would abandon efforts to build up an Investment Income Fund, 
and rather focus only on stabilising oil revenues over the lifecycle of oil production. In terms of the 
calibration of the model, these choices would amount to Nigeria putting all previously accumulated 
savings – as well as future oil revenues – into the Stabilisation Fund (that is, θ = 0). This approach would 
still require some reduction in the level of spending and/or saving out of future oil revenues in order to 
build a larger Stabilisation Fund; but after that, the spending profile will mirror the resource revenue 
profile (albeit in a more stabilised form).  
Another way to demonstrate the power of accumulated savings is to consider a counterfactual scenario in 
which the rule is calibrated under the assumption that Nigeria does have significant savings to draw 
upon. Consider, for example, that Nigeria received an estimated $440bn in oil revenues between 2000 
and 2013. In Chapter 6 it was shown that a simple saving of revenues arising above a $40 per barrel Brent 
crude price (based on a 2000 real price for oil) would have resulted in a total $144bn in savings over this 
period (a number that would have grown to between $165bn if these savings where invested in a globally 
diversified portfolio and the proceeds reinvested).82  
82 Oil theft – both at the pipeline and from revenues – is another way to think about missed opportunities for savings. 
Oby Ezekwesili, a former vice president of the World Bank, suggested in 2012 that Nigeria has lost an estimated 
$400bn in oil revenues since independence, while the country’s Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force estimates 
that Nigeria lost an $29bn between 2002 and 2012 alone due to a gas price-fixing scam; coupled with an additional 
$6bn on average per year in lost revenue due to oil theft (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2012). Separately, 
Lamido Sanusi, the former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, has suggested that the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation, the country’s national oil company, failed to remit a total of $49.8bn to the national treasury 
in a matter of only 7 months between January and July 2013 (Iriekpen, 2016).  
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Even with more conservative assumptions around the level of initial savings available in 2015, so that the 
initial size of the Stabilisation Fund is $50bn and that of the Investment Income Fund is $40bn, the 
spending rule could then have been calibrated with parameter values of α, β and δ of 0.7, 0.05 and 0.05, 
respectively – therefore with a higher α that before, which reduces the magnitude of the drop in spending 
due to lower oil revenues from 2016 through 2020. As shown in Figure 8.4, this rule combined with 
different savings rates would almost guarantee no reduction in oil based spending (in the central tendency 
of the distribution) in response to the dramatic drop in oil revenues included in the assumptions, as there 
is enough money in the sovereign wealth fund to cushion the decline the revenue. Such small reductions in 
oil-based spending could conceivably be met with higher non-oil revenues, without inflicting major 
damage on the real economy.  
With lower saving rates, the level of spending peaks around 2035 (around 20 years into the forecast 
horizon, which is just after oil production and revenues are assumed to have peaked). Under a scenario in 
50% of oil revenues are transferred to the Investment Income Fund, the level of oil-derived spending 
reaches $20bn by 2030 under the central tendency of the distribution, and permanently stabilises around 
$30bn (including beyond the forecast horizon). The extent of the trade-off involved with different savings 
rates on spending levels in the very long term is not apparent in Figure 8.4, as it mostly takes effect over a 
horizon that extends beyond the forecast horizon modelled here. However, the level at which spending 
stabilises with a savings rate of δ = 0.3 after oil revenues depletes will be lower than that which is possible 
in perpetuity with higher savings rates, such as δ = 0.5 or 0.7 (although the impact of this difference will 
largely occur beyond the forecast horizon employed here). 
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Figure 8.4:  Counterfactual  SWF transfers  for  Nigeria  with higher init ia l  funds 
8.4.a. Low savings (30% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
8.4.b. Medium savings (50% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
8.4.c. High savings (70% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
Note: all values are expressed in real terms 
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The policy implications from these simulations for Nigeria are relevant not only for the country, but for 
their more general application regarding the power of savings and the limited options policymakers in 
resource-dependent countries have in the absence of such savings. The model underlines how difficult it 
will be for Nigeria to achieve both stabilisation and savings objectives given its current starting point and 
the expectations of dramatically lower oil revenues over the first few years of the forecast horizon. The 
country has not taken the opportunity of previous oil revenue booms, including the most recent one, to 
accumulate savings. This limits Nigeria’s policy options for the future, given the assumption of a long-
term decline in oil revenues, which is assumed to start around 2026, following an initial increase in 
revenues up to that point. Realistically, this leaves Nigeria requiring a combination of reduced spending 
from oil, increased oil production (much of which is not in policymakers’ control), and significant growth 
in non-oil revenues.  
It may be more realistic for Nigeria to forgo efforts to generate a permanent source of income financed by 
oil, and rather aim to merely stabilise oil revenue over the remaining years of production, while attempting 
to raise both oil and non-oil revenue. The spending rule – and the Stabilisation Fund component of the 
sovereign wealth fund – would remain essential to stabilising the volatility of oil revenues under this 
option; as would the ability transfer a share of future revenues to the fund to prevent its depletion in 
response to future negative oil-revenue shocks. Finally, the counterfactual demonstrated forcefully the 
extent to which Nigeria would have face much less acute tradeoff if a larger (but not implausibly large) 
share of past oil revenue were saved.  
8.4.  Ghana 
The Ghanaian example is different from the three countries discussed above, as it is not yet a major 
producer of oil and does not derive a significant share of revenues from oil. Oil production is, however, to 
grow significantly over the next 10-15 years, followed by a gradual decline (absent any additional 
discoveries of oil deposits, which is certainly not impossible, given the extent of exploration and 
investment in Ghanaian oil over the past decade). Given comparatively small amount of oil revenue 
currently being generated, Ghana faces the prospect of very significant growth in oil revenues, as 
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production (and potentially oil prices) increase rapidly. Indeed, uncertainty around the outlook for the 
magnitude and timing of future oil revenues in the case of Ghana is driven not only (or even mainly) by the 
volatility of oil prices, but by uncertainty around production levels and the size of deposits. This 
combination of factors – along with other aspects, such as the large public spending needs – are typical of 
a large number of low-income countries with recent resource discoveries, not least a number of other 
African countries, such as Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique.  
Given the low level of past oil revenues, Ghana is essentially “starting from scratch” and is not assumed to 
have access to significant savings or a high level of initial spending of oil-derived revenue at the start of the 
forecasting period. Assume that initial spending is equal to $0.2bn, while the Stabilisation Fund and 
Investment Income Fund hold $0.3bn and $0.2bn, respectively (in line with the report assets of the Ghana 
Stabilisation Fund and the Ghana Heritage Fund). The key parameters, α, β and δ are set as 0.7, 0.10 and 
0.05, respectively. Figure 8.5 shows the results of the spending rule calibrated for Ghana, using these 
parameters.  
The high-savings strategy – that is, transferring 50-70% of oil revenues to the Investment Income Fund – 
may be prudent in the Ghanaian case, given the rapid level increase and decrease in the oil revenues 
(production driven), as well as the fact that oil production is assumed here to completely cease by 2040. 
Note, however, that even a high saving rate of 70% (θ = 0.7) permits a significant rise in oil-related 
spending, which will raise to $2bn per year from negligible current levels over the first 10 years of the 
forecast horizon, and stabilise in perpetuity at a level around $5bn per year (all based on the central 
tendency of the distribution of simulated outcomes). All of this would, of course, be additional to the 
levels of spending that existed prior to the discovery of oil and is funded from other fiscal revenues outside 
of oil (assuming that oil revenues do not crowd out these alternative sources of fiscal revenue).  
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Figure 8.5:  SWF transfers  for  Ghana with dif ferent  savings rates 
8.5.a. Low savings (30% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
8.5.b. Medium savings (50% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
8.5.b. High savings (70% transfer to the Investment Income Fund) 
Note: all values are expressed in real terms 
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If the combined objectives of Ghanaian policymakers are to: first, stabilise the volatility of incoming oil 
revenues; second, raise the level of oil-based spending gradually over the first decade of oil production; 
and third, maintain the level of oil-based spending at or near its peak levels once oil revenues start to 
decline (through income from the Investment Income Fund), the rule implemented with a high savings 
rate achieves these combined goals. Of course, as with all other countries, policymakers may wish to 
spend a greater share of oil revenues upfront, but this leaves a smaller Investment Income Fund for the 
future generations in the post-oil period and hence of lower level of sustained spending. A savings rate of 
30% (θ = 0.3) allows oil-related spending to increase to around $7bn after 15 years (in the central tendency 
of the distribution of simulated outcomes); followed by a decline as oil revenues deplete.83 The smaller 
allocation of revenues to the Investment Income Fund results in a stable permanent level of oil-related 
spending of around $2.5bn in real terms (under the central tendency) once oil production ends. 
Regardless, of the savings rate chosen, the spending rule proposed here will stabilise the short-term 
volatility in spending.  
The following conclusions can be drawn from the calibration of the model for Ghana – a case that holds 
useful insights for other low-income countries with the prospect of new resource production and a 
concomitant increase in new resource revenues. First, being a new resource producer, with low levels of 
resource dependence and an established set of non-resource revenue sources, provides scope for 
implementing sound savings and stabilisation policies. Indeed, the challenge could be framed as one of 
not allowing new resource revenues to introduce unwanted cyclicality and dependence into the fiscal 
framework – risks that the fiscal rule would help prevent.  
Given the sharp rise in oil production, Ghana would still see a significant rise in spending from oil 
revenues and associated financial income – even under the most conservative savings policy modelled 
here. This rise would be more stable and predictable than simply spending income oil revenue in the 
absence of a sovereign wealth fund and a fiscal rule; and place Ghana on a path to maintain a high level of 
83 Note that the distribution of outcomes under the low-savings scenario has very fat tails. This is because the 
calibration of the rule in this manner makes oil-related spending almost entirely dependent upon the modelled 
distribution of oil revenues. Given the methodology employed to simulate a distribution of revenue outcomes around 
an assumed path (discussed in Chapter 7), this results in a small probability of very high revenue outcomes (for 
example, in the top 5% of outcomes, spending from oil revenues can peak at around $25bn per year due to low savings 
and high revenues).  
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oil-based spending in perpetuity; long after oil production has stopped. The calibration of the model 
provided here would be robust to any shocks to the level of oil production – for example, if new 
discoveries result in a secular rise in revenues above the expected path. Such a development would simply 
lead to a faster ramp up in government spending and/or a higher level of permanent spending in the future 
through faster than expected growth in the Investment Income Fund.  
8.5.  Saudi Arabia 
The four examples discussed above involve calibrating the parameters of the fiscal rule to meet a set of 
policy objectives based on input assumptions and forward-looking simulations of a number of critical 
variables. It is, however, also instructive to evaluate the fiscal rule in a backward-looking manner, which 
this section does by constructing a counterfactual in which Saudi Arabia is modelled to have adopted the 
fiscal rule at the end of 2004 (that is, the rule applied as of the 2005 fiscal year).  
Figure 8.6:  Annual  Saudi oi l  revenue for  2000-2014 
 
Source: Official data from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
This exercise has the benefit of enabling the use of observed, rather than simulated, data on oil revenues 
and financial-market returns, as per the counterfactuals based on simpler rules-of-thumb for savings in 
Chapter 6.84 As was done in those exercises, the returns of the Investment Income Fund are proxied by 
84 Note also that whereas the findings for the previous four countries in this chapter were expressed in real terms, this 
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the annual returns generated by a globally diversified portfolio, while the observed yield on ten-year US 
Treasury bonds serve a proxy for Stabilisation Fund returns. Oil-revenue data are taken from official data 
released by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and are shown in Figure 8.6. 
Before discussing the counterfactual application of the fiscal rule for Saudi Arabia, it is instructive to 
highlight a number of structure features and characteristics that frame the policy challenges confronting 
Saudi policymakers with respect to the management of the country’s oil wealth and financial assets.  
8 .5 .1 .  Framing the policy  chal lenge:  structural  features  of  the Saudi  economy 
Saudi Arabia has been the world’s leading oil producer from several decades and is set to continue 
receiving significant revenues from oil for decades to come – its deposits of commercially viable proven oil 
reserves are unrivalled, and it is conceivable that Saudi Arabia will be able to maintain stable levels of oil 
production for decades to come. Moreover, Saudi Arabian oil is amongst the cheapest to extract 
worldwide, making it one of the most resilient producers in a low-price environment (a fact that featured 
prominently in the Saudi Arabia’s rhetoric and supply strategy during and after the late-2014 collapse in oil 
prices). In addition to its oil wealth, Saudi Arabia has amassed several hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
savings from previous revenue booms, held in foreign exchange reserves and other official investment 
vehicles. Yet, despite its natural and financial wealth, Saudi Arabia faces significant fiscal challenges in 
both the short and long term, as discussed below.  
8.5.1.a. Savings at risk of depletion 
The drop in global oil prices in the second half of 2014 resulted in large fiscal deficits and a decline in 
officially reported foreign exchange reserves from more than $750bn at peak (in mid-2014) to $580bn as of 
the end of the first quarter of 2016. After more than a decade of rising oil prices and revenues, fiscal 
surpluses and growing reserves, the prospect of sustained period of oil price post the 2014 collapse will 
put the Saudi Arabia’s savings from earlier oil revenue booms at risk of depletion. The IMF calculated 
that if total government spending rises at an annual compound growth rate of 4.5%, while oil revenues 
were on average 30% below the baseline forecast between 2014 and 2019 (where the baseline was simply an 
extrapolation of the preceding five years), SAMA’s assets would fall by around $450bn by 2019. Both the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
218 
observed and modelled depletion of reserves are a direct result of the absence of binding fiscal rules that 
constrain spending growth and establish a mechanism for using the earnings on accumulated assets in a 
sustainable way. 
8.5.1.b. Oil dependence: high and rising 
The Saudi economy and fiscal health remains highly dependent on oil. Moreover, oil dependence has 
risen persistently since the late 1970s, is most apparent in relation to government revenue. Figure 8.7 
shows the extent to which the share of total government revenue derived from oil has trended upward 
since early 1990s and exceeded 90% in the last few years of the previous oil boom. Even in low oil-price 
environments, oil’s share of total revenue has remained above 80%. Exceptionally high oil dependence is 
also evident in the composition of Saudi Arabia’s exports, where oil and its derivatives account for almost 
all the growth in Saudi exports since the mid-1990s. Crude oil accounts for around three-quarters of 
exports, while refined oil and petroleum gases account for an additional 10% (Hausmann et. al., 2011). 
Figure 8.7:  Increasing f iscal  dependence on oi l  
Source: Official data from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
As with many other dependent economies, foreign-currency export earnings are particularly important for 
Saudi Arabian economic (and social) stability, as the majority of consumer and capital goods are 
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at all times to maintain the fixed exchange rate. A substantial depletion of reserves could endanger the 
stability of the Saudi riyal peg. 
 
8.5.1.c. Oil-induced volatility in revenue, debt and capital spending 
 
As a direct corollary of Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil, fiscal variables are volatile and medium- to long-
term patterns are closely correlated with cyclical developments in the energy markets. The absence of 
countercyclical fiscal rules in Saudi Arabia is evident in the close connection between the share of capital 
expenditure in total expenditure to oil prices, as shown in Figure 8.8. This suggests that, when even Saudi 
policymakers have been able to maintain relatively stable spending growth throughout periods of short- 
and medium-term oil-price volatility, the burden of adjustment has historically fallen heavily on the capital-
spending component of the budget.  
 
Figure 8.8:  Oil -driven cycl ical ity  in  capital  spending 
 
Source: Official data from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
 
Note that capital spending as a share of total spending fell sharply when oil prices and revenue fell in the 
1980s and early- to mid-1990s, and only partially recovered during the significant price- and revenue boom 
from 2005 onwards. Saudi Arabia’s debt dynamics are similarly correlated with cyclical developments in 
oil prices. From the mid-1980s to the turn of the century, the Saudi Ministry of Finance issued a 
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debt-to-GDP ratio rose from very low levels to 103% of GDP by 1999. When oil prices and revenues rose 
again between 2005 and 2013, public debt was aggressively reduced to only 1.6% of GDP. 
8.5.1.d. The absence of countercyclical fiscal rules or anchors 
The use of assets accumulated during previous booms to smooth out fluctuations in fiscal spending is not 
the problem – indeed, it is quite common and generally desirable in the context of resource-rich countries, 
as discussed in relation to the function of Stabilisation Funds in Chapter 4 and as per the contingent, 
countercyclical nature of the fiscal rule introduced in the previous chapter. However, such a policy 
requires the consistently applied countercyclical policy. While elements of such a countercyclical fiscal 
framework are in place, they remain at the discretion of policymakers, rather than predictable and rule 
based. While the investment arm of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency can be described as a “quasi 
sovereign wealth fund” – its investment strategy and size (at peak) is comparable to that of the sovereign 
wealth funds of Norway, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait – is not as formally bound in a rule-based fiscal 
framework, and the majority of its assets are therefore exposed to fiscal pressures. In short, there are no 
time-consistent savings- and spending rules for the use of oil revenues and the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency’s assets.  
Figure 8.9:  Actual  versus budgeted total  government spending 
 
Source: Official data from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
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The degree to which fiscal policy is not countercyclical over the whole cycle, is evident not only in the 
sharp rise in spending over the course of the last oil revenue boom, but also in ad hoc increases in 
spending of this period. Figure 8.9 shows that actual spending was consistently raised above the 
budgeted amount in every year from 2000 onwards, as oil revenues exceeded budgeted assumption – 
suggesting a procyclical and ad hoc, rather than countercyclical, response to positive oil shocks. In short, 
while the Saudi authorities claim to embrace countercyclical spending policies during low-revenue 
periods, their actions are procyclical in boom periods.  
8.5.1.e. Long-term fiscal and demographic pressures 
The major Saudi Arabian government spending categories are defense, education, and healthcare and 
social affairs – together these three categories account for 80% of the 2015 budget. Across various budget 
categories, the public-sector wage bill is equal to around 40% of public spending, as more than 80% of 
employed Saudis work for the government. Spending on healthcare, education and unemployment 
benefits have also been rising steadily, both in absolute and per capita terms, while spending on subsidies 
for the domestic use of fuel and food imports have also risen in line with growing demands and population 
trends. The composition of current spending, coupled with exceptional demographic pressures85, 
underline the extent significant spending growth is to be anticipated over the coming decades in Saudi 
Arabia. Spending on defense and security will be difficult to reduce given the threat of regional 
insurgency, terrorism and political tensions; and while there is scope for stabilising per capita spending on 
public-sector wages and entitlements, Saudi Arabia’s demographics make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
reduce the growth in overall spending on these budget items (even assuming reductions in per capita 
spending on these items). Finally, while reductions to subsidies on fuel and food have long been identified 
as important areas for fiscal reform; again, Saudi Arabia’s demographic profile suggests that even if the 
government pushes through politically unpopular reductions in per capita spending on these items, total 
spending on these items will be difficult to contain.86   
85 Saudi Arabian demographic pressures due its “youth bulge” have been analysed at length as a major long-term 
concern. According to official data published by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, more than 70% of the 
population was below the age of 40 in 2012.  
86 The rapid growth in the domestic use of oil, in light of subsidies, has been widely studied and is the source of some 
of the most pessimistic forecasts of Saudi Arabia’s long-term fiscal outlook (Lahn and Stevens, 2011).  
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8.5.2 .  Saudi  Arabia in  hindsight:  the lost  decade 
The structural challenges highlighted above underline the importance to Saudi Arabia’s long-term fiscal 
future of establishing a rule-based countercyclical fiscal framework of the kind introduced in the previous 
chapter. While Saudi Arabia has immense oil wealth and managed to accumulate significant assets during 
the previous oil boom, it is useful to consider a counterfactual in which the fiscal rule introduced in 
Chapter 7 was implement around the start of this boom.   
In order to construct this counterfactual, assume that the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency held $300bn in 
assets at the end of 2004, which is in line with reported reserves holdings at the time, split in such a way 
between the newly established Stabilisation and Invest Income Fund, so that the former receives $100bn 
at the end of 2004 and the latter $200bn. Oil revenues for the 2005-14 period are as described above and 
shown in Figure 8.6, while the financial returns generated on the Investment Income Fund are proxied by 
a quarterly rebalanced 60/40 equity-bond portfolio. Recall that the fiscal rule provides for spending from 
three sources: (i) a fixed percentage (α) based on the previous year’s spending, irrespective of the amount 
of revenues received; (ii) a fixed percentage (β) transfer from the Stabilisation Fund; and (iii) income from 
the Investment Income Fund, based on its expected long-run real return (δ). Given the high level of initial 
savings (as of end-2014) relative to spending, the spending rule can be calibrated for Saudi Arabian 
counterfactual with a high α and β values of 0.8 and 0.1, respectively; with δ = 0.05, based on the expected 
long-run real return of the Investment Income Fund. The calibration of the parameters of the fiscal rule in 
this way provides for a level of spending in 2005 ($92bn) that is exactly in line with actual spending during 
that fiscal year, establishing a base for comparison.  
Figure 8.10 shows the comparison of actual government spending to that implied by the fiscal rule with 
different savings rates. Note the modelled profile of spending with a 20% savings rate is similar to that of 
actual spending, although spending growth is slightly more constrained in the former for the last few years 
of the sample. Total spending under the fiscal rule with 20% savings between 2005 and 2014 was $1.7 
trillion versus the $1.8 trillion actually spent. A striking difference, however, lies in the much greater 
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accumulation of assets during what was (with the benefit of hindsight) a very significant, transitory boom 
in oil prices.87  
 




Given the magnitude of the boom in revenues, it may have been prudent for Saudi Arabia to adopt a 
higher savings rate during this period, which would have constrained spending growth in the short term, 
but resulted in a greater accumulation of saved assets (particularly in the Investment Income Fund). 
Figure 8.10, therefore, also shows the modelled outcome with 30% and 40% savings rates. Under the 
former, total spending from 2005-14 would have been just below $1.6 trillion (compared to $1.8 trillion 
actually spent) and total savings at the end of 2014 would have totaled $1.584 trillion. Under the 40% 
savings rule, total spending would have been $1.48 trillion from 2005-14, while total savings would have 
equaled $1.775 trillion.  
 
A number of conclusions and implications can be drawn from this counterfactual analysis for Saudi 
Arabia. Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia managed to accumulate savings from exceptionally high oil 
revenues in certain years, notably 2008 and 2011-13, while at the same time raising the level of spending 
considerably. The analysis conducted here suggests that the failure to implement a rule-based fiscal policy 
framework and formal sovereign wealth fund structures has been a missed opportunity. Saudi Arabia 
                                                
87 Under the modelled fiscal rule with 20% savings, Saudi Arabia would have accumulated $1.393 trillion in total 
assets between the Savings and Stabilisation Fund by the end of 2014, which is significant more than the $750bn - 
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could have accumulated considerably more assets under modelled fiscal rule. This greater accumulation 
would have been due, not only to slightly more restraint on public-spending growth over the period, but 
also to the compounding effect of a few years’ of high financial-market returns (although it should also be 
noted that the sample period includes the global financial crisis of 2008). To quantify the missed 
opportunity, the more than $800bn in additional savings that would have accrued under the fiscal rule 
with a 30% savings rate, generates an additional $42bn in permanent annual investment income that can 
be sustained into perpetuity. In light of the fiscal pressures that emerged in Saudi Arabia in 2015 and 2016, 
following the collapse of global oil prices, the opportunity cost of these foregone savings are striking.  
Finally, note that the adoption of the fiscal rule, even under the most conservative savings assumption in 
which 40% of oil revenues are transferred to the Investment Income Fund, still permits a significant 
increase in spending. Indeed, nominal spending more than doubles from $92 billion in 2005 to $237bn in 
2014 under the most conservative savings rule. This is an important illustration of the fact that the fiscal 
rule proposed in Chapter 7 does not preclude significant growth in public spending in the face of a 
sustained resource revenue boom, provided the level of assets in the Stabilisation and Investment Income 
Fund permits it.  
8.6.  Policy and institutional implications 
The discussion of the underlying dynamics of the framework in the previous chapter, followed by its 
application in this one, brings several policy and institutional implications to light. The merits of the rule, 
along with general policy and institutional implications can be summarised as follows. 
8.6.1 .  Analysing trade-offs  in  the al location of  resource revenues 
Trade-offs are pervasive in the allocation of resource revenues to achieving competing aims – as well as 
between the current and future realisation of those aims. The fiscal rule proposed here helps to frame the 
trade-offs between current spending, building buffers for stabilisation purposes and creating an 
endowment for permanent income from a depleting resource source. Saving a portion of current revenue, 
which is needed both to establish and maintain a buffer in the form of a Stabilisation Fund; and, more 
fundamentally, build a permanent endowment in the form of an Investment Income Fund, involves trade-
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offs that can be difficult to achieve politically. Yet, as a number of country illustrations showed, fiscal rules 
and sovereign wealth funds do not always imply trade-offs as stark as those implied by their critics. In 
most cases analysed in this chapter, a significant increase in public spending was a realistic and prudent 
outcome in the context of rising oil revenue – despite the assumed adoption of a constraining fiscal rule 
and a sovereign wealth fund. Indeed, in a number of cases, these policy and institutional interventions 
make the maintenance of spending level through the commodity cycle – and, importantly, beyond the 
commodity production lifecycle – possible.  
In practice, policymakers can build – and have built, in the increasing number of countries with significant 
sovereign wealth funds and rule-based fiscal policies for managing resource revenues – political consensus 
and public support for short-term sacrifices by explaining the cost of unstable public spending and the 
benefits of inter-generational transfers, ensuring the sustainability of resource-based spending and 
investment, the financing of long-term public liabilities (such as pensions, education and healthcare).88 
The fiscal rule allows policymakers to frame and quantify the constructive role sovereign wealth funds, 
fiscal rules and financial income can play in meeting these challenges.  
8 .6.2.  The importance of  adhering to rules 
The framework presented here is a quintessentially rules-based one. The idea is that public spending is 
decoupled from the volatility of annual resource revenues and a part of a depleting resource is made 
permanent through a set of rules. Rules are required to ensure dynamically consistent saving and 
spending policies; and to constrain policymakers’ discretion, particularly when they face incentives for 
short-term behaviour that is not consistent with long-term goals and principles of prudence. The design of 
the rules is embodied in the choice of – and adherence to – key parameters. For the framework to work as 
intended, it is essential not only that the parameters reflect sound dynamics, but also that the government 
88 Used wisely, the stable and permanent income generated by the sovereign wealth funds framework could create a 
sense of ownership by the population over resource revenues and rents. Under supportive political conditions, such a 
stakeholder relationship could serve the positive function of increasing public scrutiny over the funds and resource 
revenues more generally, and protect them from political grabs and manipulation. A direct way of doing this is by 
tying the assets and income from the sovereign wealth funds to public liabilities such as pension benefits or 
educational grants. Of course, a poorly managed and designed transfer system on this kind can also establish a sense 
of entitlement that prohibits prudent fiscal adjustments to negative revenue shocks in future (see the discussion of 
Alaska in final section of this dissertation).  
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is able to stick to the rules during difficult times. Institutional, political and legal safeguards are needed to 
make the system resilient to changes in the political, economic and financial environment. From an 
institutional perspective, the “governance” of sovereign wealth funds pertains not only directly to the fund 
itself or even the institutions managing it, but also, critically, to the rules that govern the flows of funds in 
and out of the funds.  
8 .6.3 .  Distinguishing between technical  and discretionary choices 
In countries with declining resource revenues, as the size of the Stabilisation Fund decreases, the size of 
the Investment Income Fund needs to grow, if policymakers wish to maintain spending levels once 
resources have been depleted. Note that whereas the choice of values for α and β are largely a technical 
exercise, involving the calibration of the stabilisation component of the spending rule, so as to achieve a 
reduction in the volatility of spending (compared to that of the underlying resource revenue), the choice of 
value for θ is more discretionary. The latter parameter is an expression of preferences and choices around 
one particular trade-off: between current and future/permanent spending. All things equal, a higher θ 
implies less spending in the near term in favour of higher spending levels in the future, including a higher 
sustainable permanent level spending that extends in perpetuity, even for countries whose resources have 
been depleted.  
High-saving policies may be appropriate or even required both in countries with declining and increasing 
revenues. The logic in these two scenarios is, however, different. In countries with declining revenues, 
unless very significant savings have already been amassed, the country will need to save a portion of 
revenues in order to maintain and stabilise future spending beyond the lifecycle of the resource. On the 
other hand, in countries with rising resource revenues, high savings are typically both possible, given that 
the rise in revenues is supplementary to the existing revenues; and desirable, given that it moderates an 
unduly rapid rise in spending that can be hard to absorb, while at the same time creating a financial 
endowment for support spending by future generations.  
Of course, as discussed in all the preceding country examples (notably Nigeria), policymakers may choose 
not to maintain current levels of oil-based spending in perpetuity – either because the required 
adjustments are too painful and politically unfeasible; or because they argue that current resource 
revenues need to be invested in order to raise productivity and develop infrastructure that will be needed 
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to grow the non-resource economy. The fiscal rule allows for such preferences, through the selection of a 
relatively low percentage transfer to the Investment Income Fund. However, if this approach is pursued 
from a position of fiscal dependence on resources, coupled with an expected long-term decline such 
resource revenues, the country will face painful declines in spending if non-resource revenues fail to grow 
in replacement of resource revenues in the long run. Note also that countries that have grown dependent 
on resource revenues, have found it both politically difficult and economically unfeasible to raise non-
resource revenues, notably through taxes on individuals and companies. As the discussion of Ghana 
demonstrated, a rule-based fiscal framework with some degree of saving and transformation of natural 
wealth into financial wealth can help prevent the introduction of resource dependence and volatility in the 
fiscal framework of countries with new resource discoveries.  
8 .6.4.  Establishing separate  investment models  and governance 
The fiscal rule makes an important distinction between two types of sovereign wealth funds: a 
Stabilisation Fund and an Investment Income Fund. This distinction raises important institutional issues 
around how to ensure that the two different funds are mandated and incentivised to pursue investment 
models that are relevant to their respective functions. The Stabilisation Fund needs to maintain sufficient 
levels of liquidity, as it needs to partially fund government spending annually. In years of sharp declines in 
resource revenues, the Stabilisation Fund may need to contribute a significant amount of funding to 
government and the budget. By contrast, the Investment Income Fund only contributes an annual 
amount equal to its expected average long-run real return (for example, 5%).  
It is more important that the Investment Income Fund employs its long-term investment horizon and 
other structural advantages in order to capture various risk premiums that raise expected and actual 
returns. Care should be taken in the institutional design of the sovereign wealth fund strategy to ensure 
that the Stabilisation Fund is sufficiently liquid to meet anticipated shortfalls; while the Investment 
Income Fund should be protected from undue criticism for short-term losses and be evaluated and 
assessed more in terms of its long-term strategy and performance. 
Just as the Stabilisation Fund and the Investment Income Fund need different investment models, so too 
do they require different management and oversight structures. The Stabilisation Fund holds liquid 
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assets, and can therefore be managed by the central bank (which typically has the capacity and experience 
to manage such assets in light of its management of the country’s foreign exchange reserves) or even 
directly by the national treasury.89 By contrast, the Investment Income Fund is likely to have a more 
complex and diversified portfolio, which requires dedicated skills, capacity and expertise that most likely 
extend beyond the experience of the central bank or the treasury. Many governments have, in practice, 
handed the responsibility for managing such more complex portfolios to accountable, arms-length 
authorities that report to the government, parliaments and/or the treasury. Delegated authority requires 
more extensive oversight and reporting structures than the operationally simpler Stabilisation Fund.  
Conclusion 
This chapter applied the rule-based contingent fiscal framework for allocating resource revenues 
introduced in Chapter 7 to a number of instructive country cases. The lessons from the application of the 
fiscal rule in this chapter extend beyond the countries themselves: indeed, the characteristic of these five 
economies are prototypical of the position other resource-rich countries. As discussed above, the 
framework clearly underlines the important of several institutional aspects, notably the merits of an 
institutional separation between fiscal policymakers and the management of the Investment Income Fund 
(or similar long-term orientated sovereign wealth) – that is, of operational independence and delegated 
authority in the area of sovereign wealth fund’s investments; as well as the establishment and governance 
of fiscal rules. The final section of this dissertation is devoted to the analysis of these issues from an 
institutional perspective.  
It is instructive to return to the philosophical arguments in favour of rules. As articulated in Chapter 5 in 
reference to monetary policy, the modern understanding of rules falls between an earlier dichotomy 
between “stark” or mechanistic rules and complete discretion on the part of authorities with delegated 
power. Woodford (2002) described modern policy rules in the area of monetary policy as “principles of 
systematic conduct for institutions that are aware of the consequences of their actions and take 
responsibility for them”. Moreover, the modern rules are typically specified in such a way as to take useful 
89 Many countries, including Kuwait, Botswana, Chile and Nigeria, with a sovereign wealth fund structure that 
involves more than one type of fund, have preferred to assign responsibility for the management and investment of 
the entire fund to a single authority. 
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information on the current and expected future state of the economy into account – that is, they are 
“contingent” or “state-dependent” rules. The fiscal rule outlined in this chapter and the preceding one is 
contingent to the extent that it contains feedback loops between the state of resource cycle and the flow of 
funds between the sovereign wealth funds and the budget, while not placing an unreasonable burden of 
expectations on the ability of policymakers to accurately forecast future oil revenues.  
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Appendix to Chapter 8:  Simulated evolution of fund values
Figure A8.1:  Simulated values of Stabilisation Fund for Kazakhstan (under different savings rates) 
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Figure A8.2: Simulated values of Investment Income Fund for Kazakhstan (under different savings rates) 
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Figure A8.3: Simulated values of Stabilisation Fund for Azerbaijan (under different savings rates) 
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Figure A8.4: Simulated values of Investment Income Fund for Azerbaijan (under different savings rates) 
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Figure A8.5: Simulated values of Stabilization Fund for Nigeria (under different savings rates) 
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Figure A8.6: Simulated values of Investment Income Fund for Nigeria (under different savings rates) 
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Figure A8.7: Simulated values of Stabilization Fund for Ghana (under different savings rates) 
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Figure A8.8: Simulated values of Investment Income Fund for Ghana (under different savings rates) 
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SECTION IV 
THE GOVERNANCE OF FISCAL RULES AND  
INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS 
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Chapter 9 
Governing the f iscal  rule:  
The design and institutional infrastructure of fiscal rules for resource revenues 
The October 2015 edition of the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Monitor analysed the boom-bust 
patterns of economic growth, fiscal policy and public investment observed in resource-rich economies. 
The discussion of a wide-ranging set of policies to address volatility was cast against the sobering 
assertion that government actions have historically exacerbated rather than reduced volatility in these 
economies, and that the “principal transmission channel appears to be through the government budget, 
especially for oil exporters” (IMF, 2015). Noting that the empirical evidence “suggests that oil price shocks 
affect growth mostly through public expenditure,” the Fund called for “fiscal policies to pay closer 
attention to the large volatility and uncertainty to which commodity exporters are particularly prone.”  
Amongst the policy and institutional interventions promoted in the report is the combination of rule-
based constraints on the spending of resource revenues during boom periods, and the concomitant 
accumulation of assets in sovereign wealth funds whose assets and income can help manage the fiscal 
consequences of commodity-price slumps. As behooves an organisation whose acronym, according to an 
old joke, stands for “It’s Mainly Fiscal”, the Fund has repeatedly emphasised that sovereign wealth funds 
should be viewed as a part of a broader rule-based medium- to long-term fiscal framework for managing 
resource revenues (Davis, Ossowski and Fedelino, 2001; Das et. al. 2009, Baunsgaard et. al. 2012; IMF, 
2015). This point is well made and underappreciated. This chapter contributes to the literature on fiscal 
rules for resource revenues, but emphasising their role in relation to a number of existing sovereign wealth 
funds. The chapter adds to the usual emphasis on the design of operation of fiscal rules a focus on their 
institutional underpinnings.  
Absent fiscal rules and a supportive institutional structure that governs the rules, a sovereign wealth fund 
will be undermined when policymakers retain discretion in the allocation of resource revenues over the 
cycle and fail to break the historical tendency toward procyclicality. A rule-based fiscal framework helps 
ensure that a sufficient portion of windfalls revenues are transferred to the sovereign wealth fund during 
boom periods, rather than consumed; and guards against an unsustainable depletion of previously 
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accumulated assets during bust periods. There is a pervasive risk that policymakers in resource-dependent 
countries believe that the mere establishment of a sovereign wealth fund, capitalised by ad hoc transfers of 
surplus funds, is sufficient protection against the resource curse. As has been argued throughout this 
dissertation, however, a full embrace of the “sovereign wealth fund model” requires the situation of these 
institutions within a rule-based fiscal framework. 
The institutional arrangements or governance of the fiscal rule is of underappreciated importance. Even 
the best designed rule-based fiscal framework for resource revenues and sovereign wealth funds can be 
undermined by weak institutional and governance arrangements. The chapter reveals a wide range of 
institutional mechanisms for the specification and enforcement of fiscal rules, ranging from constitutional 
mandates to legislative statues to presidential decrees to elements of custom (or informal institutions, as 
per Chapter 2). The examples discussed in this chapter are in no way exhaustive – in fact, they are biased 
towards systems that have worked reasonably well and persisted, although the chapter does briefly discuss 
the apparent shortcomings of fiscal rules for sovereign wealth funds in a number of resource-rich 
developing countries. Three models in particular provide valuable insights into the specification and 
governance of fiscal rules for managing resource revenues and sovereign wealth fund assets and income: 
Norway, Chile and the American state endowment model.  
9.1 .  The governance of f iscal  rules for resource revenues 
There is a vast literature on the governance and institutional arrangements around fiscal rules (Kopits and 
Symansky, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 2004; and Debrun and Kumar, 2007). The general theme from 
this literature (and the practical experience with fiscal rules) is not overly optimistic. Efforts to establish 
robust fiscal rules have suffered from at least three problems. First, the design of fiscal rules is complex. 
For example, the literature has identified the difficulty of determining whether optimal rules should bind 
on budget deficits, debt-to-GDP ratios, revenue, borrowing or spending; whether and how cyclical 
adjustments should be taken into account; and whether the dynamics between fiscal policy at the federal 
and sub-national levels undermine fiscal rules. The ability of politicians to resort to “creative accounting” 
around fiscal measures in relation to the fiscal rule is another common problem (Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). 
Moving from design to governance, it is clear that the “paradox of power” and dynamic-inconsistency 
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problems loom large over efforts to enforce and adhere to fiscal rules. Debrun and Kumar summarise the 
argument of fiscal-rule sceptics in this regard, as follows: “there will always be circumstances in which 
scrapping or ignoring rules will be preferable for policymakers, suggesting a serious credibility problem. It 
follows from this argument that a credible solution to biased policies cannot be to suppress discretion but 
to find mechanisms through which it could be exerted more wisely” (Debrun and Kumar, 2007). 
It is useful to think of three stylised mechanisms through to achieve this goal. The first is to move critical 
elements of the fiscal process that are known to result in deficit biases and inefficient (and procyclical) 
spending from the realm of “in-period politics” to the “politics at the constitutional level”, as per the 
language of Buchanan (1987) discussed in Chapter 2. The second is to resort to external or third-party 
enforcement and expertise – that is, to technocratic (apolitical) opinion and analysis, or “rule by experts”. 
Third, under specific conditions, the development of an institutionalised “custom”, preferably arrived at 
through consensus, may work by establishing a sufficiently high costs of ignoring or bypassing a de facto 
rule. Of course, across all three mechanisms deviations from the rule carry (political) costs, and the 
literature has “emphasizes the role of democratic accountability as one natural mechanism through which 
deviations from the rule can be made costly”, alongside that of market penalties or sanction (Debrun and 
Kumar, 2007). 
The literature on fiscal rules has more recently focused more narrowly on their application in the context 
of resource revenues and the saving and spending rules of sovereign wealth funds (Davis et. al., 2001; 
Ossowski et. al., 2008; Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012; and Baunsgaard et. al., 2012). This chapter contributes to 
this literature by emphasising the governance and institutional arrangements around fiscal rules for 
resource revenues, and framing this discussion in terms of the above-mentioned three mechanisms. This 
chapter identifies the American permanent-fund institutional model as an (incomplete) version of the 
“politics-at-the-constitutional-level” mechanism; the Chilean model as relying on “rule-by-experts”; and the 
Norwegian model as being founded on custom and consensus.  
In discussing these rules and their institutional arrangements (along with the institutional shortcomings 
of otherwise reasonably-designed fiscal rules in Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Ghana and Timor Leste), reference 
is made to the set of criteria for the design and function of good institutions identified in Chapter 2. These 
features overlap with Kopits and Symansky (1998) list of criteria for fiscal rules, as articulated by Kyle 
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(2014) in his analysis of Kazakhstan’s fiscal rules. According to these criteria, good fiscal rules share the 
following characteristics (the compatibility of this list with the criteria for the design and function of good 
institutions in Chapter 2 is apparent):  
i. Well  def ined: policy targets and the institutional set-up to achieve them should be clearly
defined. There should be as little room for ambiguity in the operation of the rule as possible.
ii. Transparency: it should be possible to observe how the rule is intended to operate and for
stakeholders to monitor its implementation.
iii. Adequacy: the mechanisms envisioned in the rule should be capable of achieving the desired
level of the target variable.
iv. Consistency: the rule should be both internally consistent and also consistent with other
policies and goals of economic policy.
v. Simplicity: the easier the terms in which the rule is defined, the better.
vi. Flexibi l i ty: the rule should be sufficiently flexible to deal with changing economic circumstances
by, for example, containing adequate escape clauses, and other built-in feedback mechanisms.
vii. Enforceabil ity: the mechanisms to enforce compliance must be clear, in particular with respect
to role of different institutions and public actors.
Clearly these criteria span both policy-design and institutional aspects. While the emphasis and 
particularly contribution of this chapter lies in analysing the latter, the discussion below necessarily makes 
reference to aspects of the policy design of the rules themselves, as design and governance elements of 
fiscal rules are clearly interrelated.  
9.2.  Fiscal  rules for resource revenues using sovereign wealth funds 
Countries use a variety of approaches to determine the level and dynamics of transfers of resource 
revenues to their sovereign wealth funds (savings rules), as well as how to use the assets and income of 
their sovereign wealth funds (spending rules). In general, the savings rules tend to be better developed 
and more clearly articulated than spending rules. As with the design of the rules themselves, the 
institutional arrangements for implementing, monitoring, enforcing and potentially amending rules varies 
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significantly through the powers assigned variously to constitutions, statutory legislation, political 
consensus, ministerial/executive policy, or informal customs.  
9 .2 .1 .   Norway:  rule  by custom and consensus 
The primary sources of funding for the Norway Government Pension Fund Global are taxes and royalties 
generated from the extraction of oil. The fund also receives tax revenues on CO2 emissions from 
petroleum production, and operating income and dividends from Statoil, the national oil company. The 
fund also retains and reinvests earnings in excess of its mandated transfers to the budget. Accordingly, 
Norway saves and invests all of its oil revenues, minus a withdrawal equal to the estimated long-run real 
return of the sovereign wealth fund (4% per year), the latter being the spending component of the fiscal 
rule.  
The process for allocating resource revenues starts with the transfer of all resource revenues to the fund – 
in the same manner as proposed in fiscal rule introduced in Chapter 7; however, in combination with a 
spending rule that is more conservative. The spending rule allows for a transfer of investment income to 
the budget equal to 4% on the fund’s total assets, based on what policymakers believe to be the sustainable 
amount of spending of resource revenues: the expected long-run average real return generated on the 
fund’s capital. To ensure the sustainability of the fiscal framework, Norway formulates an annual budget 
under the assumption of having zero oil revenue – the so-called the “structural non-oil budget”. This non-
oil budget is permitted to run an average long-run deficit equal to the 4% transfer from the sovereign 
wealth fund. In other words, the sovereign wealth fund’s investment income finances the non-oil deficit: 
the bigger the fund becomes, the larger the value transfer (based on a fixed 4% spending), and the larger 
the permitted sustainable non-oil deficit.  
The most striking design aspect of the Norwegian rule is the large portion of resource revenues that is 
transferred to its sovereign wealth fund. Norway’s level of economic development, quality of existing 
public infrastructure and access to alternative sources of fiscal revenue – features that less developed and 
more resource-dependent countries do not share – enable this highly conservative savings policy for oil 
revenue. Given its limited degree of fiscal dependence on resource revenues (non-oil revenues account for 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
244 
around 75-80% of revenue), its emphasis on a sustainable non-oil structural deficit and the stable spending 
rule for sovereign wealth fund income, Norway does not need an additional stabilisation fund and 
stabilising transfer, as per the fiscal rule proposed in Chapter 7. While the management of volatility is less 
of concern for Norway, more oil-dependent economies have a greater need for such stabilisation 
mechanisms.  
In terms of institutional arrangements, a fiscal framework introduced in 2001 determines the flow of oil 
revenues into and investment income out of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund. An underappreciated 
aspect of the much-lauded Norwegian model is that neither the savings nor the spending rule are legally 
binding, but rather emerged through a broad consensus around the need for the prudence in spending oil 
revenues. The current rule-based approach enjoys the support of the Ministry of Finance, the parliament 
and Norges Bank Investment Management – however, it is consensual and can, at least in theory, be 
changed if the relevant parties agree.  
The spending rule is the most likely element of such change, as it is based on the expected sustainable 
long-term real return of the fund. Given that the assets of the fund are invested in a largely passive manner, 
exogenous factors could lead to changes in expectations around what is a feasible and sustainable long-
run real return. The Ministry of Finance, Norges Bank Investment Management and external experts 
have agreed in recent years that a 4% annual real return is feasible, and is therefore an appropriate amount 
to transfer (as permanent income) back to government to finance the non-oil structural deficit. However, 
it remains a topic of debate. In late 2013, for example, the Governor of Norges Bank suggested that it may 
need to be lowered to 3% due to lower returns in global financial markets (Olsen, 2012). Changing the 
spending rule in light of revised expected returns on the portfolio would involve external consultation and 
research, but is likely to be driven by the Ministry of Finance in consultation from Norges Bank 
Investment Management (possibly further requiring legislative approval, and certainly consultation). 
Thus far an institutional bias towards preserving the 4% spending rule has been maintained, based on the 
view that an adjustment downward would establish a precedent to subsequently raise the return target 
and sustainable draw upwards.  
The institutional mechanisms that govern Norway’s fiscal rule can, therefore, be described as 
characteristic of the custom-and-consensus model. In this regard, the governance of Norway’s fiscal rule 
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for resource revenues and the spending/savings rules for its sovereign wealth fund is, in fact, similar to 
those of various Middle Eastern countries, notably Abu Dhabi and Kuwait; however, the Norwegian 
model is further buttressed by exceptional levels of transparency and disclosure (which is lacking in these 
Middle Eastern countries). Consequently, the Norwegian fiscal rule meets all seven of the Kopits-
Symansky criteria outlined earlier, as well as the principles for the design and function associated with 
good institutions in Chapter 2. A possible objection to this assessment is the Norwegian fiscal rule is not 
particularly flexible, given the transfer of all oil revenues to the sovereign wealth fund and the spending of 
a fixed percentage of investment income. However, the rigidity of the rule should be understood in terms 
of the country’s specific fiscal needs. Resource revenues play a minor role in Norway’s fiscal framework, 
certainly when compared to most other countries and sub-national jurisdictions with sovereign wealth 
funds. Moreover, the fiscal rule is flexible in the most general institutional sense to the extent that the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance frequently invites (publicly disclosed) external assessments of the merits 
of the fiscal rule, notably the “Thøgersen Commission” that evaluated the rules-based fiscal framework in 
2015. 
9.2 .2 .   Chilean:  rule  by experts  
The rules governing the flows in and out of Chile’s two sovereign funds (and the funds themselves) were 
established in the Fiscal Responsibility Law, passed in 2006. The legal foundation of the strong rule-
based saving and spending procedures means that there is little discretion vested in the hands of the 
Ministry of Finance to change them, absent a change in the law.  
Chile is a prime example of a country that has adopted a two-fund structure of the kind proposed in 
Chapter 7, although its fiscal rule works differently. The Chilean model combines a short-term 
stabilisation fund (the Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund) and a long-term savings/income fund (the 
Pension Reserve Fund). The rules for transferring revenue to and from the Chilean sovereign funds, 
particularly the ESSF, are inextricably linked to the “Structural Balance Rule”, Chile’s more general fiscal 
rule. The structural budget balance is the surplus or deficit, excluding automatic stabilisers – that is, the 
difference between expenditures and revenues that would be collected if the economy were operating at 
potential GDP.  
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Chile targets a balanced structural budget that allows for state-contingent fluctuations based on the 
output gap in the level GDP and cyclical fluctuations in the price of copper (the country’s primary export, 
which accounts for 10-20% of revenue). If the combination of the output gap and the deviation in the price 
of oil from expectations is positive, Chile is supposed to run a fiscal surplus, whereas if they are negative, a 
deficit is permitted. A unique institutional feature of the Chilean model, discussed in greater detail below, 
is its reliance on two “advisory committees” staffed by technocratic subject experts, who calculate trend 
GDP growth and the outlook for copper prices, respectively. These estimates are then used to calculate 
cyclically adjusted fiscal revenue and spending, and ensure that surplus fiscal income that arises due to 
cyclical factors are deposited into the sovereign wealth funds.90 The Advisory Committee for Trend GDP 
consists of 16 members, appointed by the Minister of Finance, and provides the ministry with medium-
term projections for the rate of growth of capital, the labour force, and productivity, which are then used 
to generate projections of trend GDP and the output gap. Similarly, the Advisory Committee for the 
Reference Copper Price, consisting of 12 members also appointed by the minister, provides projections of 
the international long-term copper price (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012). 
While the (averaged) projections of the two committees are inputs into Chile’s rule-based fiscal 
framework, built around the cyclically adjusted structural balance, the ministry “retains significant 
discretionary power in defining the methodology – equations and parameters – that determines the 
cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance rule” (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012). The Ministry of Finance has, however, 
disclosed much of the details of its model, as well the minutes from the meetings of both advisory 
committees, which in practice limits the degree of discretion, as the ministry is held to account for any 
potentially deviations from its models and rules. On the spending-side of the rule, the provisions described 
in the previous section are established in law, which limits the scope for discretion or abuse of the 
sovereign funds – although there are provisions in the law for additional, discretionary savings to be 
authorised by the Minister of Finance in boom periods.  
Given Chilea’s two-fund structure, it is important to understand the rule-based process that governs the 
allocation of savings not only to the Chilean sovereign wealth funds, but also between them. The two-
90 A third advisory committee, the Advisory Financial Committee for Fiscal Responsibility Funds, provides 
guidance and assessments to the Ministry regarding the investments of the sovereign wealth funds. The role and 
function of this committee is discussed in subsequent chapters.   
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fund structure was established in 2007, replacing the Copper Stabilisation Fund, a stabilisation-only fund 
created in 2000. A minimum of 0.2% of the previous year’s GDP must be deposited into the Pension 
Reserve Fund each year, and if the fiscal surplus exceeds this amount, the deposit amount can rise to a 
maximum of 0.5% of the previous year’s GDP. Additional deposits to this savings fund structure can be 
financed with funds from the Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund at the discretion of the Minister of 
Finance. The Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund receives all remaining cyclically determined 
surplus fiscal revenue (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012). 
Transfers from Chile’s Pension Reserve Fund and Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund are governed 
by different spending rules. The assets and investment proceeds from the Pension Reserve Fund can be 
used exclusively to pay for pension and social welfare liabilities. Current provisions differentiate between a 
spending rule until 2016 and a new process after that date. Until 2016, only the previous year’s real return 
on the Pension Reserve Fund may be withdrawn (as per the investment-income fund component in 
Chapter 7’s rule – or the practice in Norway and American state permanent funds); while from 2016 
onward, annual withdrawals from the fund cannot be greater than one-third of the difference between that 
year’s pension-related expenditures and 2008’s pension-related expenditures (adjusted for inflation). The 
latter is, thus, simply a “spending cap” imposed on transfers from Chile’s saving-cum-income fund. 
Withdrawals from the ESSF can be made to cover a cyclical budget shortfall, based on the calculations of 
the two expert committees, or at the discretion of the Minister of Finance to pay down debt ahead of 
schedule or to increase the asset base of the Pension Reserve Fund. The extent to which withdrawals 
from Chile’s stabilisation fund are governed by the structural-balance rule puts the emphasis of Chilean 
fiscal policy on the need for counter-cyclicality and long-term sustainability (particularly, the avoidance of 
unsustainable spending from temporary copper-revenue driven booms).  
Two attractive features of Chile’s fiscal rule are the manner in which it formally and unambiguously 
distinguishes between stabilisation and income-generating functions of its sovereign wealth funds, and the 
extent to which these funds are but a part of a larger, more comprehensive medium-term fiscal framework. 
The fiscal rule is not strictly constitutional, as it is imbedded in a simple Act of Parliament, which could in 
theory be overturned through the process of in-period politics. However, Chile’s tradition of adhering to 
the rule and communicating policy to the public (as well as the financial markets) at the hand of that rule 
has served to move much of the major considerations around fiscal policy to the level of constitutional 
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politics – much as it has with respect to Chilean monetary policy (the country was an early adopter and 
leading innovator of central bank independence and inflation targeting).  
The use of an independent committee of experts to determine the appropriate counter-cyclical stance of 
Chilean fiscal policy is laudable, although it is questionable how applicable this approach is to other 
developing-country and emerging-market contexts. Chile has a long and successful tradition of delegating 
authority for critical economic-policy decisions to technocratic experts (as noted above, Chile has been an 
innovator around aspects of central bank independence). Technocratic proficiency – or “rule by experts – 
is embraced and respected in a manner that is exceptional not only amongst emerging markets and indeed 
all countries. While generally positive, the role of subject experts in relation to the fiscal rule in Chile does 
raise questions around the task of the expert committee that estimates equilibrium copper prices. 
Commodity prices, especially copper prices, are arguably too volatile and stochastic to expect even subject 
experts to make accurate assessments around the temporary and permanent shocks to prices.  
In terms of the Kopits-Symansky criteria for evaluating fiscal rules, it could be argued that unreasonable 
expectations around the epistemological capacity of the committee establishes a concern around the rule 
with respect to its “adequacy”. It is not clear that “the mechanisms envisioned in the rule” – notably the 
importance of the committee’s findings as a critical input into the calibration of the fiscal stance – are fully 
“capable of achieving the desired level of the target variable.” Alternative approaches to managing 
uncertainty around the temporary versus permanent nature of commodity-price shocks on fiscal revenue 
would including the use of a moving-average based rule (see Chapter 6) or a rule that channels a greater 
share of volatile copper revenues through the stabilisation fund (see Chapter 7). Finally, clarifications 
could be made with respect to the clarity and simplicity of the rule (including the transfer of assets 
between the two components of Chile’s sovereign wealth fund), as per the Kopits-Symansky framework.  
9 .2 .3 .  American permanent funds:  ( incomplete)  constitutional  rules  
While permanent funds are used to manage a wide range of state-level revenues in the United States, 
there are funds investing public revenues arising from natural resources in Texas, New Mexico, 
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Wyoming, Alaska and North Dakota.91 These funds all perform the same overarching function of 
transforming a depleting asset in the resource deposits into a permanent form of wealth (capital held in a 
financial portfolio) and income (real returns generated on those financial assets). American permanent 
funds operate as both income- and inter-generational savings funds, in the same manner of Norway’s 
sovereign wealth fund: first, they generate annual income based on the inflation-adjusted returns 
generated on the financial portfolio; while, second, ensuring that this income-generating capacity is 
maintained for future generations by protecting the fund’s capital (or principal) from both withdrawals 
and erosion through inflation.  
As noted earlier, the savings rules associated with American state permanent funds are typically mandated 
by the state constitution. The capital or corpus of state permanent funds is similarly protected by the 
constitution (although rarely in real terms, leaving the process of inflation adjustment, or “inflation 
proofing” as it is referred to in the American context, open to statutory action or custom). Combined, 
these constitutional underpinnings establish the most binding and most difficult to overturn commitment 
mechanisms for savings of all sovereign wealth fund models in existence. The procedures for amending 
American state constitutions vary, but the hurdle is universally high, requiring a two-thirds or three-
quarters super majority vote in both houses of the legislature, plus a popular vote.  The governance and 
institutional arrangements for the use of funds earnings is, however, less binding. Perhaps due to the fact 
that very few American states can be regarded as fiscally resource dependent, there has historically been 
much less emphasis on stabilisation funds and stabilisation mechanisms for spending volatile resource 
revenues than on savings and invest-income funds (permanent funds).  
The American permanent-fund model has its origins in Texas in the mid-19th century, which, as argued in 
Chapter 4, makes the state home to the oldest sovereign wealth fund in the world. The Texas Permanent 
School Fund and the Texas Permanent University Fund were established under the state constitution in 
1876 – only a decade after civilian government was restored in the state, following its cession from Mexico, 
the collapse of the autonomous Republic of Texas in 1846, and the turmoil of the post-Civil War 
reconstruction. The Texas Permanent School Fund’s predecessor, the Special School Fund, dates back 
even further, having been established by the State Legislature in 1854. While there are differences in every 
91 This list could also include funds in states such as Alabama, Louisiana, Oregon and Montana. These states are, 
however, not included in the analysis here, as they are smaller in size, and their funding sources are co-mingled with 
other forms of state income.  
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state’s application of the model, the key elements of the Texan example are attractively simple and have 
since been emulated by a number of other states (and indeed by countries). The savings rule is an 
earmarking of a fixed percentage of resource revenues to the permanent fund – typically defined as 25-30% 
of royalty- and/or severance-tax income on oil, gas and coal; while the spending rule limits withdrawals 
from the permanent fund to its real returns (as per the Norwegian example). Both the percentage of 
resource revenue saved and the preservation of the capital of the permanent fund are typically enshrined in 
the constitution of the state, establishing high institutional hurdles to change. The savings rule under the 
typical American permanent fund model can, therefore, be characterised as governed by politics as the 
constitutional level.   
In Texas and New Mexico, the permanent funds are specifically earmarked for spending educational 
purposes. In the case of the Texas Permanent University Fund, the assets are in fact owned by the public 
university system; while the Texas Permanent School Fund, the New Mexico Land Grant Permanent 
Fund (also called the New Mexico Permanent School Fund) and the New Mexico Severance Tax 
Permanent Fund are part of the budget process, but investment income is dedicated to educational 
expenses (and, in New Mexico, to a lesser extent to maintenance on state hospitals, government 
buildings, penitentiaries and water resources). In Wyoming, income from the largest permanent fund, the 
Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund, is not earmarked for specific budgeted priorities, but rather 
flows into the state’s General Fund (earmarking would require a constitutional amendment); although the 
state does have a number of smaller permanent funds that are also funded through mineral royalties and 
are earmarked for educational purposes, notably the Common School Permanent Land Fund, the 
Excellence in Higher Education Endowment Fund. In the case of the North Dakota Heritage Fund, no 
payments from the fund has been made to date (as of 2015), and transfer are only expected to start in 2017 
at the earliest, when the fund’s interest and income will start to be rolled into the state’s general budget. 
Money from the principal could also be spent in future, if two-thirds of both houses of the state legislature 
approved (additionally, no more than 15% of the principal could be spent in any two-year period). Again, 
here, it striking the extent to which the constitutional underpinnings of the fiscal framework for the use of 
natural resource revenues, channelled through permanent funds, have largely removed the pervasive 
influence of in-period politics.  
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The largest American state permanent fund, the Alaska Permanent Fund, has a famous spending policy. 
Whereas the saving policy and the protection of the fund’s capital are guaranteed through a constitutional 
amendment established in 1976 (when the Alaska Permanent Fund was established), the use of the fund’s 
earnings is a matter of policy, determined by custom and subject to legislative approval. The earnings of 
the Alaska Permanent Fund are formally separated from the capital (referred to as the “corpus”) in the 
form of the Earnings Reserve. Although the two pools are invested in the same manner, the appropriation 
of the money out of the Earnings Reserve is subject to legislative approval through a simple-majority vote 
of 50% in both the State Senate and House of Representatives. Since the early 1980s, an appropriation 
equal to 50% of the five-year moving average of the fund’s earnings has been made to fund the “Alaska 
Permanent Fund Dividend”, a direct transfer to every citizen of Alaska (subject to a minimum age and 
residency requirements). As a matter of custom, Alaskan State Legislatures have historically transferred 
part of the remaining balance of the Earnings Reserve back into the corpus to ensure that its capital is 
inflation protected. In summary, while the saving of part Alaskan oil revenues through the permanent 
fund is governed by politics at the constitutional level, the spending of the fund’s earnings (and the roughly 
70% of oil revenues that are not transferred to the fund) are subject to in-period political processes.  
This uniquely Alaska spending policy has been a double-edged sword. The establishment of Alaska 
Permanent Fund Dividend has had the consequence (intended or otherwise) of generating significant 
civic interest in the Alaska Permanent Fund, making it politically impossible for the legislature to raid the 
fund (which would require a change in the constitution). The downside is that is has limited the scope for 
fiscal adjustment, which is often needed in a state that derived more than 90% of state-level revenues from 
oil in most years since removing state income and sales taxes. In the aftermath of the 2014 collapse in oil 
prices, for example, the Office of the Governor of Alaska proposed a rationalisation in the size of dividend 
(which is 2014 equaled more than one-third of the state budget excluding Federal transfers) and the use of 
part of the earnings to establish a rule-based budget transfer, but encountered fierce public and political 
resistance (Richards, 2015). The danger is, therefore, that the political economy established by public 
expectations of an ever-increasing dividend – the situation of the dividend and spending policy at the heart 
of the in-period political process – crowds out other important public spending priorities, such as 
education, healthcare and infrastructure maintenance.  
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It is also important to highlight the merits and problems around the permanent-fund model’s saving rules. 
As noted earlier, the savings-rule component of the permanent fund model is built on a very simple, 
typically constitutionally enshrined, savings of a fixed percentage of resource revenues through the fund. 
In terms of the Kopits-Symansky criteria, therefore, this aspect of the rule scores well on the basis of 
“simplicity” and “consistency”. However, the downside is that when such savings rules are not combined 
with complementary stabilisation mechanisms, it can be procyclical. In terms of the Kopits-Symansky 
criteria, they fall short with respect to “flexibility” (not being state contingent) and “adequacy” (being 
procyclical and failing to stabilise revenue volatility). The procyclicality of the fiscal rule is not a major 
practical problem in states where the budget is not reliant of resource revenues, as in Texas, New Mexico 
and North Dakota. However, in Alaska (and to a lesser extent Wyoming), where resource revenues 
account for a major share of revenue – in Alaska, oil revenues exceed 90% of state revenues between 2010-
13 – the fixed rule is problematic, given the absence of complementary stabilisation mechanisms.  
In Alaska, the component of the Earnings Reserve that is not used to fund the dividend, as well as other 
“buffer funds” such as the Constitutional Budget Reserve and the Statutory Budget Reserve, should in 
theory provide some offsetting stability in times of low oil revenues. However, these buffer funds are small 
in size relative to spending and indeed total saved assets; and the use of their assets is not guided by a rule 
or established custom, but rather subject to legislative approval, and hence beholden to in-period political 
calculations and compromise. The above-mentioned fiscal reforms proposed by the Governor in 2015, 
would adjust both the spending and saving mechanisms in a manor closely comparable to the fiscal rule of 
Chapter 7 – transferring almost all oil revenue (particularly the volatile components) to the Alaska 
Permanent Fund in exchange for a stable draw on the fund’s investment income in order to fund the 
budget in stable and sustainable manner (Richards, 2015). However, the proposal has encouraged various 
path-dependent political obstacles, such as previously mentioned resistance on the part of legislators to 
reduce the size of the dividend and/or change the customary formula through which it is derived and a 
reluctance by the legislature to effectively cede some of its de facto appropriations powers by being bound 
by a fiscal rule (Walker, 2016 and Drummond, 2016). 
In terms of the Kopits-Symansky criteria, Wyoming and certainly Alaska in particular would benefit from 
greater – and less politicised – recourse to stabilisation mechanisms. In both states, stabilisation funds do 
exist: Alaska has the Permanent Fund Earnings Reserve, the Constitutional Budget Reserve and the 
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Statutory Budget Reserve; while Wyoming has a Budget Reserve Account and the Legislative 
Stabilisation Reserve Account. However, these funds can only be accessed after clearing various 
legislative hurdles, involving either a simple or absolute majority in both houses of the legislature.  
In Alaska, where uncontroversial, rule-based access to counter-cyclical stabilisation funds is most 
needed,92 the observed reality is exactly the opposite: the use of and access to fiscal buffers are politically 
contentious, especially when it is most needed – during episodes of fiscal pressure when oil prices collapse. 
The use of the assets of the Earnings Reserve and the Statutory Budget Reserves, for example, requires a 
simple majority of 50% in both houses of the legislature, while the Constitutional Budget Reserve can only 
be accessed through an absolute majority exceeding 75% of votes in both houses – establishing 
inappropriately high political hurdles to the use of stabilisation funds in times of fiscal crisis. Again, the 
fiscal rule, therefore, falls short in terms of Kopits and Symansky’s criteria flexibility and adequacy.  
Meaningful reforms around the role of stabilisation funds, particularly for resource-dependent American 
states, would focus not only on growing the size of assets held in buffer funds relative to the level of annual 
spending in the budget, but more fundamentally on establishing clear rules for allocating resource 
revenues between the budget, the stabilisation fund(s) and the permanent fund(s). The real institutional 
priority should be to de-politicize the flow of revenues in and out of these stabilisation funds. Ideally, such 
reforms will be conducted as part the establishment of a more dynamic framework (such as the fiscal rule 
introduced in Chapter 7), which would improve the flexibility and adequacy of the rule, albeit at the 
expense of some loss of simplicity.  
9 .2 .4.  Incomplete  rules  in  resource-r ich poor countries  
A number of resource-rich developing countries have introduced fiscal rules for the allocation of oil 
revenues and sovereign wealth fund assets and income. The governance of fiscal rules is typically 
challenged in these environments by the combination of pressure to increase public spending rapidly and a 
92 In recent years, Wyoming has generated around 30-40% of revenue from a combination of oil, gas and coal; and 
around 30-45% of revenue from sales taxes, and 15-20% from investment income from their Permanent Funds. Alaska 
is much more resource dependent: in years preceding the collapse in oil prices (2011-14), oil revenues exceeded 90% of 
the state’s fiscal revenues. Even with the collapse in oil prices, oil is still expected to account for 79% of revenues in 
2016 and 67% in 2017 (Petek, 2015; Richards, 2015). 
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weak general institutional environment. Nevertheless, there are some instances in which fiscal rules and 
sovereign wealth funds have made a clear contribution to the prudent management of resource-revenue 
windfalls. Moreover, it is instructive to study the frameworks of these countries in order to identify the 
exact areas of weakness and vulnerability, and to ascertain how poor countries have sought to marry fiscal 
rules and sovereign wealth funds with the specific developmental and institutional challenges they face.  
Kazakhstan 
The savings rule for the National Fund of Kazakhstan has changed on three occasions since 2000. The 
rule that applied between 2000 and 2004 simply stated that the budget surplus should be deposited into 
the National Fund. This imposed little discipline, as there was no binding mechanism or anchor through 
which to determine the size of fiscal surpluses (or deficits), even during times of rising commodity prices 
and oil production. To the extent that savings did occur, it was due to discretion rather than rule-based 
commitments.  
In 2005, a presidential decree specified all revenue from specific sources should be transferred to the fund: 
direct taxes on approved petroleum corporations, other income from petroleum operations, such as fines, 
the proceeds from the privatisation of state mining and manufacturing assets, proceeds from sales of 
agricultural land, and retained investment income generated by the National Fund. While the post-2005 
clarification of the source of funds was an improvement on the preceding framework, it still left significant 
scope for discretion and manipulation by the political leadership of Kazakhstan. For example, the 
Minister of Finance and the Minister of Oil and Gas annually approve a list of petroleum corporations 
that pay taxes, a practice that has been the source of unpredictability (OECD, 2012).  
Kazakhstan has also made a number of changes to the rule governing withdrawals from the National 
Fund. Until 2004, there was no spending rule and the fund was simply a depository for discretionary fiscal 
surpluses. The 2005 decree introduced a spending rule that earmarked withdrawals from the National 
Fund for exclusive use in financing long-term development programs, rather current budget expenditures. 
The withdrawal amount was determined according to a formula that included a rolling three-year 
estimate of the cost of budgeted development programmes, a three-year estimate of the National Fund’s 
real investment income, and an exchange-rate adjustment to denominate the transfer amount back to the 
local currency, the Kazakh tenge (the National Fund invests exclusively in offshore assets).  
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Although there is no formal separation between a stabilisation and savings/income component of the 
sovereign wealth fund, this spending rule bears a degree of resemblance to the fiscal rule introduced in 
Chapter 7. In both cases, withdrawals are based on a combination of the real returns of the sovereign 
wealth fund and a component that tries to stabilise spending: in the rule in Chapter 7, this is achieved 
based on the previous year’s spending and a transfer from a stabilisation fund; while in the Kazakh case, it 
was on a three-year moving average of budgeted development programs. The Kazakh rule took the 
additional step of denominating the transfer in the local currency, which would be a simple addition to the 
rule in Chapter 7 (or could be achieved through hedging part of the portfolio).  
While this formula-based spending rule required legislative approval, there were a number of ways in 
which it could manipulated in order to generate larger transfers, such as the classification of expenditure 
as “development programmes” rather than current expenditure, and inflated cost estimates. Moreover, 
once-off withdrawals, called “targetted transfers”, were also permitted – and indeed authorised in 2008-09 
(and again in 2015, despite a more general change in the fiscal rule) in order to finance transactions 
involving Samruk-Kazyna, a state development fund, and KazMunaiGas, the national oil company. 
Targetted transfers totaled approximately $11 billion (Farchy, 2015). Since 2010, following the passage of a 
new Presidential Decree,93 transfers are anchored around a nominal amount of $8 billion per year, which 
legislators can adjusted by 15%, and be used to fund current budget expenditures and development 
programs. In addition, the balance of the National Fund cannot fall below 20% of GDP in a given fiscal 
year – if it does, the shortfall has to be covered by cutting the fixed annual transfer by the amount needed 
to cover the difference.  
The Kazakh fiscal rule has the advantage of simplicity; however, it is does not provide much contingent 
feedback based on the state of the economy and the fiscal position and it unclear how the nominal 
withdrawal amount will be increased to account for inflation in the future. As discussed below, the 
biggest concern over the Kazakh fiscal rules (saving and spending policies), however, pertain not to the 
specification of the rule, but rather it governance and enforcement. Given that the saving rule has been 
changed twice and the spending rule on three occasions, it is also evident that the hurdles to changing 
93 Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 962, April 2, 2010 
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them are not particularly high and are not likely to prevent further changing in circumstances in which 
they impose significant short-term restraint during times of fiscal pressure. 
Timor Leste 
Timor Leste is one of the poorest countries in the world and one of the youngest nation states, having 
gained independence from Indonesia following a protract period of violence in 2002. The country 
persistently ranks amongst the lowest in the world on the Human Development Index, and suffers from 
extremely low levels of public infrastructure, industry, and basic health and education services 
(Government of Timor Leste, 2015). The silver lining for the country – or perhaps the nail in its coffin in 
light of the resource-curse literature – is a significant offshore oil and gas deposit (shared with Australia), 
production from which has accounted for three-quarters of GDP by the end of the first decade since 
independence (McKechnie, 2013).  
Having met extensively with international development institutions, scholars and other sovereign wealth 
funds, the country’s parliament adopted legislation in 2005 that modelled Timor Leste’s fiscal framework 
and institutions on that of Norway – with one critical exception. Like Norway, the essence of Timorese 
fiscal rule is an emphasis on the non-oil fiscal balance and spending only a percentage of oil revenues that 
are deemed to be permanent income, which in the case of Timor Leste is called the “estimated sustainable 
income”. The critical difference in the Timorese model is that, where Norway follows a so-called “bird-in-
hand” approach in which the 4% draw is based on already-received oil revenues deposited in the sovereign 
wealth fund, the “estimated sustainable income” in Timor Leste is based on a 3% draw not just on actual 
realised oil revenue, but an assessment of total oil wealth, including estimated, and yet-to-be-received oil 
revenues under the ground.  
Basing the estimate of sustainable or permanent income not just on realised oil wealth, but also potential 
future oil wealth, has the obvious implication that it allows for significant “front-loaded” spending of oil 
wealth, but it always requires complicated exercises in forecasting of the size of oil deposits, the implied 
probability of extraction (that is, the deposits’ commercially and geologically viability), and the oil price at 
which to value that expected future production. Moreover, it requires a discount rate with which to 
calculate the present value of future cash flows. The methodology established in law bases the price 
forecast on that contained in the Annual Energy Outlook, published by the United States’ Energy 
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Information Agency (EIA), and other sources; while projections of petroleum production are based on 
the government’s own estimates. Total petroleum wealth is calculated as the total assets of the Petroleum 
Fund at the end of the previous fiscal year, plus an estimate of the present value of future petroleum 
revenues, using a discount rate based on the 10-year moving average of US Treasury bills (McKechnie, 
2013). 
While the design of the Timor Leste fiscal framework provides an interesting augmentation of the 
permanent-income-and-non-oil-budget rule pursued by Norway to the capital-scarce, poor-country 
context, the burden on accurate forecasting described above is significant – and becomes a means through 
which to potentially manipulate the rule. In practice, the government of Timor Leste initially assumed 
prudently conservative estimates of both total oil wealth and prices (for example, using the low-price 
scenario in the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook). However, over time, there has been a tendency to 
incorporate increasingly aggressive assumptions; and to exploit some of the other “loopholes” in the law – 
most obviously, a provision to allow non-oil deficits to exceed that suggested by estimated sustainable 
income calculation “if properly justified and approved by Parliament” (McKechnie, 2013). More recently, 
government has scaled up public investment so that total spending amounts to more than twice the level 
consistent with the estimated sustainable income calculation, with total government spending rising from 
$70m in 2004 and $650m in 2009, to $1.3bn in 2011 (Baunsgaard et. al., 2012; and McKechnie, 2013).  
Regardless of these flaws and vulnerabilities in the system, it should be noted that the framework has 
contributed to some remarkable results in the most challenging of economic circumstances. In the first 
instance, the country has enjoyed very high growth rates and steady progress on development indicators. 
Government spending and investment in infrastructure has increased rapidly, while the country has 
accumulated $16 billion in the Petroleum Fund – roughly four times the country’s GDP (IMF, 2014c). 
Ghana 
Ghana shares many similarities with Timor Leste: it also registers at the bottom-end of global league 
tables with the respect to per capita income, Human Development Indicators and infrastructure, and 
thus has similarly massive demands for current spending and public investment. Like Timor Leste, 
Ghana is expected to experience a rapid, but short-lived, escalation in the level of oil production and 
revenue over the coming decade (as discussed in country applications in Chapters 6 and 8). Following the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
258 
publication of geological results confirming the size and commercial viability of Ghana’s offshore oil 
deposits in the first decade of the 20th century, the country also embarked on a “front-loaded” ramp up of 
anticipated oil wealth and revenue – albeit in a less formal manner than Timor Leste’s sustainable non-oil 
budget and estimated sustainable income calculation. Rather, the Ghanaian authorities borrowed on a 
massive scale. The results of the borrowing binge – which saw the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio explode 
from 26% in 2005 to 72.9% in 201594 – have been disastrous. In April 2015, having registered a budget deficit 
of 10.4% of GDP the previous year and a depreciation in the cedi of over 60% over the two preceding 
years, Ghana entered an IMF program to help fund its growing fiscal shortfalls and external debt 
obligations.  
While the growth in oil production and revenues remains largely prospective (and indefinitely delayed by 
the collapse in oil prices in late 2014), Ghana has adopted elements of a rule-based fiscal framework, 
combined with stabilisation and savings funds, called the Ghana Stabilisation Fund and the Ghana 
Heritage Fund, respectively. The rules for the transfer of oil revenues to the sovereign wealth funds allow 
for a significant amount of upfront direct spending (in addition to the aforementioned debt-financed 
spending in anticipation of future oil revenues). The process starts with the calculation of each budget’s 
“benchmark oil revenue” by the Ministry of Finance, based on the seven-year average of petroleum 
revenue. Seventy percent of this benchmark amount can then be transferred to the budget for spending, 
supposedly for exclusive earmarking to “development-related expenditures” (Parliament of the Republic of 
Ghana, 2011). 
Any additional oil revenues, resulting either from the remaining 30% of benchmarked revenues or actual 
revenues exceeding the benchmarked amount, is then deposited into the Ghana Heritage Fund and the 
Ghana Stabilisation Fund, with a minimum of 30% of the transfer amount to be deposited in the Heritage 
Fund and the remainder in the Stabilisation Fund. Withdrawals from the Stabilisation Fund, however, 
may support the budget whenever quarterly oil revenues fail to adequately cover 25% of the Annual 
Budget Funding Amount. As a long-term savings fund, the assets of the Ghana Heritage Fund are better 
protected from withdrawals, which may only occur once oil reserves are depleted and both Petroleum 
Funds’ assets are merged into a Ghana Petroleum Wealth Fund (to be established at a future date). From 
94 Ghana’s low level of debt in 2005 was not reflective of historic fiscal prudence. Quite to the contrary, Ghana 
received substantial debt forgiveness under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative of the IMF and the 
World Bank. In April 2001 when Ghana joined the programme, its reported debt-to-GDP ratio was 110%.  
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that point forward, the amount allocated to the Annual Budget Funding Amount shall not exceed the 
interest on the Ghana Petroleum Wealth Fund’s investments (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, 2011). 
The fiscal challenges Ghana has faced in managing its still-largely anticipated oil revenue boom reveal 
three overriding lessons. First, Ghana’s problems underline the danger of “front-loaded” spending of 
expected future oil income through debt in the absence of a fiscal framework or anchor for borrowing (as 
per Timor Leste). Second, Ghana’s legislation provides for a potentially very small degree of effective 
saving and wealth transformation, as the Ghana Stabilisation Fund can easily be drawn on. Third, any 
savings that do accrue over the lifecycle of Ghana’s oil future production can be undone by a concomitant 
increase in debt, as the fiscal rule for oil wealth is not matched by an anchor or constraint on borrowing, 
such a deficit or debt limit (Baunsgaard et. al., 2012).  
Nigeria 
Nigeria is another example of an oil-rich developing country that has adopted, at least in theory, a rule-
based fiscal framework in to hope of improving on a rather dismal history of resource-revenue 
management. With considerable proven oil reserves and significant potential for further discoveries, oil 
will remain a major part of the Nigerian economy for decades to come. Oil accounts for an overwhelming 
majority of Nigerian fiscal revenues (on average around 90% of budget revenues in recent decades) and 
foreign exchange earnings. Therefore even if much-needed progress is made on generating non-resource 
revenues in years to come, the economic returns on improving Nigeria’s management of oil revenues will 
be high.  
The establishment of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority, with three sovereign funds under its 
management, has the potential to improve the country’s performance in oil-revenue management; 
however, it is not the first time that reforms of this kind has been attempted. Indeed, the establishment of 
the authority – and the particular form that it has assumed - is in large part a response to the failure of the 
Excess Crude Account, a segregated fiscal account intended to ring-fence volatile oil revenues and 
provide a stable and equitable basis for sharing oil revenues between Nigeria’s state governments, 
established in 2004. The value of the Excess Crude Account reached $5.1 billion in its first year, before 
rising to a peak of over $20 billion by late 2008 due to rising oil prices. However, a mere year and a half 
later, the account was depleted to less than $4 billion (by June 2010), due to the collapse in oil prices 
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following to global financial crisis, transfers to Nigerian state governments to cover their deficits and a 
number of unaccounted withdrawals. As of April 2016, the reported balance of the Excess Crude Account 
was around $2 billion. The account – in theory a stabilisation fund – is regarded as an instrument of 
corruption and political patronage (Cocks and Brock, 2012) 
In May 2011, parliament passed a law establishing the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority to 
manage three distinct funds: the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund, the Stabilisation Fund and the Future 
Generations Fund. The Infrastructure Fund is focussed on domestic investments; the Stabilisation Fund 
invests in highly liquid safe assets to provide a buffer against macroeconomic and fiscal volatility arising 
from oil dependence; and the Future Generation Fund invests in a diversified portfolio of international 
assets in order to preserve a share of resource revenue windfalls for future generations (Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, 2011). The Federal, State and Local Governments contributed an initial $1bn as seed capital to 
the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority in 2012, in accordance with a distribution formula 
contained in the separate Allocation of Revenue Act. In February 2014, an additional transfer of $550mn 
was made to the authority.  
Future transfers of oil revenue to the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority will be provided from 
“surplus revenues from Federation Account,” the primary budget account that receives all oil-related 
revenues and from which all subsequent distributions are made. The definition of such surpluses is 
complex, and is referred to as “Residual Funds above the Budget Smoothing Amount”. Residual Funds 
are defined as revenue received into the Federation Account other than the Projected Federation 
Hydrocarbon Revenue for the relevant period, while the Budgetary Smoothing Amount is “an amount 
equal to 10% of monthly Residual funding up to a cumulative maximum amount at any one time of 2.5% of 
the Projected Federation Hydrocarbon Revenue for the year” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2011). The 
implication of these rules is that State and Local Governments are intended to receive their respective 
shares of oil revenue in line with the assumed benchmark oil price in a given year’s Federal Budget. All 
revenues exceeding the budgeted amount, minus the Budget Smoothing Amount, are transferred to the 
Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority – the savings rule is, therefore, a reference-price type rule, as per 
the discussion in Chapter 6.  
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These rules face a number of obstacles. The complexity of rules leave them subject to political challenges – 
for example, the specification of an assumed oil price in the budget is critical to the amount of savings to 
arrive at the Projected Federation Hydrocarbon Revenue amount. The price is established by the 
Minister of Finance in consultation with the parliament, a practice that has resulted in politicised debates 
every year, leading the IMF to argue for a more technical rule for benchmark oil prices based on a moving 
average (IMF, 2016). The specification of the benchmark or reference price is discretionary, the outcome 
of which can be challenged as being either too conservative or too aggressive (as discussed in Chapter 6, 
this is common problem with fiscal rules based on benchmark commodity prices). Such controversies are 
to be expected, given that the intended transfer of surplus revenues to the Nigerian Sovereign Investment 
Authority is taking funds away from the Excess Crude Account and its primary recipients, the powerful 
State Governors (unsurprisingly, the establishment of the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority was 
legally challenges by State Governors).  
The Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Act also contains an unusual provision pertaining to the 
maximum size of the assets under its management. The law empowers the Board of Director to appoint 
“recognised professionals and academics” to conduct “actuarial assessment of the demands for the 
proceeds of the Future Generations Fund”; and determine “infrastructure and capacity requirements” that 
will require the proceeds from the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund. These assessments, which the law states 
are to be conducted every two years, will be used to determine a “ceiling percentage of gross domestic 
product” for the assets under management of both funds (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2011). A second 
unusual provision is the degree of discretion for allocating capital between the three funds under the 
management of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority given to its own Board of Directors. The 
only legal provision is that each of the three funds may receive no less than 20% of revenues under any 
allocation. The initial $1 billion in assets allocated to the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority was 
allocated as follows: $325 million was allocated to the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund and the Future 
Generations Fund, respectively; $100 million was placed in the Stabilisation Fund; while $250 million 
remained unallocated. The conclusion from this analysis of the savings-rule elements of the Nigerian 
Sovereign Investment Authority Act is that savings are likely to be small (as they have been since the 
funds’ inception) and rely heavily of discretionary exercises of prudence – most obviously and directly 
through the specification of conservative oil-price assumptions in the benchmarking process. Clearly, the 
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fiscal rule falls short on a number of the Kopits-Symansky criteria, notably “adequacy”, “simplicity” and the 
quality of its “definitions”.  
The procedures for the transfer of assets and income from the funds managed by the Nigerian Sovereign 
Investment Authority are less discretionary. The Stabilisation Fund is intended to be a cash balance and 
is the smallest of the three funds under the management of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority 
(as of April 2016). The Stabilisation Fund may be drawn upon if the provisioned Budgetary Smoothing 
Amount maintained in the Federation Account is insufficient to stabilise the budget and the economy due 
to oil prices falling below the budgeted price. Both the Future Generations Fund and the Nigeria 
Infrastructure Fund are not intended to provide investment income on a regular basis: the law requires 
realised profits, interest and dividends to be reinvested in existing or new assets of both funds. The law 
does, however, allow for the Board of Directors of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority to 
“declare a distribution out of uninvested and uncommitted” funds. Such distributions can only be made if 
the Authority: (i) has recorded a profit in each fund for at least five years, (ii) recorded profits in the year of 
the distribution, and (iii) has sufficient funds to meet its own operational needs. Distributions require a 
unanimous vote by the Board of Directors of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority, and are 
capped at 60% of profits (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2011). 
As an independent asset management institution, the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority has 
adopted exemplary governance structures, exhibited high levels of accountability and transparency, and 
carefully considered investment strategy. The ultimate measure of contribution made by the authority to 
improving Nigeria’s troubled management of oil revenues will be whether it enjoys steady growth in the 
size of assets under management. This will require saving (spending restraint) during positive oil-price 
shocks that result in unanticipated windfalls, and the discipline not to raid the authority through the 
stabilisation fund in bad times. The fiscal rule is not binding and Nigeria does not have an encouraging 
track record of adopting and adhering to conservative benchmark oil-price assumptions. However, it is 
possible that the competence of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority – and the earning power of 
capital – results in a more informal gravitation of revenues towards the sovereign wealth fund over time 
(or a strengthening of the law to include more binding saving mechanisms).  
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Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the design and governance of fiscal rules currently used by a number of countries 
to determine the allocation of oil revenues and the use of sovereign wealth fund assets and income. These 
countries analysed cover a range of economic and political contexts (from one of the world’s richest 
countries, Norway and the United States of America; to some of its poorest, Nigeria, Ghana and Timor 
Leste). The analysis of the rules actually used in practice allowed for an instructive comparison with the 
rule-based framework introduced in the Chapter 7 and 8. In general, the rule-based fiscal frameworks 
adopted in Norway and Chile come closest in design to the proposed framework: while their operation is 
different from the rule in Chapter 7 and 8 (and indeed from each other), they both integrate savings 
decisions with a concept of sustainable income from depleting resources. In both cases, the ultimate goal 
behind the rule is to constrain the spending of finite resource revenues in such a way that the budget does 
not become dependent on a depleting source of fiscal revenue.  
Clearly, few countries are in the position of Norway in terms of the level of wealth and the quality of its 
institutions. The Norwegian model is thus applicable in the context of high levels of economic 
development, strong institutions and the ability to draw on other sources of fiscal revenue outside of 
commodities. The State of Wyoming pursues a similar model to that of Norway – albeit on a more limited 
scale given that it consumes the majority of its resource revenues through the budget, transfer only a 
percentage of resource revenues to its permanent fund. In Alaska, the same limited degree of savings 
applies, however, the state has to date not used the earnings of the permanent fund to fund the budget 
(rather just earmarking half of it for a unique citizens’ dividend scheme). Both Alaska and Wyoming 
would be well served by the addition of some stabilisation mechanisms: either directing a greater share of 
volatile and depleting revenue through their permanent funds, in exchange for a stable stream of 
investment income; or more directly through the establishment of larger and more rule-based budget 
stabilisation funds.  
In the low- to middle-income countries discussed in this chapter, notably Kazakhstan, Timor Leste, 
Ghana and Nigeria (Chile is an exception, given the soundness of its rule and institutional set-up), fiscal 
rules tend to be reasonably well specified in principle. However, a common theme in these countries is 
apparent blind spots or pressure points in the legislation, such as vague allocations of oil revenues to 
“development projects”, high levels of discretion in the specification of oil-price benchmarks or references, 
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or the absence of any debt and/or deficit limits (which means the accumulation of assets can be offset by a 
parallel or subsequent accumulation of liabilities). Given the scale of developmental and institutional 
challenges in these countries, the risk that these weaknesses are exploited as a means to not adequately 
fund the sovereign wealth fund, or to raid in it tough times, looms large. Nevertheless, in all these cases, 
there are indications that the (flawed) fiscal rule and sovereign wealth fund structure has contributed 
marginally to improvements in the management of oil revenues – in Kazakhstan and Timor Leste a very 
large pool of assets (relative to GDP and the government spending) has been accumulated, while fiscal 
stability has been preserved amidst dramatic economic growth and transformation; while Nigeria created 
a credible independent sovereign investment authority.  
The overarching message and purpose of the chapter is to underline the fact that when it comes to the 
potential contribution of sovereign wealth funds in managing resource revenues and avoiding the resource 
curse, “It’s Mainly Fiscal”. Without an at-least marginally constraining fiscal rule to govern the flow of 
money into and from it, a sovereign wealth fund risk becoming little more than a repository of occasional 
discretionary exercises in fiscal prudence, prone to raids and unruly depletions when resource revenues 
collapse, as they inevitably do at some point. The chapter also emphasised the importance of the 
institutional arrangements that govern the fiscal rule (as a distinct issue from the design of the rule itself). 
Three models of fiscal governance were discussed: the constitutional model (as practiced, incompletely, 
by most American permanent funds), the rule-by-experts model (as practiced in Chile), and the customary 
and consensual model (exemplified by Norway).  
Once a credible medium- to long-term fiscal framework, governed by rules, has been established – with a 
sovereign wealth as an integral part of that framework – attention may turn to the key issues in the 
institutional arrangements around the management of the sovereign wealth fund’s investments, such as 
how to achieve a degree of operational independence for the management authority, how to clarify the 
roles and responsibilities of the various principals and agents involved in the delegated-authority model of 
investment, and how the governance and performance of the investment authority may be strengthened by 
transparency, accountability and an embrace of rule-based investment policies. 
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Chapter 10 
Public footprints in private markets:  
Institutional arrangements in delegated sovereign investment management 
On New Year’s Day in 2008, Foreign Affairs journal published an article on sovereign wealth funds 
authored by Robert Kimmitt, then serving as Deputy Secretary of the United States Treasury. Writing 
against a backdrop of increasing regulatory and political concerns in the West about the growing clout of 
sovereign investors from the Middle East, Russia and Asia (notably China), Kimmit (2008) gave a 
balanced account of the benefits and concerns around sovereign investment from a recipient-country 
perspective. “If these investments are economically, rather than politically, driven,” Kimmit noted, 
“recipient countries have a strong interest in providing an open, transparent, and predictable framework 
for sovereign wealth fund investment,”  
The article also contained a number of thinly veiled threats, suggesting that evidence of overt political 
intervention in the investment practices of sovereign wealth funds by their host governments would be 
met with strong regulatory retaliation. “Foreign governments could conceivably employ large pools of 
capital in non-commercially driven ways that are politically sensitive,” Kimmit argued, citing the concern 
that a government “could use its intelligence or security services to gather information that is not available 
to a commercial investor…[and that] a sovereign wealth fund could also obtain or extend financing at 
interest rates that a commercial investor could not.” In addition to some of the specific concerns outlined 
by Kimmit (and others), it is clear that the rise of sovereign wealth funds as a class of state-owned 
investors had potentially jarred with the foundational philosophy of free-market capitalism: “the US 
economy is built on the belief that private firms allocate capital more efficiently than governments”, 
Kimmit noted. The article ran under the evocative title, “Public footprints in private markets”. 
While Kimmit was articulating the apprehensions of recipient governments about the growth in state-
owned investors, specifically sovereign wealth funds, a number of issues raised in the article are also of 
concern to the societies of host governments. In particular, the suggestion – and well-documented 
empirical evidence – that political intervention lowers the returns of long-term institutional investors, is a 
concern; particularly in the context of long-term sovereign wealth funds with the explicit functions of 
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saving, wealth transformation and income generation. Operational independence and rule-based investing 
are of particular importance for savings and investment-income type sovereign wealth funds, and 
potentially less so for stabilisation funds (given their short investment horizons and simple investment 
models) and sovereign development funds (where there is a case for alignment with political and strategic 
considerations).  
This chapter considers institutional arrangements for the investment function of operationally 
independent sovereign investment authorities, while the last two chapters will focus on the analysis of 
asset allocation and rule- and contract-based investment policies. As noted in Chapter 5, the operational 
independence of sovereign investment authorities establishes a principal-agent problem, and in the 
context of public institutions, a potential democratic deficit (much as it does in the case of operationally 
independent monetary, judicial or regulatory authorities). Rule-based investment policies, along with 
more general governance principles of accountability and transparency, help reduce this deficit. This 
chapter starts by elaborating on the theoretical case and empirical evidence in the support of operational 
independence for sovereign investment authorities, already briefly touched on in Chapter 5. The second 
part of this chapter assumes a more positive approach, identifying how the institutional arrangements for 
delegated authority, which in the case of most sovereign wealth funds involves not just a simple principal-
agent relationship but rather a chain of principals and agents, compares to established arrangements in 
other areas of institutional investment management.  
10.1.  The case for operationally independent investment authorities 
The most important reason for granting sovereign wealth funds a degree of operational independence 
from government owners is performance. As discussed in Chapter 5, much as in the area of monetary 
policy, the independence of the investment authority in the case of sovereign wealth funds rests primarily 
on a belief that governments do not make good long-term portfolio investors – or, as Kimmitt (2008) 
noted “that private firms allocate capital more efficiently than governments”. The reasons for this view 
include misaligned incentives and horizons of politicians relative to the mandate of the sovereign wealth 
fund, and the need for technocratic expertise in long-term investment management. Again, these two 
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arguments – political bias and the need for technocratic subject expertise – mirror the case of independent, 
technocratic policy boards or committees in the area of monetary policy.  
As noted in Chapter 5, there is a significant body of empirical evidence to suggest that political pressure 
and intervention reduces investor returns. The field of public-sector pension fund management, in which 
the investment policies, operations and institutional functions are closely aligned to those of long-term 
sovereign wealth funds, provides a rich body of evidence. One of the leading areas of focus in the literature 
on public pension funds is on board composition and incentives.  In the public-pension fund world, 
boards are typically composed through a combination of elections (typically by plan members and 
beneficiaries), appointment or ex officio status (Useem and Hess, 2001 and Hess and Impavido, 2004). 
The general concern in relation to public-pension fund board pertains to ex officio board members, who 
are often political officeholders, and politically appointed members, with the assumption that beneficiaries 
have sufficient “skin in the game” to elect members that serve their best interests.  
Political appointees, by contrast, are assumed (and observed) to face a conflict of interests, expressed in a 
tendency to favour investments with higher political, economic and/or social returns, rather than pure 
return maximisation. These investment activities run the gamut from favouring politically connected or 
local fund managers (if the board plays a role in manager selection), to prioritising local or domestic 
investments with an inadequate or differentiated consideration of their expected risk-return dynamics, to 
subordinating the fund’s investment performance in pursuit of other (politically rewarding) agendas, such 
as environmental and labour standards (Hess and Impavido, 2011). More generally, economists have 
modelled the negative impact on investment performance that arises due to a misalignments of incentives 
(for example, the pursuit of politically beneficial outcomes, rather than long-term returns), a mismatch in 
time horizons (with political horizons typically being shorter than that of an optimising long-term 
investor); and the tendency towards “trend chasing” (De Long, Schleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; and Lakonishok et. al., 1994).  
The empirical evidence on the links between board composition, the exercise of political pressure and 
influence on public pension funds and investment performance provide strong support for the benefits of 
political independence. Useem and Mitchell (2000) find that an array of governance variables account for 
more than 20% of the variation in investment strategies pursued by 291 American state and local 
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retirement plans (accounting for 80% of the country’s pension fund assets), which in turn is a strong 
predictor of subsequent investment performance. More specifically, Mitchell and Hsin (1997) show that 
having a greater number of beneficiary representatives on the pension board reduces investment returns, 
which they argue is likely due to a lack of investment expertise.  
A landmark study by Romano (1993) identified various conflicts faced by the board of trustees of public 
pension plans, with particular emphasis on what the literature refers to as “economically targetted 
investments”, which according to a controversial United States Department of Labour definition are 
“investments selected for the economic benefits they create apart from their investment return to the 
employee benefit plan” (US Department of Labour, 1994). The seductive argument in favour of 
economically targetted investments is that they offer rates of return comparable to those of other pension-
fund assets, while generating various positive externalities. Romano (1993) found that public pension 
funds are subject to political pressures to “tailor their investments to local needs, such as increasing state 
employment, and to engage in other socially desirable investing” and that the most widespread type of 
political pressure involved “demands to stimulate local economic activity directly by financing 
development projects that over-extended states cannot fund.” The consequences of economically targetted 
investments on pension funds have been much debated, but largely found to be negative (Mitchell and 
Hsin, 1997; and Nofisinger, 1998).  
The public pension funds included in Romano’s paper also demonstrated a tendency towards directing 
public assets toward companies with lobbying powers and significant campaign contributions. Romano 
found the percentage of independent trustees directly improve investment performance measured by total 
return on plan assets, a finding that was robust even when controlling for asset allocation (which itself is 
widely found to be robustly correlated to board composition, as per Useem and Mitchell, 2000). Overall, 
“Public fund managers must navigate carefully around the shoals of considerable political pressure to 
temper investment policies with local considerations, such as fostering in-state employment, which are not 
aimed at maximising the value of their portfolios assets” (Romano, 1993).  
Whereas the initial debate in the academic literature on public-pension fund governance focused on the 
distinction between (politically) appointed board members, who tended to advance the interests of plan 
sponsors (politicians); and elected members, who are either assumed or shown to better serve the interests 
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to fund beneficiaries, the more recent literature has focused more on the respective merits of 
“representative” versus “professional” boards. The former typically includes non-subject experts 
representing a range of stakeholders – the point is that, in the case of public pension funds, these may 
include both elected board members (for example, union leaders and current beneficiaries) and appointed 
and ex officio members. Professional boards can also consist of a combination of appointed and elected 
members, but are by contrast selected on the basis of the specialist subject knowledge and established 
professional criteria, qualifications and experience. The former has the alluring ring of democratic 
representation and inclusivity, while the latter promotes a closer alignment between the functions of a 
board and the skills required to perform them. The representative-versus-professional board literature 
suggests that the earlier distinction between elected and appointed boards (and board members) may be 
too simplistic. There is significant anecdotal and statistical evidence that a greater share of public-pension 
fund board members drawn from and representing beneficiaries undermines performance; and that the 
skills and subject competence of the board is associated with improved investment performance (Mitchell 
and Hsin, 1997, and Stewart and Yermo, 2008). 
This development in the literature holds great significance for sovereign wealth funds, where a tendency 
towards “inclusive” boards may result from understandable democratic concerns. It is easy to see how the 
goals of inclusivity and representativeness trump board competence and skill – particularly in democratic 
political environments. Sovereign wealth funds and government-owned public-pension reserves funds, 
such as the New Zealand Superannuation Fund and the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board, do 
not have easily identifiable and organised members or beneficiaries. Consequently, there are no direct 
representatives of “beneficiaries” that, even theoretically, can promote their interests; and boards are 
almost always staffed or appointed by political officeholders. In some sense, then, these sovereign 
investors have an even higher hurdle to clear in ensuring that political pressures are not exerted on the 
investment authority through the board. The case for professional boards, with arm’s length 
independence from government owners thus becomes even more compelling.    
Recent empirical investigations of sovereign wealth fund investment behaviour have tended to mirror the 
findings from the public-pension fund literature that political motivated domestic investments and direct 
political representation in oversight and management structures lower returns. Concerns over the effects 
of political influence on sovereign wealth funds’ investment decisions have been raised in a more 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
270 
theoretical sense by a number of scholars (Ang, 2010 and Das et. al. 2009), which statistical examinations 
generally (but not universally) support. Bernstein et. al.’s (2013) findings suggest a similar pattern amongst 
sovereign wealth funds as those observed by Romano (1993), Mitchell and Hsin (1997) and Useem and 
Mitchell (2000) in relation to public pension funds: exposure to political influences may introduce major 
distortions from long-run return maximisation amongst sovereign wealth funds, such as “misguided policy 
attempts to prop up inefficient firms or industries” or investments in industries, sectors or geographies 
that are deemed to be “hot” (Bernstein et. al., 2013). Their empirical evidence suggests that “the 
investments of sovereign wealth funds with politically connected managers tend to see a reduction in P/E 
levels after the investment, while investments of external manager-influenced funds on average experience 
an increase in the P/E levels.”95 Moreover, the trend is “particularly pronounced for investments at home, 
which could suggest that the pressures to invest in hot markets at home are especially strong for politically 
connected sovereign wealth funds” (Bernstein et. al., 2013). 
While the Bernstein et. al. (2013) study is the most high-profile examination of sovereign wealth fund 
investment decisions and performance, a number of other studies raise similar concerns around political 
influence and biases in the investments of these institutions, as discussed in survey of the literature by 
Megginson and Votak (2015). Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008) constructs a sample of 29,634 equity 
investments made by 27 sovereign wealth funds and a comparative sample of 38,880 equity investments by 
public pension funds in firms from 56 countries to examine whether the former demonstrate systemic 
biases compared to pension funds. They find that a bias towards investing in countries that share a 
common culture and religion is “particularly pronounced” amongst sovereign wealth funds compared to 
pension fund. Chhaochharia and Laeven’s (2008) result also suggest that aspects of sovereign wealth fund 
investment strategies are at odds with portfolio theory and their long-term advantages, as they tend to 
chase past returns, and hold portfolios that are poorly diversified both geographically and across 
industries (sovereign wealth fund portfolios are found to be heavily overweight both oil companies and 
companies with large market capitalisation). Similar results are reported by Dyck and Morse (2011), who 
also find evidence of portfolio concentration in financial-services firms. Knill, Lee and Mauck (2012) find a 
strong causal relationship between measured changes in the international political relationships of host 
and home countries and geographic investment patterns of sovereign wealth funds, to the extent that a 
deterioration in political relationships result in an increase in sovereign wealth fund investments, 
95 P/E levels refer to the price-to-earnings ratio, the most commonly used measure for valuing a company. P/E ratios 
or levels measure a company’s current share price relative to its per-share earnings. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
271 
suggesting sovereign wealth funds may be used as a political tool (or at least be influenced by changes geo-
political relationships). A contrarian perspective is offered by Avendaño and Santiso (2011), who find that 
reported sovereign wealth fund investments do not differ greatly from those of privately held mutual 
funds, and conclude that fears regarding politically motivated by sovereign wealth funds are unfounded.  
Regardless of whether political pressure or interventions do actually influence sovereign wealth funds, it is 
likely that concerns over such perceptions by regulators in host countries have played a role in efforts by 
home countries to proactively establish a degree of de jure independence. Consider, for example, the 
language around independence adopted in the Santiago Principles: “A sound governance structure that 
separates the functions of the owner, governing body(ies), and management facilitates operational 
independence in the management of the sovereign wealth fund to pursue investment decisions and 
investment operations free of political influence (International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, 2008; emphasis added). 
A more pragmatic reason for embracing a model of operational independence for the management of 
sovereign wealth funds include a need for “ring fencing” resource revenues, particularly in the context of 
corruption and poor institutions, in order to protect against theft. Given their size, complexity and 
uncertain nature, resource revenues are often a target of theft; while the tendency towards a “lack of 
transparency surrounding resource revenues…relaxes the disincentives to misappropriate funds” (Collier 
et. al., 2010). While, of course, not offering any guarantees that the sovereign wealth fund itself will not be 
raided – or, even worse, become an instrument for kleptocrats to siphon off resource revenues into foreign 
bank accounts – the establishment of an independently run sovereign wealth fund, subject to detailed 
disclosure requirements and formal oversight mechanism, can at least increase transparency and introduce 
a number of logistical obstacles to plunder. One concrete example of the latter may be to have the assets of 
the fund administered or managed by the World Bank’s Treasury Department or the Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS), with withdrawals requiring (for example), the signature of the President, 
the Finance Minister, the Minister for Petroleum, the Governor of the central bank, and the chairman and 
executive of the sovereign wealth fund; plus a statement of disclosure published by the World Bank or the 
BIS (similar arrangements may be established in law and in contract with the fund’s private-sector 
custodial bank).  
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Finally, another pragmatic reason for establishing an operationally independent investment authority has 
to do with the limitations and restrictions of public-sector pay scales. The need for hiring “in house” 
expertise – which can be prohibitively expensive for many sovereign wealth funds – depends to a large 
degree on complexity, sophistication and degree of “active management” around the fund’s investment 
strategy (as discussed in the following two chapters). The issue of compensation for human capital in 
public-sector investment context, particularly relative to the often very high earnings of people working in 
private-sector finance, has been analysed in detail in the literature (Clark and Urwin, 2008; Bertram and 
Zvan, 2009; Ambachtsheer, 2011; and Clark and Monk, 2013). For many sovereign wealth funds 
worldwide that face challenges around attracting and retaining talent – most notably, due to the 
remoteness of their head offices and the limits of public-sector compensation relative to that of the private 
sector – the heavy use of external managers and investment consultants becomes a practical necessity, 
unless the fund invests exclusively in low-cost passive index type investments (Clark and Monk, 2013). One 
of the hallmarks of the much-lauded Canadian public pension fund model – that has been followed by a 
number of sovereign wealth funds – is the establishment of independent, professional investment 
institutions, which are not tied to implicit or explicit public-sector wage scales, but can establish their own 
compensation schemes to attract and incentise internal managers.  
10.2.  Achieving institutional separation and operational independence 
Having made the case for operational independence in theory, it is insightful to reflect on how an 
institutional separation between policymakers, legislators and the management authority of sovereign 
wealth funds is achieved in a number of country cases. In reality, the independence advocated above is 
never absolute, but rather a question of degree. Moreover, the institutional arrangements between 
“principals” and “agents” in the case of sovereign wealth funds is not a simple two-way relationship, but are 
characterised by a chain of delegated authority. Most forms of institutional investing involves multiple 
layers of delegated authority and oversight; for example, between a board of directors/trustees and the 
executive, between the executive and internal/external fund managers, etc. In the context of sovereign 
wealth funds, additional layers are added: an independent appointed board of directors may report to a 
minister (or a higher “governing council” or “policy board”), which in turn reports to a parliament, a 
president or a monarch (depending on the political context). Further down the chain of delegated 
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authority, the often extensive use of investment consultants and external fund managers creates additional 
principal-agent relationships in the management of sovereign wealth funds; while expectations for public 
accountability add an often elaborate oversight infrastructure, involving a public auditor, a national 
regulator, external auditors, and sometimes a separate supervisory board (in addition to the board of 
directors). 
The independence of the authority managing a sovereign wealth fund is therefore never absolute, but 
rather embedded in an institutional arrangement that enforces oversight and accountability. Naturally, in 
the context of a myriad of interlocking principal-agent relationships due to various levels of delegated 
authority, it is important that the institutional architecture provides clarity around the precise powers and 
responsibility of each principal and agent. Figure 10.1 provides an overview of a stylised institutional set-up 
for delegated investment management of a sovereign wealth fund, while discussion below outlines the 
most important tasks assigned to each element. Note that the figure shows the full scope of the most 
detailed institutional arrangement possible – in practice, as discussed below, it is possible to economise on 
this structure with some direct reporting lines and operational structures (as the case of Chile, in 
particular, illustrates).  
Figure 10.1 .  Institutional  structure for  delegated sovereign wealth fund management 
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The operational part of the structure, shown in the central box in Figure 10.1, mirrors that of standard 
practices amongst institutional investors, such as public and private pension funds, endowments and 
foundations, particularly the principal-agent relationship between the board and the executive, and their 
intersection through the various committees of the board (which typically includes executive board 
members). The executive management of the fund then manages internal teams, colloquially known as the 
front-, middle- and back office, responsible for portfolio management, risk management, and trade 
execution and processing, respectively. 
The sovereign wealth fund simply adds additional layers of political ownership and accountability, and 
more detailed supervisory or oversight arrangements than what is typically found in non-governmental 
investment institutions, involving not only external auditors; but also, for example, reports by the public 
auditor, parliamentary scrutiny of the minister or highest policy board (and sometimes more directly of the 
board of the sovereign wealth fund itself). In a small number of countries, parliamentary oversight is 
complemented by or delegated to a supervisory committee. Like most other institutional investors, 
sovereign wealth funds also make use of external advisors and managers, some providing assistance to the 
most senior policy institutions, others more directly on investment and operational matters to the board or 
executive of the sovereign wealth fund.   
In practice, there is a significant degree of variation around this framework captured in Figure 10.1. As 
noted earlier, it is possible to simplify and economise on this elaborate structure, particularly when the 
sovereign wealth fund is relatively small; and, more importantly, if the investment strategy is very simple 
(for example, when investments are limited to passive, indexed strategies in liquid public markets) and 
highly transparent. Recall from the discussion in Chapter 5, that the governance of sovereign wealth funds 
can be categorised according to external and internal dimensions: the former pertains to the institutional 
arrangements between the investment authority and its political owners (ministries, legislators, the 
president or kind, and the public at large); while the latter relates more narrowly to the structures 
operating within the investment authority, such as the distribution of authority and responsibility between 
the board and the executive, the adoption of rule-based investment policies, etc. Within a more elaborate 
institutional model, in which delegated authority involves more than simple operational aspects, the two 
critical areas of differentiation in the overall governance structure are as follows:  
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10.2.1 .  “Supervisory councils ”  versus “policy  boards”  in  external  governance 
The first major area of differentiation is the extent to which political officeholders exercise their authority 
over the management of the sovereign wealth fund in a manner that represents either a “supervisory 
council” or “policy board”. In the supervisory-council model, political representatives set the goals for the 
organisation in comparatively board terms, such as the articulation of the fund’s purpose and legal 
standing; and then resolve to act mainly as an oversight body over the management authority, particularly 
its board (note, this may or may not be in addition to the supervisory committee, shown in the Figure 10.1 
in the left-hand column). The management authority, through a combination of powers and 
responsibilities divided between the board and the executive, are then granted significant delegated 
authority to interpret this broad political mandate and articulate an appropriate investment policy 
(including, most critically, the fund’s asset allocation).  
In contrast, the more politically “hands-on” policy-board model sees political officeholders, such as the 
minister of finance (often only this minister), other members of cabinet, presidential appointees and 
members of the legislature more directly involved with that articulation process: that is, more directly 
involved with the specification of the sovereign wealth fund’s return targets, risk tolerance and investment 
horizon (and, under most direct models, its asset allocation). Clearly, the supervisory-council model 
assumes a higher degree of delegated authority and operational independence for the investment-
management authority of the sovereign wealth fund than the policy-board model, although in practice the 
process may be more de facto consultative, involving the minister of finance (or broader policy board), the 
board and the executive of the sovereign wealth fund.  
10.2.2 .  Board-  versus executive-centric  models  of  internal  governance 
The second major distinction in the governance models of sovereign wealth funds pertains to the internal 
dimension – specifically, the distribution of authority and responsibility between the board and the 
executive. Management structures can be categorised as broadly board- or executive-centric, with the 
latter again implying a higher degree of delegated authority. The most common model sees the board 
responsible for the articulation of the fund’s investment policy most critically, the fund’s asset allocation. If 
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the political body assumes a more supervisory role in the external governance, as described above, the 
board will typically also have the authority to specify the fund’s target return, risk tolerance and investment 
horizon – as discussed in Chapter 11, ideally through a publicly disclosed “Investment Policy Statement” – 
which the executive is then tasked with implementing. Most typically, the board is also responsible for 
nominating or appointing the senior executive (sometimes subject to ministerial and/or parliamentary 
approval).  
In practice, however, the executive does have a role to play in the articulation of these critical aspects of 
the investment strategy; either through consultation to the board; or, as is more common, by assuming 
any number of seats on the board. Typically, the Chief Executive Officer will have a permanent seat on the 
board, but in the case of larger boards with greater executive representation, the Chief Investment Officer 
and possibly the Chief Risk Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and the Chief Operating Officer also serve on 
the board. The size of the board often becomes a practical issue in the management sovereign wealth fund 
(and other public investment institutions), given the executive board members are typically joined by both 
appointed and ex officio board members. In such cases, common practice is to establish separate board-
level committees, such as an Investment Committee (chaired by the Chairman of the Board and including 
the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer of the fund), a Risk or Risk-Management 
Committee, an Audit Committee, and an Operational Committee.  
One of the most important factors in the relationship between the board and the executive is the degree of 
“active” management the board wishes to tolerate or encourage. Under more passive investment models, 
the executive’s main responsibilities become administrative and operational in the sense that they 
implement a series of benchmark portfolios. More active investment models assume that the executive 
management can add value by outperforming a combination of benchmarks or by a low-cost reference 
portfolio, either through the executive’s management of an internal investment team or its selection of 
above-average external investment managers. Benchmark- or reference-portfolio specification is the task 
of the board (occasionally of a higher authority, such as a policy board, governing council or a minister), 
while active management and manager selection is that of the executive.  
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10.2.3 .  Governance models  and the public  footprint  
Decisions regarding the balance between supervisory versus governing models of political control for 
external governance, and between board- versus executive-centric models for internal governance, are 
made in part based on practical considerations around cost efficiency of institutions. However, the 
outcome of these decisions also have a major bearing on the degree or perception of political influence on 
a sovereign wealth fund.  
Naturally, if efforts are made to greatly reduce the “public footprints in private markets” left by sovereign 
wealth funds, the overall governance framework might be expected to gravitate towards a more 
supervisory-council model for external governance (and possibly a more executive-central internal 
governance model – or least one in which political representation and/or appointments to the board is 
limited). Alternatively, if political officeholders, such as the minister of finance, retain comparatively high 
levels of de jure authority over the sovereign wealth fund – as, in fact, they do in the case of both Norway 
and Chile, two widely lauded examples of sovereign wealth fund governance – concerns over the public 
footprint and political motivations behind the fund can be reduced by a combination of exceptional levels 
of transparency and disclosure, and simple, largely passive investment models.  
The degree of political influence on a sovereign wealth fund can also be depicted as per Figure 10.2, which 
is taken from an IMF paper on the governance of sovereign wealth funds (Al-Hassan et. al., 2013). The 
fund’s diagram depicts a stylised relationship between the “owner” of a sovereign wealth funds (that is, 
generally, the government and political officeholders) and the “fund” (that is, the delegated authority 
managing the fund). Without controversy, the responsibilities of the owner are depicted in broad terms: 
articulate the fund’s objectives, define risk tolerances and the investment horizon, and review of 
investment performance. Similarly, the articulation of the fund-management entity’s responsibilities 
includes a standard list of technical tasks: propose capital market assumptions, implement strategic asset 
allocation, manage portfolios in-house or select external managers, measure risk and performance, and 
report to the owner and stakeholder.  
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Figure 10.2:  Roles  and responsibi l it ies  in  determining SWF investment policy  
Source: Al-Hassan, Papaioannou, Skancke and Sung (2013) 
However, the key point is that Figure 10.2 depicts the most critical long-term determinants of investment 
performance as open to being either “retained or delegated by the Owner to the Fund”, with powers and 
responsibilities for fundamental decisions – strategic asset allocation, the specification of policy 
benchmarks, and the quantification of the risk tolerance (which Al-Hasan et. al., 2013 refer to as an “active 
risk budget”). In the governance model depicted in Figure 10.1, the most effective way to ensure and 
demonstrate limited political involvement in the investment policies of the sovereign wealth fund is for the 
government (or “owner” in the IMF’s terminology) to delegate, rather than retain these powers (as per the 
supervisory-council model discussed in Section 10.1.1.). 
The “ownership” of the asset allocation decision and process is a critical element of governance process, as 
long-term allocation (often referred to as “strategic asset allocation” or SAA) is by some margin the most 
important determinant of long-term returns (as discussed in detail in the following chapter). Al-Hassan et. 
al. (2013) describe the different models and their implications in relation to sovereign wealth fund 
management, as follows:   
“There are alternative approaches as to who ‘owns’ strategic asset allocation decisions. In a more 
typical set-up approach, the owner of the fund, usually a ministry of finance, decides on the SAA, 
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approves the benchmark portfolio representing the SAA and sets active risk limits for deviating 
from the policy benchmark. Operationalisation of the SAA and active management is then 
delegated to the fund manager (this approach is adopted by Norway and Russia). In a less typical 
approach, the SAA decision is fully delegated to and owned by the fund manager (this approach is 
adopted by Singapore). In the former approach, the sovereign wealth fund’s owner internalises 
the total risk of the policy benchmark, which represents on average about 80–95% of the overall 
risk, while the fund manager is responsible for the residual risk arising due to active management, 
and is held responsible for excess returns relative to the benchmark. In the latter approach, the 
fund manager is ultimately responsible for the total return of the fund, as well as for potentially 
substantial deviations from the stated return targets for long periods of time, with the fund owner 
not having direct control over investment outcomes” (Al-Hassan et. al. 2013: 18-19).  
As noted earlier, some of the most celebrated governance models, such as those of Norway and Chile, 
follow what Al-Hassan et. al. (2013) call the “typical model”, in which the minister of finance retains de jure 
authority for long-term asset allocation decisions. The advantage of this approach is that it makes the 
ministry highly accountable for the long-term investment performance, risk and return of the sovereign 
wealth fund – frankly, the minister has nowhere to hide if the fund underperforms and cannot blame the 
board or the executive of the fund for poor asset allocation decisions (unless the latter significantly 
deviation from the policy choices reflected in the minister’s asset allocation). The potential downside to 
this approach is that it suggests an undue degree of political interference. In practice, however, the 
passive, uncontroversial and consultative nature of the investment process (coupled with exceptional 
transparency) in cases such as Norway and Chile reduces concerns over the public footprint.  
10.3.  Existing sovereign wealth fund governance models 
The governance arrangements for the management of a sovereign wealth fund depicted in section 10.2 is a 
stylised model. It is more elaborate than many of the existing models, which in practice economise on this 
infrastructure. As discussed earlier, within the most elaborate governance model, there is significant scope 
for both de facto and de jure variations in the allocation of authority and responsibilities. In particular, the 
degree of political influence of the fund may be expressed through the choice of whether political 
officeholder assume a more supervisory versus policy role (discussed previously in relation to the 
distinction between “supervisory councils” and “policy boards”); although the de jure powers of political 
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officeholders under the latter can effectively be watered down or constrained by exceptional levels of 
transparency and disclosure, and the adoption of simple, largely passive investment models.  
10.3 .1 .  The Norwegian governance model  
The Norwegian governance model most closely resembles the arrangement depicted in Figure 10.1. The 
model is noteworthy for its involvement of a wide range of public institutions, each with clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities; and its exceptionally high reporting and disclosure requirements and practices. 
The most important institutions in the model are the Norwegian parliament and Supervisory Council, as 
oversight institutions; and the ministry of finance, the Executive Board of the central bank, and the senior 
management of a dedicated operational investment manager (under the auspices of the central bank), as 
the primary policy institutions. The distribution of core responsibilities and reporting lines around the 
Norwegian Pension Fund Global are as follows: 
• The Minister  of  Finance determines the sovereign wealth fund’s broadest strategic
orientation – as reflected in its Strategic Asset Allocation. The ministry delegates all operational
management and a degree of discretionary authority around the strategy and the selection of
external managers to a dedicated investment authority within the central bank.
• The central  bank Executive  Board is the highest authority within fund’s operational
management. It establishes the guidelines and strategic plans for the management activities of
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), a dedicated investment management unit
within the central bank. The Executive Board is subject to an internal audit; and is part of
separate governing structure for the management of the sovereign wealth fund than for other
aspects of the central bank (such as monetary policy and financial supervision). The board consists
of eight members, with the Governor of the central bank serving as chairman, and the two
Deputy Governors as first and second vice-chairman. The latter has a special responsibility for the
sovereign wealth fund.
• Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) is a dedicated asset management
department within the central bank and is the operational fund manager of the sovereign wealth
fund (in addition to other public funds, including the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves). It
implements investment strategy and exercises the small degree of active management that is
permitted by the fund’s owner. The team also performs significant research and analytical
functions around the fund’s asset allocation, external managers and operational efficiency.
The above-mentioned three institutions form the core of the policy infrastructure in the Norwegian 
model. Clearly, the deep policy choices around the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund – notably its 
strategic asset allocation, but also the decision to pursue an “ethical investment” mandate, which results in 
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the fund excluding investments in, for examples, companies involved in the tobacco and arms industries, 
or deemed guilty of human rights violations and severe environmental damages – are the domain of the 
ministry of finance. The central bank’s executive board is less of a policy board, and more of an 
operational-oversight body. Finally, the operational manager is also a largely operational authority, 
although it does exercise some limited and constrained discretion in attempt to outperform the ministry of 
finances’ benchmark. Its discretionary powers and responsibilities have risen with the introduction of a 
difficult-to-benchmark real-estate investment mandate in 2011. In addition to the policy infrastructure, the 
Norwegian model makes provision for significant oversight and supervisory institutions, as follows: 
• The Norwegian parl iament passes legislation governing the fund, approves the operational
manager’s annual budget, appoints a Supervisory Council and reviews reports on the fund’s
guidelines, strategies and performance prepared by the ministry of finance, NBIM and auditors.
• The Supervisory  Council  supervises the central bank’s activities (in general, not only of
NBIM). It has the right of access to information and investigative powers. The Supervisory
Council reports to the parliament, who also appoints its 15 members. Appointments are for four-
year terms with the possibility of re-appointment twice. Every other year, up to half of the
membership is reappointed or replaced. The chairman and deputy chairman are appointed for
two-year terms.
• The Auditor  General  performs an audit of the fund and the operations of Norges Bank
Investment Management, and reports to the parliament and the government. In addition, an
external auditor is appointed and reports to the Supervisory Council.
As has been widely noted in the literature on sovereign wealth funds, Norway has exemplary governance 
structures (Monk, 2009; Das et. al., 2009; Ang, 2010 and Frankel, 2010). While other funds may find it 
difficult to implement similar structures given political constraints and local public-sector practices, the 
Norwegian governance structure rests on three characteristic features that are worthy of emulation: (i) a 
profound commitment to transparency and public disclosure that incorporates strategy, operations and 
intra-governmental oversight; (ii) the separation of powers and responsibilities across various stakeholders 
and public institutions; and (iii) generating a stable consensus between these institutions through a highly 
consultative and representative process. Certainly, it cannot be argued that political officeholders are far 
removed from the investment of the Norwegian sovereign wealth – the minister of finance sets the 
strategic asset allocation – but, as discussed above, the transparency and simplicity of the fund’s 
investment strategy and governance model allays concerns over undue political intervention.  
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10.3 .2 .  The Kazakh governance model  
The governance model of the National Fund of Kazakhstan is characterised by a high degree of 
centralised political authority, with the president serving as the highest reporting authority of the fund 
and as a member of its powerful Management Committee. The lack of independence of the Management 
Committee means that the political leadership, particularly the President and senior ministers, enjoy a 
high degree of control and discretionary power over the fund. The National Fund is also relatively non-
transparent around key aspects (such as its detailed asset allocation and its external audits) of its 
operations and performance (although less so than a number of sovereign wealth funds, particularly in the 
Middle East). The de jure governance structure for the National Fund of Kazakhstan is as follows: 
• The President: officially recognised as the highest reporting authority of the National Fund.
The President created the National Fund and the Management Council, on which he sits,
through Presidential decrees.
• The Management Council : consists of the President, the Prime Minister, key economic policy
ministers and other high-ranking officials (including representatives of the legislature). The
Management Council sets all key governance, operational and investment policies for the
National Fund.
• The Minister  of  Finance and the Minister  of  Oil  and Gas jointly approve the list of
petroleum sector companies whose taxes are deposited into the National Fund, while parliament
passes laws determining small variations in the amounts transferred from the fund annually.
• The day-to-day investment management of the National Fund is the responsibility of the
National  Bank of  Kazakhstan. The central bank selects and oversees the fund’s external
managers of its equity portfolios. In 2012, an independent unit was established within the central
bank, called the National Investment Corporation, to manage part of the sovereign wealth funds’
money (alongside other public funds).
• The central bank is subject to external  audits, which includes its activities in relation to the
investment of the National Fund’s assets. The audits are not made public.
A particular feature of the institutional structure of the Kazakhstan fund is the formal recognition of the 
President as the highest reporting authority for the fund – something that is typically either strictly 
avoided, or only implicit, by other sovereign wealth funds. Much of the authority for establishing the 
National Fund’s policies and investment strategy rests with the Management Council, which is headed by 
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the President. Therefore, while the delegation of operational management to the central bank establishes 
some autonomy, the power vested in the Management Council – and, moreover, the President’s 
prominent position on the council – does little to conceal the extent of political influence over the fund. 
Given the nature of Kazakhstan’s institutions more generally, this structure is not surprising – it is also 
unlikely that a de jure independent or delegated-authority model would make much difference de facto 
(given the degree of centralised political control over various arms of government and state institutions). 
What is noteworthy, is the fact that despite the formal authority of the President and other senior political 
officeholders over the National Fund, it appears that little actual intervention in the investment process 
has occurred (the strength of this observation is, however, weakened by the lack of transparency and 
independence around the fund – it is possible that fund has made a number of politically-inspired 
investments that are not disclosed externally).  
10.3 .3 .  The Chilean governance model  
The Chilean governance model is noteworthy for three reasons: first, it is very simple; second, it is 
extremely transparent; and third, while the minister retains essentially all the de jure policy authority, there 
is a high degree of de facto reliance on the insights and expertise of an expert advisory committee. Both of 
Chile’s sovereign wealth funds, its stabilisation and savings funds, are under the jurisdiction of the 
ministry of finance, which develops investment policies and publishes monthly, quarterly and annual 
reports on the funds’ activities and performance. The Central Bank of Chile acts as the operational 
investment manager of the funds, but its role is relegated to an essentially operational one, given the 
ministry of finance’s decision to pursue a low-cost, passive investment strategy focused exclusive on 
tracking leading global stock and bond indexes. There are a number of other public institutions involved 
with the funds, particularly in advisory and oversight capacities. The roles, responsibilities and reporting 
lines of these institutions are established in law for the ministry of finance, and by ministerial decree for the 
central bank (issued in 2006) and the Financial Committee (issued in 2007). The key institutions in the 
Chilean model are as follows: 
• The Ministry  of  Finance determines investment and internal management policies for the
sovereign funds, including their respective asset allocations, benchmark indexes, investment
horizons and risk budgets; while the General Treasury, Chile’s revenue service, is responsible for
accounting and preparing audited reports on the funds.
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• The Advisory Financial  Committee for  Fiscal  Responsibi l ity  Funds  is a panel of
experts, appointed by the ministry of finance, which provides advice on the funds’ management
and investment policies. The six members of the committee are selected by the ministry, and
consist of local macroeconomists and financial experts, with overlapping tenures of two years.
The committee meets on average every six weeks and its members are remunerated for their
attendance of these meetings. A Secretariat for the committee is provided by the ministry, which
also prepares technical reports on international financial conditions and financial performance of
sovereign wealth fund investments. The Advisory Financial Committee releases its own annual
reports and minutes from meetings, separate from those of the ministry. The transparent use of a
technocratic advisory structure for the investments of the Chilean sovereign wealth funds mirrors
that of the fiscal rule (as discussed in Chapter 9, the fiscal rule draws on inputs from expert panels
on trend GDP growth and the future copper prices). Unlike the inputs (projections) from those
two fiscal committees, the recommendations of the Advisory Financial Committee are not
binding for the minister of Finance (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012). However, the public release of the
committee meetings’ minutes, their annual report and the frequency of their meeting schedule
creates a high degree of public and political accountability, against which the policies and actions
of the ministry of finance can be assessed.
• The Central  Bank of  Chile  manages the funds’ investment portfolios, with a portion
delegated to external fund managers (around 35% of all assets of the Pension Reserve Fund, the
country’s savings fund). The central bank appoints and monitors the performance of external fund
managers, who have little discretionary powers in deviating from the established index
benchmarks. The central bank manages fixed-income assets internally, while outsourcing some
index-benchmarked investment mandates to external managers.
The simplicity and economy of the policy and operational dimension of the Chilean governance model is 
mirrored by a basic supervisory infrastructure. Given the passive, indexed investment strategy for both 
sovereign wealth funds, their operational management by the credible central bank, and the ministry of 
finance and Financial Advisory Committees’ transparency and accountability around policy and strategic 
decisions, there is little need for an extensive arrangement of supervisory and oversight institutions, 
outside of the following: 
• The Chilean Congress  passed the legislation authorising the Funds and receives monthly,
quarterly and annual reports from the ministry of Finance.
• The Comptroller  General  performs an audit of the ministry of Finance’s activities (including
the fiscal rule and sovereign funds), and reports to the Congress. Independent external
auditors ’  reports are included in the report of the General Treasury.
The prominence of the ministry of Finance in the institutional arrangements around the Chilean funds is 
in some respects an exception to the general tendency towards and desirability of autonomy for sovereign 
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wealth funds, particularly long-term savings funds (in the Chilean case, the Pension Reserve Fund). 
However, this high degree of ministerial control is counter-balanced by exceptional transparency and 
disclosure, a very simple and non-discretionary investment strategy, and a sovereign wealth fund strategy 
that is embedded in a rule-based fiscal framework. In the Chilean case, it could be argued that 
discretionary powers are not delegated to an independent authority, exactly because the rule-based 
framework and investment strategy does not permit much discretion in the first place – effectively, there is 
no power to be delegated, and no discretion to the constrained.  
The Chilean example is the prime example of the keep-it-simple approach to sovereign wealth fund 
management and governance. It greatly economises on the cost of operating and governing the country’s 
sovereign wealth funds. The simplicity, built-in transparency and accountability, and integration of the 
sovereign wealth funds with a broader rule-based fiscal framework are all highly attractive institutional 
features – indeed, it is a model with great relevance to other resource-rich developing countries, looking to 
establish policy, governance and operational frameworks for their sovereign wealth funds.  
10.3 .4.  American permanent fund governance models  
While there is a great deal of commonality in the funding rules and institutional objectives of American 
resource-based permanent funds, there is greater divergence with respect to the operational models and 
governance structures around their investment management function. There are essentially two models 
for managing American permanent funds: in most cases, the funds are managed (alongside other public 
funds) by an Investment Board within the State Treasurer’s office; while there is also limited use of 
dedicated independent investment authorities. The two most established and successful examples are the 
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation and the University of Texas Investment Management Company. 
Both entities have well-developed governance structures, with a clear delineation between the Board and 
the Executive to the organisations, and their respective areas of authority and responsibility. In both cases, 
the comparatively large size of assets under management is a motivating factor behind the decision to 
incur the costs of a dedicated, independent management authority: the Alaska Permanent Fund, at 
roughly $52bn in assets under management (as of December 2015), is the largest sovereign wealth fund in 
America, while the University of Texas Investment Management Company manages $35 billion in assets 
(as of November 2015).  
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The more prevalent model for smaller American permanent funds is to retain investment management 
authority within a branch of the State Treasury, typically through structures such as a State Investment 
Board or State Investment Council. The model has the advantages of simplicity and cost: the State 
Treasurer typically has an existing investment infrastructure in place to manage the state’s cash flows, 
alongside existing debt and surplus asset structures (often including public-sector pension and benefit 
schemes). Adding the management administration and investment oversight of new permanent fund to 
these entities’ list of responsibilities may therefore be a logical step, although potentially temporary (until 
the assets under management are large enough to justify a dedicated investment authority).  
State Investment Boards or Councils are typically staffed by a small team of financial experts with a track 
record of prudent management of state assets. Given the complex asset allocation of most permanent 
funds (see below), State Treasuries typically do not manage investments themselves, outside of passive 
cash and fixed income portfolios, but rather make extensive use of the external managers and investment 
consultants. At first glance, this arrangement is at odds with the standard – and otherwise sensible – 
mantra on the governance of sovereign wealth funds: namely, that their investment operations should be 
removed, as far possible, from executive officeholders (in this case, State Treasurers). However, as in 
Norway and Chile, there are a number of mitigating factors that justify the choice of retaining the 
management oversight of permanent funds within the State Treasury: 
• First, the placement of these funds with the State Treasuries has not come at the expense of
transparency: rather, given American standards and expectations of accountable government,
State Investment Boards and Councils report frequently and extensively on their activities,
investment performance and internal decision-making. Transparency helps offset potential
concerns over undue political interference.
• Second, State Investment Boards and Councils are staffed with officials that enjoy a high degree
of public credibility, investment expertise and specialist skills; and their appointment generally
requires broad-based legislative approval (although of course there are no guarantees that this
tradition will be adhered to at all times).
• Third, while the extensive use of external assets managers and professional investment
consultants have the downside of costs (paid to in fees to fund managers) and governance
(undermining true ownership of asset allocation decisions), it does protect against bad decisions
and abuse, as these private companies are very reputation-sensitive and bound by Federal
regulatory requirements to act in the best interest of their clients.
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The placement of investment responsibility of permanent funds within the State Treasury can be viewed 
as a pragmatic, second-best solution, which has certain governance (and cost) drawbacks, but at the same 
time brings the benefit of simplicity and insurance against really bad outcomes. In the coming years, some 
of the larger and more established American permanent funds may approach a size and level of maturity 
where consideration should be given to the establishment of dedicated investment authorities. 
Irrespective of whether the funds are managed by the State Treasury or dedicated independent 
authorities, a number of observations can be made about the common features of American permanent 
funds’ investment models and governance processes. With the exception of the North Dakota Heritage 
Fund, which is still in its inception, American permanent funds have highly diversified portfolios 
(compared to, for example, the Norwegian and Chilean sovereign wealth funds). American permanent 
funds have significant allocations to illiquid alternative asset classes, such as infrastructure, private equity, 
real estate, high-yield credit and hedge funds. While these asset classes can generate high returns and add 
portfolio diversification benefit, they are complex to manage, involve considerable risks and incur high 
management fees when accessed through external managers.  
Indeed, a defining characteristic of the American permanent fund landscape is the extensive use of 
external asset managers and investment consultants. Partly, the explanation for this is the observation that 
most American permanent funds face significant challenges around attracting and retaining talent, most 
notably due to the remoteness of their head offices in small state capitals, such as Juneau (Alaska), 
Cheyenne (Wyoming) and Bismarck (North Dakota).96 Other challenges include the aforementioned 
limits of public-sector compensation relative to that of the private sector (Clark and Monk, 2013). As with 
their actual investment operations, American permanent funds tend to transfer a considerable amount of 
power and authority over asset allocation to external entities in the form of professional investment 
consultants. 
96 An obvious solution to this purely geographic problem is to establish in-house investment teams outside the state 
in major global financial capitals, such as London and Singapore – or even just in other American locations, such 
New York, Chicago, Boston or San Francisco. Indeed, most sovereign wealth funds and large public pension funds 
– notably the sovereign wealth funds of Norway, Singapore, Korea and the Middle East; as well as the largely
internal managed Canadian pension plans – have done this to great effect. However, proposals to do so by American 
state permanent fund have generally met with fierce political and public opposition.  
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As discussed in detail in the following chapter, academic research and past experience incontrovertibly 
demonstrate that strategic asset allocation, rather than short-term, “tactical” decisions, market “timing”, 
security and manager selection drive long-term portfolio returns. Asset allocation decisions are therefore 
at the heart of the policy choices around sovereign wealth fund investments, and the allocation of powers 
to determine asset allocation is at the heart of the governance structure. A potential downside to 
American state permanent funds’ heavy use of investment consultants in asset allocation decisions is that it 
potentially dilutes the degree of ownership of these critical decisions by the entities ultimately charged 
with managing these funds – whether it be the boards of independent management authorities or 
investment councils housed within State Treasuries.  
10.3 .5 .  The New Zealand governance model  
New Zealand’s sovereign wealth fund, the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, is a pension-reserve 
savings fund. It invests funds specifically earmarked from current fiscal surpluses in anticipation of 
growing future pension-system liabilities. In recent years, the fund has assumed an increasingly prominent 
leadership position within the global community of sovereign wealth funds, with an exemplary 
governance structure, exceptional levels of transparency and public disclosure (exceeding that of the much 
lauded Norwegian sovereign wealth fund), and stellar investment returns – in October 2015, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the fund was named as the chairman of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds.  
There are many lessons to be learned from the New Zealand sovereign wealth fund, notably from the 
comparison to the other sovereign wealth funds studied in this chapter, it is managed by the most 
independent investment authority (its use of a Reference Portfolio and risk-factor premiums to assess the 
fund’s underlying risk-return exposure and the value added by active management is discussed in the 
following two chapters). The primary means through which this separation is achieved is the 
establishment of a powerful board, which itself delegates significant powers to the executive; and the 
depoliticised process for the appointment of the board, which established what the fund calls “double 
arms-length independence”. 
The fund is managed by an independent investment authority, the Guardians of the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund, which is established in law as an “independent Crown entity”, which means that 
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while the government has a controlling interest - for example, by owning a majority of the voting shares or 
through having the power to appoint and replace a majority of the governing members, the management 
authority is “legally separate from the Crown”. The assets managed by the Guardians, however, belong to 
the Crown, that is, the government (New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 2015).  
As the operational manager, the Guardians is overseen by a Board of Governors, which according to the 
New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act of 2001, is appointed by the Governor 
General on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance. Critically, the Minister’s recommendation 
follows nominations from an independent nominating committee (which the minister appoints) and 
consultation with representatives of other political parties in Parliament. The role of the independent 
nomination committee for board appointments is significant here, as it establishes the “first arm” of the 
double arms-length independence of the Guardians of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund. Board 
members are selected based on a detailed set of professional criteria – such as experience in corporate 
governance, senior management, risk management, global investments and academic qualifications. Each 
board member is appointed for a term of up to five years and is eligible to be reappointed. There are no 
direct political appointees and no ex officio political officeholders on the board, which is designed by law 
to be small - consisting of five to seven members (New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 2015: 31). In short, 
the board of the Guardians of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund is the embodiment of the 
“professional board”, as opposed to the representative board model, referred to earlier in the chapter. 
The Guardians’ governing legislation and the Board Charter define board responsibilities and matters 
delegated to management. Formally, the Board is responsible for: (i) supervising the management of the 
Guardians and the investment of the fund; (ii) establishing the Guardians’ objectives, corporate strategy 
for achieving those objectives, the overall policy framework, and for monitoring management’s 
performance; (iii) ensuring the Fund’s assets and the Guardians’ assets are maintained under effective 
stewardship; and (iv) ensuring that decision-making authorities within the Guardians are clearly defined 
and that all applicable laws are complied with. (New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 2015: 31). In the 
model of delegated authority, the most critical task of the board (outside of a generic role in supervising 
management and acting as an institutional buffer between management, the ministry of finance and 
legislators) is that it specifies the fund’s Reference Portfolio – which, as discussed in Chapter 11, is 
simultaneously the articulation of the board’s view on the appropriate balance between risks and excepted 
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returns and the benchmark against which the added value of the Guardians is measured and assessed (the 
Reference Portfolio is a low-cost alternative to active management by the Guardians). This delegation of 
power from the government to the board for determining the reference portfolio is the second-arm of 
New Zealand’s double arms-length independence governance structure.  
The final aspect of the New Zealand governance model is an extraordinary commitment to transparency, 
disclosure and accountability. The list of policy and operational disclosures made by the fund is truly 
astonishing, including (but not limited to): quarterly, annual and long-term benchmarking of active 
management performance by the Guardians against its Reference Portfolio (broken down in terms of risk 
factors and asset classes); a full list of the names and mandates of external managers; external consultant 
reviews (and the Guardians’ response to these reviews); regular testimony before the legislature and 
frequent public presentations; a detailed breakdown of the fund’s actual portfolio holdings; granular 
information of operational expenses, remuneration packages (including, for example, the Chief 
Executive’s Officer base salary and the calculation of his/her bonus) and travel expenses of the members of 
the board and the executive; audits and financial statements. As mentioned earlier, the detail, quality and 
frequency of disclosure and accountability by the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, its board and its 
management authority establish a benchmark that not even the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund can 
match.  
Conclusion 
The chapter considered the ways in which countries have resolved a familiar tension in public policy: 
balancing the need or desire for operational independence for manager or investor of sovereign wealth, 
while at the same time preserving a degree of government control and oversight of such delegated 
authority. While the case for operational independence is based on a number of compelling reasons – 
performance, fears of a regulatory backlash, a desire to escape from public-sector pay scales, and the ring 
fencing of assets – this chapter has indicated that such independence is typically a matter of degree. In all 
cases discussed in this chapter, with the exception of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, the 
ministry of finance (or other political officers) retains at least de jure power to establish the most important 
determinant of the fund’s investment policy, namely its asset allocation.  
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When the institutional arrangements of sovereign wealth funds are compared to those of monetary 
authorities (as per the framework established in Chapter 5), an interpretation of the afore-mentioned 
observation could be that while governments are willing to give the investment authorities responsible for 
sovereign wealth fund a high degree of operational independence, the principle of “goal dependence” is 
typically preserved. In the same manner that governments retain the power to establish the goals of 
monetary policy and explicit policy targets (such as a numeric inflation target), they generally wish to 
preserve the power to establish sovereign wealth funds’ return targets, risk tolerance and asset allocation. 
In some cases, powers to exercise some degree of constrained discretion around those targets are 
delegated down to the board and the executive; while the New Zealand example is comparatively extreme 
in that the government delegates major policy-setting powers to the board (which it, moreover, does not 
directly appoint).  
Regardless of the exact institutional configuration of these powers, the examples discussed in this chapter 
show a generally high degree of public accountability from both entities responsible for major policy 
choices (target returns, risk tolerance, asset allocation and reference-portfolio selection) and entities 
responsible for investment implementation and operations. In a number of cases where the former 
remains under the control of the ministry of finance, such as Norway and Chile, concerns around 
potentially damaging political intervention into the investments of the sovereign wealth fund are reduced 
by the full transparency of the ministry’s policy choices, a high degree of public and expert consultation, 
and the adoption of uncontroversial investment policies. In the case of Kazakhstan, a lower level of 
transparency and the centralised concentration of power over the fund, provide less comfort around the 
potential for political intervention in the fund’s investment decisions. Finally, while the American 
permanent fund model has delivered positive results over a number of years, the heavy use of consultants 
and external funds is not only potentially problematic from a cost perspective, but also risks a dilution of 
institutional ownership of key decisions around these funds’ asset allocation policies (which are typically 
fairly complex and risk orientated, with significant allocations to illiquid alternative asset classes).  
Ultimately, there is a degree of cross-country variation in emphasis between delegated and centralised 
control over the investment policies and operations of sovereign wealth funds. The country-specific 
balance between political ownership of policy and delegated authority for investment operations is not 
only a function of the political system and characteristic of the countries, but also of the degree of 
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discretion permitted by the investment strategy – if the investment strategy itself is highly non-
discretionary, the discussion around the degree of delegated authority becomes less important, as there is 
essentially less power to delegate in the first place. For long-term investors, such as investment-income 
and savings type sovereign wealth funds, asset allocation (and its more sophisticated extension in the form 
of risk-factor allocation) is the fundamental determinant of long-term investment performance, and hence 
the most critical investment-policy choice. The following chapter addresses the analysis of this policy 
choice, while the final chapter considers the use of various rule-based policies by accountable public 
investment authorities that potentially add value beyond the fundamental policy choices reflected in asset 
and risk-factor allocations.  
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Chapter 11  
Shadows and siren calls:  
Rules and contracts in delegated sovereign wealth fund investment management 
In Homer’s The Odyssey, Ulysses invents a cunning plan to resist the charms of the sirens. Upon learning 
that their song drove sailors temporarily insane, Ulysses instructes his men to tie his hands to the mast of 
the ship and for wax to be poured into his sailors’ ears, to ensure they cannot hear the sirens’ song. Ulysses, 
however, is able to listen to sirens, safe in the knowledge that, being bound to the mast, he is incapable of 
leading his ship astray. Although Ulysses faces a moment of crisis, as he too goes momentarily mad upon 
hearing the sirens, and attempts to break free from the mast, the plan ultimately works and the ship 
proceeds safely on course to Ithaca.  
Pre-commitment devices of this nature have come to be known as Ulysses contracts or Ulysses pacts, and 
have wide-ranging applications. In medical practice, advance directives (or “living wills”) are a form of 
Ulysses contract, established to avoid confusion around whether decisions made by a patient during an 
initial state of health still apply when the patient has entered a different state of health. The use of Ulysses 
contracts is also common in the area of portfolio management as a means to “protect the portfolio from ad 
hoc revisions of sound long-term policy…when short-term exigencies are most distressing and the policy is 
most in doubt” (Ellis, 2013). Financial planners often force their clients to sign Ulysses contracts to avoid 
behavioural errors and irrational reactions to losses. Institutional investors similarly tie their hands to the 
mast through a set of publicly disclosed investment rules.  
In matters of public policy, rules serve an additional function beyond pre-commitment: they are 
institutional devices that promote the accountability of public institutions that exercise delegated 
authority. Chapter 5 discussed the notion that transparent rules are a way through which to distinguish 
between “normal” and “discretionary” decisions by public authorities with delegated powers (Du Plessis, 
2003). This second function of rules assumes a degree of transparency (if not to the broad public, then to a 
selected non-democratic audience or constituency, such a ruling elite) around both the nature of the rule 
and discretionary policy actions that deviate from it. The rule gives practical meaning to the concept of 
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accountability, as it provides a benchmark against which to monitor and assess discretionary actions that 
differ from the rule.  
Chapter 5 discussed this function of rules in reference to monetary policy. An example from the practice of 
public investment can be found at the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, the country’s sovereign 
wealth fund. The fund’s “reference portfolio”, established by its board, is the primary means through which 
the incremental contribution of its independent investment-management team (the Guardians) is 
measured and assessed. In communicating this function of the reference portfolio, the fund’s management 
refers to it as a “shadow portfolio”, which they need to outperform in order for the investment-
management team to demonstrate “the value we are adding through our active investment strategies” 
(New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 2016).  
The shadow or reference portfolio establishes a high hurdle: not only is it specified so as to be capable of 
meeting the fund’s objectives over time (with an aggressive 80% allocation to equities), but it consists 
entirely of passive, low-cost and listed investments that match the fund’s long-term investment horizon 
and risk profile. The implication is that the reference portfolio is a notional low-cost, rule-based alternative 
to the more elaborate institutional structure that exists in practice, involving a board and an independent 
investment-management institution. The fact that the shadow portfolio would still get the job done 
establishes clarity “on the ‘hurdles’ for active investments” by those exercising delegated authority (New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund, 2016). The well-paid and well-resourced team investing the fund’s assets 
needs to demonstrate its worth by emerging – at least in the long run – from the shadow of their reference 
portfolio. 
This chapter will consider a number of critical institutional arrangements that can be employed to govern 
the agency relationship between the “owners” of a sovereign wealth fund (the principal, such as a Minister 
of Finance or its own agent, the board) and an independent investment-management authority (the 
agent). The discussion starts by framing these institutional arrangements in terms of the content of the 
most critical document – described here as a contract between the principal and agent – governing this 
agency relationship, namely an “Investment Policy Statement”, before proceeding to discuss the design 
and implementation of three specific rules that should form of this document. 
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11.1 .  The Investment Policy Statement:  a contract between principals and agents 
An number of uncontroversial principles in the resolution of agency problems are to reduce information 
asymmetries between the principal and the agent, to clarify the expected actions of agents and to establish 
mechanisms for monitoring and measuring performance – ideally, in the form of a contract (Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 2005). In delegated asset-management relationships in the field of institutional investment, 
the most common contract is an “Investment Policy Statement”. This form of contract is used in a range of 
investment relationships, including private wealth management, when portfolio managers attempt to bind 
their clients to time-consistent policies (a Ulysses contract). They are particularly appropriate for long-
term public investors, where there are established expectations of transparency and accountability.  
The establishment (and periodic review) of a sovereign wealth fund’s Investment Policy Statement is 
usually an extension and clarification of a governing law. A number of foundational concepts – the 
function and purpose of the fund, the governance of the investment process, and possibly the articulation 
of the expected return of the fund through a numeric long-term return target, risk budget and investment 
horizon – are really the domain of the principal. More granular elements of the Investment Policy 
Statement can be arrived at through a more collaborative and iterative interaction between the principal 
and agent (most commonly through the Board’s Investment Committee, which includes representatives 
of both the principal and the agent). No matter how interactive the process is, good governance demands 
that the “buck stops” with the principal (or, specifically, the Board) with respect to the approval of the 
Investment Policy Statement. The more collaborative elements include the long-term asset allocation, the 
specification of benchmarks or reference portfolios, and a periodic rebalancing rule.97 The most important 
elements of any sovereign wealth fund’s Investment Policy Statement are as follows. 
• Function and purpose: as noted in Chapter 4, clarity is required around whether the fund
serves a stabilisation or saving function; and beyond this whether it is a fiscal or currency
stabilisation fund, and a future-generations or investment-income fund.
• Governance of  investment process: the Investment Policy Statement should clarify the
distribution of powers and responsibilities of all the policy, operational and supervisory
97 If the investment model is comparatively simple, permitting limited discretion by the agent, the principal may 
author the majority of the Investment Policy Statement, as it reduces the agent’s role to a largely administrative one. 
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institutions involved in the governance of the sovereign wealth fund, as per the various models 
discussed in Chapter 10.98 
• Return objectives,  r isk  tolerance and investment horizon:  the most basic building
blocks of any investor’s investment strategy are a statement of the owner or principal’s
expectations of the fund’s return, which cannot be contemplated without a concomitant statement
of the fund’s risk tolerance and investment horizon. These elements (particularly the latter two)
are often missing from sovereign wealth fund’s governing framework, but agents benefit from
having them clearly articulated. Asymmetric information and incomplete contracts are in neither
the principal nor the agent’s best interest.
• Long-term asset  a l location: Chapter 10 identified that the allocation of power for these
fundamental decisions generally serve as a litmus test for the degree of delegated authority in
sovereign wealth fund management. The inclusion of the asset- or risk-factor allocation in the
Investment Policy Statement is a useful device for managing agency relationships: based on
historic data and/or capital-market assumptions, the operational manager (and external advisors)
can promote an asset- and risk-factor allocation that is appropriate in light of the owner’s return
expectations. The principal may specify the asset allocation or reference portfolio in terms of low-
cost, passive and tradable asset classes, leaving the agent to design and implement a more
complex (and more costly) investment strategy in response.99
• Benchmarks or  reference portfol io:  under a conventional strategic asset allocation
approach, asset-class benchmarks are included as a means to measure and monitor the
performance of the agent. For example, if the strategic asset allocation is expressed at 60% global
equities and 40% global fixed income, the respective benchmarks for delegated management may
be the MSCI World Index (equities) and the Citigroup World Government Bond Index. A more
sophisticated risk-factor allocation approach – which looks through conventional asset-class labels
– are best suited to the specification of a low-cost reference portfolio.
• Rebalancing rule: periodic portfolio rebalancing is an essential part of long-term portfolio
management. It can be achieved through a rule-based approach. As the principal, the owner or
98 The Investment Policy Statement might include an articulation of what is expected from external managers and 
how they will be selected, monitored and evaluated. External managers may be selected due to the operational and 
budget constraints of the agent, a belief in the existence of investment talent, or because the external management fee 
structure is sufficiently low to justify external reliance over building internal investment capacity and infrastructure. 
The Investment Policy Statement can be used to clarify these issues, and establish a ranking of factors that enter the 
selection, monitoring and evaluation process (for example: fees, performance, track record, human resource and 
capacity building).  
99 An increasing number of investors include an articulation of “investment beliefs” into their Investment Policy 
Statement. The reason for this is that beliefs around the efficiency versus occasional irrationality of financial markets, 
the value of external asset managers and their ability to generate “alpha” (excess returns over the benchmark), and the 
degree of predictability and mean reversion in assets and asset classes have implications for the strategies pursued by 
the operational manager (for example, a belief in mean reversion bolsters the case for periodic rebalancing, much as a 
belief that certain markets behave [predictably] irrationally bolsters the case for pursuing active management 
strategies around market timing).  
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Board of the sovereign wealth fund may simply insist on having a rebalancing rule, while giving 
the operational manager a degree of discretion in designing the rule. 
Given the principal-agent relationship between the owner and the manager of a sovereign wealth fund, 
the Investment Policy Statement serves as a contract between the principal (owner or the Board that it 
appoints) and the agent (manager). The focus of this chapter is on the last three (the more interactive – 
and potentially controversial) items of the Investment Policy Statement 
11 .2.  The importance of  long-term asset al location 
The literature on long-term portfolio choice distinguishes between strategic and tactical asset allocation 
(Cochrane, 1999b, Ibbotson and Kaplan, 2000 and Ang, 2014). Strategic asset allocation is the process 
through which investors determine their long-run holding or weights to different type of assets, and is an 
articulation of an investor’s desired exposure to expected risk and return. Strategic asset allocation can be 
described as a top-down, low-frequency decision between asset classes in contrast to bottom-up, higher-
frequency choices within asset classes, based on attempts to select superior assets and avoiding inferior 
ones ( “asset-“ or “stock-picking”) or to time the purchase and sales of specific assets based on perceived 
predictability in cyclical or mean-reverting asset price movements (“market timing”). An intermediate step 
is called tactical asset allocation, which makes annual or semi-annual “over- and under-weight” deviations 
from the strategic asset allocation, but still understood in terms of choices between, rather than within, 
asset classes (Ang, 2014).  
The empirical literature on portfolio management has long underlined the overwhelming explanatory 
power of strategic asset allocation over observed investment returns. The seminal study in this literature, 
by Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986), found that more than 90% of the variation in investment 
performance is explained by strategic asset allocation. Since then, the discussion has evolved to examine 
the robustness of this finding to different sample periods, clarifying that it pertained to the variation in 
returns (rather than their levels); and a decomposition of cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of 
variation. Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) unpacked the evidence across these two statistical dimensions. 
They found that 90% of the variation in investment performance within a single fund over time (a time-
series question) and around 40% of the variation in investment performance between funds (a cross-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
298 
sectional question) was explained by strategic asset allocation. Three-quarters of the variation in time-
series returns is found to be due to market movement (“general asset allocation”), with the “remaining 
portion split roughly evenly between the specific asset allocation and active management” (Ibbotson, 
2010). If the decision to be exposed to market volatility – which, for Ibbotson, 2010, essentially amounts to 
holding stocks rather than cash – is interpreted as part of the asset allocation decision, the basic insight of 
Brinson et. al. (1986) stands: asset allocation is the dominant determinant of long-run investment 
performance for any particular fund.  
Strategic asset allocation choices reflect deeply held policy preferences, whose importance to the long-
term investment performance of a sovereign wealth fund are of a different magnitude than, for example, 
the ability to predict short-term movements in financial markets or select the “best” fund managers. The re 
are two major conceptual frameworks through which the ultimate “owner” of a sovereign wealth fund’s 
long-term investment policy may assess asset and risk-factor allocation choices. The simplest, and most 
widely used, way to arrive at a target or “strategic” asset allocation is based on conventional (liquid, 
publicly traded) assets classes, in which the variance of expected returns is the measure of the only source 
of risk: general, undiversifiable market volatility. Following this, many institutional investors add a range 
of alternative (illiquid, private-market) asset classes to the portfolio mix.100 The bottom-line of the risk-
factor approach is that asset returns are rewards for exposure to a combination or “bundle” of risks, and 
that investors with an ability to be exposed to a number of well-identified risks have a myriad of ways to 
capture the rewards associated with them. 
11 .2 .1 .  Simple  strategic  al location models  based traded asset  c lasses 
A useful starting point for a sovereign wealth fund is to focus on the efficiency that can be achieved by 
simply diversifying between stocks and bonds – described by Benjamin Graham (1949), the intellectual 
progenitor of long-term investment theory, as “the two major investment mediums”. The allocation 
decision between stocks and bonds has been a mainstay of institutional and personal investors for at least 
a century – leading sovereign wealth funds, including those of Chile, Botswana and Norway, are simply 
100 The term “alternative assets” covers many different types of assets of which the common characteristic is that they 
are traded in private, not public, markets. 
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diversified stock-bond investors.101 A simple stock-bond allocation incorporates the theoretical insights of 
Modern Portfolio Theory following Markowitz (1952), its subsequent expansion into the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model or CAPM (Treynor, 1961; Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; and Mossin, 1966); as well as the 
empirical evidence captured by the likes of Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) and Ibbotson (2010). 
The case for the simple model rests on both analytical and pragmatic grounds. Analytically, stock-bond 
allocations achieve a high degree of efficient diversification. Stocks confer equity rights to asset owners, 
with returns largely determined by profits and earnings; while bonds are debt instruments, with returns 
largely determined by interest payments and creditworthiness. Consequently, investors often distinguish 
between other types of assets having either bond- or equity-like returns (or some combination thereof). 
Empirically, leading bond indexes historically have amongst the lowest correlations of returns to leading 
stock indexes: emerging-market equities, absolute-return strategies, hedge funds, private equity and real-
estate investment trusts all have higher historical correlations to US equities than US government bonds 
or a broad-based US bond index (Leibowitz, Bova and Hammond, 2010: 10). So dominant are stock and 
bond allocations that a leading authority on factor investing classifies stocks and bonds as factors in their 
own right, and notes that “even without adding alternative asset classes, the equity-bond factor decision is 
the most important one…(as) it explains the majority of the variation in performance” (Ang, 2014: 445). 
Strategic asset allocation decisions are also influenced by more pragmatic constraints, which can be 
fruitfully analysed through the lens of institutional economics. As public investors managing citizens’ 
money, sovereign wealth funds may have limited appetite for “headline risk”. Default risk, which is a 
significant driver of returns on assets such as emerging-market credit and corporate bonds, are a major 
source of headline risk, and hence unsuitable for most sovereign wealth funds. Another practical 
consideration is whether the fund has sufficient institutional capacity to either manage operationally 
complex asset classes (for example, real estate, private equity and infrastructure) in house or through 
external managers (fees on alternative asset classes are much higher than those for liquid, traded assets).  
Investments in private equity, real estate and infrastructure, in particular, are operationally complex and 
expensive. They require, for example, direct engagement with the management of entities invested in and 
legal expertise to establish and negotiate contracts – in both instances due to the fact that the assets are 
101 Norway’s sovereign wealth fund in 2011 diversified beyond stocks and bonds into real estate to a maximum of 10% 
of its portfolio, but is yet to increase its effective weight to the asset class to the target level as of 2016.  
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not traded on public markets or exchanges. These features raise the transaction costs associated with 
investing in private assets, which are much higher than those possible for investors in public assets, 
particularly with the proliferation of low-cost passive, index-based alternatives to active management in 
public markets.102 Finally, to the extent that stocks and bonds are traded on public markets, they enhance 
transparency. Particularly for new sovereign wealth funds still in the process of establishing credibility, 
investments in private assets for which information on prices, risk and performance is not easily 
scrutinised can be problematic. In contrast, publicly traded stocks, bond and indexes can be valued and 
monitored in real time, both by the fund and by external observers.  
The normative prescriptions of Modern Portfolio Theory and the CAPM is that all investors should hold 
the same efficient market portfolio, arrived at through a simple optimisation based on expected means, 
variances and co-variances of stock and bond markets. A less risk-averse investor is not advised to hold a 
greater allocation of stocks, but rather to increase risk exposure by borrowing cash and investing it in the 
market portfolio – the same portfolio held by more risk-averse investors, only in smaller proportion relative 
to cash. Under Modern Portfolio Theory asset allocation only shifts when the investor believes that some 
permanent change in the covariance between stock and bond returns has occurred. The more challenging, 
and introspective, decision lies in determining how much exposure to market risk is suitable, given the 
investor’s risk tolerance and risk-bearing capacity.  
The efficient “market portfolio” is a theoretical construct. Its closest real-life approximation is the 60/40 
portfolio (60% allocation to stocks and 40% to bonds), which is widely used as either an actual portfolio or 
benchmark – it is, for example, the benchmark of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund (Chambers, 
Dimson and Ilmanen, 2011). Cochrane (1999a) attributes the prominence of the 60/40 portfolio to the 
proximate market-capitalisation weighting of the traded financial system: “The overall market is about 
60% stocks and 40% bonds, so average levels of risk aversion, whatever they are, wind up at this value.” In 
that sense, 60/40 portfolios serve as a proxy for the market portfolio, and is also described as a balance 
portfolio.  
102 Public exchanges for trading in debt and stock instruments emerged as means through which to reduce 
transaction costs. More recently, passive index products for public stocks and bonds, including exchange-traded 
funds, serve a similar function.  
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Few investors strictly follow the recommendations of Modern Portfolio Theory. Canner, Mankiw and 
Weil (1997) described an “asset allocation puzzle” according to which more risk-tolerant investors do not 
borrow to invest in the market portfolio, but rather simple increase their exposure to risk assets (equities); 
and vice versa. However, these deviations from theoretical advice have been explained at the hand of 
credit frictions, borrowing constraints and the correlation of non-portfolio income to either stocks or 
bonds. In practice, a number of sovereign wealth funds – again, Botswana, Chile and Norway are clear 
examples – have started with a bond-heavy balanced allocation and gradually increased their equity 
weighting (with maximum allocations of 70% to either asset class).  
1 1 .2 .2 .  Advanced asset  a l location through risk-factor  models  
Mean-variance analysis treats risk in a narrowly defined way. Risk is volatility, measured by the standard 
deviation or variance of an asset or a portfolio of assets. In reality, other risk dimensions enter the 
equation. A multi-dimensional understanding of risk assumes that not all risks are the same to all 
investors. Once risk is defined across a range of dimensions, a more granular perspective on the different 
kinds of risk that investors either want exposure to or, alternatively, cannot afford to be exposed to (and 
are therefore willing to pay in order to avoid), can be gained. 
An insurance fund with contingent short-term liabilities (claims) has to assume a relatively short 
investment horizon and a preference (or need) for liquidity, on at least part of its portfolio. If the fund is 
sufficiently capitalised and has the prospect of stable funding contributions over the long-run, it may be 
willing to assume some degree of traditional volatility risk, as long as the assets are liquid and can be sold 
in the event of a large contingent payout. In contrast a long-term sovereign investor, with a ten-year 
investment horizon, does not need as much liquidity – and can therefore demand compensation for 
exposure to that risk through an illiquid asset, such as real estate or private equity. The insurer, 
meanwhile, effectively “pays” or foregoes the additional illiquidity factor premium. A similar illustration 
can be made based on oil-price exposure. Certain assets and asset classes have an inherent factor exposure 
to oil – for example, the currencies of oil-exporting countries (ranging from the Canadian dollar to the 
Nigeria naira), the stocks of oil-producing and –servicing companies, and the bonds of the same countries 
and companies. This factor exposure drives at least part of the return on these assets is the oil price – and 
is distinct from the market-volatility factor. The sovereign wealth fund of an oil-importing country (Korea) 
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is better placed to gain compensation for exposure to the oil-price factor than a counterpart from an oil-
exporting country (Kuwait).  
The bottom line in the factor approach is that investors are rewarded for holding assets that are going to 
perform poorly under certain conditions, which Ang (2014) describes as “bad times”. However, factor 
theory differs from the CAPM-inspired mean-variance approach to the extent that it recognises that “bad 
times” or “risk” means different things to different investors. Whereas the CAPM has a single risk factor, 
market volatility (one beta), multi-factor theory assumes a range of risk factors (multiple betas). Multi-
factor theories have been gaining ground in terms of both academic theory and practice since a landmark 
paper on Arbitrage Pricing Theory by Ross (1976) and the subsequent three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1992 and 1993). Ross’ contribution were mostly of a theoretical nature, while Fama and French’s 
work added empirical support for and a parsimonious model of factor returns.   
Multi-factor theory extends the CAPM theory, rather than revolutionising it. Ang (2014) argues that the 
CAPM is a factor theory, albeit one with a single (which happens to be the single most important) factor. 
The following stylised list of lessons for the asset owner from the CAPM and multi-factor, following Ang 
(2014: 205) and Cochrane (1999a), underlines the similarities between these two workhorse theoretical 
models of portfolio theory – as well as the areas in which factor theory has introduced new subtleties. 
Lesson #1: Diversify – assess exposure to a factor, not individual assets 
The most important lesson of Modern Portfolio Theory and the CAPM is that diversification is efficient. 
Combining assets that are not perfectly correlated in a portfolio provides the best possible return for a 
given level of risk (volatility), as it gets rid of the inadequately rewarded idiosyncratic risk of individual 
assets. A diversified portfolio is still exposed to the most fundamental driver of returns: market (sometimes 
called “systematic”) risk, which cannot be diversified away. Investors need to determine how much 
exposure to market risk they are willing and able to bare. 
Multi-factor theories also conceive of the returns as compensation for bearing bundles of underlying risk 
factors. In competitive markets, the return on underlying factor-based drivers of asset returns are priced in 
equilibrium by the interaction of “buyers” and “sellers” of that particular factor exposure. Again, investors 
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should avoid thinking about a portfolio’s return in terms of individual assets, but rather as compensation 
for exposure to a range of risk factors, most efficiently accessed (or hedged against) through combining a 
variety of assets.  
Lesson #2: Risk tolerance is defined relative to the average investor 
The CAPM makes provision for heterogeneous agents. Investors have varying degrees of risk aversion, 
which determines the degree of exposure they hold to the market portfolio. The supply-and-demand of 
risk appetite determines the return on market volatility in equilibrium. The same logic applies in a multi-
factor world. Now the price of assets are determined by the balance of supply and demand for a range of 
risks, not just volatility. The different risk tolerances of heterogeneous investors - interpreted not just in 
terms of volatility but a range of risks – is what creates a market for trading assets that bundle together a 
number of fundamental, underlying risk factors.  
In the CAPM, the “average investor” holds the market portfolio and the market portfolio only. Investors 
that are more risk tolerant than the average investor increases exposure to the market portfolio (through 
borrowing), and the more risk averse investor reduces it (by holding more cash). Multi-factor models 
apply the same logic across a range of risk factors: most investors do not want to hold large exposure to 
stocks that are highly cyclical, because their own wealth and income is correlated with the same risk 
factor. Hence, cyclical stocks tend to carry an additional risk premium over the broad index. If you differ 
from the average investor in terms of your willingness to hold cyclical assets, a healthy premium is (or 
should be) on offer. The task of the asset owner is not so much to about finding great individual 
investments, but rather to understand its multi-dimensional nature of risk tolerance and sensitivity relative 
to the rest of the market: “figure out what risks you do not face, but that give rise to an average return 
premium in the market because most other investors do face these risks.” (Cochrane, 1999a).  
Lesson #3: Returns are rewards for bad outcomes - capture them if you can tolerate bad outcomes 
In both traditional and multi-risk factor models the expected return on assets are the reward for the fact 
that they expected to perform poorly under certain circumstances – or as Ang (2014) refers to it, “bad 
times”. The CAPM has a single definition for bad times: volatility. All investors dislike volatility, they just 
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have differing degrees of willingness and ability to handle it. In multi-factor models, “bad times” is more 
complicated – importantly, what one investors regards are really bad times, might only be somewhat bad 
(or even positive) for another. It follows that assets that continue to pay off during periods widely 
regarded as bad times (that is, most investors dislike them strongly) will have lower expected returns. This 
goes back to the average-investor point above: most investors prefer assets that are expected to be 
relatively stable for the economic cycle (such as high-dividend stocks and investment-grade sovereign 
bonds), rather than recession-exposed ones (high-yield credit, value stocks and emerging-market equities). 
Hence, the expected return on the former is relatively low, as the demand for such assets are high.  
Lesson #4: Risk-factor exposures dominate long-term returns 
The general consensus, even amongst prominent advocates of exposures to a variety of risk factors (Ang, 
2014, Leibowiz et. al., 2010, and Swensen, 2000), is that the market-risk factor is the dominant 
determinant of returns (which is why a simple stock-bond allocation is a good starting point). Empirical 
investigations of long-term investment performance using “factor screens” have found that additional 
factors explain the majority of returns that are left unattributed to the market-volatility factor (see Fama 
and French, 1993; Ang, Goetzmann and Schaefer, 2009; Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen, 2013; and 
Ang, Brandt and Denison, 2014). Risk-factor decomposition is merely a more sophisticated way of 
thinking about asset allocation than the traditional approach based on asset classes only.   
There are a number of reasons why established sovereign wealth funds, in particular, should assess their 
return potential in terms of risk-factor exposure. The first is the above-mentioned emphasis on the long 
term: while idiosyncratic, non-factor explanations for returns may be evident over short time periods, 
these tend to disappear and cancel each other out in the long run. Second, to the extent idiosyncratic, non-
factor returns exist, they are typically exploitable only by a small number of fast movers in the market 
(before they are arbitraged away) and only on a relatively small scale. Sovereign wealth funds are typically 
comparatively slow-moving investors (with deliberately rule-based decision-making and execution 
processes, given their public nature), managing large portfolios, limiting the scope of exploitable non-
factor based opportunistic investments (Ang and Kjaer, 2012).  
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Lesson #5: Focus on risk-factor premiums that have a reason to persist 
There are sharply diminishing returns to attempting to uncover new factors. The market-volatility factor 
is dominant; and that beyond this, the literature initially focused on only two additional factors to explain 
stock returns, “size” and “value” (Fama and French, 1992 and 1993); and later added a more contested 
fourth factor, “momentum” (Carhart, 1997). These studies resulted in the so-called three- and four-factor 
models, that enjoy considerable academic support. Even for more complex global portfolios that include 
emerging markets and additional asset classes, Ang (2014) suggests that there no more than 10 
academically supported factors in total. The most famous and uncontroversial tradable risk factors103 are 
summarised in Table 11.1. The discussion here is largely focused on the analysis of factor in equity markets, 
but factors exist across asset classes – indeed, as discussed below, the full embrace of the risk-factor 
approach calls for looking through traditional asset-class categories.  
Note from Table 11.1 that there are competing explanations for risk factors, ranging for those based on 
rational foundations to ones that require the assumption of behavioural irrationality. Moreover, it is not 
always clear if risk-factor labels are accurate: are the purported risks really independent of one another – 
for example, is the purported size factor, simply compensation for illiquidity and/or default risk? A general 
implication from the literature on factor theory is that the value factor enjoys the most support, and is 
(along with the illiquidity premium) the most naturally applicable to long-term investors. Ang (2014) 
suggest criteria that investors can apply in identifying factors: First, factors should be supported by 
academic research. This threshold includes both theoretical underpinnings – which may be rational or 
behaviourally founded – and robust empirical evidence. Research may conclusively identify new factors, 
but this an extremely low-frequency event, that should be subjected to a significant burden of proof. It is 
important that the sample includes significant period of “bad times”, when assets loaded with the factor in 
question perform poorly.  
103 The literature has distinguished between two broad types of factors, although the difference can become blurry. 
The first group of factors is called “fundamental” or “macro” factors that are based on macroeconomic developments, 
such as economic growth, demographics and productivity, that affect all assets albeit in varying degrees. The second 
group is called “dynamic”, “tradable” or “style” factors that can be actively traded in market, by going long or short 
different groups of assets, and for which there typically exits a supply-demand relationship based on differing abilities 
and appetites for exposure to the underlying risk (Ang, 2014). 
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Table 11 .1 :  Established tradable  r isk  factors  in  addition to market  volati l i ty  
Description Logic & explanations 
Value Difference in returns 
between “value” stocks 
(low price-to-book and 
earnings growth) and 
“growth” stocks (high 
price-to-book and 
earnings) stocks  
Arguments in the rational paradigm include that firms with low price-
to-book ratios have less flexible investment structures, and are hence 
more exposed to shocks (Cochrane, 1996 and Zhang, 2005).  
Behavioural explanations include that investors overestimate or 
extrapolate from positive earnings momentum on growth stocks, and 
vice versa for value stocks (Lakonishok et. al., 1994); or make mental 
accounting and framing errors around past losses on value stocks 
(Barberis and Huang, 2001).  
Momentum Captures effect of going 
long a cross-section of 
stocks with past high 
returns and short stocks 
with past low returns 
Momentum is largely explained on behavioural grounds. However, 
rationalist theories suggest that momentum is related to (and 
dependent upon) monetary-policy regimes and liquidity cycles – that is, 
“momentum” may in fact be concealing other factors, notably liquidity 
and macro factors (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003). 
Behavioural arguments include trend-chasing investor behaviour and 
irrational exuberance (or irrational panic); or “overreaction”, as per 
Barberis, Schleifer and Vishny (1998).  
Size Difference in returns 
between small- and large-
market capitalisation 
stocks 
Rational explanations suggest that companies with small market 
capitalisations tend to be less liquid, at higher risk of default, and 
possibly more exposed to market and economic downturns – again, 
factor the small-cap premium may in fact be a proxy for other risk 
factors. 
Behavioural arguments suggest that investors overemphasise large-cap 
stocks due to headline effects and benchmark inclusion. 
Credit  Differences between 
yield on bonds by AAA 
and sub-Investment 
Grade issuers 
Explanations are largely rational: excess returns are compensation for 
the risk of default, which is a risk distinct from market volatility and 
other risk factors. 
Liquidity  Additional returns on 
less liquid stocks and 
bonds, and other assets.  
Explanations are largely rational: excess returns are compensation for 
the fact that less liquid securities and assets may not be tradable at will 
and have higher transaction costs.  
Second, factors should be expected to persist based on economic logic. Sustainable factors emerge as an 
equilibrium outcome due to the preferences (multi-dimensional risk tolerance) of heterogeneous investors: 
some investors, for example, are willing to have greater-than-average exposure to the economic cycle, and 
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can consequently capture the value-factor premium by investing in value stocks that are undervalued 
relative to their long-term value, but more exposed to economic downswings. Others are less able to do 
so, and are hence willing to forgo premiums by eschewing value stocks. This supply-demand relationship 
can be assumed to persist in perpetuity, thereby preserving the value factor.  
Finally, exposure to the factor must be achievable and cost effective. Typically, this means that a factor 
must be tradable and, all things equal, this criteria strongly favours liquid markets. Ang (2014) points out 
that investing in illiquid, private-market instruments (such as private equity) is not the only way to capture 
the illiquidity premium: investors wishing to gain exposure to the illiquidity factor premium can also 
“overweight” less liquid stocks in a benchmark or index, while short-selling more liquid ones. This may 
prove to be a more tradable and cost effective way of capturing the illiquidity factor than investing in 
private-market assets. Most factors can be harvested (or hedged against) in a variety of manners, not least 
through increasingly popular, low-cost factor indexes.  
11 .3.  Specifying benchmarks and reference portfolios  
The case for active management – the argument that investors can “outperform” the market through the 
expression of various forms of “talent”, such as a persistently superior market, the ability to identify pricing 
anomalies (mispricing) ex ante, and security selection (picking “winning” securities) – enjoys limited 
academic support. Many unresolved controversies remain between adherents of efficient markets, for 
whom the appearance of above-benchmark returns are really just the result of luck or disguised (factor) 
risk taking; and those who believe markets exhibit not only periodic episodes of irrationality, but that 
those episodes are systematically exploitable in order to generate excess returns. Despite these 
philosophical differences, there is significant agreement on two empirical facts around the degree of 
efficiency in financial markets and the costs involved with trying to outperform them: (i) the most liquid 
and well-researched markets that approach efficiency and gains from active management are rarely, and 
certainly not reliably, realised over successive of periods (over and above returns on risk factors); and (ii) 
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when excess returns are indeed generated in a liquid market, it is generally eroded by management and 
performance fees.104  
Despite this evidence, most asset owners – and their agents – continue to believe in investment and 
expenses in pursuit of outperformance. If the asset allocation process is simple, based on leading asset 
classes (most public assets, as per the stock-bond portfolios described earlier; but also permitting 
allocations to alternative asset classes, such as real estate and private equity), the common practice is to 
simply select any one of a number of published country-specific and cross-country aggregate benchmarks 
per asset class. As with the underlying asset allocation process associated with this approach, the use of 
common public asset-class benchmarks is sub-optimal, but defendable on the basis of simplicity and 
pragmatism.    
More established sovereign wealth funds should, however, do better. Multiple risk-factor models suggest 
that the traditional focus on asset-class labels, while not exactly flawed, can paint an incomplete picture 
about the true sources of risk and return in a portfolio. The ability to look through asset-class labels and 
identify the combination of underlying risk factors associated with an investment improves investors’ 
ability to assess the risk-return implications of an investment. This has implications for the way in which 
the performance of operationally independent operational managers (and their own external manager) are 
evaluated; and for the way portfolio decisions are made across asset classes, using a reference-portfolio 
approach.  
A practical application of factor theory in the context of delegated asset management is a recognition that 
third-party managers should not be allowed to simply harvest established factor premiums (that are not 
captured by leading market-capitalisation based indexes), and claim the ensuing outperformance of the 
index benchmark to be the evidence of the purported benefits of active management. This is not a 
hypothetical concern, but one that cuts to the core of the practice of delegated asset management. In the 
largely positive evaluation of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, Ang et. al.’s (2009) empirical analysis, 
104 The articles contained in the symposium on “The Growth of the Financial Sector” in the Spring 2013 edition of the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, particularly Cochrane (2013) and Malkiel (2013), provide excellent summaries of 
the consensus around the empirical literature on the value of pre- and post-fee active asset management. The 
previously mentioned disclosure of “investment beliefs” by long-term institutional investors, such as the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund, typically reflects these points.  
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for example, found that the fund pays external managers for capturing a series of factor premiums that 
could be accessed at a fraction of the cost through factor-adjusted indexes: 
“Overall external equity management has enjoyed a modest level of success, but the active returns 
of external fixed income funds have been very poor…large exposures of active external returns to 
systematic factors suggest that active external management has not reflected a large component of 
unique management ability…much of the behaviour of the Fund’s small active return can be 
explained in terms of systematic factors. Our recommendation is that these exposures are, in 
general, appropriate but that they should be brought into the benchmark and that the Fund’s 
average exposure to these factors should be a “top-down” decision rather than emerging as a 
byproduct of “bottom-up” active management (Ang et. al., 2009).   
The bottom line from the ascent of risk-factor theory, and the concomitant proliferation of low-cost factor 
indexes, for large asset owners is that the decision to own a risk factor is a deeply introspective decision, 
taken at the top of the institution, based on a fundamental assessment of multi-dimensional risk tolerance, 
rather than something the asset owner should pay for through active management. Active management 
and investment talent, if it does exist and claims added value, needs to do so in excess of risk-factor 
exposures. Practically, this means active mandates need to be assessed relative to factor-adjusted 
benchmarks, rather than generic, broad market index benchmarks. As Ang noted in an article, co-
authored with the former head of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, Knut Kjaer, “factor indices are 
the best way to benchmark active portfolio managers: if momentum or volatility risk can be done cheaply, 
then why should we pay 2-20105 for a hedge fund manager to do it?” (Ang and Kjaer, 2012). 
The multiple risk-factor approach can be used to analyse specific investments and assess if the (expected) 
return is commensurate with the asset’s underlying risk exposures. The example of private equity is 
instructive, not least because it is one of the most popular methods of diversification for long-term 
investors (often through extremely expensive third-party funds and delegated managers). Private equity 
has higher expected returns than listed equity, although the dispersion of private-equity returns is much 
wider than that for liquid assets. But what are the risk factors underlying this higher return expectation? 
Even less risky leveraged buy-out style private equity (as opposed to venture capital) bundles together an 
extraordinary combination of risk factors. At a minimum, it includes the traditional CAPM market-risk 
factor (which is pervasive – and in this case directly impacts the asset due to the valuation of “exits” from 
105 The term is industry jargon for the widely used fee structure of 2% flat fee on assets under management, plus 20 
basis points on returns over the benchmark. 
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private holdings), interest-rate risk (private equity structures are typically levered), the size premium, 
default risk and illiquidity risk (private equity funds typically have multi-year holding periods). 
Given their long investment horizons, sovereign wealth funds may be well positioned to capture a number 
of these risk premiums. Private equity may indeed be a suitable investment. However, a factor-based 
decomposition of returns enables the investor to answer four interrelated and fundamental questions in an 
informed way: (i) what are the underlying risk factors that determine an investment’s expected return?; (ii) 
how am I placed (relative to the average investor) to be exposed to these risk – how am I different?; (iii) 
are the expected returns on a particular investment sufficient compensation for exposure to its bundles of 
underlying risk factors?; and (iv) are there other, more cost-effective ways of capturing these premiums?  
In order to assess the merits of a range of assets through a multiple risk-factor lens, some of the world’s 
most sophisticated institutional investors have adopted the so-called reference- or total-portfolio 
approach. Under this approach, long-term asset allocation and the incremental contribution of active 
management are assessed through a reference portfolio (or policy portfolio), rather than a combination of 
rigid asset-class specific benchmarks.106 As stated earlier, a reference or policy portfolio is a low-cost 
portfolio, based on passive exposure to liquid assets, which would still be expected to meet the fund’s 
target returns at an acceptable level of risk. It serves as an alternative or shadow portfolio to the more 
active and discretionary one managed by the operational manager.  
Using this approach, the case for a private-equity investment needs to be made in the context of a 
reference portfolio – that is, against investments in other asset classes, rather than against other rivalling 
private-equity investments alone. The proposed private-equity investment has to be broken down into its 
underlying risk-factor drivers of expected return. It is clear that the investment will contain, at the very 
least (for ease of exposition) an equity component (private equity is still equity) and a debt component 
(private equity transactions are levered, for argument’s sake by 30%). Typically, private equity will not be 
included in the reference portfolio (which is a low-cost passive shadow portfolio that the fund’s managers 
is trying to outperform), which means the board needs to break the private equity deal down into equity 
106 The pioneering formal adoption of this approach is credited to the Canadian Public Pension Investment Board, 
and has since been pursued (to varying degrees) by other sovereign wealth fund investors, including the New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund, the Alaska Permanent Fund and Singapore’s Government Investment Corporation; 
along with other venerated long-term investors, such as the United Kingdom’s Universities Superannuation 
Scheme. 
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and bond components. A $100m private-equity investment mimics a “long” equity position valued at $130, 
combined with a “short” $30m bond position (to account for borrowing). The addition of the private-
equity asset will increase the equity exposure of the total portfolio and reduce the bond component of the 
actual portfolio relative to the reference portfolio (Ang, 2014). Consequently, the approval of the private-
equity investment by the board would require selling a significant share of the fund’s liquid equity 
positions in order to restore the portfolio’s balance of equity and bond exposure in line with the reference 
portfolio (it could also combine selling equity with buying more bonds, if new cash is available). 
The factor-based reference-portfolio approach has both analytical and governance implications. 
Analytically, all investments are broken down into underlying risk factors and matched to the exposures 
reflected in the reference portfolio. The governance implication is that the board assesses the merits of 
each investment, not within the narrow confines of a private-equity silo (which operates independently of 
the equity or bond silos), but rather in cost-benefit terms in relation to the overall portfolio. The board has 
to determine whether funding a private equity investment is justified based on the fact that it has to be 
funded by selling exposure to the asset classes reflected in the reference portfolio.  
Finally, the reference portfolio approach is also an effective tool through which to assess the value added 
(or not) by the discretion granted to the operational manager – and to keep the manager accountable in an 
intelligible way. Returning to the example of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, it is insightful to 
note the central role its reference portfolio plays in public accountability of it operational manager, the 
Guardians of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund. The Guardians have argued that thereference 
portfolio approach is first and foremost a governance construct designed to facilitate clear decision 
making and accountability of decisions” (Brake, Iverson, Cheung and Worthington, 2015).  
The fund has one of the longest de facto and de jure investment horizons in the world, given its complete 
absence of liabilities: it is simply trying to maximise a pool of assigned capital by a target date, well into the 
future when the portfolio will be used to fund future pension liabilities. Consequently, the fund has an 
aggressive “equilibrium” reference portfolio, established by its board, consisting of 80% exposure to 
equities and 20% to fixed income. Again, the reference portfolio is a low-cost, passive portfolio that 
contains only traditional asset classes and reflects an appropriate risk level for the fund, given its function 
(Brake et. al. 2015).  
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The Guardians may (and do) deviate from the reference portfolio using a number of rule-based active 
strategies, but it needs to show that it is adding value (net of the human-capital and operational costs 
associated with having the Guardians in the first place). The most noteworthy of these active strategies is 
the embrace of a top-down dynamic asset allocation, called “strategic tilting”, which is based on two of the 
Guardian’s stated investment beliefs: (i) there is a (small) degree of predictability in asset returns due to 
mean reversions, and (ii) investors with a long-term horizon can outperform more short-term focused 
investors (because they have the patience to wait for mean reversion to occur over an uncertain horizon).  
Strategic titling, which is similar to “tactical asset allocation” discussed earlier but operates at a lower 
frequency, implies “tilting” asset class holdings relative to their weights in the reference portfolio, 
according to their relative expected returns over near- and medium-term horizons. The strategy involves 
the use of modelled and statistical inputs, overlaid with discretionary judgment by the Guardians. The 
strategy is not for the faint of heart – or not for the type of investor whose board or underlying owner does 
not have the patience to wait for the strategy to pay off. The Guardians note: 
“Strategic tilting is a ‘contrarian’ strategy that may imply an extended period of losses relative to 
long-run benchmarks. Being underweight an asset class in a bull market or overweight in a bear 
market can bring enormous pressure to unwind the strategy. Perhaps the worst possible outcome 
for a fund would be to abandon a position when valuations for an asset class prove to be extreme 
after the fact. For this reason, it is imperative that the Fund’s board is committed to the strategy – 
both from the perspective of buying into the investment beliefs behind the strategy, and being 
willing to defend the strategy in periods when it underperforms. Having consistent investment 
beliefs bolsters the collective courage to stay the course” (New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 
2014). 
Strategic tilting, combined with investments in asset classes not captured in the reference portfolio that 
the Guardians believe are subject to a degree of inefficient pricing, and effective trade execution (which 
the Guardians call “portfolio completion”) are the three “value-adding strategies” the Guardians employ in 
an effort to outperform the reference portfolio. The fund’s 2015 Annual Report reflected on the fund’s 
performance over the five years since it moved away from a conventional strategic asset allocation 
approach with asset-class based benchmarks towards the reference-portfolio approach: they found that 
70% of the Guardians’ actual portfolio mimics that of the reference portfolio, implying a 30% discretionary 
deviation. Whereas the reference portfolio generated an average annual return of 13.2%, the discretionary 
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actions of the Guardian contributed an additional 3.65% per year on average – equal to NZ$4.55bn or 
more than US$3bn (New Zealand Superannuation Fund, 2015: 53). Clearly, at least over the five-year 
period in question, the gains associated with the delegated discretion granted to the Guardians, assessed 
relative to its reference-portfolio alternative, have outweighed the costs. 
11 .4.  Rule-based rebalancing 
Strategic asset or risk-factor allocations are the target long-term weighting of different asset classes or risk 
factors in a portfolio. In reality, the constantly diverging returns on the various assets in the portfolio mean 
that the target weight is rarely achieved, absent interventions by the investor. For example, without 
periodic adjustments back to the target asset allocation, the long-run outperformance of equities over 
bonds will result in a higher effective allocation to equities over time than that of the original target weight 
in the strategic asset allocation. If the strategic asset allocation is indeed appropriately specified at the 
outset, this upward drift in the portfolio’s equity holding would be undesirable – for example, reducing 
diversification and increasing the risk of the portfolio. Portfolio rebalancing ensures that the fund’s overall 
portfolio is periodically returned to its targets. In doing so, a rebalancing rule pre-commits the investors to 
counter-cyclical investments that prevent “arbitrary actions of changing asset allocations in response to 
short-term noise” (Ang et. al., 2009), and earns a rebalancing premium if asset prices revert to mean.  
Rebalancing rules are an example of a Ulysses contract applied to portfolio management. Rebalancing 
institutionalises countercyclical investing that will result in additional investment returns when asset-class 
returns revert to mean, a proposition for which there is qualified support over the long run (Cochrane, 
1999b and Barberis, 2000). Ang (2014: 145) argues that rebalancing is related to the idea of the benefits of 
diversification, which is often described as a rare “free lunch”, as applied to long-term investing: 
“diversification gets you a benefit in one period, but this diversification benefit dies out if you do not 
rebalance.” Rebalancing enjoys considerable academic support of both an empirical and theoretical 
nature, as well as being widely adopted by practitioners (Samuelson, 1969; Merton, 1969; and Ang, 2014: 
144-147). There are a number of technical considerations in the process of portfolio rebalancing, such the 
frequency (rebalancing is not costless, as it requires both the buying and selling of assets and hence 
trading costs).  
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To illustrate the benefits of rebalancing and the implications of various specifications of such rules, 
consider a portfolio invested in liquid stock and bond indexes, with two possible approaches to 
rebalancing: (i) contingent on percentage thresholds for the deviation or drift from the target asset 
allocation; and (ii) a more naïve calendar-based rule, with either quarterly, annual or bi-annual returns to 
the original allocation. In this exercise, historic returns for global stock and bond markets are proxied by 
the MSCI World Index and Citigroup World Bond Index, respectively; over a sample period from 
January 1988 to February 2013. In all cases, the portfolios are indexed to an initial value of 100.  
While the calendar-based approach is self-explanatory, the threshold-based approach requires some 
clarification. Under a 10% rebalancing rule, the allocation to either asset class is allowed to drift a 
maximum of 10% from the original target allocation, before a rebalancing episode is triggered. For 
example, for a 50/50 equity-bond portfolio with a 10% drift rule, the allocation to either asset class can drop 
as low as 45% and as high as 55%, beyond which rebalancing restores the original 50/50 allocation. Table 
11.2 shows the results for five portfolios (30/70, 40/60, 50/50, 60/40 and 70/30 equity-bond portfolios), 
using six different rebalancing rules. The six rules considered include: (i) two threshold-based rules, 
allowing for 10% and 5% deviations from target allocations, respectively; (ii) three calendar-based rules, 
with quarterly, annual and bi-annual rebalancing; and (iii) a no-rebalancing rule, implying a naïve buy-and-
hold approach. 
The most striking observation from Table 11.2 is that for all five portfolios, the two threshold-based rules 
and the three calendar-based rules all outperform a no-rebalancing/buy-and-hold strategy over the sample 
period. Across all five portfolios, the rebalanced-portfolio returns (expressed as a compound annual 
growth rate) are higher using any of the rebalancing rules. Looking at returns only, there is little to choose 
between the two threshold-based rules and the quarterly and annual rebalancing rules. However, in 
weighing up the merits of different rebalancing rules, a number of factors beyond returns need to be 
considered. Following the criteria established in Section 1 for sound institutional design, the efficiency, 
robustness and clarity of different rebalancing rules should be used to assess their respective merits.  
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Table 11 .2 :  Summary of  results  for  dif ferent  rebalancing rules 
10% drift  5% drift  Quarterly  Annual  Bi-annual  No rebalances 
(buy and hold)  
30/70 Portfol io 
Final value 480 480 486 493 473 451 
Return 6.43% 6.44% 6.48% 6.55% 6.37% 6.17% 
 Number of rebalances 22 62 100 26 13 0 
40/60 Portfol io  
Final value 473 468 475 483 460 436 
Return 6.37% 6.33% 6.38% 6.46% 6.25% 6.02% 
Number of rebalances 19 50 100 26 13 0 
50/50 Portfol io  
Final value 463 460 460 469 445 421 
Return 6.28% 6.25% 6.25% 6.34% 6.11% 5.87% 
Number of rebalances 13 45 100 26 13 0 
60/40 Portfol io  
Final value 444 434 442 451 428 405 
Return 6.10% 6.01% 6.08% 6.17% 5.95% 5.72% 
Number of rebalances 20 51 100 26 13 0 
70/30 Portfol io  
Final value 414 415 421 429 409 390 
Return 5.80% 5.82% 5.88% 5.96% 5.76% 5.56% 
Number of rebalances 19 61 100 26 13 0 
12 .2 .1 .  The ef f ic iency of  rebalancing rules  
Table 11.2 also shows the number of rebalancing episodes required by each of the rules. Rebalancing is not 
a costless exercise: it incurs trading costs from both “buying up” and “selling down” on portfolio weights. 
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All things equal, investors should favour a rule that requires relatively fewer rebalancing episodes. 
Comparing the results for the two threshold-based rules in Table 11.2 only, the rule that more narrowly 
constrains the drift from the target allocation naturally triggers a greater number of rebalancing episodes. 
In the case of the 50/50 equity-bond portfolio, the 10% drift rule results in 13 rebalancing episodes over the 
sample period, while the 5% drift rule results in a much larger number of 45 such episodes. This difference 
in the frequency of rebalancing between the two rules is also shown graphically in Figures 11.1 and 11.2, 
where the vertical lines indicate a rebalancing episode.  
Figure 11 .1 :  Rebalancing episodes under a  10% drift  rule  (50/50 portfol io)  
With this in mind, a reconsideration of the findings in Table 11.2 suggests that the threshold-based 
rebalancing rule with 10% drift and the annual rebalancing rule are roughly comparable: the annual 
rebalancing rule happens to marginally outperform in this sample period and with these asset-class 
proxies. However, the 10% threshold rule requires less rebalancing episodes (note that under this rule, 
years can pass without the need for rebalancing – for example between 1990 and 1996, as per Figure 11.1). 
In practice, the cost of rebalancing will be affected by the nature of the portfolio’s allocation to various 
asset classes (for example, do the respective stock and bond allocations include less liquid securities than 
need to be part of the rebalancing; are the funds managed through passive indexes; are they managed 
internally or through third-party managers; in the case of the latter, is there a large number of managers?) 
– and, moreover, whether rebalancing occurs across a range of asset classes; and potentially within sub-
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Figure 11 .2 :  Rebalancing episodes under a  5% dri ft  rule  (50/50 portfol io)  
12 .2 .2 .  The robustness  of  rebalancing rules  
Threshold-based rebalancing rules are contingent on market valuations as opposed to the mechanistic 
calendar-based rule. The outperformance (in terms of returns only, ignoring trading costs) of the annual 
rebalancing rule reported in Table 11.2 requires an element of luck: for the purposes of the exercise, the 
automatic annual rebalancing takes place in January - however, if the annual rebalancing date is June each 
year, the rule underperforms the threshold-rule based on 10% maximum drift in most cases. An interesting 
contrast is evident when Figure 11.1, which shows the spacing of the rebalancing triggers under the 10% 
drift rule, is reconsidered. The rebalancing episodes triggered by this rule are not evenly distributed 
through time. There are long periods where no rebalancing is required (such as 1990 to 1996), as well as 
periods with relatively frequent rebalancing episodes (such as in 2000 to 2001 and particularly 2008 to 
2009). This is intuitive, as allocations are more likely to deviate from target allocations during volatile 
periods, such as those around the stock market correction in 2001 and the onset of the global financial 
crisis in 2008. A contingent rule, such as the threshold-based rule, which uses information on market 
prices and asset-class movements to inform when to rebalance is more robust than a calendar-based rule, 
which introduces the risk that arbitrarily chosen rebalancing dates do not coincide with appropriate 
rebalancing periods based on valuations. That said, many investors adopt a calendar-based approach for 









































































































Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
318 
12.2 .3 .  The clarity  of  rebalancing rules  
Implementing a rebalancing strategy is not as easy as designing one. Rebalancing goes against 
behavioural tendencies: it requires the investor to sell assets that have performed well over the most recent 
period in memory and buy assets that have done poorly. Public perceptions of asset-class performance are 
typically formed with a lag, meaning that a rebalancing sovereign wealth fund could be selling certain 
assets exactly at a point in time when public enthusiasm for them is growing or near its peak; and buy 
assets that appear in the public mind to be a losing bet. These challenges are not trivial – they affect the 
most experienced and sophisticated investors in the world.  
Rebalancing will not pay off every single time it is done, but it is a proven strategy for implementing a 
counter-cyclical investment policy and generating excess returns in the long run. But precisely because it 
does not work every time and requires a conquering of behavioural bias, it is best that rebalancing policies 
are encapsulated in rules, rather than rely on discretion. Investment committees and boards at large public 
investment institutions confront significant risks of dynamic inconsistencies in implementing rebalancing, 
absent the bounds of a rule: the siren calls are likely to direct them in exactly the opposite direction than 
the rebalancing rule.  
Both for the purposes of internal decision-making and to promote accountability and transparency 
(particularly in the context of public investment institutions), it is useful to have rules and institutional 
arrangements that are clear in and of themselves and advance clarity around the actual policymaking 
process and objectives of the institutions. The rules discussed above have the advantage of clarity and ease 
of communication. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund has been active in explaining the merits and 
mechanics of its rebalancing rule to the public and key constituents, testifying on it before parliament and 
publishing white papers and notes. Holding a diversified portfolio and implementing dynamic 
rebalancing are rare “free lunches” that have a significant effect on long-run investment returns. As Mark 
Wiseman, the Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board, noted:  
“We consistently rebalance our portfolio to 65% equities and 35% fixed income. This is a 
brilliantly simple methodology that all investors, in my view, should employ…We don’t know 
when [the equity markets] are going to rally or turn bearish, so we just say what we want is to 
be consistent in keeping that 65% equity weighting through the cycle. That is a very, very 
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powerful self-leveling mechanism. You’re buying on the way down and selling on the way 
up…(this) creates fantastic discipline” (quoted in Zawalsky, 2012).” 
Rebalancing should be a fundamental part of any long-term sovereign wealth fund’s strategy, regardless of 
its level of sophistication and expertise. Rule-based rebalancing does not require great skill – it “merely” 
requires a sound rule and conviction to ensure adherence to the rule when the pressure mounts. An 
investor who cannot stomach diversified exposure to market volatility and cannot specify and adhere to a 
rebalancing rule, should not attempt more elaborate investment strategies – such as investments in illiquid 
alternatives (private equity, hedge funds and infrastructure) and active market-timing or security-selection 
strategies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified how a number of rule-based policies and contractual arrangements can be 
employed to manage the agency relationship established between the owner and the manager of a 
sovereign wealth fund. The rules and contracts discussed in this chapter – the collaborative establishment 
of an Investment Policy Statement as a governing contract between the principal and the agent, a long-
term asset allocation framework, the adoption of asset-class benchmarks or reference portfolios, and 
finally dynamic portfolio rebalancing rules – all enjoy considerable academic and practitioner support. 
They are essential elements of institutional arrangements for the delegated nature of sovereign wealth 
fund investment management.  
Rules perform two functions in the execution of investment mandates by sovereign wealth funds. First, in 
the spirit of a mast-bound Ulysses, rule-based investment strategies are voluntary pre-commitments to 
charting a steady course through periods when incentives and behavioural tendencies might lead to 
actions that are inconsistent with long-term objectives. Long-term investors should take advantage of the 
benefits for their extended investment horizon (compared to that of the average investor) by capturing the 
rebalancing premium, in addition to more complex and uncertain factor premiums. Periodic rebalancing 
is a way of establishing a degree of counter-cyclical investment, as it avoids “arbitrary actions of changing 
asset allocations in response to short-term noise” (Ang et. al., 2009) and helps “protect the portfolio from 
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ad hoc revisions of sound long-term policy…when short-term exigencies are most distressing and the 
policy is most in doubt” (Ellis, 2013).  
The second function of rule-based investment strategies is to promote and give substance to the 
accountability of sovereign wealth funds as public institutions managing assets on behalf of the citizenry. 
The Investment Policy Statement, rebalancing rules, and a reference portfolio or asset allocation 
framework with associated disclosure of benchmarks establish observable counterfactuals to the actual, 
discretionary portfolio management decisions of the sovereign wealth fund’s delegated manager. While 
many sovereign wealth funds have failed to adopt – or at least publicly disclose – such rules and 
contractual arrangements, a small number of them are at the vanguard of global best practices around the 
governance of delegated investment authority, providing institutional benchmarks other sovereign wealth 
funds can aspire to emulate.  




This dissertation offers an institutional analysis of the sovereign wealth fund model for managing resource 
revenues. The discussion proceeds from a reading of the literature that, first, underlines the massive 
historic and cross-sectional variation in economic performance of resource economies; and, second, 
emphasises the central importance of institutions in determining whether resource wealth promotes or 
undermines economic growth in the long run. At the same time, it is argued that the understanding of 
“institutions” in this context remains rather general, and that a fruitful line of enquiry there focuses on a 
more concentrated cluster of institutional reforms located around the management of the fiscal revenues 
generated from the extraction of natural resources. The increasingly popular “sovereign wealth fund 
model” is presented and analysed as exactly this type of targetted institution.  
Throughout this dissertation it is maintained that the sovereign wealth fund model should be conceived 
as more than the mere establishment of a portfolio of financial assets funded from resource revenues – or 
even an institution to manage such a portfolio. Rather, the sovereign wealth fund model is best 
understood as a component of a credible, counter-cyclical rule-based fiscal framework. The sovereign 
wealth fund model stands the best chance of contributing to improved economic performance if it is 
complemented by, or embedded in, a system of rules that governs the flow of resource revenues into the 
fund, the flow of assets and income out of the sovereign wealth funds (variously designed), and the 
principal-agent relationships involved in the delegated authority around the management of sovereign 
investment institutions.  
The relationship between natural resources and economic prosperity is complex. Today, the list of the 
world’s top ten producers of oil includes some of the poorest and some of its richest countries. Moreover, 
it is ahistorical to suggest that an abundance of natural resource wealth implies an inevitable disposition 
to poor economic performance, given the critical role such forms of wealth played in the historic economic 
emergence of the West. That said, the so-called “resource curse” phenomenon enjoys significant empirical 
and theoretical support – albeit conditioned and qualified in a number of ways. The erstwhile uncritical 
acceptance of the resource-curse hypothesis, which emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s, has been 
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replaced by a more nuanced and conditional understanding of the average relationship between resources 
and economic performance. This has resulted in a more fruitful emphasis on country- and context-specific 
factors that promote either success or failure in harnessing resource wealth. The role and quality of 
institutions and political-economy factors feature prominently in this discussion, as do notions of “resource 
dependence” rather than “resource abundance”. 
Section 1 :  Resources,  economic performance of  the role  of  institutions 
Whereas the early resource-curse literature was particularly sceptical about the role of the quality of 
institutions in explaining the differentiated economic performance of resource economies – preferring 
instead institutions-free economic models, notably the Dutch disease – the institutional argument has 
gained prominence and support in recent years. Scholars have identified the quality of institutions at the 
time of resource discovery as particularly important to the successful management of resource wealth. 
Today, institutions-centric explanations for the resource curse are no longer presented in direct 
opposition to more fundamentally economic ones (such as the Dutch disease), but rather attempt to 
account for the interactions between resource windfalls, the quality of general institutions, specific 
institutions relating to the management of resources and the quality of economic policies.  
Chapter 1 provides an account of the historic ambivalence economists have demonstrated about the 
economic benefits and potential disadvantages of natural resources. The chapter discusses in detail the 
emergence of the Dutch-disease and resource-curse literatures in the 1980s and early 1990s. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the manner in which institutions-centric explanations for the observed 
divergence in economic performance of resource economies have gained prominence. The understanding 
of “institutions”, particularly in the empirical literature, is however a deliberately general one, focused on 
what is often described as “meta” or “macro” institutions, such as the rule of law, the specification and 
enforcement of property rights and the extent of corruption. The emerging frontier of the literature is 
bringing more narrowly defined and resource-specific institutions into view – a development to which this 
dissertation contributes.  
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Chapter 2 proceeds with a general discussion of the theory of institutions, including principles around 
their common forms and functions. Chapter 3 focuses more narrowly on the political economy challenges 
around the management of resource windfalls, and the role of institutions in this regard. These chapters 
form the theoretical backbone for the central argument advanced in this dissertation: that sovereign 
wealth funds, if embedded in an accompanying rule-based system for fiscal policy and rule-based and 
contractual principal-agent relationship, provide a promising – if only partial – institutional solution to 
widely observed failures in the management of resource windfalls. An important overarching theme in the 
first section of this dissertation is an appreciation of the slow-moving nature of institutions and the extent 
to which arguments in favour of the primacy of institutions in economics tend to pertain to long-run 
relationships. This is particularly important for any argument linking institutions to the resource curse, 
because the latter is also best understood as a set of arguments around long-term economic relationships.  
A practical implication of this long-term, institutions-centric perspective is that it calls into question the 
wisdom of many policy prescriptions for the resource-dependent developing countries, particularly as it 
applies to potential contribution of sovereign wealth funds. A powerful and seductive intellectual 
tradition, which started with Rosenstein-Rodan’s big-push model in the 1950s, suggests that governments 
in resource-dependent poor countries should use commodity windfalls to promote rapid and dramatic 
economic transformation. Leading development economists, notably Paul Collier and Jeffrey Sachs, are 
the intellectual heirs of Rostenstein and Rodan in arguing that resource windfalls are a means through 
which to achieve such a transformation, economic diversification and development. This tradition 
typically argues for the strong hand of the state in the escape from a number of perceived “development 
traps”, with resource revenues providing otherwise scarce capital through which to achieve it.  
The institutionalist argument in favour of sovereign wealth funds presented in this dissertation takes a 
different view of resource-based economic development. This view suggests that big-push models in the 
spirit of Rosenstein-Rodan, Sachs and Collier, particularly as they assign such an aggressively activist role 
for the state in investing resource revenues, tend to underestimate the institutional and political-economy 
constraints on efficient and sustainable public investment financed by resource revenues. The contribution 
of sovereign wealth funds proposed in this dissertation regards these institutional and political economy 
constraints as fundamental to resource-dependent economies. Consequently, the institutional perspective 
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on sovereign wealth funds calls for them to be embedded in a set of rules, and supports a more gradualist 
view of how resource revenues should be used in the process of economic development.  
Section 2:  Sovereign wealth fund definit ions,  types and institutional  models  
The second section of this dissertation introduces the sovereign wealth fund model, and discusses various 
approaches to defining and categorising these institutions. The section identifies the key elements of the 
institutional framework that underpins the sovereign wealth fund model. It draws a series of parallels and 
lessons from the modern monetary consensus, with its support for operationally independent monetary 
authorities, explicit policy targets and contingent rules, amongst other elements of the institutional 
framework. Chapter 4 starts by underlining the significant variation in the landscape of sovereign wealth 
funds, and provides a typology of the different kinds of sovereign wealth funds based on the various 
functions they perform. An important distinction is made between stabilisation funds, with short-term 
investment horizons and the function of macroeconomic and fiscal stabilisation, and more long-term 
savings vehicles, which diversify the fiscal base of resource-dependent economies and transform depleting 
assets into permanent wealth in the form of a financial endowment. 
As with most institutions, sovereign wealth funds are neither normatively nor positively “one-size-fits-all” 
entities: there is significant scope for tailoring sovereign wealth funds’ functions, policies around savings, 
spending and investments, and intra-governmental and internal governance arrangements to meet local 
requirements, based on the economic (and political) realities. Criticisms of sovereign wealth funds tend to 
underestimate this degree of flexibility; as well as the extent to which resource-based sovereign wealth 
funds are designed to directly and indirectly address common afflictions associated with the resource 
curse (identified in Section 1, particularly Chapter 3).  
Chapter 5 finds that the central tenets of the modern monetary consensus can applied in aid of the 
construction of an institutional framework for sovereign wealth funds. The first area of overlap is the 
importance of clarifying institutional mandates and objectives, which are not only important for 
accountability, but also defines the appropriate scope of specific institutions: emphasising their optimal 
contribution and clarifying which social objectives lie beyond their reach. Particularly as there is currently 
less agreement around the appropriate objectives and mandate of sovereign wealth funds than there is for 
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monetary policy, it is critical to define, both positively and negatively, exactly what the functions, 
mandates and objectives of sovereign wealth funds are.  
The management of sovereign wealth funds further share with modern monetary policy institutions the 
characteristics of a classic agency relationship, established by the granting of operational authority to 
independent institutions in order to avoid well-known political biases and incentive problems. 
Operational independence has gained a particular understanding through the theory and practice of 
modern monetary policy – notably, it is typically accompanied by goal dependence, and an elaborate set of 
complementary institutional arrangements that promote accountability and transparency. A similar 
understanding appears warranted in the area of sovereign wealth funds (further explored in the final 
section of the dissertation). Further parallels to and lessons from modern central banking for the sovereign 
wealth fund model are drawn in Chapter 5, including the emphasis on institutionalised credibility, and the 
adoption of explicit targets and contingent rules as a means to reduce the costs associated with achieving 
credibility (while also promoting public accountability). The institutional framework established in the 
second section is used to evaluate fiscal rules and the management of the agency relationships around 
sovereign wealth funds in the remainder of the dissertation.  
Section 3:  Fiscal  rules  
Having argued that a full and meaningful understanding of the sovereign wealth fund model requires that 
they be understood as a part of rule-based fiscal framework, Section 3 is devoted to normative and positive 
assessments of saving and spending rules. These rules govern the flow of resource revenues into sovereign 
wealth funds, and the transfer of these funds’ assets and investment income to the budget (or other 
earmarked purposes). With a few notable exceptions, there is significant scope for improving the fiscal 
rules surrounding sovereign wealth funds, and achieving greater integration of sovereign wealth fund 
savings and spending policies with a broader counter-cyclical fiscal framework. A more typical 
arrangement is to combine either ad hoc or highly mechanistic savings rules with simple spending rules 
for investment-income funds and poorly designed (or, again, ad hoc) transfers from stabilisation funds.  
Chapter 6 discusses a number of simple rules for saving a share of revenues arising from natural resource 
revenues through transfers to a sovereign wealth fund structure. These rules – variously based on a fixed 
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percentage of resource revenues, deviations from a set reference price for the underlying commodity, or a 
similar deviation from a moving average of prices or revenues – are simple to the point of being crude. 
While they therefore have the attraction of simplicity and ease of communication, they make no attempt to 
distinguish between the use of accumulated assets for stabilisation, saving and income-generation 
purposed in particular; or, generally, how savings in the sovereign wealth fund may be integrated with a 
broader fiscal framework, as discussed above. They are, therefore, best understood as accumulation rules, 
most relevant to a potential period prior to the establishment of a more comprehensive fiscal framework. 
Another reason for studying these simple saving rules is that, while clearly suboptimal, they are closer to 
current practice amongst global sovereign wealth funds than more complex, integrated fiscal rules (while, 
as the chapter demonstrates, a number of resource-dependent countries have failed to even implement 
even such basic savings rules or processes during the most recent oil boom).  
Chapters 7 and 8 respectively introduces and applies a more integrated fiscal rule that combines spending, 
stabilisation and saving decisions for oil revenues in a single framework. The framework is based on a 
spending rule that anchors oil-derived spending – or, more precisely transfers from the sovereign wealth 
fund to the government – on a function of the previous year’s spending and the balance of assets in the 
sovereign wealth fund, consisting of a stabilisation- and investment-income fund component. The rule can 
be characterised as contingent or state-dependent, as it incorporates automatic feedback loops between 
fluctuations in resource revenues and the level of oil-derived spending (that is, transfers from the sovereign 
wealth funds): when oil revenues increase, the rule permits a gradual upward adjustment in spending, 
permitted due to an increase in size of the sovereign wealth fund (and vice versa).   
The fiscal rule underlines the trade-off between a rapid ramp-up in public spending financed by resource 
revenues (“front-loaded spending”) and the accumulation of a significant pool of financial assets in the 
Stabilisation Fund and the Investment Income Fund, which transforms a depleting natural asset into a 
source of permanent wealth and income. The trade-off between current spending and the creation of a 
Stabilisation Fund is not that acute (beyond the initial accumulation with which to establish the fund); 
but the establishment of an Investment Income Fund involves more substantial reduction in the level of 
short-term spending in order to establish the endowment and maintain permanent spending. A number of 
resource-rich countries have already accumulated such assets during previous commodity booms – these 
countries essentially already have the financial building blocks in place to successfully implement the fiscal 
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rule. For countries that are yet to build up these initial capital buffers, the challenge of implementing the 
rule is more substantial and, in some cases (such as Nigeria in the examples analysed in this dissertation), 
simply unfeasible. The lessons from the application of the fiscal rule in Chapter 8 extend beyond the 
countries themselves, as the characteristics of the five economies used are representative of the position of 
other resource-rich countries.  
Section 4:  The governance of  f iscal  rules  and delegated investment authorit ies  
The final section starts with a discussion of the design and governance of existing integrated fiscal rules. 
These countries analysed cover a range of economic and political contexts, including some of the world’s 
richest countries, Norway and the United States of America, and some of its poorest, such as Nigeria, 
Ghana and Timor Leste. The analysis of the rules actually used in practice allowed for a revealing 
comparison with the rule-based framework introduced in the Chapter 7. In general, the rule-based fiscal 
frameworks adopted in Norway and Chile come closest to the proposed fiscal rule: while their operation 
is different from the rule in Chapter 7 (and indeed from each other), they both integrate savings decisions 
with a concept of sustainable income from depleting resources. In both cases, the ultimate goal behind the 
rule is to constrain the spending of finite resource revenues in such a way that the budget does not become 
dependent on a depleting source of fiscal revenue. Wyoming pursues a similar model to that of Norway – 
if on a more limited scale given that it consumes the majority of its oil, gas and coal revenues through the 
budget, sending only a percentage of resource revenues to its permanent fund. In Alaska, the same limited 
degree of savings applies; however, the state has to date not used the earnings of the permanent fund to 
fund the budget (rather just earmarking half of it for a unique citizens’ dividend scheme). Both Alaska and 
Wyoming would be well served by the addition of some stabilisation mechanisms: either directing a 
greater share of volatile and depleting revenue through their permanent funds, in exchange for a stable 
stream of investment income; or more directly through the establishment of larger and more rule-based 
fiscal stabilisation funds.  
In the low- and middle-income countries discussed in Chapter 9, notably Kazakhstan, Timor Leste, 
Ghana and Nigeria (Chile is an exception), fiscal rules are reasonably well specified in principle. 
However, a common theme in these countries is apparent blind spots in the enabling legislation and 
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institutional framework, such as the allocations of resource revenues to vaguely defined “development 
projects”, high levels of discretion in the specification of oil-price benchmarks or references, or the absence 
of debt and/or deficit limits (which means the accumulation of assets can be offset by a parallel or 
subsequent accumulation of liabilities). Given the institutional challenges in these countries, the risk that 
these weaknesses will exploited as a means to inadequately fund the sovereign wealth fund, or to raid in it 
tough times, looms large. Nevertheless, in all these cases, there are indications that these (flawed) fiscal 
rules and sovereign wealth funds have contributed to improvements in the management of oil revenues – 
in Kazakhstan and Timor Leste a very large pool of assets (relative to GDP and the government 
spending) has been accumulated, while fiscal stability has been preserved amidst rapid economic growth 
and transformation; while in Nigeria a world-class independent sovereign investment authority has been 
created (albeit with a currently small asset base). The overarching message of the section is that in the 
absence of a constraining fiscal rule to govern the flow of money into and from it, a sovereign wealth fund 
risk becoming little more than a repository of occasional discretionary exercises in fiscal prudence, prone 
to subsequent raids and depletions when resource revenues collapse, as they inevitably do at some point.  
The final institutional aspects of the sovereign wealth fund model discussed in this dissertation pertain to 
various elements of sovereign wealth funds’ investments and the delegated investment institutions 
involved in this part of the model, including why and how to achieve a degree of operational independence 
from government for the management authority, how to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various 
principals and agents involved in the delegated-authority model of investment, and how the governance 
and performance of the investment authority may be strengthened by transparency, accountability and 
rule-based investment policies. 
Having restated and elaborated on the case for operational independence in the management of long-term 
sovereign investment portfolios, Chapter 10 considers the ways in which countries have resolved a familiar 
tension in public policy: balancing the desire for operational independence on the part of an investment 
authority of sovereign wealth with a degree of government control and oversight of such delegated 
authority. While the case for operational independence rests on compelling foundations – investment 
performance, fears of a regulatory backlash, a desire to escape from public-sector pay scales, and the ring 
fencing of assets – Chapter 10 indicates that independence is typically a matter of degree. In all cases 
discussed in this chapter, with the exception of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, the ministry of 
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finance (or other political officers) retains at least de jure power to establish the most important 
determinant of the fund’s investment policy, namely its asset allocation.  
When the institutional arrangements of sovereign wealth funds are compared to those of monetary 
authorities (as per the framework established in Chapter 5), an interpretation of this observation could be 
that while governments are willing to give the investment authorities responsible for sovereign wealth 
fund a high degree of operational independence, the principle of “goal dependence” is typically preserved. 
In the same manner that governments retain the power to establish the goals of monetary policy and 
explicit policy targets (such as a numeric inflation target), they generally wish to preserve the power to 
establish sovereign wealth funds’ return targets, risk tolerance and asset allocation. In some cases, powers 
to exercise some degree of discretion around the establishment of those targets are delegated down to the 
board and the executive; while the New Zealand example is comparatively extreme in that the 
government delegates all major policy-setting powers to the board (which it, moreover, does not directly 
appoint).  
In a number of cases where major investment-policy decisions remain under the control of the ministry of 
finance, such as in Norway and Chile, concerns around potentially damaging political intervention in the 
investments of the sovereign wealth fund are reduced by transparency around the policy choices of the 
ministry (or other political owners), a high degree of public and expert consultation, and the adoption of 
uncontroversial and rule-based investment policies. In the case of Kazakhstan, a lower level of 
transparency and the concentration of power over the fund provide less comfort around the potential for 
future political intervention in the fund’s investment decisions. Finally, while the American permanent 
fund model has delivered positive results over a number of years, the heavy use of consultants and external 
fund managers is not only potentially problematic from a cost perspective, but also risks a lack of clarity 
around the ultimate institutional ownership of critical policy decisions, notably the funds’ long-term asset 
allocation. 
There is a significant degree of observed cross-country variation in emphasis between delegated and 
centralised control over the investment policies and operations of sovereign wealth funds. The country-
specific balance between political ownership of investment policies and delegated authority for investment 
operations is ultimately not only a function of the political system and institutional characteristics of the 
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countries, but also of the degree of discretion permitted by the investment strategy in the first place: if the 
investment strategy itself is highly non-discretionary, the discussion around the degree of delegated 
authority becomes less important, as there is essentially less power to delegate.  
A number of rule-based policies and contractual arrangements can be employed to manage the agency 
relationship established between the owner and the manager of a sovereign wealth fund, under 
governance models that assume the delegation of discretionary powers from the principal (government) to 
an agent (the delegated sovereign investment authority). Rules and contracts perform two functions in the 
execution of investment mandates by sovereign wealth funds. First, rule-based investment strategies are 
voluntary pre-commitments to charting a steady course through periods when incentives and behavioural 
tendencies might lead to actions that are inconsistent with long-term objectives. The second function of 
rule-based investment is to promote and give substance to the accountability of sovereign wealth funds as 
public institutions managing assets on behalf of the citizenry.  
The chapter proposes the collaborative establishment of an Investment Policy Statement as a governing 
contract between the principal and the agent. For long-term investors, such as investment-income and 
savings-type sovereign wealth funds, long-term asset allocation – and its more sophisticated extension in 
the form of risk-factor allocation – is the fundamental determinant of investment performance, and hence 
the most critical investment-policy decision. Whether determined by the minister of finance, a governing 
board of political officeholders or an independent board, this long-term target weighting lies at the heart 
of the policy decisions pertaining to the investments of sovereign wealth funds, and is an articulation of 
deep-seated policy preferences for the balance of risk and return.  
Chapter 11 suggests that many existing sovereign wealth funds have mirrored other long-term institutional 
investors by keeping it simple and adopting the tried and tested balanced-portfolio approach based only 
on exposure to traded (or listed) stocks and bonds. As their risk tolerance increased over time, a number 
of sovereign wealth funds gradually increased the share of equities in their portfolios – in a manner that 
matches the workhorse benchmark portfolio for long-term institutional investors, namely the 60/40 
equity-bond portfolio. This basic, if limited, approach to long-term asset allocation achieves a high degree 
of portfolio diversification, and provides long-term capital a near-efficient allocation to the most pervasive 
determinant of portfolio returns: market volatility. It is a simple investment-policy model for sovereign 
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wealth funds to follow, particularly during their inception phase, when the focus is more typically (and 
appropriately) on the aforementioned fiscal framework.  
More established sovereign wealth funds might embrace increasingly sophisticated and multi-
dimensional asset allocation models and analytical tools. An emerging frontier in asset allocation is the 
risk-factor approach, which has been cautiously adopted by the world’s most sophisticated and established 
sovereign wealth funds. The risk-factor approach attempts to look beyond the most basic specification of 
the fund’s strategic asset allocation in terms of the asset classes to one that focussed on underlying risk-
factor allocation. The basic logic is that investors are compensated for their exposure to a wide range of 
risk factors (in addition to the market-volatility factor of traditional portfolio theory); or, conversely, pay a 
premium (or an opportunity cost in terms of foregone return premiums) for holding assets that effectively 
hedge against these risk factors.  
A risk-factor approach serves a number of important institutional functions in the context of long-term 
investment. First, it is a complete and comprehensive way of analysing the long-term return potential of, 
and the unique opportunities available to, a sovereign wealth fund. Second, it is a useful lens through 
which to view both portfolio construction and case-by-case investment decisions: looking through 
traditional asset classes, which are simply bundles of underlying risk factors, the investor can determine 
the best way to gain desired factor exposure. Finally, factor-adjusted benchmarks and performance 
measures hold third-party managers to higher account, making it impossible for them to claim the 
harvesting of factor premiums to be the purported benefits of active management and investment talent. 
Chapter 11 suggests an initial focus on a small set of factors that enjoy considerable empirical and 
theoretical support, have a long empirical track record, and can be captured in a cost-effective manner. A 
focus on value and illiquidity factor premiums are obvious points of departure for sovereign wealth funds 
with long investment horizons.  
Chapter 11 further considers two additional rule-based contractual arrangements between the principal 
and in its agent in the form of an independent investment authority managing a sovereign wealth fund’s 
assets. The first of these is the specification of performance benchmarks through which to assess the 
contribution of investment discretion. In the case of simple asset-allocation frameworks, common practice 
is to select a set of asset-class specific indexes as benchmarks; however, it was argued that the more 
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sophisticated risk-factor approach to long-term asset allocation is best accompanied by the specification of 
a reference (or policy) portfolio. Finally, the chapter discusses and analysed the specification a dynamic 
portfolio rebalancing rule, which institutionalises a degree of counter-cyclical investment on the part of the 
agent, who might otherwise succumb to dynamically inconsistent behaviour. 
This dissertation adopts a sympathetic stance on the contribution sovereign wealth funds can play in the 
management of resource revenues. However, this conclusion is premised on the understanding that 
sovereign wealth funds are embedded in a comprehensive, rule-based fiscal framework; and that they are 
accompanied by a fairly elaborate institutional framework. The potential contribution of sovereign wealth 
funds, particularly when narrowly defined as simply a portfolio of assets funded from a resource revenue 
windfall, should not be overstated. However, when accompanied by supporting fiscal rules and a sound 
institutional structure, the sovereign wealth fund model is a promising targetted institutional intervention 
to the by now widely understood problems of resource economies.  
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